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ABSTRACT 
 
 This dissertation examines the ethical systems created in response to the crisis of 
the Holocaust by Emmanuel Levinas, Elie Wiesel and Richard Rubenstein. Prior to the 
Holocaust, European Jewish philosophers grounded ethics in traditional metaphysics. 
Unlike their predecessors, Levinas, Wiesel and Rubenstein all make ethics “first 
philosophy” by grounding ethics in the temporal experience of suffering rather than 
ontology or theology, deliberately rejecting ethical views rooted in traditional 
metaphysical claims. With varying degrees of success, they all employ Jewish texts and 
traditions to do so. Their applications of Jewish sources are both orthodox and 
innovative, and show how philosophical approaches to ethics can benefit from religion. 
Suffering becomes not only the first priority of ethics, but an experience that 
simultaneously necessitates and activates ethical response.  
 According to this view, human beings are not blank slates whose values are 
  ix 
informed exclusively by culture and moral instruction alone; nor is human consciousness 
awakened or even primarily constituted by reason, as argued by deontologists. Rather, 
consciousness is characterized by affectivity and sensibility as interconnected faculties 
working in concert to create ethical response. This dissertation argues that if what makes 
ethical response possible is located in human consciousness rather than in metaphysics or 
culture, a re-orientation of philosophy toward the investigation of human affectivity and 
its role in ethical response is in order. All three thinkers examined actively resist 
categorization and repudiate claims that a single philosophical system can be successfully 
applied to all aspects of life, and this dissertation does not choose one of the three 
projects examined here as the most persuasive or significant. Instead, it explores how the 
work of Levinas, Wiesel and Rubenstein might be combined, built upon and expanded to 
form an ethics that is deeply informed by human experience and makes human and non-
human suffering our greatest priorities.  
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Introduction  
 
 For many, the Holocaust made thinking about ethics in traditional ways 
impossible.  It has been argued convincingly that Western thought, especially as it 
developed in nineteenth century Europe and the United States and culminated in the work 
of Heidegger, tends to privilege speculative ontology at the expense of ethics.1 According 
to this point of view, the concurrent political, cultural and philosophical inattention to 
universal ethics in particular was both a cause and an effect of European civilization's 
collapse in the twentieth century; only a complete disintegration of ethical norms and 
mores could have allowed a catastrophe so cataclysmic and abysmal as the Holocaust.   
 Emmanuel Levinas, Elie Wiesel and Richard Rubenstein respond directly to this 
problem by insisting that ethics must be Western thought's first concern. Unlike previous 
thinkers who claimed that a universal ethic requires a traditional metaphysics, Levinas, 
Wiesel and Rubenstein locate humanity's source of universal ethical obligation in the 
temporal world of experience. According to this model, suffering in all its forms is the 
most powerful shared human experience and provides the ground for ethics and makes 
ethical engagement possible.  Such an ethics emphasizes intercession on behalf of our 
fellow man, especially when he is suffering unjustly. The ethics these three thinkers 
                                                
1 Heidegger, the philosopher hailed by many as the most important thinker of the twentieth century, was 
unapologetically a dues paying member of the Nazi party until its eventual collapse. Yet Husserl, his 
own teacher, was born into an assimilated Jewish family, although he and his wife both converted to 
Christianity before their wedding in 1886. It is likely that Husserl converted in order to be eligible for 
faculty positions in German universities, although it could be that be converted for reasons of faith.  
Many of any of Heidegger's most successful students, including his lover of many years, Hannah 
Arendt, were also Jews: Leo Strauss, Emmanuel Levinas and Karl Löwith are the most notable 
examples.  
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develop are neither relativistic nor universal in the Enlightenment sense since they reject 
the notion that traditional metaphysics provide sufficient ground for ethics.  Instead, their 
ethics derive universality from humanity's shared lived experiences.  
 Although they reject traditional models of ethical obligation, all three thinkers, 
with varying degrees of success, use Judaism to develop a contemporary ethics that could 
operate with or without God.  Levinas, Wiesel and Rubenstein all contend that Judaism's 
most important lesson is that our fellow human is our responsibility, regardless of her 
race, creed, culture, or preferences.  Moreover, this responsibility is non-negotiable, even 
if concrete answers about the existence of God, the nature of the man and the universe, 
and the source of human knowledge are not forthcoming.  All three thinkers urge us to 
spend more time asking questions about how we should behave toward fellow humans 
who are suffering instead.   
 This project explores selected works of Levinas, Wiesel and Rubenstein for 
practical applications of their ethics and asks the following questions of them: Why 
should suffering be central to ethics? What is the source of our obligation to our fellow 
man? How does our own suffering help us to connect with others when nothing else will? 
What does each thinker suggest we do when we are faced with human suffering? And 
finally, does an ethics grounded in suffering provide useful directives with regard to 
problems that have nothing to do with suffering?  
 Since Levinas, Wiesel and Rubenstein also use Jewish sources to create a 
universal ethics, this dissertation also explores how they propose to do so without 
ultimately grounding ethics in theology, or alternatively devolving into relativism. Each 
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thinker's use of Judaism and Jewish sources will also be explored in order to discern 
whether their applications can be understood as legitimate and authentic, recognizing that 
these terms, themselves, need to be explained and investigated. In addition, I examine 
each thinker's philosophical methods and the assumptions that they employ, and consider 
the advantages and the disadvantages of deriving universal ethics from sources and 
traditions particular to Judaism. Finally, I suggest how the work of Jewish thinkers living 
in the wake the Holocaust and the thought and values of minority communities in general 
can be of unique value to those interested in the problem of ethics in the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries. 
Context  
 
 In 1977, Richard Rubenstein wrote that the Third Reich had ''successfully 
overcome...a hitherto unbreachable moral and political barrier in the history of Western 
civilization...[As a result, the] systematic, bureaucratically administered extermination of 
millions of citizens...will [henceforth] forever be one of the capacities and temptations of 
government.”2 In the context of fascist Europe, the inherent problems of Kant's 
deontological ethics on one hand and Heidegger's assertion that grounding ethics is 
impossible on the other become increasingly apparent. In l’univers concentrationnare3 
                                                
2  Richard Rubenstein, The Cunning of History: The Holocaust and the American Future (New York: 
Peter Smith Publisher, 1975), 2. 
3  “The universe of the concentration camp,” a term Wiesel used often to describe the abject nature of life 
in the concentration camps of the Third Reich. The term is particularly apt here because the world of the 
camps turned all ethical and social expectations upside down. Camp hospitals at best made camp 
victims sicker, children and the elderly were considered useless, and people who were thugs and 
prisoners in pre-war Europe were given positions of power. The whole purpose of the camps—to use up 
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especially, victims' desires to adhere to pre-war “categorical imperatives” was expected, 
and such behavior was perversely antithetical to victims' survival.  The Nazi war against 
the Jews was designed to turn society upside down, so that black became white and 
immorality became morality.4 Claudia Koonz points out that the Nazi conscience5 
considered murdering Jews and other “inferior races” ethical. According to Nazi “moral” 
codes, murdering the Jews of Europe was a justifiable means to a worthy end: ridding the 
continent of dangerous parasites who would enslave innocent Germans. The Third Reich 
claimed that by prioritizing “racial hygiene” it “put collective need ahead of selfish 
need.” When the Nazis placed Jews and others outside their community of moral 
obligation, they meant to expel them not only from Germany but also from the human 
family.  This made it ethical to murder with impunity even Jewish children and Jewish 
women who might some day give birth to more Jewish children.  “Racial purity” was the 
moral imperative that trumped all others, the desired end of all social and political 
                                                                                                                                            
and then murder, in the most unimaginable ways, millions of innocent victims--belied the possibility of 
human ethics, let alone universal ethics. In the Nazi ghettoes of Eastern Europe, for example, stealing 
was often the only way to survive, since rations were intentionally inadequate and sneaking in extra 
food was punishable by death. Yet without stealing food, at least on occasion, many of those who lived 
through those years would not have survived.  
4  The notion that the Reich developed an intricate and relentless psychological assault on its targeted 
victims is well documented. See David Redles' work on the Reich as a messianic movement listed in the 
bibliography of this dissertation, Lucy Dawidowicz's work The Nazi War Against the Jews: 1933-1945 
(Claremont, FL: Paw Prints Publishing, 2008) and Steven T. Katz's encyclopedic three volume work 
The Holocaust in Historical Context: The Holocaust and Mass Death Before the Modern Age (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1994). The Reich used psychological warfare on its own “Aryan” people, as 
well, with the express intent of changing moral codes and expectations; see Claudia Koonz (details in 
the following footnote) and David Redles for more on this. 
5 See Claudia Koonz's excellent examination of Nazi ethics in her 2003 book The Nazi Conscience 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003). Koonz explores the notion that the Nazis were 
radicals with a traditionalist theme who believed all moral obligations were owed only to one's own 
ethnic group. In fact, moral behavior toward a person outside of one's ethnic group was not only weak, 
but immoral. 
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activities and allegiances.6 This approach to ethics views norms and directives as relative 
to particular culture, an assertion supported by the philosophical systems of Heidegger 
and others of the time. 
 Levinas, Wiesel and Rubenstein faced the ethical challenges posed by Nazi 
Europe as Jewish thinkers who either survived the Holocaust, like Wiesel and Levinas, or 
were profoundly affected by the realities of American Jewish life and practice in its 
wake, like Rubenstein. In response to this crisis, Levinas, Wiesel and Rubenstein did 
what many Jewish thinkers before them did: they used the sources of Judaism to 
contribute to the wider Western conversation about ethics, universalism, and politics. 
They inherit a dual tradition: that of general philosophy, and that of Jewish thought.7 
Jewish philosophical tradition spans approximately two thousand years, and most Jewish 
thinkers did not begin their investigations with the assumption that Judaism and 
philosophy were at ultimately at odds.8 In fact, bridging of the particularity of Judaism 
and the perceived universality of the dominant cultures in which Jews live has been one 
                                                
6  The embrace of racial purity as an ethical imperative of the highest order implies that ethical systems 
are entirely relative to culture and cannot be universally applied.  A regime such as the Reich could 
enforce adherence to legal systems that enabled adherence to this ethic, but there is a difference 
between forcing subjects to comply and coercing them to agree.   
7  I use the term “Jewish thought” here to encompass multiple genres: Jewish philosophy, Jewish 
religious thought or theology, and Jewish political thought. Historically, the term “theology” has been 
problematic for many Jewish thinkers. This is slowly changing, however. For more on this see David 
Novak's “Jewish Theology,” Modern Judaism 10, no. 3 (Oct., 1990), 311-323. 
8   See Hermann Cohen's Ethics of  Maimonides, translated into English for the first time in 2004 by 
Almut Sh. Bruckstein (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004). Also, see Emmanuel Levinas, 
“On Jewish Philosophy,” in the Time of the Nations, trans. Michael B. Smith (London: Continuum, 
2007), 152-153. “...Jewish texts have always been understood as constantly accompanied by a layer of 
symbolic meaning, apologues, new interpretations to be discovered: in short, always lined with 
midrash...But one day it is discovered that philosophy is also multiple, and that its truth is hidden, has 
levels and goes progressively deeper, that its texts contradict one another and that its systems are 
fraught with internal contradictions.” Levinas restates his opinion on the relationship between religion 
and philosophy again when he claims that “philosophy is derived from religion. It is called forth by 
religion adrift, and religion is always adrift...” From ibid.,157. 
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of Jewish thought's most important concerns. Many Jewish thinkers have made careful 
marriages between Judaism and philosophy because they felt Judaism offered something 
unique to general thought and culture, and that Judaism might prove its most basic tenets 
compatible with, or even identical to those of classical philosophy.  In this respect, 
Levinas, Wiesel and Rubenstein's respective projects are no different. They engage with 
modern philosophy while making use of traditional Jewish sources and methodologies to 
respond to contemporary problems; like their predecessors, each thinker locates within 
Judaism something they contend Western philosophy lacks.  
 Jewish intellectual response to the Holocaust, however, is far from monolithic, 
although it also tends to make use of multiple traditions in order to understand 
contemporary problems. Some have argued that the Holocaust necessitates significant 
changes to Jewish theology and practice.  Primary topics of debate include but are not 
limited to: the validity of the covenant after Auschwitz, the presence or absence of God 
during the destruction and the problem of theodicy in the light of the systematic murder 
of 4 million Jewish adults and 2 million Jewish children. For example, some claimed that 
the Holocaust shows us nothing particularly new about the God of the Jews.  In 1952, for 
example, Martin Buber wrote:  
 
We do not accept the world as it is but rather struggle for its redemption, and in 
this struggle appeal for help to our Lord, who on His part is once more, and still, 
One who hides. In this condition we await His voice, whether it comes out of the 
storm or the stillness that follows it. And although His coming manifestation may 
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resemble no earlier one, we shall nevertheless recognize again our cruel and 
merciful God. 9   
 
 Some ultra-orthodox thinkers have chosen to see the Holocaust as punishment for 
Zionism or assimilation, but the vast majority claim that no sin is deserving of such a 
punishment. Some thinkers suggested changes to Jewish thought and practice in response 
to the radical suffering and destruction wrought by the Nazi war against the Jews.  Emil 
Fackenheim, for example, called for the creation of a 614th commandment: “Thou shalt 
not grant Hitler posthumous victory.” Response to Fackenheim's suggestion was mixed.10 
The American theologian Irving Greenberg argued that the covenant between God and 
the Jews is now voluntary. Greenberg asserts that the Holocaust is “a fundamental 
watershed in Jewish and human history after which nothing will ever be the same. It is 
one of those reorienting moments of Jewish history and religion when basic conceptions 
of God, of humanity and of Jewish destiny shift”.11 Greenberg also famously claimed that 
“...no statement, theological or otherwise, should be made that would not be credible in 
the presence of burning children.”12 These varying responses have enlivened Jewish 
                                                
9  Martin Buber, At the Turning (New York: Schocken Book, 1952), 61ff. 
10  See Emil Fackenheim's To Mend the World: Foundations of Post-Holocaust Jewish Thought 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994).  
11  Irving Greenberg, The Jewish Way: Living the Holidays (New York: Touchstone, 1993): 338. 
Greenberg's notion of voluntary covenant has had significant impact on American Jewish culture and 
practice. See Alan L. Berger's “The Holocaust, Second-Generation Witnesses, and the Voluntary 
Covenant in American Judaism,” Religion and American Culture: A Journal of Interpretation 5, no. 1 
(Winter, 1995): 23-47. 
12 Irving Greenberg, “Cloud of Smoke, Pillar of Fire: Judaism, Christianity and Modernity After the 
Holocaust,” Auschwitz: The Beginning of a New Era? Reflections on the Holocaust, Papers Given at 
the International Symposium on the Holocaust, Held at the Cathedral of St. John the Divine, New York 
City, 2007 ed. Eva Fleisher (Philadelphia: KTAV Publishing, 1977), 23.  
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thought and practice, and provided multiple options for how Jews and Judaism might 
respond to the Holocaust, and Levinas, Wiesel and Rubenstein have each contributed 
significantly to that process.  
 Richard Rubenstein's rejection of the theological claim that the Jews were elected 
by an omnipotent God of history to be His chosen people was more radical than the 
suggestions made by his cohort, however.  He was the first Jewish theologian to have 
openly asserted that accepting theological stasis in Judaism meant affirming that 6 
million innocent Jews deserved to suffer and die, and it was therefore no surprise that 
much of Jewish intellectual response to Rubenstein's project was blistering.13 Jewish 
thinkers often insist that Judaism remain a living system in touch with demands of its 
particular community of practitioners while simultaneously contributing to wider 
mainstream culture in meaningful ways. But in 1966, many Jews felt that Rubenstein had 
pushed Judaism too far, particularly because he was not a Holocaust survivor, but an 
American rabbi who had never experienced the virulent anti-Semitism of twentieth 
century Europe (and had nearly converted to Christianity at that). Rubenstein nonetheless 
argued doggedly that the Holocaust necessitated radical changes to both Judaism and to 
the Western tradition in which it is situated. Still, like Levinas and Wiesel, Rubenstein 
emphasized Judaism's embrace of righteous defiance on behalf of innocent suffering. For 
                                                
13 See Zachary Braiterman's essay “Hitler's Accomplice?: The Tragic Theology of Richard Rubenstein ,” 
Modern Judaism 17, no. 1 (February 1, 1997): 75-89 for an excellent examination of the response to 
Rubenstein's project. Because Rubenstein was the first Jewish thinker to claim Judaism must 
fundamentally change in response to the Holocaust, the importance of Rubenstein's questions was, 
unfortunately, overlooked by most critics. Steven Katz’s essay on Rubenstein’s After Auschwitz in his 
1982 Post Holocaust Dialogues is an exception. Katz clearly states that he likes Rubenstein’s questions 
but does not agree with his answers. See his essay “The Issue of Confirmation and Disconfirmation in 
Jewish Thought After the Shoah,” The Impact of the Holocaust on Jewish Theology (New York, NYU 
Press, 2007), 13-60.  
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this and other reasons, Rubenstein's project, although it is in some ways antinomian for 
its time, is not as far apart from those of his peers as it may seem regarding ethics, and 
should be re-examined in conjunction with the work of other major Jewish thinkers 
concerned about ethics after the Holocaust.  
 Significantly, Levinas, Wiesel and Rubenstein have each successfully engaged 
Jewish and non-Jewish audiences alike, and are therefore uniquely positioned to reach a 
wider audience than many of their peers. Levinas' work has had significant impact on 
philosophy, theology, literary studies, linguistics, psychology, social work and the social 
sciences, such that response to and application of Levinas' work almost constitutes an 
industry of its own.14 Levinas is influenced by the dialogical theologies of Martin Buber 
and Franz Rosenzweig, and his Jewish writings attempt to show how his approach to 
Judaism's multiple understandings of ethics, revelation, justice, and transcendence could 
enrich and improve the Western philosophical tradition. Levinas was also profoundly 
influenced by Husserl's work, but he was most enthralled with Heidegger, especially after 
the publication of Being in Time.15 In 1932, Levinas discovered that Heidegger had 
become a member of the Nazi party, and immediately abandoned his Heideggerian 
project.16 As Levinas developed his own philosophy, he specifically positioned himself 
                                                
14 Many Levinas scholars know little or nothing about the Jewish thought and traditions upon which 
Levinas so heavily relies.  The failure to take into account the degree to which he makes use of Jewish 
sources and methods has arguably led to misinterpretations and misapplications of his work.  
15 Levinas' first three books were heavily influenced by Husserl and Heidegger, and he became well-
known in France for his translations of their work. Levinas' first three books are: The Theory of Intuition 
in Husserl's Phenomenology in 1930, Existence and Existents in 1947, and En Découvrant l'existence 
avec Husserl et Heidegger in 1949. 
16 In 1939, Levinas served as an officer in the French military, and was captured as a prisoner of war. His 
parents and his brothers were murdered by the Nazis. See The Cambridge Companion to Levinas, edited 
by Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. xv. 
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against Heidegger when he stated that “ethics is first philosophy.”17 Levinas always 
claimed that his method was phenomenological, but he took issue with Husserl's project 
in significant ways, as well. First and foremost, Levinas felt that Husserl overemphasized 
the centrality of the thinking subject and, as a result, neglected the importance of inter-
subjectivity. For Levinas, ethics should be our first priority because human potential for 
ethics and our subsequent awareness of our obligation to the other both precede our 
ability to reason. 
 In a short 1934 essay entitled “Reflections of the Philosophy of Hitlerism,” 
Levinas placed the blame for Nazi ideology squarely on the shoulders of western 
philosophy when he claimed: 
 
...the bloody barbarism of National Socialism lies not in some contingent anomaly 
within human reasoning, nor in some accidental misunderstanding. [The] source 
stems from the essential possibility of elemental evil into which we can be lead by 
logic and against which Western philosophy had not sufficiently insured itself.18 
                                                                                                                                            
Levinas' wife and daughter were hidden in a convent and survived the war, however. Levinas fought for 
the French and was taken prisoner by the Germans. Interestingly, most of Levinas' professional life was 
spent as the administrator for the Normale Israelite Orientale, a teacher training school founded by the 
Alliance Israelite Uńiverselle. He was responsible for the Talmudic study sessions at the ENIO and 
apparently “fostered a vision of Judaism that [he] would defend with increasing vigor after the war 
years: rigorously intellectual, rooted in textual study, rationalistic, anti-mystical, humanist and 
universalist” (ibid., xx). Levinas and Wiesel both study Talmud with Monsieur Chouchani from 1947 to 
1949. Both men claim Chouchani was one of their most important mentors. See Wiesel's All Rivers Run 
Into the Sea, (New York: Schocken Press, 1995), 121-130 for Wiesel's description of his relationship 
with Chouchani. Levinas' own Talmudic Readings are a result of his study with Chouchani. 
17  Here we see the influence of Martin Buber and Franz Rosenzweig, especially in his exploration of 
dialogical, “face-to-face” encounters with “the other.” 
18  Emmanuel, Levinas, Sean Hand, trans.,“Reflections of the Philosophy of Hitlerism,” Critical Inquiry 
17, no. 1 (Autumn, 1990): 63. Again, Levinas writes, “[It is] dangerous when we think that the logical 
forms of knowledge—in which all philosophy is indeed expressed—are the ultimate structures of the 
  
11 
 
According to Levinas, Western thought, and German idealism in particular, placed too 
much faith in reason and could therefore be convinced by formal logic to commit evil. In 
fact, reason had displaced intuition so completely that man was no longer in touch with 
the mechanisms that endow him with ethical potential in the first place.19 Yet of Judaism, 
Levinas wrote, “Judaism is...conscience [and] testimony...where the burning of my 
suffering and the anguish of my death [become] the dread and concern for the other 
man...a thought which...untiringly denounces...cruel[ty], excesses of power, and all 
arbitrary rule.”20 For Levinas, Judaism's methodology and teachings could transform 
suffering into empathy, and empathy into shared responsibility for the other. More 
broadly, the ground for human ethics in general was the shared human experience of 
suffering, especially since our first experience of suffering is, for Levinas, the suffering 
caused by the pre-reflective discovery of one's own alterity. 
 Wiesel, whose literary efforts are known worldwide, has used his fame to, among 
other things, highlight the dangerous role bystanderism plays in the successful 
perpetuation of fascism, persecution and genocide. Of the three thinkers examined here, 
Wiesel's efforts enjoy the most sizable mainstream audience, and his impact on public 
school curricula in the United States and in Europe is significant. Millions of school 
                                                                                                                                            
meaningful.” From In the Time of the Nations, trans. Michael B. Smith (London: Continuum, 1994): 
159. And again, “Behind reason with its universal logic there is the wisdom that has neither method not 
fixed categories...Wisdom as the freedom of reason, if not freed from reason. This wisdom is incumbent 
precisely upon the the uniqueness of the one who thinks...” Found in ibid., 160.  
19 Note that the claim that ethics is reliant on man's intuition rather than his reason is antithetical to Kant's 
claims that ethics is grounded in reason.  
20 Emmanuel Levinas, “Demanding Judaism,” Beyond the Verse: Talmudic Readings and Lectures, Gary 
D. Mole, trans. (London, Continuum, 2007), 4. 
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children read Night each year as part of a wider study of genocide and intolerance. His 
work with Facing History and Ourselves and his commitment to human rights in general 
are practical applications of his ethics. Wiesel uses more traditional approaches to 
rabbinic and biblical sources as well as more obscure aspects of hasidut in much of his 
work to suggest that interest in one's fellow man in general and dialogue with the other in 
particular are lacking in mainstream Western thought and culture.  
 Since the publication of Night in 1958,21 Wiesel has been a prolific writer.  Of 
particular interest for this project is The Trial of God, a play wherein God is placed on 
trial for crimes against humanity.22 Wiesel's humble trial has no designs on ending human 
suffering. At best, it aims to impact human response to undeserved suffering. God is not 
even expected to show up and bluster about as He did when Job accused Him so long 
ago. The Trial of God relates the horror of the Holocaust by exploring both the history of 
anti-Semitic violence specifically and pointless suffering in general. In so doing, Wiesel 
insists that there have always been bystanders and massacres of innocents in human 
history, even if the Holocaust is a unique “mutation.”23 In other words, although God is 
the defendant in Wiesel’s trial, The Trial of God is really about man, the creature made in 
God’s flawed image. The trial is not concluded at the end of the play because the reader 
is to have no delusions that the real-world conditions that warranted the trial will 
                                                
21 The original manuscript, written in Yiddish, was published in Buenos Aries in 1955. The Yiddish text 
was 862 pages long. 
22  The trial is a re-telling of a real “trial of God” Wiesel witnessed while in Auschwitz. He was asked to 
serve as “witness” in a din-Torah held by several rabbis who found God guilty of crimes against 
humanity. Wiesel tried telling the story in many different forms; he finally decided to write the play as a 
kind of Purimshpiel set in 16th century Poland.  
23  Robert McAfee Brown, Elie Wiesel: Messenger to All Humanity (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University 
Press, 1989), 24. 
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disappear.24 The trial’s value lies not in its conclusion but in the fact of its having 
happened at all. The dialogue of the trial must, in the end, be enough to help humanity 
survive the next Holocaust.25  Dialogue that happens in spite of everything is at the very 
heart of Wiesel’s ethic. 
 Rubenstein's work opened the doors for interfaith dialogue a mere 20 years after 
the Holocaust, despite the largely negative response his constructive theology garnered 
from his co-religionists. His refusal to vilify Christianity even as he criticized it 
extensively has helped make productive dialogue between Judaism and Christianity 
regarding the Holocaust possible.  Rubenstein paved the way for thinkers like Emil 
Fackenheim and Irving Greenberg, and perhaps his demands were so radical that the 
ideas of others who came after him seemed significantly more reasonable than his. In any 
case, Fackenheim and Greenberg were not, like Rubenstein, accused of posthumously 
colluding with Hitler.  Rubenstein's project failed to resonate in any significant way with 
most of his fellow Jews, even as his Christian contemporaries applauded his efforts.  Yet 
Rubenstein's project, although in some ways heretical, was less antinomian than his 
critics—and perhaps even Rubenstein himself—would have us believe.   
 Most importantly for this project, all three assert that Judaism's emphasis on 
                                                
24  See Brown, Messenger to All Humanity, 163 for Wiesel’s assertions about the impossibility of “easy 
denial” and “easy belief” for people who live consciously. Wiesel often claims, as he does here, that the 
best questions don’t have answers. Here Wiesel positions himself as post-modern—more interested in 
eternal questions than in eternal answers. 
25  While Wiesel specifically draws on halakhic proscriptions for court proceedings, Maria the Gentile’s 
loyalty to Berish and his daughter shape a significant part of the landscape of the play. That she is 
considered a moral character whom herself was wronged in love by a Jewish man suggests that Wiesel 
hopes for a human ethic grounded firmly in the best Judaism has to offer and to which Judaism—as 
well as other traditions—could continue to contribute. This ethic emphasizes governing of diverse 
communities who agree to abstain from abusing one another in exchange for the right to practice their 
particular religions and philosophies unmolested. 
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dialogue and invention on behalf of those who suffer unjustly can be useful whether one 
believes in God or not or, most importantly, whether one is Jewish or not. Levinas, 
Wiesel and Rubenstein try to resist the temptation to create traditional philosophical 
“systems” through which all reality and all human interactions should be viewed, since 
this would result in universalization that, in their opinion, results in fanaticisms. Instead, 
they hope to point toward the few ethical imperatives that believe most cultures already 
share—even if they don't share them for the same reasons—in hopes that we can be 
persuaded to intervene on behalf of our suffering neighbor, even if we don't like her very 
much. So long as we intervene on behalf of our neighbor, our reasons for doing so are 
less important.  
 
Methodology 
 
 This project necessitates a multidisciplinary approach26 primarily because the 
respective work of Levinas, Wiesel and Rubenstein is all technically multidisciplinary. 
All three, in different ways, remain firmly planted in the dual tradition of Jewish 
thought—itself a multidisciplinary genre--but they also make use of and are deeply 
                                                
26 The term “multidisciplinary” refers to the practice of using multiple methodologies from multiple fields 
in order to shed light on a single project. I intentionally use the term “multidisciplinary” rather than the 
term “interdisciplinary” for the following reasons. First, the term “interdisciplinary” implies that the 
outcome of interdisciplinary is additional disciplines constituted by a fusion of extant disciplines. I have 
no interest in trying to create any new disciplines. Most importantly, the term multidisciplinary implies 
that one need not create new disciplines in order to successfully make use of multiple methodologies 
and multiple areas of expertise. By adopting a multidisciplinary approach for this project, I assert that 
the knowledge and expertise of multiple disciplines contributes to the greater purpose of understanding 
ethics and ethical systems in a deeper, more meaningful way. 
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influenced by literature. The relationship between philosophical ethics, literature and 
theology has long been enmeshed, despite post-Enlightenment efforts to separate them 
into distinct disciplines. Because theology offers “God-talk” as well as guidance on how 
to make the proper ethical choices in accordance with religious belief and practice, the 
relationship between ethics and theology is in many ways taken for granted. In fact, as 
David Novak points out, for some Jewish philosophers and theologians of the early 
twentieth century, rational Judaism's inversion of philosophy's “priority of metaphysics 
over ethics” suggested that Jewish theology in particular had something “unique to offer 
philosophical ethics in general.”27 Generally speaking, theology offers moral teachings 
based on its sense of God and His relationship to creation, and while much of modern 
philosophy approaches ethics in non-religious terms, it is nonetheless accepted that 
theology is a viable source of moral imperative.  Novak asserts that Jewish religious 
thought before the Enlightenment was usually defined as either grounded in rationalism 
(and reliant on Aristotelian methods) or grounded in Kabbalistic inquiry and practice. 
Either way, Novak points out, Jews were indeed engaging in theology, even if they didn't 
use the term to describe what they were doing.28 
 Yet literature's relationship to modern philosophical ethics has not been so 
straightforward. Literary fiction and ethics, sometimes considered dichotomous after the 
Enlightenment, are also allies in the dissemination of moral messages. Literature scholar 
Adia Mendelsohn-Maoz points out that the growth of analytical philosophy in the early 
                                                
27 David Novak, “Jewish Theology,” Modern Judaism 10 n. 3 (Oct, 1990): 312. Novak also discusses the 
fact the word “theology” still causes some discomfort for some Jews.  
28 Novak, “Jewish Theology,” 311. 
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twentieth century, along with various attempts to make the study of literature a “science,” 
have contributed to a perceived divide between literature and ethics. Deconstructionist 
and post-colonialist literary theorists, however, inspired by philosophers like Michel 
Foucault, Jacques Derrida and Levinas have suggested that claiming literary study is a 
“science” as many mid twentieth century New Critics did, for example, was not only 
arbitrary but immoral, since the New Critics tended to focus on the formal procedure of 
reading, rather the social, political, and ethical aspects of the content; moreover, they 
often considered content in general less important to the over all value or meaning of a 
text. Authorial intent or the ways in which different audiences respond to the texts they 
read were also not of interest to most New Critics.29 According to postmodernist literary 
theorists, however, the formal aspects of texts should not be separated from the time and 
place in which they were written if we want to understand them in any meaningful way. 
The impact of these ideas on philosophers, writers and theologians in the twentieth 
century cannot be underestimated.30 Literature has long been considered a friend of the 
ethicist, since literature can “illustrate philosophical ideas and illuminate actual moral 
life,” and animate “the actual performance of certain ethical issues” while putting 
“complex situations under a new light.”31 This project proceeds on the “postmodern” 
                                                
29 The work of literary scholar and critic Edward Said is indeed founded on this vary claim. 
30  Adia Mendelsohn-Maoz, “Ethics and Literature: An Introduction,” Philosophia 35 (2007):111. 
Mendelsohn-Maoz's article is a useful exploration of how the relationship between literary fiction and 
ethics were considered dichotomous after the Enlightenment in some circles. The fiction of Camus and 
Sartre had considerable impact on Wiesel and Rubenstein in particular. 
31 Ibid. Also, literary theorist Michael Eskin points out that “our moral education has not, fundamentally, 
been entrusted to [philosophical] ethics. Nursery rhymes, stories, plays, verbal and filmic narratives 
pursued from early childhood have been supposed to ensure...the formation of the variously conceived 
good person.” See Michael Esken, “On Literature andEthics,” Poetics Today 25 (4), no. 573 (2004): 
573-594.  
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assumption that it is useful to be academically trained in philosophy to study ethics in the 
academic sense, but it is not necessary to use traditional philosophical methods or to 
write philosophical treatises in order to experiment with and create new and viable 
approaches to ethics. 
 Examining the work of Levinas, Wiesel and Rubenstein for common themes and 
concerns requires a willingness to relinquish traditional expectations of firmly ensconced 
disciplines that present form and content in predictable ways. Though Levinas' approach 
is the most traditionally philosophical of the three, the themes he treats—and the way in 
which he treats them—indicate that his project is, in some ways, altogether new. Levinas 
disrupts traditional paradigms by using language that is often more poetic and literary 
than philosophical, and by making philosophy's first concern ethics rather than being or 
ontology.32 This dissertation examines whether Levinas' project offers enough to build a 
new ethics, or simply points to the possibility of ethical action that relies neither on 
reason alone nor traditional metaphysics. The most well-read of Wiesel's texts, on the 
other hand, are “philosophical literature”—novels, plays and memoirs devoted to 
exploring the nature of man, God, society, ethics, and other matters typically understood 
as philosophical and theological in nature.33 Recurring themes and images in Wiesel's 
fiction, theological writings and public lectures, make suffering and the sufferer the 
                                                
32 See Bettina Bergo's “What is Levinas Doing? Phenomenology and the Rhetoric of an Ethical Un-
Conscious,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 8, no 2 (2005): 122-144. 
33 While there is no universally accepted definition of the “philosophical novel,” more than a few 
examples of the genre continue to make a significant impact on the dispersal of philosophical ideas to a 
wider audience than that typically enjoyed by texts traditionally considered philosophical Some 
examples are Voltaire's Candide , Tolstoy's War and Peace, and Hermann Hesse's Siddhartha. Of 
particular importance for Wiesel, however, were the literary works of Jean-Paul Sartre and Albert 
Camus. Like Sartre, Wiesel wrote both novels and plays that made use of absurdist themes, but had 
more in common philosophically with Camus, whose work had a significant impact on him.  
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center of his ethics. While it is true that Wiesel devotes considerable time to exploring the 
continued importance of man's relationship with God,34 it is a mistake to see Wiesel's 
work as strictly theological in nature because he takes great pains to construct an ethics 
that does not require belief in God. After all, when Wiesel imagines a bound God unable 
to rescue His suffering people, he is claiming that man cannot wait for God to save our 
neighbors for us; that, he insists, is our job. Ethical action is set in motion by man's 
intervention in worldly affairs, not God's. This project examines whether Wiesel's 
project, more steeped in traditional Jewish sensibilities than Levinas and Rubenstein's, is 
really inclusive enough to operate as a shared ethic for Jews, non-Jews and atheists alike.  
 Mainstream Judaism has not adopted Rubenstein’s prescriptions for Jewish 
theology, but his work has much to offer any modern conversation about the possibility 
of shared ethics after the Holocaust, and has contributed significantly to Christian 
theological conversation regarding the necessity of a global change the West's approach 
to God, identity and its failure to truly prioritize ecumenical engagement. This project 
examines whether Rubenstein's project seen as antinomian at its conception, nonetheless 
makes significant contributions to philosophical ethics after the Holocaust. Like Wiesel's 
ethics, Rubenstein's ethics does not require God, but does not exclude Him. Yet while 
Orthodox and Reform Jews alike have embraced Wiesel’s project, Rubenstein's has 
proven less attractive. Does Rubenstein's contention that the existence of undeserved 
suffering renders life absurd leave us with enough impetus to intervene on behalf of our 
                                                
34 David Novak rightly describes this as the central concern of post-World War II Christian and Jewish 
theology. Even Jewish thinkers like Wiesel and Joseph B. Soloveitchik, who do not identify as 
theologians used “theological categories” in their work. See Novak, “Jewish Theology,” 314. 
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fellow man? This dissertation will explore whether Rubenstein's project, with its radical 
revisions of Judaism, could be as appealing to Jews as it has been to the Christian 
theologians he attempted to connect with forty years ago. 
 Lastly, since each thinker's ethic also makes use of Jewish sources—the Bible, 
rabbinic literature, and in the case of Wiesel, the largely oral tradition of post-eighteenth 
century hasidut—this project also explores what kind of theological assumptions they 
make that directly or indirectly inform the creation of their ethics. Do they each appear to 
make use of Jewish sources without reifying ethical systems that require shared belief 
rather than shared experience? If we see “universalism” as nothing more than a 
“dominant particular” that, at worst, obliterates the other, changes suggested by 
individuals from victimized communities could provide mainstream societies with much 
needed insight. 
 Since all three use philosophy, Jewish scripture and commentary, literature, and 
postmodern literary criticism, any in-depth analysis of their projects requires taking each 
one of these influences into account without finally categorizing their efforts in ways the 
thinkers themselves would not consider authentic. For the purposes of this project, a 
careful reading of the selected works of all three thinkers is required. Full appreciation of 
their respective projects requires the understanding that each is partaking in both ancient 
and contemporary, and Jewish and non-Jewish conversations simultaneously.  Form and 
content are often of equal import and may be concurrently derived from traditional 
philosophical, Judaic, or literary models, since Levinas, Wiesel and Rubenstein all find 
that traditional Western philosophy alone is ill-equipped to answer the questions they ask. 
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Some of these questions are:  
 
1. In what ways is traditional Western thought flawed in its approach to 
ethics, and can grounding ethics in suffering help correct those flaws? 
2. How can we ease human suffering, especially the suffering of 
survivors of trauma, and how can we help prevent suffering?  
3. What kind of human engagement might encourage a potential 
bystander to intervene on behalf of his suffering neighbor, even if he 
doesn't like him very much?  
   
  The answers each thinker provides to these questions will then be subjected to a series of 
questions: 
 
1. Does each thinker indeed offer an ethics that is not grounded in traditional 
metaphysics or theology but in the experience of suffering?  
2. Does each thinker suggest an ethics that avoids the systematization and inauthentic 
universalization they associate with the Western philosophical tradition and so 
vehemently reject? 
3. Does the suggested ethics make use of Jewish sources in way that is legitimate and 
authentic? 
4. Which of the three thinkers offer an ethics that is most likely to impact the wider 
audience—consisting of Jews and non-Jews—they hope to reach, and how might the 
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ethics offered by each thinker be combined to produce something useful to 
philosophical ethics? 
 
 While the Holocaust is arguably the most unique attempted genocide in history,35 
it is not even the first genocide of the twentieth century. Over 100,000 Herero and Nama 
tribes were systematically exterminated and forced into concentration camps by German 
colonists at the turn of the twentieth century.36 As many as 1 million Armenians were 
murdered by the Ottoman Empire near the end of World War I, and the abject horror of 
genocide and mass murder is still with us. The atrocities in Cambodia, Bosnia, Rwanda 
and the Darfur region of Sudan37 are a few examples of post-Holocaust mass murders and 
                                                
35  The question of the Holocaust's uniqueness constitutes a significant part of post-Holocaust 
conversation in Jewish thought, but non-Jews often discuss the issue as well. For more, see Steven T. 
Katz's three volume opus, The Holocaust in Historical Context, Emil Fackenheim's To Mend the World: 
Foundations of Post-Holocaust Jewish Thought (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), Yehuda 
Bauer's Rethinking the Holocaust (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), Charles Maier, The 
Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust and German National Identity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1998), Saul Friedlander's Nazi Germany and the Jews: 939-1945: The Years of 
Extermination (London: Harper Perennial, 2008), and Raul Hilberg's The Destruction of the European 
Jews (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003). 
36 Women and children were sent to work camps and forced to work as sex slaves. Many Herero and 
Nama women gave birth to the children of German colonists. A man named Eugen Fischer, who was 
interested in genetics, came to the concentration camps in which they were held and studied them. He 
also carried out medical experiments on the children. He concluded these children were inferior to their 
German fathers and published his ideas in a book entitled The Principles of Human Heredity and Race 
Hygiene. There are no scientific foundations for his findings. Hitler read this book while imprisoned 
during 1923 and referred to it occasionally in his own publications and lectures on “racial purity.” In 
1933, Hitler appointed Fischer rector of the Frederick William University of Berlin (now Humboldt 
University). His theories about miscegenation influenced not only the Nuremberg Laws of 1935 but 
also the attitude of the Nazis toward “non-Aryans” in general. 
37 Although Sudan, Rawanda, Namibia and Armenia are all geographically “non-western,” in each 
location, the attempted genocide was carried out by representatives of European powers or by groups 
profoundly influenced and effected by their own encounters with the west. Even in the case of Darfur, 
the Northern Sudanese identification with Muslim Pan-Arabism has been a primary source of conflict; 
Northern “Arabs” who took part in the conflict saw themselves as racially superior to the Southern 
“African” Sudanese they victimized. The Pan-Arabist movement itself was influenced by, among other 
things, the ideology of the Nazi Party. Nazi influence on Pan-Arabism was both ideological and 
practical. Nazis who fled war tribunals were given refuge in cities like Cairo and Damascus, where they 
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attempted genocides that plague the West and those countries once controlled by Western 
colonialist powers. The search for an approach to Western ethics that confronts and 
eradicates genocide is as pressing as it ever was. With its history of bridging the distance 
between perceived universals and particular cultures, Jewish thought is positioned to 
offer meaningful—if not invaluable— suggestions for how we continue that search.
                                                                                                                                            
later trained future members of Fatah, the PLO and the Muslim Brotherhood. See Anwar Sadat's In 
Search of Identity: An Autobiography (London: Harpercollins, 1978) and Alan Hart's biography of 
Yasser Arafat entitled Arafat: A Political Biography (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989).  
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Chapter 1 
I. The Conversation in Inter-War Europe: The 1929 Davos Disputation 
 
 Levinas is not alone in blaming Western thought for the Holocaust. The tradition 
of Western thought is typically thought to begin with Socrates, and includes in its 
trajectory many more thinkers than those at whom Levinas' work takes aim.  But Levinas 
does not reject the whole of Western thought; instead, he rejects the way in which much 
of the tradition took shape after the Enlightenment, especially in Europe. To understand 
on what grounds Levinas, Wiesel, Rubenstein and others blame Western thought for the 
Holocaust and other mass murders and genocides, one must examine the climate of 
thought and politics in the pre-World War I and interwar periods not only in Germany, 
but in Europe and America in general. The social climate of Europe in particular changed 
radically during these two periods, and in ways that shaped the philosophical, theological, 
and political movements Levinas, Wiesel and Rubenstein take part in; and while we can, 
in some ways see their work as a continuation of the values of the Enlightenment, each 
thinker also pushes back against the universalizing tendencies of Enlightenment thought.  
They are suspicious of its marked reliance on reason, which they feel is dangerous and 
misguided, regardless of adherents' good intentions. Thus, it is perhaps even better to see 
each thinker's project as, first and foremost, opposing the reactionary campaigns of 
National Socialism and other modern forms of violent fanaticism which they perceive as 
preoccupied with theoretical (and politically convenient) speculations about the nature of 
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being at the expense of ethics.1 Most importantly, they oppose these modern fanaticisms 
not by blindly returning to Enlightenment ethics as they had been previously imagined—
that is primarily universalizing and dependent on reason as man's best and most reliable 
shared trait—but by claiming that we should do something altogether new. 
 The 1929 public conversation between Ernst Cassirer and Martin Heidegger in 
Davos, Switzerland is often considered a watershed moment in Continental philosophy 
specifically and in Western thought in general, and so we begin our examination here, 
particularly because the crux of Cassirer and Heidegger's philosophical differences lies in 
their estimation of the role of ethics in philosophy and politics. As Peter E. Gordon 
recently pointed out, “scholars of a variety of disciplines and ideological camps are 
tempted to regard it as a final moment of rupture—between humanism and anti-
humanism, enlightenment and counter-enlightenment, or rationalism and irrationalism—
as if the defining struggles of twentieth century thought were crystallized within this 
single event.”2  
 The tendency to attribute considerable allegorical and political significance to the 
Davos disputation is amplified by the anecdotal accounts of those in attendance. 
Newspapers and academic journals of the time described the encounter in generational 
                                                
1 All three thinkers see the problem of ethics as having increased exponentially, in part because of the 
growing trend toward universalism, but also because of the declining role of religious values as they 
might be applied to public life. Modern life in the West, according to them, places greater value on the 
integrity and survival of overarching systems, rather than on the preservation of human life, community 
and culture. Rubenstein in particular expresses a distrust of technology and bloated bureaucracies, 
which he sees as both the cause and result of modern atrocities like Auschwitz.   
2 Peter E. Gordon, Continental Divide: Heidegger, Cassirer, Davos (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2010), 1.  
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terms as a kind of altercation between “the old and new thinking.”3 Heidegger's student, 
Otto Friedrich Bollnow stated grandly that he “had the most sublime feeling, to 
have...witness[ed]...an historical moment...like that of which Goethe had spoken in his 
'Campagne in Frankreich': 'From here and now a new epoch of world-history begins,'--in 
this case, of philosophical history.”4 
 Leo Strauss, who wrote his dissertation under Cassirer and was not even in 
attendance at Davos nonetheless proclaimed that the disputation had proven that 
Heidegger was the “only great thinker of our time.” He alleged that Cassirer had 
“silently...transformed” his teacher Hermann Cohen's philosophical ethics into a “new 
system” from which ethics had “completely disappeared.” According to Strauss, 
Cassirer's failure to acknowledge this alleged disappearance meant that he had also failed 
to “confront the problem of ethics,” while Heidegger, the hero of the day, had “faced the 
problem” by declaring that “ethics is impossible.” According to Strauss, “Heidegger's 
whole being was permeated by the awareness that this fact opens up an abyss...”5  
                                                
3 Hermann Herrigel, “Denken dieser Zeit: Fakultäten und Nationen treffen sich in Davos,” FZ, 
Abendblatt: Hochschulblatt, April 22, 1929, 4.  Franz Rosenzweig also referred to the Davos 
conversation between Cassirer and Heidegger as encounter between “the old and new thinking” in his 
1929 essay entitled “Exchanged Frontiers,” wherein he claims that Heidegger's rejection of idealism 
was in line with Cohen's later work, and, as such, was the rightful inheritor of Cohen's chair at Marburg. 
See Karl Lowith's “M. Heidegger and F. Rosenzweig or Temporality and Eternity,” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 3, no. 1 (Sept., 1942): 53-77.  
4 Otto Friedrich Bollnow, “Gespräche in Davos,” Errinerung an Martin Heidegger, ed. Günter Neske 
(Pfullingen: Neske, 1977), 25-29.  
5 Leo Strauss, “An Introduction to Heideggerian Existentialism,” in The Rebirth of Political Rationalism: 
An Introduction to the Thought of Leo Strauss, ed., Thomas L. Pangle (Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 1989), 28. Given Strauss' propensity for crafting artful polemics disguised as mere descriptive 
narration, his assertion that Cassirer had “dropped” ethics while re-cycling Cohen's neo-Kantianism is 
dubious, particularly since Cassirer felt Heidegger's emphasis on “destiny” led to an ethical stalemate.  
In Cassirer's own words, “...a philosophy [like Heidegger's] whose whole attention is focused on the 
Geworfenheit, the Being-thrown of man, can no longer do its duty.” See Ernst Cassirer, Symbol, Myth 
and Culture (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 230. For Cassirer, man's duty was to take part 
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 Regardless of whether Strauss' understanding of either Cassirer or Heidegger is 
accurate, it appears that Strauss and several of the graduate students who actually 
attended the Davos symposium found Cassirer’s neo-Kantianism insufficient, 
unconvincing and out of touch with lived human experience. Cassirer and Heidegger 
disagreed most regarding how we should understand Kant's project concerning the nature 
of metaphysics. Heidegger averred that neo-Kantianism created an “embarrassing 
dilemma” by misunderstanding the very role of philosophy. Furthermore, he claimed that 
neo-Kantianism incorrectly argued that questions of ontology should be supplanted by 
questions regarding the “knowledge of science.” Neo-Kantians (and here Heidegger 
names Cohen, Wondelband, Richert, Erdmann and Riehl as prime offenders) failed to 
understand Kant, who Heidegger asserts “did not wish to provide a theory of science, but 
to show the problematic of metaphysics, more specifically of ontology.”6 In one deft 
statement, Heidegger dismissed Cassirer and neo-Kantianism as an embarrassment to 
philosophy and suggested that Kant, understood by many as having been primarily 
concerned with, in the words of Cassirer, “the problem [of the possibility of] freedom,” 
was actually preoccupied with “ontology.”  And certainly if this were the case, Heidegger 
                                                                                                                                            
in the shaping human ethics and culture, and, first and foremost, to foster ethical responsibility by 
means of independent ethical decisions.  In this Cassirer was in fact quite a bit like Cohen, even if his 
corpus lacks the pronounced ethical theory one finds in that of his mentor. For a helpful analysis of 
Cassirer's criticisms of Heidegger's thought, see John Michael Krois, “Cassirer's Unpublished Critique 
of Heidegger,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 16, no. 3 (1983): 147-159.  See also Strauss' critique of 
Cassirer's The Myth of the State in What is Political Philosophy? and Other Studies (Glencoe, 
IL:McGraw-Hill Publishing, 1959), 292-296.  As another means of placing Strauss' description of 
Davos in perspective, it is worth noting that although Strauss completed his dissertation with Cassirer, 
he had attended university with every intention of completing that work under Cohen whose work could 
hardly be more antithetical to Heidegger's, especially with regard to ethics.  
6 Francis Slade, “A Discussion Between Ernst Cassirer and Martin Heidegger, ” in The Existential 
Tradition: Selected Writings. trans. Nino Langiulli (New York: Doubleday, 1971), 193.  
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could consider himself, rather than Cassirer, Husserl, or any of his contemporaries, the 
true inheritor of the Kantian mantle.  
 Cassirer agreed with Heidegger's claims that Kant saw man's capacity for 
knowledge as finite, but insisted that Kant “stood for...complete objectivity...[and] 
absoluteness...in the realms of the ethical and the theoretical.”7 In other words, Cassirer 
felt that Kant wanted to understand how man, in his finitude, seems nonetheless able to 
connect with and make use of that which extends beyond the finite—like, for Kant, the 
categorical imperative. Yet Heidegger, at least at Davos, shows no interest in Kant's 
assertion that the categorical imperative is evidence of man's connectedness to the 
infinite.  During the disputation, one of Heidegger's main objectives was to argue that 
Kant, understood for decades as connecting a universal system of ethics with an a priori 
acceptance of man's ultimate freedom, was not a foremost progenitor of European 
Enlightenment, but rather, privately aware that the core beliefs of the Enlightenment, 
particularly those related to ethics, were a sham.  
 Levinas, who was living in Germany at the time, is the most well known attendee 
of Davos today. He was Husserl's other now-famous student. Years later he, too, would 
recall that Cassirer's performance seemed to indicate “the end of a particular type of 
humanism.”8 Levinas, who was present at Heidegger's request, 9 went on to say that he 
“thought for a long time—in the course of those terrible years—that I had felt it then, in 
spite of my enthusiasms.  The value judgments of [these enthusiasms] have necessarily 
                                                
7 Slade, “A Discussion,” 194.  
8 François Poirié, Emmanuel Lévinas: Qui êtesvous? (Lyon: La Manufacture, 1987), 78.  
9 Megan Craig, Levinas and James: Toward a Pragmatic Phenomenology (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2010), 49.  
  
28 
changed over time.  And during the Hitler years I reproached myself for having preferred 
Heidegger at Davos.”10 He regretted his treatment of Cassirer for the rest of his life, and 
bitterly admitted, “I did not even pity Cassirer.  For years afterward, the scene haunted 
me.”11He remembered, too, feeling that “Heidegger announced that a world that was 
going to be turned over...” even though “one would have to have had the gift of prophecy 
to sense this already at Davos.” Heidegger joined the Nazi Party on May 1, 1933, and 
was a dues-paying member until the party collapsed in 1945. Heidegger's embrace and 
facilitation of Nazi ideology affected Levinas and his burgeoning approach to philosophy 
profoundly.12 
 Strauss and Levinas' perceptions on the nature and outcome of the Davos 
disputation are instructive, since both thinkers acknowledge that, at the very least, it 
highlighted modern Western thought's movement away from an interest in universal 
                                                
10 Poirié, Emmanuel Lévinas, 78. 
11 Craig, 49. The “scene” to which Levinas refers is likely the mock cabaret performed by some of the 
graduate students who attended the disputation.  Levinas performed the role of Cassirer by dusting his 
hair with flour (to mimic Cassirer's white hair) and repeated the phrase “Ich bin versöhnlich verstimmt” 
in response to everything Heidegger (played by Bollnow) said. From Geoffrey Waite's “On Esotericism: 
Heidegger and/or Cassirer at Davos,” Political Theory 26, no. 5 (Oct. 1998):635.  Levinas's parody 
indicates that the graduate students felt Cassirer had not rallied well against Heidegger's attacks on neo-
Kantianism and had focused on appearing more intellectually amicable than Heidegger instead.  
12 Levinas often argues with and against Heidegger, especially with regard to rightful position of ethics 
within philosophy. And it is arguably Levinas' sense of the betrayal with regard to Heidegger that leads 
him to critique the weakness of philosophical inquiries against brutal immorality when we are armed 
only with reason. But Levinas also engaged in subtextual arguments with and against other thinkers of 
his time, as well. Myriam Bienenstock argues convincingly Levinas argues against thinkers like 
Alexandre Kojéve, Franz Rosenzeig and Hermann Cohen in a similar fashion. Her three part lecture 
series on Levinas in context delivered at Boston University and broadcast on radio station WBUR.  The 
three lectures were: “Levinas in Context: The French Connection” (lecture, the Elie Wiesel Center for 
Judaic Studies at Boston University, Boston, MA, April 10, 2013); “Levinas in Context: The German 
Connection” (lecture, the Elie Wiesel Center for Judaic Studies at Boston University, Boston, MA, 
April 17, 2013); and “Levinas in Context: The Jewish Connection” (lecture, the Elie Wiesel Center for 
Judaic Studies at Boston University, Boston MA, April 24, 2013).  Podcasts are available here: 
http://worldofideas.wbur.org. 
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ethics. Davos provides us with a useful snapshot of the philosophical and political 
landscape of the interwar period in Europe—defined largely by the dominance of 
Enlightenment ideology and the subsequent backlash against it.  It also reflects the 
magnitude of the increasingly passionate and bloody stand off between two radically 
different political orientations. After all, philosophy's most pressing and timeless 
questions are the same as those asked in times of political turmoil: What is the nature of 
man? What is the best form of governance for him? What are man's obligations to 
himself and his fellow man? And most importantly, who is his fellow man: The members 
of his faith community? The members of his ethnic or national group? All of mankind? It 
was precisely these questions that divided post-Enlightenment “liberalism” from the 
growing romantic nationalist revolt that culminated in National Socialism and other 
totalitarian regimes in Europe. 
 Let us return to Levinas' “Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism.” In 1934, 
six years after Davos, Levinas blamed the existence and popularity of Nazi ideology on 
what he felt were fundamental flaws in Western thought: 
 
...the bloody barbarism of Nationalism Socialism lies not in some 
contingent anomaly within human reason, nor in some accidental 
misunderstanding.  [The] source stems from the essential possibility of 
elemental evil into which we can be lead by logic and against which 
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Western philosophy had not sufficiently insured itself.”13 
 
While Levinas is referring most obviously to Heidegger here, he is making a much 
deeper claim than that.  According to Levinas, fascism, genocide and totalitarianism are 
not primarily manifestations of innate human brutality.  They are the inevitable results of 
what he perceived as the inherent violence of totalizing thinking that perceives other 
human beings as objects to be brought in line with and subsequently categorized within 
the thinking subject's expectations and assumptions about the world.  According to 
Levinas, this ideologically sanctioned obliteration and objectification of the other made 
brutes of the people of Europe, and rendered those who might otherwise have rejected 
National Socialism, fascism and bystanderism helpless against the calculating, 
philosophically buttressed blitzkrieg of Hitler's Germany.  To get a better sense of the 
philosophical, political and cultural movements against which Levinas feels 
“philosophy”—and perhaps all of Europe—“had not sufficiently insured itself,” it is best 
to start with the ideas and thinkers who shaped not only Heidegger, but Hitler, his 
henchmen, and the romantic nationalist ideology that culminated in a Europe dominated 
by fascism.  
 
                                                
13  Emmanuel Levinas,“Reflections of the Philosophy of Hitlerism,” trans. Séan Hand Critical Inquiry 17, 
no. 1 (Autumn, 1990): 63. 
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II. Against the Enlightenment: Cultural Criticism and Conservative Revolution 
in the Nineteenth Century  
  
 Because fascism was ultimately most successful in twentieth century Germany, 
we begin with Germany proto-fascism.  As early as 1853, theologian Paul De Lagarde 
claimed that Germany's “destiny” lay “in the east.” In his very first essay, he demanded 
that Germans colonize all non-German territory within the German Bund,14 with the 
express goal of  “unifying the Germans.”15 Even after the creation of the German state in 
1871, Lagarde remained expansionist.  He insisted that Germany's safety could be 
guaranteed only if she took some border territories from France and annexed the whole of 
the Austrian empire.  He wrote that, “Austria had no other purpose than to become 
Germany's colonial state.”16 The greatest obstacle to Germany's fulfillment of its 
expansionist destiny as Lagarde understood it was Russia, who would “force us to war” 
by refusing to surrender Poland, the Balkans, and part of the Black Sea coast, all of which 
Lagarde felt rightfully belonged to Germany.  “The Germans are a peaceful people,” 
Lagarde claimed, “but they are convinced of their right to fight for themselves, as 
Germans, and convinced that they have a mission to perform for all the nations of the 
                                                
14 The Deutscher Bund, or the German Confederation, was created by the Congress of Vienna in 1815 in 
an effort to coordinate the economies of German speaking territories and countries. It was considered by 
some to be weak and ineffective, and certainly went against the grain of rising German nationalist 
aspirations.  The Bund collapsed in 1848, due in part to German dualism and revolution, but was re-
established in 1850.  It is this configuration of the Bund to which Lagarde's essay refers. Several of the 
member states were ruled by foreign or non-Germanic monarchs, (the King of Britain even ruled one of 
the states), but the most powerful members were Prussian and Austria.  
15 Paul De Lagarde, “Die Religion der Zukunft,” Deutsche Schriften (Ulan Press, 2012), 278.  
16 Found in Fritz Stern, The Politics of Cultural Despair: a Study in the Rise of the Germanic Ideology 
(Berkley: University of California Press, 1961), 69.  
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earth...”17 After all, according to Lagarde, war was a powerful means of gaining strength, 
unity of purpose and virility for any nation. 
 Lagarde's plans for the German domination of Europe included “population 
transfers.” After colonizing Poland, for example, Lagarde felt the whole of Polish Jewry 
should be expelled to an unnamed territory.  All other “non-Germans”—Slovenes, 
Czechs, and others—should be relocated to assigned and regulated locations within the 
Austrian empire. From there, Germany could simply keep expanding its borders, until it 
had gone as far as Asia Minor.  Lagarde felt his scheme would solve several issues that 
he identified as most pressing for Germans of the time. First, it would unify the German 
people. Second, it would provide a cultural boon by taking many Germans out of urban 
centers and place them in the countryside, where he felt they belonged.  Finally, it would 
ease Germany's overpopulation problems and cease all immigration to America.18 What 
Lagarde ultimately wanted, though, was an Austrian-German union. According to 
Lagarde, the two emperors should form an alliance, whereby the two empires would 
merge after the death of either monarch.  If Europe as a whole were dominated by 
German thought and culture, Lagarde reasoned, then it would be at peace.19 
 It should come as no surprise that the Nazis recognized Paul de Lagarde as a 
progenitor of National Socialism. Many of the similarities between Lagarde's fantasies 
and real world Nazi policy are startling.  Lagarde's suggested “population relocation” 
immediately following Germany's colonization of “the east” was a significant part of the 
                                                
17 Lagarde, Deutsche Schriften, 79.  
18 Ibid.  
19 Lagarde,  Deutsche Schriften, 286.  
  
33 
inspiration for what would later be known as the Lebensraum movement—Nazi 
Germany's push for more and more acreage upon which Germans could comfortably live, 
while native populations gave up their money, jobs and property to work as slaves to the 
Reich. Even Lagarde's villainization of Russia, coupled with his assertion that countries 
unwilling to hand over their territory to Germany were “forcing Germans into war” was 
echoed in Hitler's later rhetoric as the Nazis blitzkrieged Europe.  
 Less obvious, perhaps, are the philosophical similarities between Lagarde's 
impassioned essays and the ideology of the Reich, as well as the work of other nineteenth 
and early twentieth century Germans. First and foremost is the claim that Germany had a 
messianic destiny to fulfill, a destiny which, once attained, would bring peace and 
cultural renaissance to all of Europe. This messianic destiny was founded on a 
mythologized German past and a deep nostalgia for an imagined history to which 
Germans and Germany must be forcefully re-connected. No less important is the shared 
romanticization of physical conflict and war as noble and spiritually cleansing. Finally, 
there is the shared distrust of mechanization and urbanization—of “cosmopolitanism,” 
the fear of which often manifested itself as anti-Semitism.    
 These ideas cannot be attributed to Lagarde and the Nazis alone, who typify 
National Socialism and anti-Enlightenment response in their most extreme forms. 
Consider the words of Walter Rathenau: 
 
We [Germans] are endowed as no other people is for a mission of the 
spirit. Such a mission was ours until a century ago; we renounced it, and 
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instead devoted ourselves to the most far-reaching developments of 
mechanism and their counterpart of bid to power.  It was Faust, lured 
away from his true path, astray among witches, brawlers, and alchemists. 
But the Faust soul of Germany is not dead.  Of all peoples on the earth we 
alone have never ceased to struggle with ourselves...the soul of the 
German people still lies in the convulsions and hallucinations of a slow 
recovery.  It is a recovery not alone from the War, but from something 
worse, its hundred years alienation from itself.  We must reunite ourselves 
with the days before we ceased to be Germans and became Berliners.20 
 
Walter Rathenau was not a fascist, or even a member of the German or Viennese youth 
movements, groups known to espouse a similar distrust of industry, capital, and urban 
spaces. Rathenau was a German Jewish economist, industrialist, writer and statesman 
who served as Foreign Minister of Germany for the Weimar Republic. Yet in the above 
passage he describes Germany much like Lagarde does: as a nation unique among nations 
and charged with a messianic destiny who has been led astray by the mechanization and 
industrialization of the city, implicitly identified as foreign inventions that have forced 
themselves upon a hapless Germany. Rathenau was indeed an ardent German nationalist, 
and a strong proponent of Jewish assimilation who felt very strongly that Jews should 
reject both Zionism and socialism in order to fully integrate into German society.21 For 
                                                
20 Walter Rathenau, The New Society (London: Williams and Norgate, 1921), 99.  
21 See Arnold Brecht's essay, “Walter Rathenau and the German People,” The Journal of Politics 10, no. 1 
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Rathenau, German Jews were, first and foremost, German.  
 Even though Rathenau felt the reparations assigned to Germany through the 
Versailles Treaty would prove impossible to repay, he nonetheless insisted that Germany 
comply to the best of her abilities until the terms of the treaty could be re-worked. This 
point of view made him extremely unpopular with those German nationalists who, unlike 
moderate, liberal Rathenau, favored authoritarian rule—a population that, especially 
since Germany's defeat in WWI, was growing in numbers.  Rathenau was assassinated in 
1924, the same year he received his appointment to the Foreign Ministry by very young 
assassins who were members of a group called the “Organization Consul.” In an eerie 
foreshadowing of things to come, the Consul's chief complaint about Rathenau was that 
he was a member of “the Jewish-Bolshevist conspiracy,” and needed to be disposed of; 
when the Nazis came to power, his assassins were declared national heroes.22 We must 
admit that, in the words of Arnold Brecht, Rathenau “sometimes use[d] a language that 
could be mistaken for that of a forerunner of the Nazis, as Luther, Kant or Nietzsche used 
phrases that could be so mistaken.”23 This should not make us doubt Rathenau's sanity—
for why indeed would a German Jew espouse proto-Nazi ideology? Rather, it should help 
us to understand something deeper about the German political and intellectual climate of 
the pre WWI and interwar periods.   
 Notions of special German mission, distrust of cities, industry, and of all things 
deemed “non-German” were not exclusive to the language, ideology and mythology of 
                                                                                                                                            
(Feb. 1948): 20-48 for more on Rathenau's life, career, and assassination.  
22 Brecht, “Walter Rathenau and the German People,” 44.  
23 Brecht, “Walter Rathenau and the German People,” 27.  
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right wing German romantic nationalists. Of course even though the general climate of 
interwar Germany can be characterized as marked by fantasies and concerns similar to 
those expressed by National Socialism, there are qualitative differences between the 
politic goals of someone like Rathenau—who was not and never would have been a 
Nazi—and the goals of someone like Paul De Lagarde, who is credited with providing 
national socialism with some of its most important foundational ideas. Rathenau was 
indeed a fervid nationalist, but he eschewed the then-popular claim that national unity 
required authoritarian rule.  As a liberal capitalist, he also rejected the idea of state 
ownership of industry, and instead advocated for greater worker participation in company 
management.  Of the Bolshevik revolution, Rathenau wrote that this “Russian idea is 
compulsory happiness, the same sense and with the same logic as the compulsory 
introduction of Christianity and the Inquisition.”24  
 As William Orton pointed out in 1935, during the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, many Germans made similar romantic nationalist proclamations, so, from his 
point of view,  “two poles of the German universe” emerge. “...on the one hand, genius 
for objective system and order, pragmatic accomplishment and tenacity of purpose, 
reflected in the tangible successes of social, economic and military organization; and on 
the other hand, the transcendental aspiration, the romantic introversion, the [self-
proclaimed] profundity of German feeling and culture.” Orton suggests that “between 
these poles the ideal of German unity has always lain in a field of instability and 
                                                
24 Walther Rathenau, Kritik der dreifachen Revolution (Buenos Aires: Fischer Press), 1919. 
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tension...and in this constant tension lies the key to German history.”25Orton, who 
described his essay as an attempt to explain what he called the “semi-mystical, subjective 
Germanism” of the Nazis to baffled Americans, closes his argument by quoting a 
September, 1934 speech of Adolf Hitler: 
 
The idea of human civilization may be built up on an entirely 
unconscious...fulfillment of a longing and its urge as inwardly determined by the 
influence of blood...For the purpose of building up a new civilization it would be 
a mistake to adopt elements of a philosophy imported in the past but not rooted in 
the blood of our people. 
 
In this passage, Orton identifies a number of the themes that are central to what Fritz 
Stern later calls the “German cultural critics” of the romantic nationalist persuasion. He 
points to Hitler's “admission of a deep spiritual dissatisfaction, together with its natural 
outcome in messianic imagery,” something Stern claims is ubiquitous among 
conservative German cultural critics in Germany in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries.  Hitler's distrust of “foreign philosophies”—as well as the assertion that blood 
is a purveyor of ultimate identity—is found in the earliest forms of romantic 
nationalism.26  In conclusion, Orton claims that Germans “put [national] solidarity” 
before “personal liberty to a degree that seems shocking to an American...”27 
                                                
25 William Orton, “Understanding the Nazis,” The North American Review 239, no 3 (March 1935): 227.  
26 Orton, “Understanding the Nazis,” 231. Emphasis mine.  
27 Orton,“Understanding the Nazis,” 232. 
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 Orton makes excellent observations here, but hints that this fondness for 
“solidarity” that he identifies in nineteenth and twentieth century German political 
thought is intrinsic to the German “spirit.” He suggests that Germany has somehow taken 
a path far different than the one monolithically chosen by the rest of Central and Western 
Europe.  Orton subscribed to the Sonderweg thesis, or the idea that Germany was 
somehow unique among other European nations and therefore pursued a less well-
established path than the rest of the West. As Jürgen Kocka points out, there have 
multiple variants of the Sonderweg thesis since its modern genesis in the nineteenth 
century. Many German historians from nineteenth and early twentieth century “were 
convinced of a positive 'German way.' In contrast to English and French historians, they 
liked to stress certain basic German specifics, consistent with German geography and 
historical pattern...[and] German 'Kultur' was considered different from western 
'Zivilisation', a view which reached its zenith at the beginning of the first world war...”28 
Then scholars like Otto Hintze and Ernst Troeltsch adopted a variant of the Sonderweg 
idea as well.  National Socialism's argument that Germany was destined to dominate all 
of Europe under a messianic führer was another variant of this theory of essential 
German uniqueness. Interestingly enough, Sonderweg theories are often used to explain 
the development and overwhelming success of the Third Reich's genocidal version of 
fascism in Germany (rather than in France or Italy, for example).   
In the nineteenth century, the Sonderweg theory was popular among liberals as 
                                                
28 Jürgen Kocka, “German History Before Hitler: The Debate About the German Sonderweg,” Journal of 
Contemporary History 23, no. 1 (January, 1988): 3.  
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well as conservatives. Fritz Stern argues that the fundamental difference between 
someone like Rathenau and someone like Lagarde, both of whom embrace Sonderweg 
style notions of German uniqueness can, in many ways be attributed to whether one 
possessed the “deep spiritual dissatisfaction” with extant German culture professed by 
many conservatives. Stern's 1961 study, The Politics of Cultural Despair: A Study of the 
Rise of Germanic Ideology which examines Paul De Lagarde, Julius Langbehn, and 
Moeller van den Bruck as progenitors of the ideology of the Third Reich, suggests that 
these men saw themselves as “moralists and the guardians of what they thought was an 
ancient tradition.” As such, they “attacked the progress of modernity—the growing 
power of liberalism and secularism.” All three recounted the dangers of Germany's 
growing industrialism and “warned against the loss of faith, of unity, of “values.”  All 
three were foes of commerce, and cities as well—heroic vitalists who denigrated reason 
and routine.”29 “Above all,” writes Stern, “these men loathed liberalism.” But why? 
Liberalism had, up until the Weimar years, never been an especially popular position in 
Germany, and Stern's cultural critics were primarily active before the Weimar years. 
Stern argues that to Lagarde and Moeller in particular, liberalism nonetheless seemed to 
be the “cause and the incarnation of all evil...and the principle premise of modern society; 
everything they dreaded seem to spring from it: the bourgeois life, Manchesterism,30 
materialism, parliament and the parties, the lack of political leadership.”  What they 
                                                
29 Stern, The Politics of Cultural Despair, xi.  
30 Manchesterism was the term used for a particular kind of liberalism that originated in Manchester, 
England.  The central idea was that free trade would lead to a more equitable society by making more 
goods readily available to more people.  The term is believed to have been coined by Benjamin Disraeli 
in 1848.  
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longed for, Stern claims, was “a new faith, a new community of believers, a world with 
fixed standards and no doubts, a new national religion that would bind all Germans 
together. All this liberalism denied...”31  
 In addition, Langbehn and Lagarde were virulent anti-Semites, and saw Jews as 
“insidious bacilli.”  This should come as no surprise, given that Langbehn and Lagarde's 
sense of authentic “German-ness,” unlike Rathenau's, was deeply rooted in an imagined 
Teutonic past that they believed was destroyed by modern liberalism—a political point of 
view which, in Germany, often included strong support for civil rights for German Jews.  
To add insult to injury, it was French rule that ultimately forced the passage of equal 
rights for Jews in Germany, not a German government acting on its own accord.  If Jews 
were not already targets of suspicion for thinkers like Lagarde, Langbehn and Moeller, 
then Enlightenment ideals of the equality of all men and the subsequent forced liberation 
of European Jews certainly would have made them so.   
 Part and parcel with their own peculiar brand of messianism, Lagarde, Langbehn 
and Moeller plainly called for a Führer whose strength of will would not only unify 
Germany at home, but bring her into well-deserved dominance abroad so that she might, 
at last, become the greatest power in the world.32 Taken together, this collection of ideas 
impacted the Lebensgefühle of Germans of every class two generations before Hitler ever 
appeared on the political scene. Moreover, this ideology, in the words of Stern, “not only 
resembles National Socialism, but...the National Socialists themselves acknowledged [it] 
                                                
31 Stern, The Politics of Cultural Despair, xiii. 
32 Stern, The Politics of Cultural Despair, xiii-xiv.  
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as a central part of their legacy...” and accounts for “the politically exploitable 
discontent...so long embedded in German culture” with which we have “not sufficiently 
reckoned.”33 
 Stern points out that these forerunners of National Socialism, not unlike the 
forerunners of other forms of European fascism, also believed deeply in a similarly 
articulated but imaginary folk-rooted past.  They also shared a fondness for conspiracy 
theories, and often proclaimed a deep distrust for the state. But they also tended to 
advocate authoritarian forms of government coupled with extensive cultural planning as a 
means of stamping out any possible dissenters until true national unity could be (re)-
established. Stern's sense that political and cultural discontent—forces with which the 
rest of the world “had not sufficiently reckoned”---were at least in part to blame for the 
popularity and power of the Nazi party mirror almost exactly Levinas' concerns about the 
inability of Western philosophy to “sufficiently insure itself against...the bloody 
barbarism of national socialism.” Both Stern and Levinas attribute the success of 
National Socialism to the West's inability to understand itself. The West's love of reform 
(and its penchant for messianic longing, which looks both forward into the future while 
gazing intently backward into an often mythic past) can manifest itself as a revolt against 
modernity just as easily as it can demonstrate a profound desire for it.  
 Note that neither Stern nor Levinas blame German thought and culture 
exclusively, although neither would deny that National Socialism was wildly successful 
in Germany, perhaps surprisingly so.  Certainly, to suggest that the problem lay only with 
                                                
33 Stern, The Politics of Cultural Despair, xiv-xv. 
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German thought and culture comes too close to reifying romantic nationalism’s 
essentialist claims that identity is dictated by “blood” or folk “spirit,” and most 
importantly would not account for the significant popularity of other forms of romantic 
nationalism in the rest of the modern West. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, this kind of nationalism appeared in nearly every country in Europe and 
showed signs of life in the United States. What Stern calls an “ideology of despair and 
redemption” could be found not only in the political platforms of the pan-Germans and 
the anti-Semitic parties in Germany, but in those of Action Française and the anti-
Dreyfusards in France, the 1903 Italian nationalists, and the Christian Fronters and the 
German American Bund in the United States as well.  
 For example, historian Peter M. Rutkoff notes that the political milieu of late 
nineteenth century France when Action Française and other anti-Dreyfusard groups were 
founded is marked by a “transference of nationalism from [the] left to [the] right.” 
Rutkoff correctly points out that the French right of the late nineteenth has not been 
universally understood as proto-fascist because key figures of the period have been 
“evaluated in terms of what they said rather than what they did and who they were...” 
Therefore historians have “tended to deny the existence of an authentic [subsequent] 
fascist movement” because they mistakenly believed there was no “indigenous fascist 
tradition.” Subsequently, the French leagues of the 1930s34 that were inspired by the anti-
                                                
34 There were quite a number of far-right Ligues in France in the 1920s and 1930s, and some of them 
copied Mussolini's form of fascism or were inspired by or collaborators with the Nazis, but a few saw 
themselves as inheritors of a French, ultra-nationalist, anti-republican tradition.  Jeunesses Patriotes 
was founded in 1924 by Pierre Taittinger who claimed the legacy of the Ligue des Patriotes. Other 
“native French” Ligues from the 1920s and 1930s include the royalist Action Française, inspired by the 
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Dreyfusards and the Ligue des Patriotes from the latter part of the previous century are 
identified as “Bonapartist, conservative, or foreign but not fascist in inspiration.”35 Yet 
there are two major events in nineteenth century France which both reflected and helped 
to create an upsurge in right wing political activity in both Paris and the provinces: the 
Boulanger Affair and the Dreyfus Affair.  
 Rutkoff identifies Paul Déroulède, founder and leader of the Ligue des Partiotes 
in 1882 and again in 1897, as the major figure in “indigenous” French proto-fascist and 
fascist politics, and the Boulanger Affair and the Dreyfus Affair provided traction for 
Déroulède's Ligue, which served to unify royalist, anti-republican and anti-parliamentary 
constituencies under one proto-fascist umbrella. In its first iteration, the Ligue supported 
Georges Ernest Boulanger, a French General and political figure whose popularity 
ballooned during his commission as War Minister which began in January of 1886. He 
earned the nickname “Général Revanche” when he introduced legal and military reforms 
to benefit soldiers and appealed to the French desire for revenge against Germany for 
France's swift defeat in the war of 1870 (the Franco-Prussian War). The government 
fairly quickly came to see Boulanger as a risk, and he was removed from his position as 
War Minister in May of 1887. The government was astonished, however, when 
Boulanger received approximately 100,000 votes in the general election in Seine, he was 
                                                                                                                                            
proto-fascist organizations (like Edouard Drumont's Ligue Antisemitique and Paul Déroulède's Ligue 
des Patriotes) discussed at length in this chapter.  Le Faisceau, founded in 1925 by Georges Valois was 
inspired by Mussolini, as well as Francisme, found in 1933 by Marcel Bucard and partly funded by 
Mussolini himself. Solidarité Française, which imitated the Nazis, was founded in 1933 by the 
perfumer François Coty.   
35 Peter, M. Rutkoff, “The Ligue des Patriotes: The Nature of the Radical Right and the Dreyfuss Affair,” 
French Historical Studies 8 no 4 (Autumn, 1974): 587. Emphasis mine.  
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removed from Paris, where is was an increasingly beloved figure, and sent to the 
provinces.  
 By 1889, Boulanger had received enough votes to seize power, but he refused.  
The government launched an attack on both Boulanger and his followers. Boulanger fled 
to Belgium with his mistress, who died in July 1891, and Boulanger himself committed 
suicide 2 months later.  What is most interesting about Boulanger is that he attracted 
followers from across the French political spectrum.  Bonapartists, Republicans, 
socialists, Blanquists,36 (known for their anti-Semitism) and monarchists alike subscribed 
to Boulangisme, which advocated three basic principles: Revanche (revenge against 
Germany), Révision (of the constitution), and Restoration (of the monarchy). These are 
culturally specific manifestations of themes already familiar to us.  Much like Lagarde, 
Langbehn and van den Bruck, Boulanger called for a return to a monarchist past that 
predated modern constitutional, democratic, republican government. Boulanger’s appeals 
were attractive to the working and middle classes and the socialists of Paris and the 
provinces because of their anti-bourgeois and anti-capitalist content. Like other 
conservative anti-modern movements, Boulangisme centered on the power and charisma 
of a single leader who was seen as a kind of political savior for a nation led astray by 
“foreign” forces and ideology.  Just as the German cultural critics felt certain that 
“foreign” ideology and invention would distract Germany from her ultimate mission to 
unify and perfect Europe, at stake for Boulanger and his followers was the purity and 
                                                
36 Blanquism refers to a form of socialist revolution generally attributed to Louis Auguste Blanqui, who 
claimed that small, organized and secretive conspirators were best equipped for carrying out revolution.   
Revolutionary takeover would be putsch-like, except that the revolutionaries would harness the power 
of the state in order to institute socialism or communism.  
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French history, identity and mission. 
 Déroulède's Ligue of Patriotes disbanded after Boulanger fled, but the Ligue 
reappeared in 1897 in response to the Dreyfus Affair, a phenomenon which, perhaps even 
more than the Boulanger Affair, provides a useful display of the most significant 
philosophical and political conflicts of nineteenth and twentieth century France.  Nancy 
Green points out that “...polarized around the Affair were “anti-Semites, clericalists, 
militarists, nationalists and anti-republicans on one side; and the anti-anti-Semites (not 
only Jews nor necessarily philo-Semites), anti-clericalists, anti-militarists and republicans 
on the other.”37 Green asserts that “[French] nationalism as a coherent doctrine was 
forged through The Affair.”38Between 1897 and 1900 Déroulède's Ligue was at the 
forefront of the anti-Dreyfusards and nationalist forces.39 Déroulède retained Boulanger's 
cry for “Revanche” against Germany as central to Ligue ideology, and this was a 
powerful theme for the times, especially in Paris where the Dreyfus Affair dominated the 
conversations of the wealthy and the working class alike. And although Action Fraçaise 
would not come into being until a year later when it is founded by monarchist counter-
revolutionary Charles Maurass, much of its organization and membership descends 
directly from the Déroulède's Ligue. 
 The Ligue used the same psychological weapon utilized by all proto-fascist 
                                                
37 Nancy L. Green, “The Dreyfus Affair and Ruling Class Cohesion,” Science and Society 43 no. 1 
(Spring, 1979): 31.  Green's essay is particular helpful for readers interested in what Green calls “the 
contemporary terms” related to the Affair and their “corresponding constellations of interests.” (34) She 
argues persuasively that these interests should be closely examined in relation to the socio-economic 
cleavages in French society that they—and the Affair itself—represented.  
38 Green, “The Dreyfus Affair,” 35.  
39 Rutkoff, “The Ligue des Patriotes,” 586.  
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groups of the time: fear of the foreigner, the Jew, the far left, the “sans-patrie.”40And 
although, as Rutkoff points out, the Ligue did not engage in anti-Semitic propaganda until 
late in its existence, it is evident that many Liguers were anti-Semitic and that the Ligue 
des Patriotes and the Ligue Antisémitique had remarkably similar constituencies. 
Rutkoff's observations about the demographics of Ligue membership are instructive: 
 
It is significant that the quartiers of Paris where the membership of the 
Ligue des Patriotes was highest also contained the highest proportional 
number of eastern European Jews, who tended to enter, or try to enter, 
lower middle-class trades, and whose relative success and competitive 
strivings were instrumental in arousing anti-Semitism...Further, the 
undercurrent of anticapitalism was a significant theme in the general 
appeal of the Ligue, with its exhortations against the rotten, inbred, 
“foreign”-dominated parliamentary regime...[The Parisian lower middle-
class was] no longer at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder but [was] 
fearful of many things—proletarianization, the wealthy, the Jew, the 
socialists, the foreign element—they were becoming the forgotten men of 
in a system of economic interests and political compromise based on the 
alliance of the middle class and peasantry of which they had once been a 
part. The Parisian lower middle class had but one outlet for its 
frustrations--the street...Although the Ligue failed in its major objectives 
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[regarding Dreyfus] it did represent a segment of the population and a 
tradition that became a new and modern force on the French right.41 
 
An additional Ligue contribution to French nationalism was a “new appeal for direct 
action.”42 The “politics of the street” took precedence over “electoral politics.”  
Underlying this emphasis on direct action in the streets was the Ligue's firm rejection of 
parliamentary systems as unacceptable. Emphasizing the “power of the street” kept the 
focus—and the political control—in the hands of the leaders, such as Déroulède. Rutkoff 
notes that Déroulède's “personal dominance over the Ligue was extraordinary; his 
followers' sense of loyalty to the man first and the movement second is the most striking 
feature of his rôle in the Ligue...”43The Ligue fizzled out completely when its charismatic 
leader could not remain at the helm.   
 French proto-fascism was invigorated by the divisive nature of the Dreyfus Affair, 
which according to Rutkoff, is “surely the episode that in the history of the Third 
Republic which divided Frenchmen the most.”44 The popularity of the second iteration of 
the Ligue was not insignificant. By February of 1899, the month of Déroulède's 
unsuccessful coup attempt the Ligue had 60,000 members.45 The details of the Dreyfus 
Affair touched on nearly all of the issues that deeply divided a conflicted French 
populace.  Not all of France felt that a republic, which was after still after all an 
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experiment, was preferable to a non-parliamentary monarchy, and not all Frenchmen felt 
Jews and other French minorities should be afforded civil and legal rights. Many cried 
out for a “return” to a more homogeneous France—which, not unlike the Germany that 
the cultural critics of the same era pined for, never truly existed.  The conservative 
revolutions of late nineteenth and early twentieth century France and Germany were, in 
fact, more similar than different, even with regard to the power and prevalence of anti-
Semitism.  
 A similar, although less popular conservative backlash occurred in the United 
States, evidenced by the creation of the German American Bund in 1936. The Bund was 
one among many German-American ethnic organizations, but the only of its kind to 
define itself as pro-Nazi.  This meant they were anti-Semitic, anti-communist, and pro-
Hitler. The Bund published magazines and brochures, launched demonstrations, and ran a 
number of youth camps, not unlike those run by the Nazi party in Germany.  At their 
peak, they had 25,000 dues paying members and supported 8,000 uniformed “Storm 
Troopers” (the Bund's equivalent of the Sturmabteilungen, or the SA).46  
 The Bund worked closely with another conservative American organization called 
the “Christian Front” whose constituency was much broader and whose members were 
more likely to be Irish-Catholic than German-American.  The Front was founded and 
inspired by Father Charles Coughlin,47 whose anti-Semitism was well known.  Coughlin 
                                                
46 The Reich sent Rudolph Hess to facilitate the creation of an American Nazi party in 1933. There are 
other estimates of membership rates, but most reliable sources reckon the number to be around 25,000.  
The number of people who were sympathetic to the Bund's ideology would be far more difficult to 
ascertain.  
47 United States Holocaust Museum. “German American Bund,” Holocaust Encyclopedia, 
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achieved a degree of national fame because of his radio program broadcast out of Detroit 
from 1926 to 1940. The Christian Front's official mandate was “to organize Christians to 
battle communism.”48But the organization's mission seemed far broader in scope than 
that; it sought to accomplish what it considered a moral mission. In the words of Father 
Coughlin himself, “It is Christ or chaos!...It is either Christian social justice or pagan 
social decay!”49Not at all unlike the European cultural critics who trumpeted warnings 
about modernity's trajectory toward certain moral decay, Coughlin insisted that foreign 
“forces were engineering the mechanism of a juggernaut of hatred, slavery and death.” 
America's only hope was a united Christian “front,” that could repel the “foreign “isms” “ 
which were ready and waiting to “plunge its dagger into YOU.”50 Not surprisingly, 
members of other ultra-nationalist, pro-fascist, and pro-Nazi groups, like the German 
American Bund, associated themselves with the Front almost immediately.51  
 One of the central messages given to Christian Front members was to “act 
Christian.”  But as Gregory Fein points out: 
 
Fronters would not even define what they meant when they instructed 
members to “act Christian”—they would just say it. The Fronters became 
more specific when they spoke about buying and voting Christian. These 
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definitions were more obvious. Buying Christian including patronizing 
Christian-owned businesses, boycotting Jewish owned businesses, and 
railing against “Jewish-controlled” media...52  
 
To facilitate this end, the CF used anti-Semitic stereotypes and language to describe 
“Jewish business policies.”  For example, Jewish businessmen were called “circumcisers” 
because the CF believed that Jewish businesses routinely posted going out of business 
signs in stores that were actually staying in business.  As Fein relates: 
 
[It was believed that] their false advertising enticed unsuspecting Christian 
patrons to shop at their shops, thinking they were getting a good deal.  The 
result was those patrons did not shop at Christian-owned businesses.  In 
other words, Jews were taking their “pound of flesh” from Christians—
they methodically cut-off Christian shoppers from Christian merchants.  
Jewish merchants were denounced for unfair business practices and were 
accused of being irreligious because they failed to live up to the 
“Commandments of Moses.”53 
 
Just like their European and American fascist and romantic nationalist counterparts, the 
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CF blamed the ills of modernity—typified for them by the poverty, alienation, and fearful 
uncertainty wrought by the Great Depression—on the “internationalists,” a euphemism 
for Jews, always identified with secular government and urban, industrial society.  
According to Coughlin and other CF members, “Jews were the internationalist bankers; 
Jews were the factory owners; Jews had usurped the control of education and labor 
unions, all in the name of communism.”54 Like their European fascist cohorts, the CF 
worked with a messianic fervor to protect and create a “Christian America” founded on 
what they considered the principles of social justice as taught by Jesus.  And not unlike 
the European cultural critics who longed for a mythical past that never existed, the CF 
“proclaimed itself the protector of a Christian America that existed only in its collective 
mind.”55 In an article by James Wechsler from The Nation, Coughlinites were described 
as “A grim and humorless array.” Wechsler went on: 
 
Parochial students who have suddenly become missionaries, middle-aged 
men and women who have obviously had very little fun in life, 
neighborhood toughs who now have lofty motives for rowdyism, elderly 
women who get hysterical at the drop of an anti-Coughlin phrase, children 
whose services have been donated by zealous parents. But they are more 
than stock types for fanaticism.  In large measure they are creatures of 
poverty and disappointment: You can see the frayed white collar, you can 
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sense the unfulfilled dreams and the perennial inadequacy of lower-
middle-class life. They are clerks who wrap bundles all week, 
unsuccessful little merchants with large and resentful wives, unemployed 
workers clutching for some intangible enemy...56    
  
 The tone of this passage is derisive, but Wechsler's description of CF members as 
“disappointed,” “resentful,” and  “clutching for some intangible enemy” is almost 
identical to Stern's more diplomatic descriptions of the German cultural critics of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.57 And although the rioting and violence 
perpetrated by CFers was minor outside New York City, national membership was on the 
rise in 1940, especially in cities like Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Baltimore and Cleveland. 
As we have seen, contemporary depictions of CF and Bund members often describe them 
as almost exclusively uneducated, immigrants or working class poor, but evidence shows 
this is not the case. Nor was fascism simply another manifestation of the “German spirit,” 
as suggested by Orton. Members of every class and every cultural and ethnic group, in 
fact, supported totalitarianism. The work of Julien Benda also strongly suggests that 
without the support of the educated middle and upper classes, fascism, in any nation, 
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57  In a government-sponsored pamphlet written for the American Council on Public Affairs, Theodore 
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could not succeed. Supporters of fascism profess a political and cultural alienation, a 
dissatisfaction with many—and sometimes all—aspects of what they might call a modern 
liberal society: cities, industry, secular schools and institutions, cultural heterogeneity, 
democratic political process and everything associated with it. What drives them is 
messianic longing for a leader who will unite—or reunite—them with their “own 
people,” defined in terms similar to the Reich's use of the term “volk.” Political and 
cultural backlash against the Enlightenment was typified by, but not isolated to, the work 
of Lagarde, Langbehn and Moeller in France and Déroulède in France who felt strongly 
that their country should resist “creations” like mechanization, industrialization, political 
parties, and democracy, which they describe as “foreign” and return to its past in order to 
fulfill its destiny.  
 If we define “modernity” as having begun in the mid-eighteenth century—and I 
agree with Stern's terms here, since much of what romantic nationalism and fascism 
object to are the fundamental claims promoted by Enlightenment models—we can locate 
the intellectual roots of the “conservative revolution” in the work of Rousseau and his 
followers, and trace it through the work of Hegel, Nietzsche and Dostoevsky, even 
though it is far from accurate to claim that these figures were all fascist. On the other 
hand, although Levinas and Rubenstein in particular take aim most passionately at 
Heidegger, he is by far not the only member of the Western intelligentsia to have 
supported fascism, although he might be the only such thinker whose work is still lauded 
by many as among the most brilliant of the twentieth century. What Heidegger did for 
National Socialism in Germany, Giovanni Gentile, best known today for the texts he 
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ghostwrote for Benito Mussolini, did for fascism in Italy; he legitimated the conservative 
revolution among intellectuals and middle and upper class people, at home and abroad. 
 Gentile was, in turn, greatly influenced by Georges Sorel, a French Marxist best 
known for his advocacy of syndicalism, a proposed replacement for capitalism and state 
socialism. Like the German cultural critics and the Italian fascists of the early twentieth 
century, Sorel considered violence a virtue. As his disciple Mussolini once said, Sorel felt 
that ultimately humanity did not actually “move mountains,” but rather “created the 
illusion that mountains move” independently of historical reality. Not unlike Mussolini, 
Heidegger, and other modern pro-fascist philosophers, Sorel also insisted that ethical 
codes are relative to their time and place.  Therefore, the Declaration of the Rights of 
Man was “only a colorless collection of abstract and confused formulas, without any 
political bearing.”58 Interestingly, Sorel was a member of Action Français for one year, 
but in the end never truly committed to their ideology, and he was unimpressed by much 
of fascism and communism as it developed on political stage in his lifetime. Nonetheless, 
the philosophical ideas he espoused are more similar to those of Gentile, Lagarde, 
Langbehn and van den Bruck than they are different.  
 The modern Western love affair with romantic nationalism and totalitarianism 
was far-reaching.  In 1927, Julien Benda, wrote in his insightful essay on modern 
romantic nationalism, The Treason of the Intellectuals, that: 
 
Patriotism today is the assertion of one form of mind against other forms 
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of mind...the notion that political warfare involves a war of cultures is 
entirely an invention of modern times, and confers upon them a 
conspicuous place in the moral history of humanity. 59  
 
Unlike writers who attempt to provide phenomenological descriptions of “conservative 
revolutionaries,” Benda focuses on the ethical problems created by romantic nationalism.  
He also notes the strong messianic component of modern romantic nationalism, although 
he describes it in slightly different terms: 
 
Another strengthening of national passions comes from the determination of the 
peoples to be conscious of their past, more precisely to be conscious of their 
ambitions as going back to their ancestors, and to vibrate with “centuries-old” 
aspirations, with attachments to “historical” rights.  This Romantic patriotism is 
also a characteristic of patriotism as practiced by popular minds (by “popular” 
here I mean all minds governed by imagination, that is, in the first place society 
people and men of letters).   
 
Moreover, Benda adds: 
 
...national passions, owing to the fact that they are now exerted by 
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plebeian minds, assume the characteristics of mysticism, of a religious 
adoration almost unknown in these passions in the practical minds of great 
nobles…this mystical adoration of the nation is not only to be explained 
by the nature of those who adore, but also by the changes which have 
taken place in the adored object. There is first of all the spectacle of the 
military force and organization of modern States, which is something far 
more imposing than of old.60 
 
As a French philosopher and man of letters, Benda is particularly concerned with the 
increasingly nationalistic trends he observed in French politics. Of course The Treason of 
the Intellectuals is a polemical essay against the rising tide of romantic nationalism and a 
waxing affair with totalitarianism in Western Europe in general, and yet Benda's 
observations are illustrative: 
 
...several very powerful political passions, which were originally 
independent of nationalist feeling, have now become incorporated with 
[nationalism].  These passions are: (a) The movement against the Jews; (b) 
the movement of the possessing classes against the proletariat; (c) the 
movement of the champions of authority against the democrats.  Today 
each of these passions is identified with national feeling and declares that 
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its adversary implies the negation of nationalism. I may add that when a 
person is affected by one of these passions he is generally affected by all 
three...61 
   
To sum up, like Orton, Irwin, Fein, Wechsler, Stern and Benda all note of the messianism 
inherent in romantic nationalism which, more than any other aspect of its agenda, tended 
to sweep followers up into an intoxicating romance with a mythical past they hope to 
revive.  Romantic nationalists tended to be anti-Semitic, anti-worker (even though the 
rhetoric used by the National Socialist and fascist parties of Germany and Italy 
respectively belied this reality), anti-democracy and pro-“authority.”  Like Stern, Benda 
observes that totalitarian romantic nationalism relies more on ideology more than 
demography.  The love affair with totalitarianism is not only a “German thing.”  It is a 
Western thing, at least in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  And Benda is 
describing what he feels are troubling political trends among educated Europeans and not 
just the “uneducated masses.”  
 What bothers Benda most, however, is his sense that “passions” such as “Anti-
Semitism, Pangermanism, French Monarchism and Socialism,” once considered 
appropriate only for politics, are used as to “defend a particular form of morality, of 
intelligence, of sensibility, of literature, of philosophy and of artistic conceptions.”  
Moreover, these political passions are justified by theories that they are in line “with the 
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development of evolution” and “the profound unrolling of history;” one's own movement 
is merely carrying out the inevitable trajectory of history, while one's opponent is bound 
to fail because she is working against history.62  Philosophers and intellectuals are, as 
always, not only caught up in current political and cultural tides, but simultaneously help 
to create and sustain them by justifying them in seemingly objective terms. What is lost, 
Benda claims, is any sense of morality that exists outside of the political round. Ethics 
that transcend tribal affiliation, at least insofar as they were understood by post-
Enlightenment Europe, might have been the “conservative revolution’s” first target.  
 The Doctrine of Fascism, by Benito Mussolini and Giovanni Gentile makes use of 
and places itself squarely within a long line of Western philosophy and political thought, 
and addresses the problem of universal ethics as promoted by the Enlightenment within 
the first few pages.  Mussolini and Gentile state that fascism “sees not only the individual 
but the nation and the country; individuals and generations bound together by moral 
law...” They go on to define the scope and content of this “moral law” according to 
(Italian) fascism: 
 
...with common traditions and a mission which suppresses the instinct for 
life closed in a brief circle of pleasure, builds up a higher life, founded on 
duty,  a life free from the limitations of time and space, in which the 
individual, by self-sacrifice, the renunciation of self interest, by death 
itself, can achieve that purely spiritual existence in which his value as a 
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man consists.63 
 
 According to the fascist worldview, one behaves morally by engaging in 
“common traditions” with other members of his state, and focuses on his duty as it is 
dictated to him by that State, not by the inherent nature of man. Whereas most 
Enlightenment theories about the nature of the perfect state indicate that the best 
government supports and protects the innate rights of the individual and enforces a 
morality grounded in man's nature as a creature of reason, the fascism, according to 
Mussolini and Gentile, “creates the nation, conferring volition and therefore real life on a 
people made aware of their moral unity.” According to this view, the state creates and 
enforces human ethics; human ethics do not inform the state because human beings are 
not inherently ethical. Unlike the “liberal State,” which, according to Mussolini and 
Gentile, “restricts its activities to recording results, the fascist state “direct[s] the game 
and guide[s] the moral and material progress of the community.”64 Mussolini and Gentile 
make further comparisons between Fascism and democracy (often simply referred to as 
“liberalism”): 
 
If liberalism spells individualism, Fascism spells government. The Fascist 
State is, however, a unique and original creation.  It is not reactionary but 
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revolutionary, for it anticipates the solution of certain universal problems 
which have been raised elsewhere, in the political field by the splitting up 
of the parties, the usurpation of power by the parliaments, the 
irresponsibility of assemblies;...in the ethical field by the need felt for 
order, discipline, obedience to the moral dictates of patriotism.65 
 
Gentile explains succinctly that, according to fascism, nothing is or should be outside the 
purview of the state.  Restricting the power of the State, even in relation to individual 
liberty or expression, is unethical, since even morality is a product of the state.  Fascism 
is “totalitarian” because nothing truly exists outside of it; in fact everything is unified and 
homogenized within it, including ethics, culture and religious practice. The state does not 
require parties or parliament, but is streamlined, monolithic, and spends all its “moral” 
energy in its battle for eternal life for the state.  “All nations...bring their contribution” to 
“history,” and outside of its trajectory, “man is a non-entity.” Fascism conceives of 
individual human life as a short and brutal struggle best spent in the glorification of the 
state. “Fascism,” Gentile writes, is “not only a system of government but also and above 
all a system of thought.”66  
 In a 1921 article, Mussolini claimed that “the philosophy of force” upon which 
fascism is grounded was, unlike Germany's essentialist racist national socialism, “nothing 
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but relativist.”67 Here Mussolini uses Nietzsche and Hans Vaihinger, a leading neo-
Kantian of the time a justification for his use of “philosophy of the as-if.” Italian fascism, 
argued Mussolini, was the ultimate manifestation of philosophical relativism and 
Nietzsche's “Will to Power.” Fascism and relativism are ungrounded systems unless we 
“act as-if” they are grounded; the ungroundedness becomes the ground. Geoff Waite 
points out that for Mussolini, “there are no eternal verities: God is dead, all is permitted; 
only the strong decide what truth is;” and when fascism is, in its turn, crushed by a 
superior entity,  “then so be it.” What emerges is a “profound epistemological and 
political aporia that extends through history...”68 The aporia of fascism—in Italy as well 
as in Germany—is that it is a form of relativism and a form of mysticism because it 
creates its own myths; and, even more importantly, it both eschews the notion that all 
men deserve respect and ethical treatment and instead purports to embrace them by 
making man's duty to the state, and to his particular community only, the ultimate in 
ethical behavior.  
 
III. Return to Davos 
 
 Recall that Heidegger and Cassirer's conversation focused primarily on the correct 
interpretation of Kant and the place of ethics in philosophical discourse, a topic that was 
of great interest to Mussolini and Gentile as well.  There is no question that the debate 
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was shaped by and directly reflected in the political and philosophical climate of the 
times.  And as Richard Rubenstein points out, “Were Heidegger a lesser figure, his 
involvement in National Socialism would be of little concern save to historians with a 
special interest in German philosophy. Unfortunately, such is not the case.”69 Some claim 
that there is no intrinsic connection between Heidegger's thought and his politics, and yet 
this seems impossible, given that as early as 1927 Heidegger himself implied there was 
indeed a connection between authentic existence, thought and politics. Heidegger wrote: 
 
Our fates have already been guided in advance, in our Being with one 
another in the same world and in our resoluteness for definite 
possibilities...Dasein's fateful destiny in and with its 'generation' goes to 
make up the full authentic historicizing of Dasein70. 
 
One is authentic when one is fully committed to and engaged in achieving the destiny of 
one's volk. This is, in fact, the most authentic of all engagements, since for Heidegger 
there is no transcendence and no authentic subjective “individualism.”  These themes—
the destiny of a volk, the submersion of the individual for the purpose of a specific volk 
collective's greater good—are reminiscent of those taken up by proto-fascists and by 
Heidegger’s fascist contemporaries.  
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70 Heidegger, Being and Time, 436.  
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 Also present as early as in Being and Time is Heidegger's longing for a “hero.” 
According to Heidegger, Dasein might choose his hero based on “authentic...repeatable 
possibilities of existence.” In other words, one might choose a “hero” based on whether 
or not his or her presence resonates with history, with themes and values and mythologies 
of a repeatable past. Although Heidegger's language is far more guarded and esoteric than 
that of the other romantic nationalists we have examined so far, the messianic longing in 
Being and Time is unmistakable. An authentic hero will bring with him the possibility of 
repeating the mythic past in the present time, among his own generation and for the sake 
of his volk.  
 Throughout his career Heidegger professed a profound distaste for pluralistic, 
urban modernity that for Heidegger and other likeminded intellectuals was synonymous 
with the democracy and heterogeneity of the Weimar years. Along with Heidegger, men 
like Gerhard Kittel, Paul Althaus and Emmanuel Hirsch, all Protestant theologians gave 
National Socialism their full support when it arrived on the German political scene.  This 
disgust for cities and heterogeneous life often went hand in hand with the racial anti-
Semitism of the time. In 1937 Paul Althaus wrote of his distaste for both Jews and urban 
places: 
 
Its does not have to do with Jewish hatred—one can reach an agreement 
directly with serious Jews on that point--, it does have to do with blood, 
also not with the religious beliefs of Judaism.  But it does involve threat of 
a quite specific disintegrated and demoralizing urban spirituality, whose 
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representative is now the Jewish Volk.71 
 
 Statements like this from thinkers across Europe during the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries which express a distaste for urban like accompanied by anti-Semitic 
feelings are not uncommon.72  It is outside the scope of this study to answer the question 
of whether Heidegger himself was anti-Semitic.73 The question is still hotly debated, but 
there is significant evidence that Heidegger was indeed anti-Semitic, or at least 
opportunistic enough to have acted the part of an anti-Semite more than once. Our 
understanding of the discussion at Davos is more comprehensive when we see the 
exchange between Heidegger and Cassirer as taking place at the same time that National 
Socialism and other forms of totalitarianism are increasingly popular.  
 We begin to see this most clearly when, during the proceedings at Davos, 
Heidegger resorts to a personal attack against Cassier. When attempting to sum up what 
he feels is the essential task of philosophy, Heidegger states: “...there is genuine activity 
only when there is opposition...and philosophy has the task of throwing man back into the 
                                                
71 Paul Althaus, Kirche und Volkstum: Der völkische Wille im Lichte des Evansgeliums (Gutersloh, 1928), 
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hardness of his fate from out of the softness [or shallowness] of one who merely lives off 
the work of the spirit.”74 As Geoffrey Waite rightly remarks about this statement, “The 
Davos audience must have gasped silently, if not aloud.  For it was clear...that Cassirer—
his person, institution, and tradition—was suddenly being accused of inauthentic, 
cowardly, opportunistic parasitism. The rule of academic decorum had been...broken...”75  
 In response to Heidegger's underhanded, oppositional remarks, Cassirer seems to 
acknowledge that Heidegger has insulted him: “I believe it has already become clearer in 
what the opposition exists. It is not fruitful to stress the opposition repeatedly...It seems, 
then,” Cassirer continued, “we are condemned here to some sort of relativity...We are at a 
point where there is little to be gained through purely logical arguments.”76 If Cassirer 
was not aware that Heidegger was a budding National Socialist, he at least recognized the 
relativist, romantic nature of Heidegger's thought. Heidegger claimed, at Davos and 
elsewhere, that truth and ethical norms were not universal but relative. Heidegger states 
that he does not believe that “truth is always only what the individual man thinks” when 
he claims “truth is relative to Dasein.” Yet he asserts that “truth as such can only be as 
truth if Dasein exists,” therefore, “truth is relative to Dasein.”77  Heidegger then asserts 
that the real question of philosophy should not be about the nature of truth, but rather, the 
“validity of eternality” and the impossibility of freedom as an “object of theoretical 
comprehension.” In so doing, he sidesteps entirely the issue of ethics as a primary 
concern of philosophy and avoids acknowledging directly the implications of the claim 
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75 Waite, “On Esotericism,” 26.  
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that truth is relative. Heidegger resorts to attacking Cassirer personally after he resists 
Heidegger's repeated attempts to steer the whole of the conversation toward musings 
about metaphysics.  
 Heidegger's work is targeted by thinkers like Levinas, Wiesel and Rubenstein for 
reasons which include and extend beyond accusations of anti-Semitism.  About 
Heidegger's earliest years as a thinker, Emmanuel Faye writes: 
 
...the rejection, by 1919, of universality as inauthentic, disdain for the 
ideal of humanity, the affirmation of self and concern for oneself, as well 
as attentiveness to the historicity of existence: these salient points were 
affirmed by 1919-1923, while he was teaching at...Freiburg  as Husserl's 
assistant...Heidegger kept up an appearance of ties with Husserl until 
obtaining the latter's succession, in 1928, as ordinary professor 
at...Freiburg.  Two months after his appointment [as Husserl's 
replacement] he broke off all relations with his former teacher.78 
 
Heidegger later accused Husserl, as he had accused Cassirer at Davos, of Bodenlosigkeit, 
or absence of soil with regard to history, a concept he may have discovered in 
Correspondence Between Wilhelm Dilthey and Count Paul Yorck von Wartenburg, from 
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the first volume of Erich Rothacker's Philosophy and the Sciences of the Mind.79 
Wartenburg writes to Dilthey: 
 
I thank you for all the particular cases in which you keep teaching chairs 
away from the thin Jewish run-of-the-mill [die dünne jüdische Routine] 
who lack consciousness of the responsibility of thought, just as the whole 
race lacks a feeling for psychic and physical soil.80 
 
These ideas entered the academy and were justified and normalized by the scholars who 
embraced them and made it possible for fascism to laud itself as philosophically and 
ethically sound.  While Dilthey himself was not an anti-Semite, it is hard to read his 
friend and correspondent's words as anything but that. The notion that Jews constitute a 
“race” with a pre-determined “consciousness” was far from uncommon, even among 
intellectuals.81 
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IV. “Between Rivers,” or, Modern Jewish Thought82  
 
             Along with changing the way much of European thought about science, 
statecraft, governance, human nature and ethics, the Enlightenment also created modern 
Jewish thought, which must be differentiated from Jewish philosophy. The term “Jewish 
thought” refers not only to Jewish philosophy, but also to Jewish theology and political 
thought as well. The distinction between “thought” and “philosophy” is in many ways a 
counter-Enlightenment critique, but Jewish intellectual tradition makes these distinctions 
as well.  The term “Jewish thought” assumes that Jewish philosophy is but one kind of 
Jewish intellectual expression.  
 One crucial difference between Jewish “thought” and Jewish “philosophy” is that 
in theory Jewish philosophy attempts to transcend the particularities of Jewish religion, 
culture, politics and experience by means of a methodology that aims for the “universal,” 
or better yet, makes use of the particularity of Judaism in order to point to something 
“universal.” Ancient, medieval and modern Jewish philosophy all participate in placing 
texts, ideas and traditions specific to Judaism as well as its laws, precepts and ethics in 
correlation with the methodology of philosophy. In the ancient and medieval periods, the 
basic assumption that drove the entire enterprise of Jewish philosophy was that 
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reconciliation between revelation and philosophy was not only possible, but also 
relatively unproblematic. The work of Philo of Alexander, for example, centered on the 
allegorical interpretation of sacred texts and served a dual purpose. First, it served as a 
justification of Judaism to mainstream Greco-Roman society.  Second, it attempted to 
prove to other Jews that Judaism and Greek philosophy were not actually in opposition 
with one another, but in fact stood for what he felt were compatible ideologies. Judaism 
and philosophy could work in concert, modifying and improving one another through the 
application and development of shared values.   
 The medieval period experienced a proliferation of Jewish philosophy for a 
number of reasons. First, philosophy itself was a popular discipline because it still 
included all the theoretical sciences of antiquity, including physics and metaphysics 
(otherwise known as philosophical theology) and ethics.  The study of philosophy was 
often combined with the study of law or medicine as well.83 As Michael Zank points out, 
medieval philosophers were “universally educated” thinkers who were not considered 
specialists, at least not in the modern sense of the term.  Philosophers showed their skill 
by becoming familiar with a canon of texts and an accompanying number of “well-
rehearsed” arguments, and  “...individual creativity expressed itself mostly in style and in 
the ability to rearrange connections between problems that had long since been 
articulated.”84  
 But medieval Jewish philosophers like Judah Ha-Levi, Abraham Ibn Daud and 
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Maimonides did not have direct access to the ancient Greek and Romans sources like 
ancient Jewish philosophers did, and so they inherited the Islamic philosophical tradition 
and wrote mostly in Arabic or Judeo-Arabic and, later, Hebrew.  And like their ancient 
predecessors, they primarily concerned themselves with proving that the truths and tenets 
of Greek philosophy were not in contradiction with those of the Torah.  Modern Jewish 
philosophers read most of these medieval Jewish philosophers in Hebrew rather than in 
its original Arabic or Judeo-Arabic but were also able to read the ancient Greek and 
Roman sources in their original Latin and Greek.  According to Zank, “...like ancient 
Jewish philosophy, its modern heir is fraught with problems of cultural identity, while for 
the medievals the problem was how to philosophize without breaking the law, and how to 
be obedient to the law without relinquishing the truth. In contrast, modern Jewish 
philosophy appears under the suspicion that it represents an attenuated Judaism.”85  
 Moses Mendelssohn's Jerusalem, published in 1783 is generally considered the 
progenitor of modern Jewish philosophy but there is less agreement on which texts are 
considered the “last” of the genre.  In general, however, the production of modern Jewish 
philosophy, not unlike neo-Kantianism and other Enlightenment-inspired philosophies, 
wanes during the interwar period.86 And like many of the philosophical, theological and 
political texts of the time, modern Jewish philosophical works feature the messianic 
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notion of “progress” achieved by means of a “return” to original, pre-modern and 
heretofore misunderstood systems and paradigms.  Messianism manifests itself in a 
number of ways in modern Jewish philosophy, but is arguably the most prominent in the 
work of Hermann Cohen, who understands the messianic as at least in part man's ability 
to perfect himself and his world by means of the reason given to him by God.  Cohen's 
messianism did not embrace the same kind of utopian future favored by the German 
cultural critics and proto-fascists of his time.  Instead, man and man, and man and God, 
would come into greater correlation with one another, until each man saw every other 
man as his mitmenschen. Cohen's final destination was the perfection of ethical relations 
between human beings, and by extension, the perfection of the relationship between 
humankind and the Divine.  
 Cohen's image of a perfected world was liberal, progressive and socialist.  To be 
sure, many modern Jewish philosophers supported Enlightenment ideals. In the political 
climate of the times, rejection of the Enlightenment implied a lack of support for the 
emancipation of European Jews, and without the Enlightenment, people like Cohen and 
later, his student Ernst Cassirer, would have never been eligible for a university post in 
philosophy. Jürgen Habermas' observation that a deep affinity existed between the spirit 
of Kant and the spirit of Judaism was supported by the “remarkable prominence of 
theorists of Jewish heritage would seem to suggest Kant's essential “attractiveness to the 
Jewish mind.””87 As Peter Gordon points out, “it seems most likely that it was the 
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emancipatory potential of Kant's Enlightenment idea that best explains the alliance.” This 
connection between Jewish and liberal Enlightenment interests continued “from the era 
of emancipation to the First World War and continued well into the Weimar Republic, 
when most Jews still identified themselves with the major liberal parties or the majority 
socialists (not, as some might now imagine, with anarchism and radical utopianism).”88 
This makes sense, since it would be in a German Jew's best interest to support his own 
emancipation.   
 Of primary concern is the possibility of a secular ethics derived from values 
shared by Judaism and Kantian inspired philosophy.  As Paul W. Franks states: 
 
Since the end of the eighteenth century, no non-Jewish philosopher has been more 
central to Jewish philosophy than Kant. The major Jewish philosophers of late 
mediation of post-Kantians...just as the major ancient and medieval Jewish 
philosophers worked out their positions in relation to Plato, sometimes through 
the mediation of post-Platonists such as Aristotle, Plotinus and Alfarabi.89  
  
Franks further argues that Jewish philosophy's affinity for Kant can be best explained by 
its “longstanding involvement with the Platonic tradition...some distinctive features of 
Kant's Platonism are especially susceptible to interpretation in terms of such central 
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Jewish concepts as divine unity, law and messianism.”90  
 Most striking, though, for anyone familiar with both Jewish philosophy and Kant 
is the fact that Kant brings together epistemology and ethics through the concept of law, a 
concept central to Jewish philosophy since Philo.  Even more important is Kant's 
understanding that ideas regulate the goals of ethical life.  In the words of Franks: 
   
Kant argues [that] human beings want to be happy, and it is rational for us to 
pursue happiness, so long as it is subordinate to virtue.  Thus, the supreme goal of 
life—the highest good—is a world containing a society of maximally virtuous 
agents who are just as happy as they deserve to be.  The highest good makes 
ethics into a project that is also political and economical.  For it requires us to do 
whatever we can to create and support institutions and arrangements that 
maximally support this ideal world.   
 
But as Franks points out, Kant's project is not entirely secular, even though he intends to 
develop an ethics that can facilitate “the highest good” in secular society.  
 
...the highest good [however] makes ethics into a project that is also 
religious.  For, Kant argues, we humans can never secure the 
proportionality of happiness to virtue; only God, who is both creator of the 
world and has a holy will—a will for which the moral law justice is a strict 
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necessity—could render this goal attainable.  Since the ethical project 
requires us to hope for the highest good, and since this hope is realizable 
only with divine assistance, it follows that the ethical project requires 
belief in God.  Religion is thus required by reason as a part of morality.91 
 
Kant's later work, then, claims not only the idea that rational faith is a precondition for 
the highest good, but God is “the legislator of the moral law” because God is pure 
rational will which expresses itself in the moral law. Some Kantians—specifically those 
who seek to dispense with religion as the ground of morality altogether—have remained 
unconvinced by this argument, but Jewish philosophers often adopted this aspect of 
Kant’s ethics.  Hermann Cohen, for example, asserts that God is the idea of a holy will 
that is the absolute ground of virtue, and not merely a guarantor of the realization of the 
highest good.  
 The themes of prophecy, revelation, law and ethics are central to Jewish thought 
and are irretrievably and inextricably intertwined.  Thinkers put these components 
together in various ways and may emphasize one over the other, but the prophet as the 
receiver and mouthpiece of the law and ethics is constant.  For Maimonides, the prophet 
was one who received “lightening flashes” of truth in varying amounts and for varying 
lengths of time.  Some prophets received brief flashes only to return to “darkness” 
forever, although most perceived these prophet flashes at long intervals. As the receiver 
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of the Torah mi'Sinai, Moses Rabbenu remained in “unceasing light” and “night appears 
to him as day.”92 Law and ethics are inseparable because they come from the same 
source: the Divine.  And the prophet is the harbinger of the ethical imperative because the 
law is revealed to him or her by God. But the rabbis of the Mishnah instruct practitioners 
to follow every commandment with equal diligence, since we cannot be sure which 
merits the greater or lesser reward.93 There was no independent ethics that could be 
separated from the law.  
 But most European Jewish philosophers from Mendelssohn on assumed that 
divine commandments were not a proper source for the foundation of universal ethics. As 
Marvin Fox explains, “Moral principles, in their view, are known independently and are 
grounded in human reason.”94 These modern thinkers, unlike their rabbinic and medieval 
predecessors, asserted that laws were ordained by God because they were moral. This 
meant that the ethicality of a commandment was based on its inherent rationality, not on 
the fact of its divine source. This configuration does not necessarily sever the connection 
between law, ethics, and prophecy present in Jewish texts since the Hebrew Bible but it 
does create significant changes in the way in which Jewish thought treats themes related 
to the interconnectedness of morality and law specifically.   
 Modern philosophy of religion in general tends to argue that the area of greatest 
connection between religion and philosophy—and therefore the juncture at which the two 
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traditions can be of greatest service to us—is ethics. We recall that regardless of Kant's 
assertions that God's holy will guarantees the possibility of the highest good, what he 
worked toward was an ethics that can be applied in all our actions with any other human 
beings regardless of differences in belief or station.  If every person is her own “kingdom 
of ends,” then every human being deserves respect, or ethical treatment at the hands of 
others.  It is hard to think of an approach to ethics that would have appealed more to most 
European Jewish philosophers before, during and immediately following the 
emancipation of European Jewry. When Jewish philosophers point to the centrality of the 
prophetic imperative in Jewish thought and legal tradition, they are also highlighting an 
aspect of their tradition which they hope will be seen as compatible with liberal post-
Enlightenment interest in human equality.   
 But not all modern Jewish philosophers monolithically supported the precepts of 
the Enlightenment. By the end of the 1920s many of the younger generation had grown 
disillusioned with Kantianism. Given that many of this generation were also veterans of 
the Great War, this ideological malaise is understandable. Thinkers like former Hegelian 
Franz Rosenzweig turned away from philosophical idealism and categorized it as 
“diseased.” Instead Rosenzweig was deeply influenced by the romanticism and 
existentialism of pre-and-post-World War I Europe.  According to Rosenzweig, idealism 
failed to provide man with his most important skill: dealing with the fear of death. Like 
Heidegger, who Rosenzweig claimed as his “philosophical brother,” Rosenzweig 
embraced “Das Neue Denken,” that focused on finitude, alienation and isolation as the 
central concerns of modern thought.  Rosenzweig's most famous work, The Star of 
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Redemption, written in the gruesome trenches of World War I, reflects the culture of 
Weimar at least as much, if not more than it represents traditional Jewish metaphysics. 
Like Heidegger, Rosenzweig claims that man develops “authenticity” only when he 
stares into Nothingness and faces his finitude, and “redemption” has occurred when man 
embraces his temporality and learns to exist in stable relation to man and God.95  
 Rosenzweig's language is often essentialist. If Gordon is correct that “similarity, 
not otherness, was the guiding principle of Cohen's cultural vision,”96 then surely 
Rosenzweig's guidepost was his understanding of German-Jewish identity as “between 
rivers” or in a “perpetually liminal space.” This is different from Cohen's assertion that 
German Jews represented the perfect correlation between Deutschtum and Judentum.  
Instead, German Jews represented a kind of liminality, not “this” and “that” but neither 
“this” nor “that.”97 German Jews were an ultimate other for Rosenzweig, and unlike 
Cohen's generation who struggled against associating Judaism and Jewishness with 
otherness, Rosenzweig embraced it.   
 According to Rosenzweig, Jews and Christians exist in different kinds of time and 
experience.  Whereas Jews receive redemption “in the world,” Christians must wait to 
experience eternality at the end of time. “The role of the Christian is the eternal way,” 
wrote Rosenzweig, “while the role of Judaism is that of eternal life.” The notion that a 
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volk like the Jews has a pre-determined, distinctive position in human history is 
reminiscent of other nationalist discourses of the time. But it is difficult to characterize 
Rosenzweig's political proclivities, except that he may have had monarchist, rather than 
democratic or socialist leanings. He was not a Zionist, but one could not call him and 
anti-Zionist either; what characterized his work, at least in part, was his rejection of 
Enlightenment precepts of universality with regard to culture, belief and ethics.  
 Leo Strauss was not a theologian, but like Rosenzweig, he rejected what he felt 
was the inherently homogenizing nature of Enlightenment thought and politics. In his 
opinion, democracy as it developed via Enlightenment philosophy forced a “creeping 
conformity” and made false promises to minority communities who traded their traditions 
and specific identities for an equality and freedom that, in Strauss' opinion, never fully 
materialized.  Moreover, he felt that politically enforced equality prevented excellence 
and erased difference. Strauss' rejection of neo-Kantian Judaism may have been the result 
of the Great War, the failure of emancipation to quell increasingly virulent anti-Semitism, 
and maybe even the irresistible pull of “the New Thinking” espoused by Heidegger and 
his students.  It should be noted that Strauss hoped to be Hermann Cohen's student, but 
the World War I prevented it.  By the time Strauss was free to attend university, Cohen 
had died.   
 When Heidegger and Cassirer appear at Davos in 1929, the 23 year-old Levinas is 
a student of Edmund Husserl and also enthralled with “the New Thinking” as expressed 
by Rosenzweig and Heidegger.  By the 1930s, Levinas' thinking would change radically.  
In 1929, Richard Rubenstein was 5 years old, but only a few short years later would face 
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anti-Semitic violence from Bund members who lived in his neighborhood while his 
parents looked on helplessly.  Elie Wiesel was not yet a year old and was living with his 
family in Hungary. By the time he was 23 years old, he had survived his father in 
Auschwitz, been relocated to Paris, studied at the Sorbonne, and joined the Irgun. The 
world Levinas, Rubenstein and Wiesel inherited was different beyond measure from that 
of their predecessors.   
 
V. Jewish Theological and Philosophical Response to the Holocaust  
 
 Emancipation of the Jews in Europe changed Western Jewish thought profoundly. 
The Holocaust changed it yet again. Although Jewish theological and philosophical 
responses to the Holocaust vary significantly, they can be understood by and large as 
either relying on pre-existing explanations for the presence of evil and undeserved human 
suffering, or as attempts to develop new ways of coping with these eternal problems.  The 
question of foremost significance in regard to this issue is the question of the Holocaust's 
uniqueness in Jewish history and in human history in general. While there are several 
ways in which one can attempt to measure the uniqueness of an event like the Holocaust 
qualitatively, such efforts are dubious and produce results that are impossible to defend.  
How, for example, can we claim that the Holocaust is “more evil” than New World 
slavery or the mass murder of Armenians under Turkish rule in the early twentieth 
century? How, too, could we possibly compare the suffering of those slaughtered in 
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Rwanda to those who suffered in Treblinka? As Steven T. Katz asserts, the best criteria 
for measuring the uniqueness of any event are phenomenological.  Katz writes: 
 
The Holocaust is phenomenologically unique by virtue of the fact that 
never before has a state set out, as a matter of intentional principle and 
actualized policy, to annihilate every man, woman and child belonging to 
a specific people.  This conclusion entails that the Holocaust would not be 
the Holocaust if the property of “intentionally pursuing the physical 
annihilation of a people without remainder” were not present. Likewise, 
other occasions of mass death that lack this necessary intent...are not 
comparable to the Holocaust, at least not as regards this property.98 
 
Katz also argues persuasively that it is “not at all clear...that there is a direct, and 
preferred, theological meaning to be drawn from the exceptionality of [the Holocaust].”99 
Yet arguments that claim that no significant changes are necessary as a result of the 
Holocaust are not thoroughly convincing, either.  The matter remains open for debate. 
And this fundamental question regarding the Holocaust's uniqueness serves as the 
necessary starting point for the numerous theological and philosophical responses to the 
                                                
98 Steven T. Katz's introduction to “Part III: European and American Responses During and Following the 
War,” Wrestling with God: Jewish Theological Responses During and After the Holocaust, eds. Steven 
T. Katz, Shlomo Biderman and Gershon Greenberg (New York, 2007), 367-368. See Katz's The 
Holocaust in Historical Context, vol. 1 (New York, 1994) for a complete explication of his argument 
about the uniqueness of the Holocaust.  
99  Katz, “Introduction,” 368.  
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Holocaust whether they are traditional or innovative, including those of Levinas, Wiesel 
and Rubenstein.  
 For example, there are at least six biblical models that have been used by Jewish 
theology and philosophy to cope with and make sense of the many challenges the 
Holocaust poses to Jewish life and practice.  
 
1. The Akedah or the Binding of Isaac story found in Genesis 
2. Job 
3. The “Suffering Servant” doctrine in the Book of Isaiah 
4. Hester Panim, an idea found in various texts in the Hebrew Bible that attempts to 
account for moments in history when God appears to be conspicuously absent 
5. Mipnei Chataeynu, or “Because of Our Sins We Are Punished,” often referred to as 
Deutoronomistic approach to theodicy 
6. The Burden of Human Freedom, or “The Free Will Defense”100 
 
Each of these positions are extensions of classical Jewish responses to Jewish suffering 
and persecution and can be used to support the position that the Holocaust does not 
necessitate any significant changes to Jewish theology and practice whether it is 
considered a unique event in Jewish history or not. The salient characteristic of these 
responses is that the nature of God, humanity and creation as Judaism has understood 
them (at least since Maimonides if not before) remain intact.  God is perfect, He is just, 
                                                
100  Katz, “Introduction,” 355-360. 
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and His justice is often beyond human understanding. While the more ultra-orthodox 
assertions which place the blame for the entirety of the Shoah squarely on the shoulders 
of the 6 million murdered Jewish men, women and children are often considered 
unthinkable by most, such claims must also be understood as containing, for those who 
espouse them, a significant degree of comfort: God still loves His people, precisely 
because He made the effort to punish them; Hope remains because the Jews, although 
severely reduced in number, remain; God and His Torah need not be questioned.  Then, 
too, if you believe those who suffer deserve to suffer, then your own suffering and the 
suffering of your loved ones seems within your control: If I want to avoid punishment, I 
will follow the Law as best I can and persuade others to do the same.    
 But most of the approaches that seek to maintain traditional Jewish theology even 
in light of the Holocaust do not embrace this Deuteronomistic approach to suffering. The 
strength of these arguments is founded in the very claims Katz makes regarding the 
impossibility of measuring the potential ethical or metaphysical uniqueness of an 
historical event.  The suffering of those Jews who died in the Rhineland and elsewhere 
during the massacres of the first Crusade, for example, cannot be compared to the 
suffering of the Jewish children who starved to death in the Warsaw Ghetto.  And the 
qualitative uniqueness of the domestic policies of a state such as Nazi Germany need not 
influence the future of Jewish theology; that is, Jews were the victims of the Holocaust 
and not it's perpetrators. The moral or metaphysical imperfections that led to the Shoah 
are not the fault of traditional Judaism as system, but rather of Western ethics and 
governments as a whole. Even the ultra-orthodox who claim the 6 million were punished 
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and therefore not innocent claim only that Judaism was imperfectly practiced, and not 
that Judaism as a system is somehow lacking and therefore responsible for the tragedy of 
the Shoah.  
 In the last 60 years, however, a number of Jewish philosophers and theologians 
have insisted that the size, scope and magnitude of the horrors of the Final Solution 
require radical changes to Jewish thought and practice even though the 6 million innocent 
victims—and Judaism itself--are blameless.  These thinkers attempt to create something 
new, their efforts usually feature the same stories, metaphors and images as those utilized 
by classical pre-Holocaust Judaism; Job, Abraham and Isaac, the Hidden God, and the 
Suffering Servant continue to hold meaning, whether or not Judaism can remain 
unchanged after Auschwitz. The notion that I suffer because I sinned, however, is 
universally rejected by the more innovative approaches to Judaism after the Holocaust. 
While there are many suggestions for how Judaism can and should respond to the 
Holocaust six in particular that are worth exploring here. 
 
1. Auschwitz Constitutes a New Revelation 
2. The Covenant Has Been Broken 
3. Redefining God 
4. God is Dead 
5. A Renewal of Ethical Obligation 
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6. Mystery and Silence101 
 
 Jewish philosophical responses to the Holocaust abound as well.  Berel Lang 
argues that the “single most widely discussed analysis of evil in relation to the 
Holocaust...remains” that posed by Hannah Arendt in Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report 
of the Banality of Evil.  Lang argues that Arendt views the Holocaust as both unique and 
part of a continuing problem of theodicy and human evil as it has unfolded in time.  Lang 
also points out that the controversial nature of Arendt's discussion of Eichmann and evil 
rests on her simultaneous arguments that evil is neither deep nor “real” in the 
philosophical sense and that Eichmann is nonetheless responsible for the attempted 
genocide of European Jews and deserves execution. Lang aptly writes that if these 
“claims [are] puzzling, it says as much about the issues as it does about her specific 
account.”102  
 Arendt's treatment of the problem of evil is more well known, perhaps in part 
because it is patently philosophical and lacks the theological component present in the 
work of many Jewish thinkers, especially with regard to the Shoah. Arendt's assessment 
of both Eichmann and the Holocaust as originating from something “banal” invited 
intense criticism from contemporary Jewish thinkers in particular.103 Gershom Scholem, 
                                                
101 Katz, “Introduction,” 361-367.  
102 Berel Lang, Evil, Suffering and the Holocaust,” The Cambridge Companion to Modern Jewish 
Philosophy, Morgan, Michael, L. and Peter Eli Gordon, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), 293.  
103 In 1963 the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith issued condemnatory memorandums and 
newspaper columns denounced Arendt as a “self-hating Jewess.”  See Anti-Defamation League's “A 
Report on the Evil of Banality: The Arendt Book,” Facts 15, no. 1 (July-August): 263-270. Critics were 
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for example, felt that Jewish philosophy—and perhaps philosophy in general—was out of 
touch with and disconnected from lived human experience. Scholem instead embraced a 
“kabbalistic” approach to confronting the problem of evil: 
 
Kabbalism...did not turn its back on the primitive side of life, that all-
important region where mortals are afraid of life, and in fear of death, and 
derive scant wisdom from rational philosophy.  Philosophy ignored these 
fears...and in turning its back upon the primitive side of man's existence, it 
paid a high price in losing touch with him altogether.  For it is cold 
comfort to those who are plagued by genuine fear and sorrow to be told 
that their troubles are but the workings of the imagination.104 
 
The tendency of Jewish thinkers to utilize both philosophy and theology, especially when 
approaching the problem of evil as Scholem does is neither new nor uncommon. On the 
other hand, Arendt's approach to evil (which Scholem roundly condemned)105 is atypical, 
                                                                                                                                            
particularly dismayed that Arendt attempted to discuss the role of the Judenräte in the death of 6 
million European Jews. While Arendt claimed “there was no possibility of resistance,” she did insist 
that “there remained the possibility of doing nothing.”  What, for example, if the Judenräte had simply 
been less organized, and had refused en masse to provide the Nazis with careful lists of names? These 
kinds of questions were almost impossible to broach at the time, as is evidenced by the outpouring of 
criticism when Arendt raised the question in Eichmann in Jerusalem. For more on reactions to Arendt's 
Eichmann in Jerusalem, see Judith N. Shklar's “Hannah Arendt as Pariah,” Partisan Review 50:1 
(1983): 64-77; Bernard Crick, “Hannah Arendt and the Burden of Our Times,” in The Political 
Quarterly 30 (1997): 77-84.  
104  Gershom Scholem, Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism, (New York: Schocken Books, 1941), 35.  
105  In 1964, an exchange of letters between Scholem and Arendt was published in Encounter.  All the 
correspondence between them referred to in this chapter belong to that exchange. Arendt's assessment 
of evil as it manifested in Eichmann and the henchmen of the Reich runs counter to Scholem's theories 
about evil.  See “Eichmann in Jerusalem,” Encounter 22 no. 1(January 1964):51-52 and “An Exchange 
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at least among Jewish thinkers.106  In his letter to Arendt regarding Eichmann in 
Jerusalem wherein Arendt begins to develop her theory regarding the nature of evil, he 
focuses mainly on what he calls her “heartless, frequently almost sneering and malicious 
tone.”  According to Scholem, her account of Eichmann's trial and her subsequent 
discussions regarding the role of the Judenräte in the demise of European Jewry107 and 
the ethical quandary she believed was posed by collaborative efforts between some 
Zionists and the Nazis to get Jews out of Europe “cease...to be objective and 
acquire...overtones of malice.” Scholem went on to say that he had “little sympathy with 
that tone—well expressed by the English word “flippancy”--which you employed so 
often in the course of your book.  To the matter of which you speak it is unimaginably 
inappropriate.” Jewish critics were deeply upset by her book, he explained, because “...In 
the Jewish tradition, there is a concept, hard to define and yet concrete enough, which we 
know as Ahabath Israel: “Love of the Jewish people”...In you, dear Hannah...I find little 
trace of this.”108  
 Arendt agreed wholeheartedly with Scholem's assessment of her as no “lover of 
Israel.” She was “not moved by any “love” of this sort...I have never in my life “loved” 
any people or collective—neither the German people, nor the French, nor the American, 
                                                                                                                                            
of Letters,” Encounter 22 no. 1 (January 1964):53-55.   
106 When I use the term “Jewish thinkers” here, I am referring to thinkers who practice Jewish philosophy 
or Jewish thought as defined earlier in this chapter.  I am not referring to all thinkers who happen to be 
Jewish.  
107  Arendt wrote that “Jewish leaders...almost without exception, cooperated in one way or another, for 
one reason or another, with the Nazis. The whole truth is that if the Jewish people had really been 
unorganized and leaderless, there would have chaos and plenty of misery but the total number of 
victims would hardly have been four and half an six million people.” “Eichmann in Jerusalem,” The 
Portable Hannah Arendt, 354.  
108  Arendt, “Eichmann in Jerusalem,” 354. 
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nor the working class or anything of that sort...in this sense I do not “love” the Jews...I 
merely belong to them as a matter of course, beyond dispute or argument.” Arendt wrote 
to Scholem:  
 
I do not belong to any organization and always speak for myself, and on 
the other hand...I have great confidence in Lessing's selbstdenken for 
which, I think, no ideology, no public opinion, and no “convictions” can 
ever be a substitute. Whatever your objections to the results, you must 
realize that they are really my own and nobody else's.109 
  
 There were noteworthy supporters of Arendt's account of the Eichmann trial, as 
well. Among the most prominent was Bruno Bettelheim, who wrote a positive review of 
the book for The New Republic. Bettelheim, who was a camp survivor, insisted that the 
real issue was not Eichmann, but totalitarianism.  Bettelheim wrote: 
 
...while I would recommend this book for many reasons, the most important one 
is that our best protection against oppressive control and dehumanizing 
totalitarianism is still a personal understanding of events as they happen.  To this 
end Hannah Arendt has furnished us with a richness of material.   
 
                                                
109  Hannah Arendt, ““A Daughter of Our People”: A Response to Gershom Scholem,” The Portable 
Hannah Arendt (New York: Penguin Books, 2000), 394-395.  
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Bettelheim agreed with Arendt's assessment that the Holocaust was not the climax of a 
long history of violence against the Jews of Europe, but rather “merely one part of the 
master plan to create the thousand year totalitarian Reich.”110 In 1965, Michael 
Musmanno, an outspoken critic of Eichmann in Jerusalem, claimed that Arendt's book 
was so full of errors that “one could only cover the absurdities in her book by writing one 
equally as long to refute it.”111 Jacob Robinson did just that.  His treatise, entitled And the 
Crooked Shall be Made Straight, was over 400 pages long. By means of hundreds of 
different sources in multiple languages he comprehensively demolished Arendt's theses 
regarding the Judenräte, the character of Eichmann, and the nature of international law.  
Although she attempted to refute Robinson's argument, Robinson's book was extremely 
well researched and pointed to glaring mistakes in Arendt's scholarship. 
 Unlike many other Jewish thinkers of her time, Arendt never employed a dual 
tradition, but remained firmly ensconced in the tradition of German philosophical and 
political thought. It may have been precisely this fact that made her approach to 
understanding the Holocaust—and more broadly, to evil—so unpalatable and ultimately 
insufficient for Scholem.  It indicated more than Arendt's reluctance to affiliate herself 
ideologically with one camp over another. For thinkers like Scholem, such problems 
could not be understood or dealt with by means of a single tradition or discipline alone. 
Anson Rabinovich argued that the controversy surrounding Eichmann in Jerusalem was 
                                                
110  Bruno Bettelheim, “Eichmann; the System; the Victims,” The New Republic 148, no 24 (June 15, 
1963): 23-33.  
111  Michael, A. Musmanno, “Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Critique,” Chicago Jewish Forum 21, no. 4 
(Summer, 1963): 282-285.  
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“certainly the most bitter dispute regarding the Holocaust that has ever taken place.”112 
What emerges from the majority of post-Holocaust Jewish thought is rarely exclusively 
philosophical or theological but an amalgamation of both, a methodology that has been 
utilized by Jewish thinkers for centuries. If Kant and Cohen insisted philosophy should be 
about method, and Heidegger and Rosenzweig insisted it should be about metaphysics, 
then Levinas, Wiesel and Rubenstein insisted it should be about ethics, even if this meant 
rejecting traditional metaphysics.
                                                
112 Anson Rabinovich, “Eichmann in New York: The New York Intellectuals and the Hannah Arendt 
Controversy,” 97-111.  When the Partisan Review ran Lionel Abel's scathing review of Eichmann in 
Jerusalem, the editors agreed to allow for an open discussion on the matter.  What followed over a 
series of issues constituted an extremely passionate debate between intellectuals of various affiliations 
and persuasions. The Spring 1964 edition contained over thirty pages of arguments sparked by Arendt's 
book and the debates it raised. See Michael Ezra's “The Eichmann Polemics: Hannah Arendt and Her 
Critics,” Democratiya 9 (Summer 2007) for an excellent summary of the controversy surrounding 
Eichmann in Jerusalem and the public debate it spawned.  
  
90 
Chapter 2 
The Call of the Other: Levinasian Ethics 
 
 Part one of this chapter provides an exegesis of texts selected from Levinas' 
corpus to support the following claims about Levinasian ethics: 
 
1. Levinas grounds ethics in the temporal experience of suffering. 
2. Levinas draws heavily on Jewish texts, themes and culture to create his ethics, and 
claims that Judaism's focus on ethics and obligation to the other could provide 
Western thought with a blueprint for making ethics “first philosophy.” 
3. Levinas does not intend to create a normative ethics. Instead, he argues that we 
possess a built-in propensity for ethics that does not guarantee ethical behavior, but 
makes it possible. Levinas hoped others would use his theoretical framework to create 
an applied ethics.  
 
Part two of this chapter is a critical analysis of the texts and ideas presented in part one.  
Additional conclusions regarding Levinas' project are provided in Chapter 5.  
 
I.  Exegesis   
 
 If one reads Levinas' “philosophical” works as well as his “Jewish” writings, it is 
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clear that at least for Levinas, the two are not necessarily in conflict. Richard A. Cohen, 
who has translated a considerable number of Levinas' writings into English, writes:  
   
For...Levinas, there is no divorce between philosophy and religion. “There 
is communication between faith and philosophy,” he writes, “and not the 
notorious conflict. Communication in both directions.” No doubt the 
continuity between the two derives from the fact that Judaism is obligated 
to no “theology,” to no logos or dogma in conflict with philosophy.  
Judaism is rather a way of life in covenant with God, and such covenantal 
life includes knowledge, reflecting, and questioning—the mentalities 
traditionally associated with philosophy. But [more deeply than this]...For 
Levinas monotheism provides the ultimate justification for philosophy, 
satisfying philosophy's innermost demand for justification, but in a way 
that a philosophy detached from religion is unable.1 
  
Cohen correctly points out that many Jewish thinkers before Levinas have made similar 
arguments about the interconnectedness of religion and ethics.2 Ethics and religion are 
                                                
1 Richard A. Cohen, “Emmanuel Levinas: Philosopher and Jew,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia, T. 62, 
Fasc. 2/4 Entre Razão e Revelação: A'Lógica' da Dimensão Semíta na Filosofia/Between Reason and 
Revelation : The 'Logic' of the Semitic Dimension of Philosophy (April -Dec., 2006): 481.  
2  R.A. Cohen aptly states that making ethics the primary philosophical concern is not just a product of 
the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, or even of reformed liberal religion. Rabbi Samson Raphael 
Hirsch, the intellectual founder of modern Orthodox Judaism, would have agreed with Levinas' 
understanding of keeping the mitzvot.  As Cohen states, it “requires constant renewal in the present. 
Only in this way are commandments “living,” the word of the “living God,” operative in the created 
world that God Himself declares “good” right from the start. In this way, eternity and time intersect, 
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not distinct, but “one is the fulfillment of the other, and both require obedience to Law.” 
In other words, if I keep God's Law, then I am in close relation with God, especially 
when I render justice to other human beings in accordance with that Law. Cohen goes on 
to state that Levinas should be understood as applying this correlation between God, 
humanity, ethics and Law to more than just halakah: 
  
...the origin of theory is not simply praxis...nor is the origin of both theory 
and praxis a more primordial aesthetics of sensation or 
worldliness...Rather they begin and are permeated by the imperatives of 
social life as ethics. Prayer and ritual, moral care and juridical structures, 
as well as knowledge and scientific inquiry are all ventures in a human 
sociality driven not by myths and fantasies but by respect for others.3 
 
The familiar historical position that encourages correlation between morality, ritual, and 
law adopted by many Jewish thinkers before, during and after Levinas' time becomes 
“ethics as first philosophy” in Levinas' thought. Again, in the words of R.A. Cohen: 
 
For Levinas, the very humanity of the human is constituted as a moral 
relation—an “inter-subjective” relation—requiring kindness to one's 
neighbors and justice for all. Instead of thinking of humans as real beings 
                                                                                                                                            
require and elicit one another.” See “Philosopher and Jew,” 483.  
3 R.A. Cohen, “Philosopher and Jew,” 483.  
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who take on moral behavior as a gloss, or as intellects surpassing common 
morality, Levinas conceives of humans as moral beings for whom the 
real—both as science and culture—takes on a sense based upon personal 
responsibility, moral obligations and justice. Not freedom and culture but 
responsibility and justice lie at the heart of human selfhood.4 
   
Levinas finds this orientation of morality and obedience to the “good” as the ground of 
all other human pursuits--such as culture, science and civilization--in the Torah and the 
Talmud.  One does “good” as is commanded, and then one “knows” the “good.” If 
Western philosophy and culture adopted as its first concern man's responsibility for his 
fellow man, we would not create and support science or culture for its own sake or solely 
for the sake of economic growth; we would create science and culture to exist in the 
service of humanity. We would create culture and pursue knowledge because as moral 
creatures we want to create systems whose sole intent was the benefit our fellow man. 
Such a shift in emphasis would indeed require not just a re-orientation but a radical re-
thinking that in every sense places ethics in the first position. When we think of Levinas' 
project as working toward this kind of re-organization of thought and culture, Levinas' 
rejection of a forcible separation of philosophy and religion is not simply a matter of 
course but a deliberate re-ordering. Herein lies one of the most important innovations of 
Levinas' work and makes it a true re-thinking of Western thought. As R. A. Cohen puts it, 
                                                
4 R.A. Cohen, “Philosopher and Jew,” 487.  
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in the world view to which Levinas subscribes, “All the world's value and meaning—
from the intimate sighs of love to the universal symbols of mathematics—stands or falls 
on the shoulders of these very pressing historical concrete responsibilities.”5 The face of 
the other person contains a reminder of our obligations to one another, and provides a 
glimpse of the Holy Other.  That Holy Other is “living” because the singularity of the 
human face contains the epiphany of God on earth.  
 The focus of this dissertation with regard to Levinas is the way in which he uses 
the universal human experience of suffering as the ground for human ethical relations. 
Levinas not only focuses on the problem of human suffering as the central concern of 
ethics, but asserts that suffering, experienced on a spectrum throughout our lives, is what 
repeatedly activates the potential for ethics in the human psyche. While many scholars 
have focused on the theme of suffering in Levinas' work, none have noted that for 
Levinas human ethics are in fact grounded in suffering.  Levinas turns philosophical 
ethics on its head yet again by suggesting that ethics are not founded on law, happiness or 
carefully cultivated virtues.  The human ethical impulse is activated in spite of us and 
without our permission, and we experience our confrontation with the needs and demands 
of the other as both a suffering and a fulfillment.     
What Is Suffering? 
 
 Levinas attempted to correct what he believed was a centuries-long flaw in 
Western thought (a disinterest in ethics as a “serious” philosophical concern) and to 
                                                
5 R.A. Cohen, “Philosopher and Jew,” 490.  
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respond to the historical events for which he held Western thought responsible: the 
genocides and mass murders of the twentieth century.  For Levinas, philosophy's 
disconnection from religion not only took the problem of suffering out of the purview of 
philosophy, but placed ethics and the ethical impulse outside the range of rigorous 
inquiry altogether.  Like Husserl, Levinas believed that consciousness is our first “world” 
and that it can be investigated if we effectively describe affect, passions, moods, and 
reflections with fullness.6 Levinas' focus on immanence allowed the spectrum of 
consciousness as constituted in part by affective modes to become the subject of serious 
philosophical inquiry.  In Levinas' own words: “Husserlian phenomenology has made 
possible this passage from ethics to metaphysical exteriority.” And lest we think Levinas 
aims to answer any questions in the traditional sense, he avers that “Philosophical 
research in any case does not answer questions like an interview, an oracle, or wisdom.”7 
Levinas didn't believe his observations alone would solve long-standing philosophical, 
political or cultural problems, although his work was motivated by those problems. He 
wanted to change the style and focus of philosophical inquiry in hopes that a seismic shift 
of this kind would create at least the opportunity for change. The political nature of 
Levinas' project is stated clearly in the preface of Totality and Infinity:  
   
The state of war suspends morality; it divests the eternal institutions and 
                                                
6 See Bettina Bergo's “What is Levinas Doing? Phenomenology and the Rhetoric of an Ethical Un-
Conscious,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 8 no 2 (2004): 122-144.  
7 Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
Press, 1969), 29. See also Husserl's Logical Investigations, ed. J.N. Findlay (The International Library 
of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method, 1970) for more on Husserl's discussion of this 
matter. 
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obligations of their eternity and rescinds ad interim the unconditional 
imperatives...The art of foreseeing was and of winning it by every means--
politics—is henceforth enjoined as the very exercise of reason.  Politics is 
opposed to morality, and philosophy to naiveté.8   
 
 Levinas begins by claiming his project is above or at least set apart from politics. 
But it is not politics in the general sense—that is, the activities associated with governing 
bodies, or the beliefs and values which motivate us to support one system or party over 
another—that Levinas is rejecting, but a certain political persuasion: 
 
...violence does not consist so much in injuring and annihilating persons as 
in interrupting their continuity, making them play roles in which they no 
longer recognize themselves, making them betray not only commitments 
but their own substance, making them  carry out actions that will destroy 
every possibility for action.9 
 
Levinas clearly refers to the dehumanizing policies of twentieth century totalitarianism—
and Nazism and its “race” policies specifically—wherein: 
 
 ...individuals are reduced to being bearers of forces that command them 
                                                
8 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 21.  
9 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 22.  
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unbeknownst to themselves…and the meaning of individuals (invisible outside 
this totality) is derived from the totality. 
 
And he felt that the political inclination toward totalitarian ideology and racism in Europe 
had become ingrained not just in Western politics, but Western thought:  
 
The visage of being that shows itself in war is fixed in the concept of 
totality, which dominates Western philosophy.10  
 
Levinas wants to expose as political the philosophical claim made by Nietzsche, 
Heidegger and others, that humanity's destiny is fulfilled—and his innermost connection 
to being reclaimed—when we engage in war.  Levinas makes it clear that what motivates 
his own desire to shift philosophy away from justifications of war and toward the 
problem of ethics is the suffering of innocents at the hands of totalitarian regimes that 
make the obliteration of cultural and political difference their first priority.  To do this, 
Levinas searches for a different understanding of man as not fundamentally for-himself, 
but as for-the-other, and not driven toward homogeneity, but desirous of the other as not-
I.  
 Suffering becomes the ground upon which Levinas can make these claims. 
Suffering not only makes ethics possible, but is the affect experienced by consciousness 
                                                
10 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 21-22.  
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upon the discovery that there are others in the world and that my needs, wants and 
perceptions are not my first concern. I “suffer” intense passions when I understand on an 
affective level that I am not the center of the world's concerns.11 According to Levinas, 
this experience takes place before I even have the capacity to reflect upon my 
experiences, and awakens what makes ethical response in humans possible. But does the 
“I” really suffer when it “sees” the face of the other for the first time and is pried open? 
Does the suffering I feel then feel the same as the suffering I experience as a victim of 
child abuse, domestic abuse, rape, or torture? Is it like the emotional suffering brought on 
by the end of a love affair, the death of a beloved parent, the loss of religious faith or 
disappointment I feel when I realize a long-cherished dream will not come to fruition?  
 Levinas would likely agree that suffering varies in degree and type. Levinas does 
not equate the suffering of “ruptured immanence” (the realization of the vulnerability and 
mortality of both myself and the other and my inescapable responsibility for that other) 
quantitatively with the extreme corporeal suffering experienced by victims of physical 
torture. What connects these forms of suffering are, for Levinas, the phenomenological 
features of suffering as an affect. In Totality and Infinity, Levinas writes this, regarding 
the nature of suffering: 
 
The privileged situation where the ever future evil becomes present—at 
the limit of consciousness—is reached in the suffering called physical. We 
                                                
11 Levinas' interest in the pre-cognitive and his belief that we begin life by feeling that “I” am the whole of 
the world, or at least the center of it is deeply informed by and indebted to psychology. Although he did 
not agree with much of Freud's analysis of human psychology, he was nonetheless, like Husserl, 
interested in and influenced by him and other European psychoanalysts like Jacques Lacan.  
  
99 
find ourselves backed up to being.  We do not only know suffering as a 
disagreeable sensation, accompanying the fact of being at bay and struck; 
this fact is suffering itself, the “dead end” of the contact.12   
 
Suffering “backs us up to being” by nailing us to the present.  Part of what defines 
suffering is a feeling of inescapability; I must be here now. I have no choice.  Moreover 
suffering is not only physical.  He continues:  
 
The whole acuity of suffering lies in the impossibility of fleeing it, of 
being protected in oneself from oneself; it lies in being cut off from every 
living spring.  And there is the impossibility of retreat...here the other 
grasps me, the world affects, touches the will.13   
 
Another characteristic of suffering is that it leaves me feeling that I cannot protect myself 
from the other or from my own experience of pain.  Suffering is also marked by a feeling 
of being cut off from living things and from the source of life itself.  The other grasps me, 
holds me still, “nails me to the present” and holds me open.  I cannot shut out the world 
but am affected by it and held in place by it.  And: 
 
In suffering reality acts on the in itself of the will, which turns 
                                                
12 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 238. 
13 Ibid.  
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despairingly into total submission to the will of the Other...suffering 
realizes in the will the extreme proximity of the being menacing the will.14 
 
Suffering defeats my will, my drive to be for-myself.  I cannot help but acknowledge the 
power of a being whose intent is to disrupt my own will, my own plans for this moment, 
this week, this year, or my life.   
 Levinas' understanding of suffering is paradoxical.  Suffering is also capable of 
creating multiple responses in the sufferer: 
 
[When we suffer]...we witness this turning of the I into a thing; we are at 
the same time a thing and at a distance from our reification, an abdication 
minimally distanced from abdication. Suffering remains ambiguous: it is 
already the present of the pain acting on the for itself of the will, but as 
consciousness the pain is always yet to come...It remains at a distance 
from this pain by its very consciousness, and consequently can become a 
heroic will.15   
 
When we suffer, we feel strange to ourselves because we experience ourselves as no 
longer subjects with the ability to choose.  We become “things” or objects, and are forced 
to watch our own “thingification.” The I is no longer the ruler of its body or destiny; the 
                                                
14 Ibid.  
15 Ibid. 
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I's power has been stripped and the I itself abdicates, gives in, submits. I become a 
“thing” insofar as I lose my power to be for myself, and yet I am more a subject, an “I” 
than ever because I witness and experience pain at my own objectification, and recognize 
my own vulnerability, my own interconnectedness with the world I believe I have 
mastery over or can escape.  I am both in pain and distanced from pain.  
 Finally, suffering begets “hope”: 
 
...consciousness deprived of all freedom of movement maintains a 
minimal distance from the present, this ultimate passivity which 
nonetheless desperately turns into action and into hope, is patience---the 
passivity of undergoing and yet mastery itself.16 
 
When I see I am not free, I can maintain a distance from the present and yet experience 
pain nonetheless.  In my despair, I hope. I hope the pain will end, and I hope that I will be 
freed.  I am patient because I have to be. In a sense I master the pain because I integrate 
into my sense of self and world. Already, suffering calls me to act even before I am free 
to do so.  
 In these passages, Levinas offers a phenomenological description of suffering that 
we can use to compare the suffering we experience when we encounter the other to the 
experience of physical suffering described above:  
                                                
16 Ibid.  
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1. First, suffering is not only the physical experience of pain. Suffering can also be 
emotional pain or intellectual pain, and it can vary in acuity.  But suffering is a 
particular kind of pain.  
2. Second, all varieties of suffering share a quality of inescapability, of feeling nailed to 
the present despite the sufferer's will to escape the present and the suffering.   
3. Third, suffering deprives me of my will and suffering forces me to submit my 
sovereignty over myself to the will and sovereignty of the other. 
4. Fourth, suffering causes the sufferer to become a “thing” which can be acted upon; 
this “thingification” is itself a kind of suffering, and the pain I feel witnessing my 
own objectification reminds me that I am both a thing and not a thing, a subject who 
has been subjugated.  The world is not in my control, and others are not defined or 
controlled by me. My immanence is not a hermetically sealed enclosure into which I 
can safely burrow when the world makes it clear that I cannot control it. I am strange 
to myself.  
5. Finally, suffering has the power to change me, to make me hopeful, to call me to 
action on behalf of the suffering other.  
 
 The above five-part description of suffering culled from Totality and Infinity 
highlights Levinas’ intention to express that the infant or child suffers (rather than resents 
or fears, for example) when it realizes that the other is “not-I” but another subject whose 
needs, wants and sufferings are her responsibility. Moreover, she will also suffer each 
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time she encounters the other throughout her life. In Levinas' later work, Otherwise Than 
Being, or Beyond Essence, he attempts to describe the pre-reflective event—that is, an 
event which precedes our ability to reason—of the experience that I am “for-the-other” 
that makes human ethics and ethical action possible. He defines the recognition that I am 
“for-the-other” as “substitution,” which is a kind of repeating potential investiture innate 
to the human psyche.17 This experience is described as an inhabitation of the I by the 
other. “The suffering of substitution,” Bergo writes, “is remarkable”: 
 
It is traumatic, it entails a fissioned immanence or an “other”-in-the-same.  
But the strange force in “me,” which I suffer repeatedly and cannot grasp, 
is neither neurosis nor psychosis...Still, it must be considered an 
“experience” which repeats, with increasing intensity, whose sign is 
anxiety.  In substitution...the anguished immanence is described as a pre-
reflective self, narrowed down...to a kind of singularity. Ethical investiture 
[is circular] and comprises specification of selfhood through the loss of the 
volitional, representational subject. This takes place only at the passional 
[or emotional] level...and is discovered once suffering can be represented 
as a “mood”....18 
 
Levinas' understanding of transcendence changes between the 1930s and the 1970s, but 
                                                
17 Levinas, Otherwise Than Being, or Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
University Press, 1998), 113-118.  
18 Bergo, “What is Levinas Doing?” 125.  
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always it involves escape from the immanent self toward an other, and constitutes a 
message that arrives spontaneously, as if evoked.  This initial encounter of the other is 
repeated and my response to it gains intensity and always elicits a break in my 
immanence, my experience in the world as same within the same.  Just as in Levinas' 
phenomenological description of physical suffering, the will of the I breaks down and 
finds itself “backed up to being,” nailed to the present in such a way that I both escape 
myself and am trapped in myself. I am forced to realize I am for-the-other, and not, as I 
might want to believe, for-my-self. I am both subject to the will of another and a thinking 
subject. And perhaps most importantly, I am forced to acknowledge that my immanence 
is not hermetically sealed, and I cannot escape the particularity of myself and of every 
other “I.” The world affects me, and I cannot change that or control that.  
 Levinas' descriptions of the experience of substitution are, as Bergo states, fraught 
with emotional and intellectual pain. And yet, not unlike what Levinas describes in the 
case of physical suffering, near the end of the arc which might figuratively replicate the 
concrete experience of substitution comes hope and a sense of being called to action for-
the-sake-of-the-other.  The experience of substitution and the experience of other kinds of 
physical and emotional suffering are phenomenologically similar because the suffering of 
substitution activates my potential for ethical behavior.  It is the repeated experience of 
suffering, either from substitution or from the suffering brought about by loss, 
persecution, failure, illness, tragedy and other experiences that renews and gives shape to 
the call to act on behalf of the suffering other.  The whole of Levinasian ethics, while 
resistant to systematicization, is grounded firmly in the lived, concrete experience of 
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suffering.     
 
The Predatory Other  
 
 This breaking open of my immanence, my temporal emotional self which I had 
heretofore imagined as sealed and as the same among same, will not always create an 
ethical response.  This experience only creates the possibility of ethical response.  
Levinas does not see man as entirely or inevitably moral; in fact for Levinas “being” 
should be understood as, at least in part, predatory and mechanistic.19  Therefore, for 
Levinas, some people are governed by drives that do not include a proclivity for the 
other. This does not mean that such a person—a person we might call for our purposes a 
“potential predator”—does not encounter the face of the other.  Rather, such people 
might respond to the face of the other, the inter-subjectivity it demands and the personal 
suffering the encounter creates in the “I” with violence rather than with obedience.  In the 
following passage from Totality and Infinity, Levinas provides a description of the affect 
of the victimizer as she is victimizing the other: 
 
...hatred...seeks to grasp the ungraspable, to humiliate, from on high, 
through the suffering in which the Other exists as pure passivity. Hatred 
                                                
19 Scholars argue that this understand of “being” is in part of response to Heidegger, for whom being is 
always neutral.  Levinas develops an understanding of human being, which is not, for the most part, 
only neutral and mechanistic, but often inclined toward morality and sensitive to the call of the face of 
the other.  For more on this read Bettina Bergo's “Ontology, Transcendence and Immanence in 
Levinas's Philosophy,” in Research in Phenomenology 35 no. 1 (2005): 141-180.   
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wills this passivity in the eminently active being that is to bear witness to 
it.  Hatred does not always desire the death of the Other, or at least it 
desires the death of the Other only in inflicting this death as extreme 
suffering.  The one who hates seeks to be the cause of suffering to which 
the despised being must be witness. To inflict suffering is not to reduce the 
Other to the rank of object, but on the contrary is to maintain him superbly 
in his subjectivity.  In suffering the subject must know his reification, but 
in order to do so he must precisely remain a subject.  Hatred wills both 
things. Whence the insatiable character of hatred; it is satisfied when it is 
not satisfied, since the Other satisfied it only by becoming and object, but 
can never become object enough, since at the same time as his fall, his 
lucidity and witness are demanded.  In this lies the logical absurdity of 
hatred.20 
    
Although Levinas uses the term “hatred” here, he is also describing the logic of violence.  
Just like someone who will respond ethically rather than with violence, the potential 
predator sees the face of the other, and his immanence is disturbed, slammed into by the 
unsolicited call of the other.  He also realizes that the world is beyond his ability to define 
or control it, realizes when the other looks at him that he is particular, and finally that 
what he has seen as homogeneous is in fact pluralistic. The other, simply because she 
                                                
20 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 239.  
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exists, is his responsibility. And yet rather than accept this responsibility, the potential 
predator rejects it, and rejects his own particularity as well. The potential predator resents 
the face of the other for fragmenting him, for making him strange to himself; if the 
potential predator acts, she then becomes a predator and commits violence in response to 
the call of the other, a call, which for Levinas contains the imperative “thou shall not 
kill.”21  
 Levinas insists that the predator is aware of the paradoxical experience of 
suffering. When suffering, one becomes a thing that can be grasped, and yet is aware of 
one's “thingification” and suffers from it.  We are keenly aware of ourselves as subjects 
when we suffer, even as we are powerless to escape the suffering.  A sentient subject 
cannot truly be “grasped” even as his body is held down, or is beyond his control. The 
living face is always its own, even as it offers itself. The predator knows this, and wants 
to become the force that causes suffering, and wants to make the other witness her own 
objectification, her own dehumanization.  And yet, a living human being can never be a 
thing; and when she dies and her body does not contain the force that calls out to the 
world and says, “thou shall not kill!” the predator is not satisfied, for the victim was not 
“there” to witness her final objectification. This inevitable dissatisfaction is what, for 
Levinas, accounts for the cyclical nature of violence and persecuting societies.  Levinas 
also notes that violence prevents transcendence, even transcendence as escape. Thus the 
predator, like all humans, longs for an exit from himself and cannot get it because he 
                                                
21 For more on this, Difficult Freedom is especially helpful, as well as Otherwise Than Being. This theme 
is central to Levinas work from the 1960s on, however.  
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cannot bear the acceptance of heterogeneity that transcendence requires.  
 Levinas' inclusion of “the predator” in his ethics is part of what makes it unique 
and, potentially, of real use. Levinasian ethics is grounded in suffering because Levinas 
locates the ethical trajectory of any individual in his response to the suffering created by 
the realization which for many of us is developmentally inevitable: the world is not 
defined by me and is not, regardless of what I think I want, an extension of me. An 
individual can accept this and accept the ethical investiture it can endow; or an individual 
can reject the call to ethical action and attempt to make the world as he understands it a 
homogeneous extension of himself. He can attempt to obliterate, subjugate and reify the 
other.  He can attempt to force a totality that will always be an illusion. Yet we are each 
faced with the choice to respond ethically or unethically each time we hear the call of the 
other and are disrupted inside ourselves by her. We do not choose the path toward or 
away from ethical investiture once, but many times.  The choice is always dependent on 
our response to the suffering inherent to the human condition.  
 
Why Judaism? 
 
Religion is the excellence proper to sociality with the Absolute, or, if you 
will, in the positive sense of the expression, Peace with the other...This 
seems to me fundamental to the Judaic faith, in which the relation with 
God is inseparable from the Torah; that is, inseparable from the 
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recognition of the other person.  The relation to God is already ethics; or, 
as Isaiah 58 would have it, the proximity to God, devotion itself, is the 
devotion to the other man.22 
 
 In “Revelation in the Jewish Tradition” Levinas remarks on “the surprising 
present existence of Judaism, a human collectivity, albeit small and continuously sapped 
by persecution, weakened by half-heartedness, temptations and apostasy, yet capable, in 
its very irreligiousity, of founding its political life on the truths and rights taken from the 
Bible.”  Jews maintain a “mysterious unity” even in Diaspora because they are capable of 
basing their most important truths on the Bible and the “holy History” it relates, whether 
or not they are religious, whether or not they confess a connection with or belief in God.  
Levinas goes on to state how he believes Jews and Judaism are able to do this—to 
maintain continuous connection with the ancient Holy past—despite dispersion, 
integration, assimilation, conversion, atheism and unspeakable persecution: 
 
...the chapters of Holy history are reproduced in the course of profane 
History by trials that constitute a Passion, the Passion of Israel. For many 
Jews who have long since forgotten or never learnt the narratives and the 
message of the Scriptures, the signs of the Revelation that was received—
and the muted calls of this exalting Revelation—are reduced to the trauma 
                                                
22 Emmanuel Levinas, In the Time of the Nations, trans. M. Smith (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1994), 171.  
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of lived events long after the completion of the biblical canon, long after 
the Talmud was written down...For many Jews, holy History and the 
Revelation it entails are reduced to the memories of being burnt at the 
stake, the gas chambers, and even the public affronts received in 
international assemblies or heard in the refusal to allow them to emigrate. 
They experience the Revelation in the form of persecution!23 
 
Here Levinas equates revelation (the Sinaitic Revelation as well as God's revealing of 
Himself to individuals) with the physical and emotional trauma created by the lived 
experience of persecution.  In other words, this lived experience of suffering transmits at 
least some of the most important of the lessons found in the Sinaitic Revelation (the 
written and oral Torah).  For Levinas, Revelation as lived, repeated experience is the 
center of Judaism and is what has made the centuries-long survival of the Jews possible, 
no matter how loosely affiliated they are with one another as a “people.” Revelation can 
be “reduced to the trauma of lived events” and nonetheless contain Judaism's essential 
message. A Jew can know no Torah, no Talmud, no Hebrew, but if he suffers as a Jew, 
whether he intends to or not he is receiving the lessons of Revelation.  What, then, 
according to Levinas is Judaism's essential message and how does it inform his ethics? Is 
Levinas reducing Judaism to the suffering of persecution that is more or less absent of 
content? What is he doing here?   
                                                
23 Levinas, “Revelation in the Jewish Tradition,” Beyond the Verse, trans. Gary D. Mole (London: 
Continuum 2007), 127-128.  
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 By claiming that Jews can “receive” what is central to Judaism through 
persecution, Levinas is on one hand insisting that Judaism consists of more than “just” 
text and law; it is also constituted by lived experience, made up in large part by a 
religious practice that both feet planted in this world. “The entire Revelation,” he asserts, 
“is bound up around daily ritual.”24 Keeping the mitzvot is likewise meant to “bind” us to 
our duties here on earth.  When we keep His Law, we remain in relation with God. 
Traditionally understood, the Revelation is the delivery of the content of Torah from 
“outside the order of the world...the exposition of the content and above all of the 
structure of the Revelation presented so far.”25Levinas insists that Revelation is of 
continued relevance even though we live in what Levinas calls the age of “the death of 
metaphysics” and cannot accept the idea of transcendence in the traditional sense.  The 
values taught by Revelation, and by Judaism more broadly, are transmitted by experience 
whether—or even if—we believe in the ontological status of that Revelation as outside, 
above, or elsewhere, or not.  
 But how is Revelation connected to suffering specifically, rather than awe or 
humility or something else? To be sure, the prophets of the Hebrew Bible who are 
charged with the task of re-iterating the lessons of the Sinaitic Revelation to recalcitrants 
often undergo trauma of all sorts.  Moses' face is changed forever after meeting with God 
                                                
24 Levinas uses the term “bound up” intentionally here.  Among the many source texts Levinas uses to 
support his understanding of revelation are Exodus 33:23 and the midrash of the same passage.  
According to Exodus 33:23 when Moses asked to see God's face, God refused to show Moses his face, 
but agreed to hide Moses in the cleft of a rock as his “divine Glory” ran past.  Moses saw only God's 
“back parts.”  The rabbinic sages claimed that this “back” Moses saw was the straps of his tefillin 
knotted at the back of God's neck.  God, too, was  “bound up” by the word because he was following 
the commandment to lay tefillin and “bind” the words of Deuteronomy to his body.  
25 Levinas, “Revelation in the Jewish Tradition,” 140.  
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on Sinai in Exodus 34:29-35. Jeremiah, Isaiah and Ezekiel all undergo physical hardships 
and social humiliation for the sake of God and his messages to Israel; this is what all 
“suffering servants” are obligated to accept, what Levinas calls the “trauma of prophecy.” 
Na'vi, the Hebrew word for “prophet” loosely means “spokesperson.” The root (nun-vov) 
means “openness” or “hollowness,” implying that a person who is chosen to prophesy 
will be hollowed out and filled up with whatever God puts there. The prophet often 
resists God's commands initially.  Moses wants God to ask someone else, Jeremiah 
dreads the public spectacle his office will require him to enact and resents that when he 
opens his mouth, he speaks God's words and not his own.  God tells Moses he will be 
“with” Mose's mouth when it is time for him to speak; Ezekiel's mouth is forcibly filled 
with the words of God as God pulls him up off the ground by his hair. God reveals 
himself to his prophets and they become receivers of God in every sense.26 The 
individual selfhood, the “subjectness” of the prophet is erased and he or she is subjugated 
to God, the ultimate Other to whom engagement with the other always points; and yet 
according to Levinas, prophets—and all who suffer at the hands of others—ironically 
experience themselves as free subjects through their mandatory powerlessness.  The 
prophet as suffering servant is the servant of God and man.  
 Levinas identifies suffering as inextricably connected to prophesy. In order to 
explain how an every day person of any background and practice who is not a prophet in 
the strict sense can nonetheless be said to experience the “trauma of prophecy,” Levinas 
                                                
26 Many of the prophets suffer physically as well as emotionally.  Jeremiah is compelled to make a 
wooden yoke with leather straps and wear it around his neck as a foreshadowing of Babylon's 
occupation of Israel.  Ezekiel must lie on his side for 390 days to warn of a coming siege; Isaiah went 
naked for three years to forewarn of Israel of her forthcoming captivity.  
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turns to Amos 3:8: “The Lord God has spoken—who can but prophesy?” and understands 
this to mean that “prophetic receptivity already lies in the human soul.  Is it not 
subjectivity, through its potential for listening—that is obeying—the very rupture of 
immanence?”27 What makes the prophetic encounter with the divine Other possible is the 
nature of humankind, our potential for listening to the other, to the “not me,” to move 
beyond our sense of the world as homogeneous to “I” and embrace heterogeneity (and for 
Levinas the ethical relation is always heterogeneous). Revelation is correlative to the life 
changing experience of being in relation with a being which is wholly other, and thereby 
encountering the ultimate Other and responding to it with open “obedience.”  For 
Levinas, this obedience, 
   
...cannot be reduced to a categorical imperative in which a universality is 
suddenly able to direct a will.  It is an obedience, rather, which can be traced back 
to the love of one's neighbour: a love without eros, without self-complacency and, 
in this sense, a love that is obeyed, the responsibility for one's neighbour, the 
taking upon oneself of the other's destiny, or fraternity.  The relation with the 
other is placed at the beginning!  
 
He goes on to say that, 
 
...Kant himself, in the statement of the second phrase of the categorical 
                                                
27 Levinas, “Revelation in the Jewish Tradition,” 141.  
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imperative, hastens toward this relation [with the other] through a regular 
or irregular deduction from the universality of the maxim.  Obedience, 
which finds concrete form in the relation with the other, indicates a reason 
that is less centered than Greek reason, the latter having its immediate 
correlative something stable, the law of the Same.28 
 
Biblical law delivered through Revelation puts ethics first because the delivery requires 
humanity's openness to someone or something entirely different from itself before 
anything else can take place. For Levinas, this is not true of “Greek” or Western 
philosophy, which aspires to universality and homogeneity as a precondition for the 
ethical.  The “Greek” philosophical approach to ethics, Levinas argues here and 
elsewhere, actually requires the obliteration of the ethical (that is, the acceptance of the 
other is not-I and the realization that I am responsible for him) as Levinas understands it.  
 God, the absolute Other, calls to man, and man says, “Hineini!”29 This is the first 
encounter, the encounter which makes being in relation with the other the first, most 
important step of man's development, and also the beginning of ethics and ethical 
relation. It is what makes us human. “Is not the model of revelation,” Levinas insists, “an 
ethical one?”30 Ethics—and, just as important, man's predisposition to the ethical—are 
born of the suffering we experience as human beings.  On this Levinas is clear: 
                                                
28 Levinas, Emmanuel,  “Demanding Judaism,” Beyond the Verse: Talmudic Readings and Lectures, 
trans. Gary D. Mole (London: Continuum, 2007), 143.  
29 “Here I am!”  Levinas refers to this response to God's call as “man welcoming his neighbour.” This 
primal relation is template for ethical relation to the other.  “Demanding Judaism,” 144.  
30 Levinas, “Demanding Judaism,” 143. 
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...to follow [the teachings of] the Most-High is also to know that nothing is 
greater than to approach one's neighbour, than the concern of the lot for 
the 'widow and orphan, the stranger and the poor'; and that to approach 
with empty hands is not to approach at all.  The adventure of the Spirit 
also takes place on earth among men. The trauma I experienced as a slave 
in the land of Egypt constitutes my humanity itself. This immediately 
brings me closer to all the problems of the damned on earth, of all those 
who are persecuted...My very uniqueness lies in the responsibility for the 
other man...31 
 
When we suffer, Levinas claims, we become more ethically inclined.  Simply put, we 
will empathize with, and then wish to assuage, the suffering of others if we have suffered 
ourselves.  Moreover, when we obey or listen to the call of the other, and respond 
“Hineini: Here I am!” we become, through our subjectivity, “the very rupture of 
immanence.”32 This “rupture” is the next important step toward the development of our 
potential for ethical behavior.   
 For Levinas, “immanence” refers to a number of things.  “Immanence” refers to 
the affective aspect of humanity. Rupture of my own immanence is proof of the 
undeniable alterity of others that reminds me that the whole of the world is not identical 
                                                
31 Levinas, “Demanding Judaism,” 139.  
32 Levinas, “Demanding Judaism,” 141.  
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to me, but rather filled with other thinking, feeling subjects who I cannot in any absolute 
way define, control or obliterate.33 When I understand that the “other” or the not-me is 
also a subject and yet exterior to me, I must subsequently acknowledge my obligation to 
honor that reality; to know that I am not the world, nor can I control the world, makes me 
suffer, and feel strange to myself. I then enter into ethical relation with the other. My own 
“immanence” is enriched by this acknowledgement of or “obedience” to the 
“immanence” of the other and evokes and substantiates God's Revelation to humanity. 
Again, this heterogeneity makes ethical relations possible and provides inspiration to 
humanity to evolve and achieve. Levinas states: 
   
The path I would be inclined to take in order to solve the paradox of the 
Revelation is one which claims that this relation, at first glance a 
paradoxical one, may find a model in the non-difference towards the other, 
in a responsibility towards him, and that is precisely within this relation 
that man becomes his 'self'; designated without any possibility of escape, 
chosen, unique, non-interchangeable and, in this sense, free. Ethics is the 
model worthy of transcendence, and it is an ethical kerygma that the Bible 
                                                
33 It is important to note here that for Levinas, murdering the other does not give me power over her. 
Instead, the act of murder proves that the other cannot be fully eliminated by eliminating her body.“To 
kill is not to dominate but to annihilate; it is to renounce comprehension absolutely. Murder exercises a 
power over what escapes power. It is still a power, for the face expresses itself in the sensible, but 
already impotency, because the face rends the sensible. The alterity that is expressed in the face 
provides the unique ‘matter’ possible for total negation” (Totality and Infinity, 198). Also, Levinas' 
earlier work often describes transcendence (the getting-out-of-myself) in terms of “light.”  
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is Revelation.34 
 
And in “Demanding Judaism,” Levinas writes: 
 
...it is probably distinctive feature of the Jewish people to live and endure, already 
in its exceptional history and in the precariousness of its condition and dwelling 
on earth, the incompletion of a world experienced from the irreducible and urgent 
demand for justice which is its actual religious message.  The crudeness of the 
world...of which Judaism is not only the conscience, but also the testimony, that is 
to say, the martyrdom; the cruelty where the burning of my suffering and the 
anguish of my death were able to be transfigured into the death and concern for 
the other man...Judaism...is a rupture of the natural and the historical that are 
constantly reconstituted and, thus, a Revelation which is always forgotten.   
 
 And here we return to our original question: Why does Levinas reduce the lessons 
of Judaism to temporal suffering for the other? One answer to the question is that for 
Levinas the violence of anti-Semitism and the suffering it creates for Jews makes the 
Jewish people the perfect mouthpiece—the perfect prophets, perhaps—for Judaism's 
religious message which he sees as constituted primarily of the desire for justice in an 
“incomplete world,” a world that in Lurianic terms, is always in the midst of being 
                                                
34 Levinas, “Demanding Judaism,” 144-145.  
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created but is never “done.”35 Jewish people cannot escape the most important lesson of 
Judaism—the ethical relation—because Jews are (at least in the West) in almost every 
era, made to suffer and yet are innocent.  They are the historical “other” of Western 
civilization since Rome, an “other” which is understood to have stubbornly refused to 
join completely his or her non-Jewish neighbors culturally or religiously. The history of 
their suffering (suffering they endure because of their refusal to join the “same”) makes 
them the conscience of Western thought as well as the proof or testimony of the exact 
nature of the problem: ethics.  Moreover, that man is meant to be a moral creature whose 
ethics are grounded in the experience of suffering is for Levinas the central message of 
Judaism. Judaism as a system—and not Jewishness or Jewish people in essentialist 
terms—corrects and completes Western philosophy because it privileges ethics above 
ontology and epistemology and is, for Levinas, open to all who wish to embrace its 
precepts.    
 Levinas is not the first Jewish philosopher to see connections between the gift of 
revelation and humanity's moral development.  Neo-Kantian Hermann Cohen's Religion 
of Reason Out of the Sources of Judaism also depicted Judaism as possessing a morality 
he felt was lacking in other forms of Western thought and culture.  Martin Buber, Leo 
Strauss, Gershom Scholem, Walter Benjamin, and perhaps most especially Franz 
Rosenzweig (whose Star of Redemption was particularly important to Levinas), all of 
whom studied Cohen’s work closely at one time or another, repeatedly treat the themes 
                                                
35 The idea that demanding justice is one of humanity's most important tasks in the never-ending job of 
creation is an important concept in various streams of Judaism. 
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Cohen’s work brought to the fore: the role of revelation in human experience, individual 
and communal spiritual renewal, the possibility of universal human progress through the 
moral lessons of ethical monotheism, the continued importance of Jewish mission, 
perhaps most importantly the messianic idea as both manifestation of and crucial vehicle 
for the attainment of universal human perfection.  For Cohen, revelation did not endow 
man with the potential for ethical behavior directly, but it did, by imparting reason to 
humankind, make us capable of existing in ethical correlation with one another.  Reason 
rather than affect was the faculty that, for Cohen, had the capability to make humans 
“good.”  
 Although Levinas and Cohen are very different thinkers on a systematic level, 
both felt strongly that the burden of the other man was man's most important duty, the 
fulfillment of which placed him in direct relation with God and His Law.  As a 
consequence, both thinkers made ethics the center of their work.  Suffering is redemptive 
for both Cohen and Levinas, although in markedly different ways. That suffering—an 
experience he describes as existing on a spectrum that makes us more empathetic to our 
fellow man—creates the potential for ethical actions is a universal truth. In short, 
suffering, an experience which is at best unpleasant and at worst deadly, has the potential 
to redeem us by making us more ethical and thereby more likely to intervene on behalf of 
those who suffer.  For Cohen, suffering and punishment played an important role in our 
individual and collective development.  The suffering other is for Cohen a kind of 
prophet whose trials are meant to remind us of the value of atonement and the avoidance 
of sin. For Cohen, suffering was a necessary part of recognizing one's moral 
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responsibilities to God and one's fellow human beings.36 
 Levinas did not feel, as Cohen did, that the innocent suffering of the Jews would, 
by and by, play a role in humanity's ultimate discovery of the value of unification through 
ethical monotheism, although for both men Jewish suffering is endowed with special 
meaning. For Levinas, the suffering of the Jews was a political reality that stemmed from 
the increasingly totalizing nature of Western thought, the result of which was a culture 
increasingly intolerant of difference. He felt the plight of the Jews and other “others” 
could be changed by changing Western thought.  According to Cohen, the suffering of 
the Jews preserved them as a people and enabled them to fulfill their role as harbingers of 
the progress of history toward messianic perfection. And while the prophets and their 
message of ethical responsibility were also central to both thinkers, Cohen perceived the 
prophets as harbingers of the truth of monotheism, while for Levinas, “prophetic 
receptivity” demonstrated humanity's special receptivity to obedience and service.  
 Perhaps surprisingly, both Levinas and Cohen expressed a faith in the messianic 
future. For Levinas, the universalism championed by the philosophical idealism espoused 
by Cohen is an illusion; cultures are particular, individuals are particular, languages are 
particular and religious traditions are particular.  And yet, not unlike Cohen, Levinas 
imagines a messianic future wherein human beings engage in the ethical treatment of one 
another.  For Levinas, this was a utopian “eschatological future” that would initially 
                                                
36 For an interesting discussion of suffering in Hermann Cohen's philosophy, see Oliver Leaman's Evil and 
Suffering in Jewish Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 157-164.  For a 
valuable and comprehensive analysis of atonement, revelation, correlation and redemption in Cohen's 
work, see Michael Zank's The Idea of Atonement in the Philosophy of Hermann Cohen (Atlanta: 
Scholars Press, 2000).   
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unfold on an inter-subjective level in human relationships, while for Cohen, the messianic 
future, also a rabbit on the horizon, constituted a perfecting of history and a unification of 
mankind culturally, politically, economically and spiritually. And though these two 
constructs are different in many ways, both suggest a belief in the perfectibility of 
mankind as a species.  While Cohen felt mankind moved toward universality in an 
idealist sense, Levinas seems to have felt that utopian existent would entail a human 
acceptance of difference and the celebration of intersubjectivity rather than an unrealistic 
and violent homogenization.  
 Most importantly for our purposes here, though, is that Levinas and Cohen felt 
Judaism provided necessary correctives to Western thought resulted by placing ethics at 
the center of human concern. Certainly both felt Judaism made significant contributions 
to Western thought and civilization and had still more to offer.  For Cohen, God was in 
many ways an ideal which humans should strive to emulate than a personal deity or a 
deity who intervenes in human history. Levinas' God, the Holy Other, is also highly 
abstract; Levinas' descriptions of God depict an un-embodied divine transcendence more 
than the traditional God of Judaism.  Cohen offers an intellectualized textual Judaism 
heavily influenced by Wissenschafts des Judentum movement, while Levinas offers a 
phenomenology of the Divine. Yet both see Judaism as an approach to human life and 
culture that does not, at least in definitive terms, separate law from ethics, the individual 
from the collective, theology from philosophy.  Judaism is historical, continuous and 
contemporary, and the suffering of Jews has, according to Cohen and Levinas, generated 
more hope than despair.  Both Cohen and Levinas value and make use of the Talmudic 
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tradition as evidence of the possibility and ethical value of dialogue in the face of 
disagreement.  Creation, revelation, the prophets, exile and redemption, themes both men 
identify as central to authentic Judaism are both specific to the Jewish experience and 
indicative of humanity's broader developmental journey. But while Cohen's messianic 
future may have entailed a world full of ethical monotheists, Levinas was imagining a 
world full of particular communities in service to other “others.” 
 
But is it Ethics?  
 
 Ethical action in the temporal lives of human beings is the most genuine 
expression of ethical “inter-subjectivity.” Levinasian ethics rely on the lived experience 
of suffering to ground it, and “the ethical” must be expressed not only in thought but also 
in action. Yet while Levinas carefully delineates the source of the ethical impulse and the 
circumstances that awaken it, he provides very few examples of actions we should 
consider ethical. In fact, Levinas' work contains very few directives for ethical behavior 
in any sense. As a matter of principle, his ethics consistently resist systematization, 
making it problematic to discern a practical ethics in his project. According to Diane 
Perpich: 
 
It is as if there is a dilemma at the heart of Levinas' scholarship. It is clear 
that Levinas is not in the business of constructing normative moral 
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principles meant to tell us how to live rightly or virtuously or well, so it 
seems quite right to distance his thought from what we normally mean by 
normative ethics.  But when we deny that Levinas' thought has anything to 
do with normative ethics, it then appears contradictory to use his work to 
do exactly the sort of work that normative ethics is usually employed to 
do.37 
 
Perpich describes Levinas as entering the philosophical “scene” enthralled with 
Heidegger's “Letter on Humanism” which speculates that the desire for ethics reflects a 
misguided yearning “for a peremptory directive and for rules that say how man...ought to 
live in a fitting manner.” Heidegger's claims that both ethics and humanism were 
unnecessary—at least in the traditional sense—can be understood as part of a wider 
movement in France and elsewhere toward questioning normativity in general. “Does 
Levinas offer us an ethics after Heidegger,” Perpich asks, “or an ethics despite Heidegger 
or, as seems to be the case, an impertinent combination of the two?”38 And even as 
Levinas attempts to, on occasion, distance his work from “moralistic resonances”39 
associated with the term 'ethics,' his terminology is laden with normative prescriptions 
and injunctions.  
 “My task,” Levinas wrote, “does not consist in constructing ethics; I only try to 
                                                
37 Diane, Perpich, The Ethics of Emmanuel Levinas, eds. Mieke Bal and Hent de Vries (Standford: 
Stanford University Press, 2008), 9.  
38 Perpich, Ethics, 10-11.  
39 Levinas, Autrement que Savoir (Paris: Osiris, 1987), 28, cited in Critchley Ethics of Deconstruction 
(West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1992), 17.  
  
124 
find its meaning...[but] One can without a doubt construct an ethics in function of what I 
have just said, but this is not my own theme.”40 In light of Levinas' own description of his 
goals as a philosopher, Perpich is right to insist that “Levinas' work is not about the 
specifics of our moral life so much as it is a struggle to say how we come to find 
ourselves with a moral life at all.”41Levinas does not engage in traditional normative 
ethics, but it is useful to see Levinas as what Stanley Cavell calls a “moral perfectionist.” 
According to Cavell, some ethicists are “legislators” who, like Kant, Rawls, and Rorty, 
produce detailed rules for ethical action while others, like Levinas, are perfectionists who 
believe that there is something prior to rules without which the rules themselves are 
useless.42 Herein lies one of several important reasons for Levinas' overwhelming 
popularity among the humanities and social sciences: Levinas intended to create a 
theoretical framework that could support the point of view that ethics were not only 
necessary but possible, and not only possible, but hardwired into psycho-social 
development. This theoretical framework is arguably poetic and certainly radical, but its 
most innovative feature is that gives itself over for implementation by other thinkers 
whose “theme” is—unlike Levinas'—the construction of ethics “in function.” When 
understood as primarily concerned with grounding ethics in temporal experience—or as 
Cavell might phrase it, with the illumination of the prior temporal conditions that make 
ethics possible— any normative language Levinas uses can be primarily understood as 
                                                
40 Levinas, Ethics and Infinity:Conversations with Philippe Nemo, trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh: 
Duquesne University Press, 1985), 90.  
41 Perpich, Ethics, 12.  
42 Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi, eds., The Cambridge Companion to Levinas (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 36.  
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first and foremost pointing toward definitive evidence for the possibility of ethics.  What 
makes Levinas' thought “universal,” however, is that he grounds ethics in the lived 
experience of human suffering.  Suffering rather than love or law or a sense of justice 
activates and provides the ground for human ethics.   
 One of the most well known critics of Levinas' ethics qua philosophical ethics is 
Ricard Rorty.43 Rorty states that if “'one understands ethics in the particular and radical 
sense given to that word by Levinas, then Derrida's practice may well have 'an overriding 
ethical significance.' But I don't understand the 'ethics' in that way, and I don't think it 
useful to give it that sense.”44 Rorty also admits to being “unable to connect Levinas' 
pathos of the infinite with ethics or politics” because politics is at least in part about 
“reaching accommodation between competing interests” and it remains unclear how 
Levinas' descriptions of the other/Other contribute to that end.45 Elsewhere Rorty asserts 
that Levinas' notions of infinite responsibility “may be useful to some of us on our 
individual quests for private perfection. [But w]hen we take up our public 
responsibilities...the infinite and the un-representable are merely nuances.  Thinking our 
responsibilities in these terms is as much of a stumbling-block to effective political 
organization as is the sense of sin.”46  
 What is implied by Rorty's critique in particular is that ethics informed by religion 
                                                
43 See Rudi Visker, “The Core of My Opposition to Levinas: A Clarification for Richard Rorty,” Ethical 
Perspectives: The Journal of the European Ethics Network 3, no. 4 (October):154-70; and Michael 
Newman, “Sensibility, Trauma and the Trace: Levinas from Phenomenology to the Immemorial,” in 
The Face of the Other and the Trace of God: Essays on the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, ed. 
Jeffery Bloechl, 90-129 (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000).   
44 Mouffe, Chantal, ed., Deconstruction and Pragmatism, (London: Routledge, 1996), 17. The person 
Rorty quotes here is Simon Critchley.  
45 Moufee, Deconstruction, 17.  
46 Found in Diane Peprich, Ethics, 5. 
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cannot truly be understood as ethics in the broader sense; for Rorty, religious traditions 
are private and particular and perhaps cannot be expanded or adapted for secular public 
use. According to this line of thinking, it follows that if Levinas grounds an ethics 
informed by the texts and traditions of a religious tradition, his ethics cannot be 
philosophical or even relevant to political discourse. Rorty is correct that Levinas' project 
cannot be defined as “ethics” in any traditional sense. As Bettina Bergo rightly claims, “If 
ethics means rationalist self-legislation and freedom (deontology), the calculation of 
happiness (utilitarianism), or the cultivation of virtues (virtue ethics) then Levinas' 
philosophy is not an ethics.”47 Levinas' work is primarily an interpretive 
phenomenological description of inter-subjectivity designed to challenge traditional 
understandings of human development and the role of ethics in human relationships and 
culture.  
 Contrary to Rorty's objection that Levinas' ethics is not connected to the political 
realm, Levinas' project is also inherently political and concerns itself directly with the 
human casualties of political conflict. Levinas resists and dismantles “totalizing” 
philosophy because he rejects political totalitarianism.  He wants a world with room for 
difference and an ethics that does not rely on shared religious or political ideology; 
moreover, a relation is not ethical unless you are “other” than myself. Finally, an ethics 
that cannot protect the other from my ability to destroy him when his otherness disrupts 
me is not an ethics. Levinas' work advocates, in the words of Seán Hand, “a multiplicity 
                                                
47 Bettina Bergo, “Emmanuel Levinas,” The Standard Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2013 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).  
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in being which refuses totalization and takes form instead as fraternity and discourse, an 
ethical relation which forever precedes and exceeds the tyranny of ontology.”48 Levinas 
claims to locate the precepts of his ethics in the sources of Judaism and not in those 
exclusive to Christianity, Islam or “Greek” or Western philosophy, and this, too, is in part 
a political statement. For Levinas, theology does not supersede philosophy, nor should 
ethics derived in part from religion be of use only for religious people. Levinas wants to 
correct Western philosophy at a fundamental, systemic level with what he believes 
Judaism has successfully placed at the front and center of its system: an understanding of 
ethical relation as dependent upon heterogeneity, and an account of the existence of an 
ethical impulse in the human psyche which is activated by the universal human 
experience of suffering.  If Levinas were creating a religious ethics developed for 
religious Jews alone, wouldn't it be most prudent if he insisted that any normative claims 
be derived from observance of the Torah? But this is not what Levinas does. 
 And yet the practical implications of Rorty's objections are relevant. Can Levinas' 
work be meaningful for people who do not share his theological proclivities—in other 
words, people who are not religious Jews? Can his ideas about suffering as central to 
ethics be applied to “secular” thought as well? With regard to Rorty's objections 
specifically, it is arguable that the religious and the political can be so neatly severed 
from one another in the first place.  Political persuasions are similar to religious 
persuasions in that they suggest a particular worldview or ideology that shapes and is 
shaped at least in part by our place in society as we understand it.  But setting aside for 
                                                
48 Seán Hand, ed., The Levinas Reader, (Cambridge, Basil Blackwell, 1989), 8.   
  
128 
now the inherent problems with claiming that the political or the philosophical are 
inherently more “universal” than the theological, a comparison of Levinas' thought as it 
appears in his “philosophical” with excerpts from the “Jewish writings” excerpted above 
demonstrates the continuity of his thought and its applicability and value to secular 
discourse. Bergo aptly points out that as early as the 1960s, Levinas was actively working 
toward a “pre-synthetic phenomenology” or a phenomenology of the pre-cognitive: 
 
Levinas tells us he is describing a prerepresentational occurrence, which 
we cannot call “experience,” if “experience” involves just intentional 
consciousness. Instead, Levinas pursues a prereflexive immediacy that is 
affective and excessive, and whose expression is paradoxical. This 
protoexperience, “substitution,” takes the form of suffering and contains a 
certain call—of consciousness, as it had done in Heidegger, yet somehow 
more concrete because the “other” is another person.49 
  
Bergo refers specifically to what is, in many ways, most Husserlian50 about Levinas' 
project.  Husserl sought to connect science and philosophy to a greater extent than they 
had been before, in part by proving that phenomenology, with its use of bracketing and 
descriptive analyses of experience, could offer valuable new tools to scientific inquiry.  
Levinas used phenomenology to develop what Bergo calls a “description of affectivity.” 
                                                
49 Bettina Bergo, “What is Levinas Doing?” 123.  
50  Edmund Husserl's The Paris Lectures, 2nd edition, ed. Peter Koestenbaum (Bassendean:The Hague, 
1967) offers helpful discussion of Husserl's methodology in particular.   
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In Levinas' work these descriptions of affectivity lead us back to prereflective 
consciousness to the development of conscience, which is inextricably connected to the 
subject's initial realization of the other—that is, the being other than the self who is not an 
object but another thinking subject. If ethics could be traced to a human impulse that 
presupposes cognition, then the idea that ethics must be grounded in metaphysics, as 
Kant claimed—as well as the arguments against ethics posed by Heidegger could be laid 
to rest.  If the ethical impulse is hardwired into our sense of self and our psycho-social 
development such that it appears even before our ability to reflect, then ethics are 
essential to human engagement should be of primary concern. 
 Levinas is not interested in developing a systematic normative ethics, nor is he 
interested in offering objective “proof” that ethics should consist of certain norms and 
values per se.  He is interested in uncovering that which even makes ethics possible and 
upon what grounds a normative ethics can be constructed. Levinas uses a phenomenology 
deeply informed by psychology to locate the ethical impulse in the pre-representational 
experience of suffering created by the immediacy of the presence of an other.  Not unlike 
Jacque Lacan's mirror stage, Levinas gives an account of a pre-reflective experience of 
the presence of the “other” who is not the “same” as me yet shapes me profoundly.  
Lacan's infant looks into the face of the mother and sees himself mirrored there.  Levinas' 
infant (although Levinas does not refer specifically to infant development but to 
precognition) experiences suffering or “passions” which must be endured when she 
realizes she does not constitute the whole of the world and is obliged to subjugate her 
own needs to the needs of the other. Again, this suffering is brought on by “the call” of 
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the conscience that develops not in isolation, but is activated by the demands of the 
other.51   
 That we experience suffering in the moment that we hear the “call” of the other is 
significant in a number of ways. First, for Levinas, we suffer when we hear the “call” 
because the discovery of the other makes me strange to myself, such that I experience an 
“other” within myself.  This experience repeats again and again, and has the power to 
create either ethical investiture in or explosions of violence against “the other.” A person 
has countless opportunities over the course of his lifetime to either embrace or reject 
ethical engagement and investiture. We see the beginnings of an articulation of suffering 
as the foundation of ethical action in Totality and Infinity where relation between “I” and 
“the other” or the Stranger is made the primary pursuit of philosophical inquiry.  
Suffering forms the foundation of Levinasian ethics because I cannot become an ethical 
being until I suffer the experience of myself as separate from the world around me and, 
therefore, separate also from myself.   
 Totality and Infinity discusses physical suffering at length as well.  For Levinas, 
physical suffering is also ethically meaningful. We are reminded that Totality and Infinity 
is a book driven by the desire for social justice when we read that “[t]he whole acuity of 
suffering lies in the impossibility of fleeing it, of being protected in oneself, it is the 
impossibility of retreat.”52 In suffering, the free being ceases to be free, and yet remains 
                                                
51 Levinas borrows heavily from Heidegger's terminology, but often inverts its meaning, emphasis or 
usage.  For Heidegger, “the call” originates from an ontologically neutral, faceless place and lacks a 
clear message.  Levinas, on the other hand, describes “the call” of being as of specific import to humans 
and thus constituted of a clear message which demands our attention.  
52 Bergo, “What is Levinas Doing?” 123. 
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free in that it cannot truly be controlled by those who impose suffering upon it.  Much in 
the same way that our initial discovery of the other creates a paradoxical emotional 
suffering which both makes us strange to ourselves and yet shapes us in potentially 
positive ways, we “witness the turning of an I into a thing” when in the throes of acute 
physical suffering. The sufferer becomes both “a thing and at a distance from our 
reification.”53 As for the self who is suffering, his suffering makes him feel like both an 
object or a thing and a subject, an “I” who can never be reduced to an object. This 
inability to forget oneself and get “out” of or escape oneself as at the mercy of the other 
makes the suffering all the more acute.  
 For Levinas, then, suffering is what makes us ethical, or at least helps create the 
potential for ethics.  As Bergo points out: 
 
Levinas' reduction [of the ideology and “sacred delirium” of religion to 
signification] yields various claims about the “ethical” meaning of 
affectivity—generally as traumatized affect.  Not all affectivity has ethical 
meaning.  But certain affects, or better, passions (i.e., intense recurring 
emotions that we “suffer”) that we find in the wake of trauma are liable to 
have an ethical character.   For Levinas, this ethical character means that 
the otherwise closed character of our immanence can be held open...in the 
presence of a human other [and] gets forced open momentarily, in what he 
                                                
53 Ibid. 
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calls transcendence.54 
 
Our “immanence” or affectivity is normally tightly sealed and eschews suffering 
precisely because it makes us suffer, makes us vulnerable, and makes us strange to 
ourselves.  But when my immanence is before the other who I cannot help but 
acknowledge is my obligation, I suffer, and am forced open momentarily.  This forced 
openness creates what Levinas calls “transcendence.”  Levinas calls this opening “for-
the-other,” which is ethical in nature because it is what makes inter-subjective relation 
and generosity possible.  This generosity allows me to escape the shackles of my 
obsession with myself, thereby allowing me a paradoxical freedom. 
 
II.  Analysis 
 
 Dominique Janicaud's Phenomenology and the “Theological Turn”: The French 
Debate is an analysis of the ways in which French phenomenology has changed since its 
initial reception of Husserl and Heidegger. Janicaud provides analysis, critique and 
polemic which “aims toward a sole goal: methodological clarification.”55 Janicaud's 
central question is whether phenomenology's current interest in making “the invisible” an 
object of philosophical investigation constitutes a misuse of Husserlian phenomenology.  
                                                
54 Bergo, “What is Levinas Doing?” 124.  
55 Dominique Janicaud, Phenomenology and the “Theological Turn:The French Debate (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2000), 17.  
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Janicaud spends a great deal of time on early Levinas, whose work Janicaud describes as 
“imprecise” and “inconsistent,” a kind of theological hijacking of Husserlian 
phenomenology.  His critique of Levinas, although flawed, is nonetheless astute and 
provides insight into some of the weaknesses of Levinas' project.  
 Janicaud begins with Totality and Infinity, wherein Levinas lays the groundwork 
for his project as it unfolds throughout his career. He accuses Levinas of “philosophical 
aplomb,” or marked self-assuredness: 
 
[Here] aplomb designates...the attitude that loftily affirms itself 
in...Totality and Infinity...aplomb is the categorical affirmation of the 
primacy of the idea of infinity, immediately dispossessing the sameness 
[mêmeté] of the I, or of being [être].  Totality and Infinity is...concerned 
with resolving the...problem in ...Husserlian phenomenology [which is 
that] neither emergence in the world, not access to the other [autrui] 
received sufficient attention.56 
 
Janicaud is correct that Levinas “assumes the primacy of infinity” as a matter of form; his 
philosophical claims won't hold otherwise. The “I” is always confronted with the “other,” 
and this repeated encounter prevents the “I” from believing for too long that the world is 
an extension of itself and can be legitimately unified by its categories. But Levinas' 
                                                
56 Janicaud, Phenomenology and the “Theological Turn,” 25.  
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interpretations of his own phenomenological observations are the evidence for these 
claims.  Levinas' identification of suffering as the source of ethics is itself an 
interpretation of his own affectivity and the affectivity of other human beings as he 
observed and subsequently interpreted them.  Such phenomena can be categorized as 
both visible and invisible. For example, we “read” the facial expressions and body 
language of others to understand what they might be feeling on the “inside.” When 
reading our own emotions, moods and reactions to stimuli, though, we are not reading 
our own faces but analyzing what cannot be “seen.” Both phenomena must be “read” 
whether they are visible or not.  Furthermore, interactions between subjects must be 
“read” and interpreted as well, which Levinas does freely in order to support his theories 
regarding the centrality of inter-subjectivity to human development and self-awareness.  
When Levinas refers to the invisible as an object of philosophical investigation, this is, in 
part, what he means. This focus on emotion and emotional exchange as not only suitable 
for philosophy but the primary concern of philosophy is what makes Levinas' work 
radical and allows him to begin, almost a priori with the “primacy of infinity.”  
 Janicaud claims that the phenomenologist must choose between “the 
unconditional affirmation of Transcendence and the patient interrogation of the visible” 
because the “incompatibility” of the two “cries out.” He laments, “...are we going to 
choose with the head or the heart—arbitrarily or not?” Here Janicaud misses an important 
aspect of Levinas' project. If pressed to choose between the two, Levinas would likely 
answer that he chooses—and that Western philosophy should choose—both. Rationality 
and affectivity must inform one another.  When these human faculties are placed in 
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isolation from one another, human social development is stunted. The importance of this 
idea to Levinas cannot be underestimated.  We cannot, and should not, divorce the body 
from the mind or emotions from thought. The inextricable connections between these 
working parts is precisely why ethics as the first concern of philosophy can and should, in 
Levinas' opinion, be grounded in the physical and emotional experience of suffering.  
 Janicaud's most important objections to Levinas' work are evident in Janicaud's 
claims that philosophy demands we follow the “guide that does nor buy itself off with 
fine words.”57 Janicaud mentions Levinas' definition of Desire as desire for the absolute 
Other. The alterity of the other is, by Levinas, “understood as the alterity of the Other 
[Autrui] and as that of the most High.”58 Janicaud writes: 
 
All is acquired and imposed from the outset, and this is all no little thing: 
nothing less than the God of the biblical tradition. Strict treason of the 
reduction of the transcendental I...here theology is restored with its parade 
of capital letters.  But this theology which dispenses with giving itself a 
title, installs itself at the most intimate dwelling of consciousness, as if it 
were as natural as could be.  Must philosophy let itself be thus 
intimidated?  Is this not but incantation, initiation?59 
 
Janicaud objects to what he sees as Levinas' re-introduction of theological metaphysics to 
                                                
57 Janicaud, Phenomenology and the “Theological Turn,” 26.  
58 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 34.  
59 Janicaud, Phenomenology and the “Theological Turn,” 27.  
  
136 
philosophy.  It is Levinas' nonchalant analysis of this “invisible” phenomenon, and not 
the “invisible” phenomena of affect mentioned earlier, then, to which Janicaud most 
objects. “After all,” Janicaud continues, “even if we agree to consider a “dimension of 
height,” must it immediately yield the “Most High”? For Janicaud, this is a transgression 
of serious dimensions, and Levinas' purpose is difficult to understand. While he does not 
see Levinas' work as without merit, he cannot accept Levinas' project in its entirety: 
 
We would do well to recognize the talent and singular originality of Levinas 
without, however, granting him the least concession when it comes to 
methodological and phenomenological coherence...To be sure, Levinas 
acknowledges his transgression of phenomenology's “play of lights,” but his 
biased utilization of what he presents as phenomenology (to pedagogic ends? To 
apologetic ends?) and his inscription of the aplomb of the Other [Autre] at the 
heart of experience makes things infinitely more complex than would be an 
explicit passage (or conversion) from “phenomenology” to “metaphysics.” Vis-á-
vis what he names “formal logic,” Levinas likewise walks quite softly—striving 
to overwhelm it, all the while proclaiming himself faithful to the spirit of 
intellectual rationalism...every philosopher has the right to intervene and point a 
finger at Desire: capitalized, does it not become generic?60 
   
 Levinas’ thought is assertive, and he willfully attempts to undo hundreds of years 
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of philosophy without carefully delineating his methodology.  Levinas' marriage of 
religion and philosophy is also intentional, although not necessarily unannounced, as 
Janicaud claims. It is not be so strange or radical a move to make meaningful use of 
theology in the course of philosophical examination for a thinker like Levinas who was 
so profoundly shaped and influenced by Judaism. But Levinas does this while claiming to 
reject traditional metaphysics, and for all his insistence that it is the living God in the face 
of the other, the fact remains that sometimes Levinas feels compelled to ground the 
transcendence and alterity of the other human being an absolute transcendence of God.  
While Levinas may aim at a deeper “complexity” by phenomenologically blurring the 
boundaries between theology and philosophy, the results are often, as Janicaud claims, 
inconsistent.  Too often, Levinas engages in word play that causes us to lose sight of his 
most unique and practical contributions to Western thought. The results are poetic and yet 
smack of revivalism.  He uses religion to disrupt totalizing theories of Western 
philosophy that he believes pave over, uproot and ignore the affective experiences of 
human beings and the moral nature of humankind.  
 For Levinas, any philosophy relevant to the temporal world must include 
affectivity in investigations and acknowledge that unseen phenomena are at play in the 
world. What is the force that animates the human face while it lives but vacates the body 
when it dies, for example? What is it about this force that makes us “suffer” and then 
submit to the obligation to care for it? For Levinas, religion is the place where questions 
regarding affectivity, ethical responsibility are most often posed; moreover, religion 
historically provides instruction for the maintenance of particular identity that can survive 
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cultural and political totalization (or at least Levinas’ Judaism is such a religion). And so 
it is to religion that Levinas turns.  As a result, metaphysics are not done away with but 
problematized, and to a large extent, consist in part of a God who paves the way for inter-
subjectivity, rather than “Being,” which Levinas asserts calls for and justifies totalizing 
violence to the other.   
 Along with sneaking God “back” into things, Janicaud claims that when Levinas 
asserts that Husserlian methodology is constituted mainly of eidetic reduction, he is 
selling phenomenology short.61 This is indeed what Levinas thinks; even though he freely 
admits that his own work would not be possible without Husserl, Levinas attempts to 
solve Husserl's lack of attention to inter-subjectivity by equating revelation with 
subjectivity: 
 
...what sense does it make to claim that it does not involve, precisely, 
intentionality? A sham intentionality, purely representative, has been 
fabricated to prepare the way for the advent of the infinite.  This is an 
artificial operation, one that Descartes and Husserl were able to do 
without: for these thinkers, in discovering in me the idea of the infinite, I 
discover also that my subjectivity exceeds the representation I have of it.  
There is no need, then, to introduce the Other [Autre] face to the Same, 
nor to claim, as Levinas does, that the idea of the infinite is “the non-
                                                
61 Janicaud, Phenomenology and the “Theological Turn,” p. 38.  
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adequation par excellence.”62 
 
When Decartes and Husserl and attempted to make sense of human subjectivity, they did 
so imagining the self in relation to other objects, rather than in relation to objects and 
subjects, and it is exactly this kind of approach to subjectivity which Levinas rejects.  
Either you agree with Levinas that Husserlian and Cartesian investigations ignore a 
dimension of human consciousness and development (that of correlation and inter-
subjectivity), or you don’t. For Levinas, humans only truly experience their own 
subjectivity as “beyond them” when they come into relation with other human beings.  
The subjectivity of others will always be invisible to me even if their words, actions and 
affectivity are largely disclosed to me; therefore, it is really my contemplation of and 
interest in the subjectivity of others that allows me to transcend myself. It is not my own 
subjectivity but the subjectivity of the other that finally exceeds my understanding and 
forces me outside my own immanence. 
 “Levinas imposes his schema...only at the price of considerable distortions of his 
methodological referents,” Janicaud concludes. “In order to reestablish the coherence of 
his project, we must accept “his” intentionality, “his” conception of phenomenology. But 
at what price?”63 Janicaud is correct again, and yet what innovative thinker does not 
ultimately demand this? Intellectual history is filled with thinkers who push beyond the 
boundaries of their disciplines because what they have been taught has in their opinion, 
                                                
62 Janicaud, Phenomenology and the “Theological Turn,” 38-39.  
63 Janicaud, Phenomenology and the “Theological Turn,” 39.  
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proved inadequate. Much is owed to those whose “distortions” or reinventions that show 
us something new about ourselves or about our time and place. It is seems impossible to 
expect that we all remain beholden to the methods of the past without first rejecting and 
then re-imagining those aspects that no longer seem effective.  Janicaud would rather 
Levinas had held onto Husserl's “intentionality” and engage in intellectual gymnastics to 
make it “work.” It is not Levinas’ demands that we accept his definitions that most bother 
Janicaud. Janicaud simply remains unconvinced. And yet, Janicaud admits, “...we would 
like to conclude these critical remarks by showing that things still hold together. A 
phenomenology attentive to experience is within its rights to contest the “defection of 
phenomenology” that would be forced upon it.”64 Janicaud admits that phenomenology 
does not prevent Levinas from posing the question of the philosophical status of the idea 
of God.  “Our critical inquiry,” Janicaud insists, “means to make room for all 
phenomenological and philosophical possibilities.  Thanks to methodological 
discrimination, we mean to permit each project to retrieve its specificity and to respect 
the type of rigor specific to it.”65 One can argue that the God idea has no real place in 
philosophy, but is this a fair claim? Is Janicaud correct that we should make room for 
philosophical inquiry into the existence and nature of God, and if so how would this be 
any different than a theological inquiry of the same?  
 If we allow, albeit reluctantly, the idea of God to re-enter the philosophical 
mainstream—and we must keep in mind that God has never left the conversation in 
                                                
64 Janicaud, Phenomenology and the “Theological Turn,” 46.  
65 Janicaud, Phenomenology and the “Theological Turn,” 50-51.  
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Jewish thought—then we must ask if Levinas' philosophical Judaism really Judaism. And 
if so, how? 
 
But is it Judaism? 
 
In persecution I rediscover the original sense of J[udaism], its initial 
emotion. This is not just any persecution—an absolute persecution, which 
pursues the being everywhere. And it is here also (chapter 53 of Isaiah) –
in the discouragement which no one would know how to comprehend—
that the divine presence is revealed.  The situation of pure submission 
where there is an election in the sense of a person who caresses you. Or 
rather revelation of an order different from the natural order...An 
intoxication of this useless suffering, of this pure passivity by which one 
becomes the son of God.66 
  
The diary Levinas kept while in the German POW camp sheds light on the ways in which 
Levinas' personal sufferings shaped his post-war conception of Judaism and on his 
understanding of the role of election in his own philosophical inquiries. As Sarah 
Hammerschlag points out, in “On Escape,” written in 1935, it becomes clear that 
“Levinas had already begun to look at Judaism as the source for a thinking that could 
                                                
66 Levinas, Carnets de Captivité: oeuvres 1, (Paris: Bernard Grasset/IMEC, 2009), 180.  
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offer a route to transcendence.  But how could Judaism exemplify the existence of being 
riveted to one's being and offer a path to transcendence?”67  
 As discussed above in relation to Janicaud's discussion of Levinas' use of religion 
in philosophical analyses, Judaism as a tradition takes on what Levinas believes 
philosophy leaves out: suffering and its role in the creation of ethics and the demand that 
ethics be humanity's first concern.  More broadly, Judaism also offers a particular identity 
and practice that withstands the totalizing aspects of Western culture and even enriches it. 
Judaism is the place of particularity (or, if you like, alterity, in Levinasian terms) from 
which the totalizing aspects of Western secular culture can be challenged, and it is proof 
that we can remain faithful to our specific cultural identities and still have the best 
interests of the larger collective in mind.  In fact, Levinas would argue that it is better for 
mainstream culture if we are not all the same culturally, spiritually and politically.  The 
presence of minorities in fact ensures ethical relations. We will return to this idea later on 
in the chapter.  For now, having offered the possible philosophical and political value of 
Judaism in Levinas' work, we return to the original now two-part question: Is what 
Levinas calls Judaism really Judaism, and how does it offer a path to transcendence? 
 Recall that Levinas wrote that “holy History and the Revelation it entails are 
reduced to the memories of being burnt at the stake, the gas chambers, and even the 
public affronts received in international assemblies or heard in the refusal to allow them 
to emigrate. They experience the Revelation in the form of persecution!”68 Revelation, in 
                                                
67 Sarah Hammerschlag, “ 'A splinter in the Flesh,': Levinas and the Resignification of Jewish Suffering, 
1928-1947,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 20 no. 3 (2012), 397.  
68 Levinas, “Revelation in the Jewish Tradition,” Beyond the Verse trans. Gary D. Mole (London: 
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other words, can be “reduced to the trauma of lived events” and nonetheless contain 
Judaism's essential message.  From here we might assume that Judaism's meaning lies not 
in its content but in the experience of persecution suffered by its followers.  And yet 
traditional Judaism does not see the Sinaitic Revelation as void of content.  Revelation is 
the contents of the Torah, and the Torah in turn provides not only Law but ethics which, 
as discussed in Chapter 1 of this study, are for most of traditional Judaism, 
interconnected. In other words, for most Jews, Judaism is not reducible to the form of its 
delivery (i.e., the painful experience of receiving revelation and then delivering the 
message delivered by that revelation to an often unreceptive audience) but is traditionally 
defined by the content delivered to its earliest adherents at Sinai.  
 Yet we should be hesitant to believe that a man who spent decades of his 
professional life as a Talmud teacher and an administrator in a Jewish school would take 
this poetic claim too literally. As Janicaud points out, for Levinas, revelation is equated 
with subjectivity; and our subjectivity is activated by our repeated encounters with the 
other.  But the face of the other is not without content; it is not defined only by the 
suffering it brings which activates our ethical impulse. Its message, according to Levinas, 
is “Thou shalt not kill.” Just as revelation is not without content, Revelation is not 
without content, despite Levinas' musings in Beyond the Verse and elsewhere. Levinas 
emphasizes the textual evidence of the traumatic nature of revelation for the prophet to 
draw a parallel between the role of suffering in the creation of the ethical impulse and the 
role of Jews and Judaism in Western culture in general.  But does this work?  
                                                                                                                                            
Continuum, 2007), 127-128.  
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 To explore this idea more deeply, we return to Sarah Hammerschlag's “'A splinter 
in the Flesh',” her 2012 essay which explores the ways in which Levinas' Judaism—at 
least as it appears in his writings—changes after 1945. In this essay, Hammerschlag 
spends a great deal of time drawing parallels between Heidegger's work before and 
during the war and Levinas' changing conceptions of Judaism after his release from the 
POW camp. What allows Levinas to connect his philosophical work with his Judaism, 
according to Hammerschlag, is Levinas' conception of election, which she claims “is a 
temporal one.”69 As early as 1935 Levinas begins to explicitly make connections between 
“his phenomenological descriptions and his Jewish writings: 'Not to be able to flee one's 
condition—for many, this was like vertigo. Granted, this is a human situation, and in this 
the human soul is perhaps Jewish.'”70 Hammerschlag rightly asks that if election is not 
necessarily theological, but dictated by the position in society to which you are born 
(which may be impossible to escape, depending on the time and place in which you were 
born) then what is Jewishness? 
 
If [Judaism] is not based on a belief in God, then on what is it founded? Is 
it racial or natural? Is it historical? Is it merely a cultural remainder, a 
vestige, a sign that points nowhere but signifies nonetheless?71 
 
She answers by noting that Levinas does not necessarily deal with that question 
                                                
69 Hammerschlag, “'A Splinter,” 398.  
70 Hammerschlag quotes Levinas' essay “On Escape” here.  Hammerschlag, “'A Splinter,” 398.  
71 Hammerschlag, “'A Splinter,” 399. 
  
145 
consistently.  Instead he focuses on the experience of election.  And:  
 
Levinas can consider the experience of election without addressing the 
question of its cause by treating it as a modality of facticity.  In so doing 
he is following in Heidegger's footsteps...What is now evident, however, is 
the fundamental link between Levinas' ethics and his Jewish writing in so 
far as both depend on factical description of election.72 
 
Hammerschlag's compelling conclusion regarding Levinas' understanding of election is 
this: 
 
Levinas is clearly not advocating Jewish fatalism in the face of 
persecution but his essays from the late 1930s, the notes we have from 
journals written during his imprisonment in a Nazi labor camp, and his 
publications from the first years after the war all entail an attempt at re-
appropriating the experience of being persecuted as a form of being-in-
the-world, which, running counter to what Levinas will come to identify 
as Heidegger's neo-paganism, nonetheless would seem to be aimed at 
conceptualizing Jews and Jewishness as an alternative 
Schicksalgemeinschaft. When we consider the debt that Heidegger's own 
                                                
72 Hammerschlag, “'A Splinter,” 398. 
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description of Dasein owes to Christian theological resources, as recent 
scholarship has clearly demonstrated, then Levinas' turn to Jewish 
categories begins to look less like a departure and more like its translation 
into different register.73 
 
Levinas is very much concerned with politics and power, despite his feeble attempts in 
Totality and Infinity and elsewhere to claim otherwise. Like Hammerschlag, Janicaud 
also suggests that Levinas is fighting Heidegger with Heideggerian weapons.  If we 
understand Levinas in this way, then Levinas is simply offering another “community of 
fate” that will lead Europe—if not the world—toward another destiny grounded in the 
metaphysical truth of the God of the Jews. But I must respectfully disagree with 
Hammerschlag's claim that Levinas' use of Judaism “looks less like a departure and more 
like a translation [of Heideggerian thought] into a different register.” As discussed in 
Chapter 1, Levinas' thought is in many ways a direct response to Heidegger, but not 
because it wants to displace the Aryan with the Jew and thereby lead Europe or the world 
toward a different destiny.  In Totality and Infinity, Levinas makes it clear that his 
thought is meant to disrupt European political assumptions about the value of a 
universalization that obliterates the individual cultures and contributions of minority 
                                                
73 Hammerschlag, “'A Splinter,” 394. Hammerschlag also argues that Levinas applies Heideggerian 
notions of Shicksalgemeinshaft  by way of Franz Rosenzweig, who saw Jewishness as, in Levinasian 
terms, “another category of being” from whom non-Jews could learn something about history and 
salvation.  Levinas' interest in Rosenzweig is a topic of considerable proportion, and it is beyond the 
scope of this study, but others have devoted their time to the matter with interesting results. Robert 
Gibbs' excellent book Correlations in Rosenzweig and Levinas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1992) is among the better discussions of the similar ways in which Rosenzweig and Levinas approach 
philosophy through the lens of Judaism.  
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groups. What can stem the tide of the West's adoption of political and philosophical 
homogeneity is the preservation of particular communities and the way in which they 
resist complete assimilation can have powerful consequences.  When a society is made up 
of particular groups rather than a homogenized whole, ethical relation is possible.  Recall 
that for Levinas, true ethical relation requires an acknowledgement on my part that 
another who is not like me nonetheless deserves to define himself in his own terms.  
When I engage in true ethical relation, I heed the call of the other and do not raise a 
murderous hand against him. His face reveals to me that he deserves to live, and so do I.  
A continent led by a hegemony built on the ethical imperative to refrain from murder 
would arguably develop very differently than Europe did under a Reich founded on racial 
dominance and the ethical imperative to protect that dominance by murdering the other.74  
 If Levinas did at one point theorize about the possibility of a Western 
philosophical tradition focused on theologically informed ethical relation, I doubt he 
hoped for such a state of affairs for long. But then what did Levinas want?  We have 
discussed at length Levinas' equation of Judaism with suffering, his equation of suffering 
with prophecy, and the ethical call of the other, “ thou shalt not kill.” If we see 
Levinasian ethics and theology as temporal—and I believe that they are, despite Levinas' 
exasperating inconsistencies—then it makes sense that, for Levinas, to practice Judaism, 
or to even be a Jew in Europe from 1933-1945 very likely meant that unprecedented 
suffering was inevitable. A Jew was indeed trapped in her being, so to speak.  To survive, 
                                                
74 I am not implying that Hammerschlag considers Levinasian thought murderous.  I am taking the 
Heideggerian hegemonic as it unfolded in Nazi practice and the Levinasian hegemonic to two possible 
logical ends.  
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a Jew fled, hid, or held on to life in some way in the abyss of the German camp system 
until liberation. And then one had to survive the memories of one's loss and suffering to 
go on living after the war was over.  Levinas' motives with regard to Heidegger 
specifically are practically impossible to discern with any reliability, but we can easily 
understand how, after 1945, Levinas might be driven to find not just proof of the 
possibility of ethics, but proof of the value of Judaism to Western thought and culture. 
After 1933, when Heidegger accepted the rectorship at Freiburg, Levinas could no 
longer, if he were sane, see his own philosophical point of view—let alone his 
experiences—reflected in contemporary philosophy. And if Levinas did not see 
philosophical value in suffering before the war (or even imagine that human suffering 
must be represented and a primary concern of philosophy), then after the war, he 
certainly did.  
 At least part of what Levinas worked toward was a disruption of the current 
trajectory of Western thought as he understood it, and a way to give voice to another 
aspect of human experience which was not represented by the triumphant march of Being 
which typified popular politics of the time. Western philosophy rarely reflects or 
considers minority experience, let alone applies itself with any seriousness to the 
problems members of persecuted minority groups face. Western thought and experience 
are not monolithic, and Levinas knew this from experience; his experience was proof of 
that fact. Furthermore, the totality of human thought and experience is not monolithic 
either, although humans have much in common with one another experientially. Levinas 
and Wiesel both remark that their experiences in Nazi Europe were more reliably 
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reflected in traditional narrative of Judaism than in the mainstream European thought and 
culture surrounding them. Of course they would turn to the tools of the culture and 
tradition that speaks to their experiences when attempting to make use of them 
philosophically.   
 That said, Levinas takes liberties with Judaism, at least in his writings. 
Hammerschlag is right to notice the peculiar nature of election in Levinas' thought. And 
her questions about the nature of Levinas' Judaism are likewise worth asking.  Again, I 
am unconvinced that Levinas simply took up Heidegger polemic and turned it on it's 
head, especially because this theory hinges on a clear understanding of what election 
means for Levinas, and the nature of Levinas' election remains unclear.  Are the Jews 
“chosen” in accordance with any of the traditional understandings of that term discussed 
in Chapter 4 of this dissertation, and if so, for what are they chosen? Or do the Jews 
themselves do the choosing, and if so, what are they choosing, and to what end? Is all of 
humanity chosen, as Levinas suggests in “On Escape?” And if so, again, by whom, and to 
what end? Sometimes Levinas indicates that election is the plight of the Jews alone, and 
that the Jews are chosen to suffer for political reasons that are beyond their control.  
Again, this understanding of election, especially in the 1930s and 1940s, would not be 
surprising, but we should be careful not to adopt this understanding as timeless or 
universally embraced by all Jews, let alone non-Jews.  Even when Levinas attempts to 
extend chosenness to humanity in general, he defines election as a state of being trapped. 
Ultimately, election is not the linchpin for Levinas' Judaism or for Levinas' philosophy, 
nor does it connect the two bodies of work.  What holds the two bodies of work together 
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and fuels the engine of each is suffering. 
 Despite the fact that much of Levinas' work is innovative, unique, poetic and 
thought provoking, Levinas' grounding of ethics in the temporal experience of suffering, 
a project he begins in earnest in Totality and Infinity, is arguably one of his most valuable 
contributions to Western thought. And the task of creating a philosophy that makes ethics 
its first concern remained Levinas' primary project. Levinas did not develop a normative 
ethics, but he consciously opted out of that task. What he provided was a theoretical 
framework for an ethics grounded in the experience of suffering that could be utilized by 
thinkers concerned first and foremost with the alleviation and prevention of useless 
suffering and persecution.  Levinas created this theoretical framework from 
phenomenological descriptions of his own experiences and from the sources of Judaism 
that prioritize the alleviation of temporal suffering. The bare framework of Levinas' 
theory does not require God or Judaism, even though both concepts figure prominently 
for Levinas.  We need not adopt a Levinasian “system” in order to adopt those aspects of 
his work that will be of long term value to the work of urging Western philosophy toward 
a greater interest in the problem of suffering.  In any case, to attempt to do so would belie 
Levinas' entire project.  
 But if we accept Levinas' framework for an ethics grounded in the experience of 
suffering, what principles would such an ethics embrace, and what would the 
motivational force of its content be? The commandment to “love your neighbor as 
yourself” has long been an imperative in Western theology, and yet the Holocaust took 
place in modern Christian Europe.  Perhaps what needs changing is not the command 
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itself but the definition of who one's neighbors are75.
                                                
75 Thank you to my friend and colleague, Cristine Hutchison-Jones, with whom I have had many 
meaningful conversations regarding the centrality of the question of how we define the term “neighbor” 
to the problem of ethics. 
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Chapter 3 
In Spite of Man: The Ethics of Elie Wiesel 
    
The existence of an Eichmann casts doubt on the nature and mentality of 
the German people, but the possibility of a Mengele throws into question 
the very basis of German education and culture...many officers of the 
Einsatzgruppen...received [doctorates in literature...philosophy, theology 
or history] from Germany's best universities...yet nothing kept them from 
killing Jewish children...Their education provided them with no shield, no 
shelter from the temptation and seduction of cruelty that people may carry 
within. Why?1  
   
 In part one of this chapter, an exegesis of texts selected from Wiesel's corpus is 
presented to support the following claims about his project. 
 
1.  Wiesel ground ethics in suffering. 
2. Wiesel argues that the stories of suffering told by victims activate ethical response in 
bystanders and potential victims. Literature and storytelling are among the best 
methods for the dissemination of moral message and the persuasion of bystanders to 
                                                
1 Elie Wiesel, “Without Conscience,” New England Journal of Medicine 352, no. 15 (April 14, 2005): 
1512-1513.   
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intervene on behalf of those who suffer unjustly. 
3. Wiesel claims that the particularity of Judaism can represent what is universal in 
human spirituality and culture.  
 
Part two is a critical analysis of the texts and ideas presented in part one of this chapter.  
Final conclusions regarding Wiesel's project are provided in Chapter 5. 
 
I. The Exegesis 
 
 Of the three thinkers examined here, Wiesel's work and thought have had the 
greatest impact on mainstream culture.  Wiesel's influence is two-fold.  Wiesel is very 
popular among non-Jewish audiences for his work on Holocaust memory and victim 
advocacy, and he has utilized that popularity to educate non-Jews not only about the 
Holocaust but also about Jewish history, culture and religious practice. Generally, he is 
considered a novelist and essayist and, more broadly, a “voice of morality” but his impact 
on Jewish thought outside of his work on Holocaust remembrance and representation is 
less often examined. 
 To be sure, Night, Wiesel's bestselling autobiography and Holocaust testimony for 
which he is most known, has sold millions of copies worldwide and has been translated 
into more than 30 languages to date. Thousands of primary and secondary schools around 
the United States and Europe have adopted Night as a centerpiece to their genocide 
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education programs, and this has contributed significantly to Wiesel's fame as an 
outspoken advocate for victims of genocides, mass murders and other forms of brutality.  
The sheer volume of primary and secondary literature surrounding Holocaust education 
and Holocaust literature is astounding, and Wiesel's Night has inarguably played a 
significant role in the study and representation of the Holocaust. For reasons discussed in 
the following pages, however, this dissertation utilizes other sources as the primary foci 
of this analysis of Wiesel's ethics, an aspect of Wiesel's thought which is of central 
importance. Since it is typically assumed that any discussion regarding Holocaust and 
post-Holocaust Jewish thought will include Night, the decision to leave this text out of an 
in-depth analysis of ethics after Auschwitz should be explained. Given Night's impact 
and its international popularity, how could any analysis of Wiesel's work fail to include 
it?  
 There are two primary reasons discussed below before we begin our analysis of 
Wiesel's ethics vise-a-vie other works in his corpus. Wiesel has written 58 books to date, 
many of which are non-fiction. When Wiesel is described as a theologian, the label is 
often qualified: Wiesel is a “Holocaust theologian,” a term which is problematic because 
it implies that the theology in question refers—or is meaningful only in relation to—the 
Holocaust.  Critics who describe Wiesel in these terms tend to over-emphasize his 
descriptions of the Holocaust as a metaphysical and mystical event in such a way that 
many of the other contributions Wiesel makes to Holocaust remembrance, contemporary 
Jewish theology, ethics, and political and social justice activism are overshadowed or 
misinterpreted. Naomi Seidman is correct when she states that “the interpretation of the 
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Holocaust as a religious-theological event is not a tendentious imposition on Night but 
rather a careful reading of the work.”2 But Seidman convincingly argues that Night may 
not be an unmediated account of Wiesel's experience in the first place—nor, I would 
argue in conjunction, of his theological understanding, analysis and incorporation of that 
experience.  
 In her controversial essay “Elie Wiesel and the Scandal of Jewish Rage,” Seidman 
asserts that “...Read together, the text of Night and Wiesel's account of its composition 
form a single portrait of the artist as a young survivor, haunted by a cosmic, deathly 
silence he can only break at the urging of another.”3The French version of Night to which 
Seidman refers features a forward written by French Catholic philosopher François 
Mauriac, who was awarded the Nobel Prize for literature in 1952.  It was Mauriac who, 
two years later, is said to have “urged” Wiesel to write about his experiences as a child 
survivor of the Holocaust. According to Seidman it is Mauriac's introduction, replete with 
comparisons of Wiesel to Jesus on the cross, in addition to the translation of the initial 
Yiddish text into French which mediate Wiesel's account by stripping it of his rage and 
his desire for revenge and instead buttressing it with sad “mysticism.” What most 
differentiates Und di welt hot geshvign from La Nuit as different texts with different 
audiences in mind, however, is that they belong to completely different literary genres.  
 Seidman's argument is valid. According to Wiesel's own 1994 memoir, All Rivers 
Run to the Sea, he first composed the first part of his memoir of his life in Yiddish while 
                                                
2 Seidman, Naomi, “Elie Wiesel and the Scandal of Jewish Rage,” Jewish Social Studies 3, no. 1 
(Autumn, 1996): 1.  
3 Seidman, “Jewish Rage,” 4.  
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aboard a ship to Brazil.  He submitted this text for publication in 1954, several months 
before his meeting with Mauriac.  Therefore, that account was already published in a 
series edited by Buenos Aries based Mark Turkov entitled Dos poylishe yidntum (Polish 
Judaism).  This first Yiddish version of his experience, Und di welt hot geshvign (And the 
World Was Silent), was not published as a stand-alone memoir like La Nuit, but rather as 
one among a growing number of Yiddish Holocaust memoirs published for a Jewish 
audience, most of whom it can be assumed no longer lived in Europe.4 Many Yiddish 
testimonies of the Holocaust were modeled after the local chronicle (pinkes) or memorial 
book (yizker-bukh), which featured catalogues of names, addresses and occupations. In 
addition, these Yiddish accounts were scrupulously detailed and tended to profess 
political motivations of some kind. Wiesel's Und di welt hot geshvign, which contains 
detailed history of Sighet and its residents and overt calls for revenge against the 
“German murders” and those who stood idly by follows these genre specific 
requirements.   
 The part of La Nuit and Und di welt hot geshvign that differs the most is the 
ending, which recounts the first time Wiesel sees his own reflection since he left the 
ghetto in 1944.  La Nuit or Night ends with Wiesel's assertion that the image of the 
“corpse” gazing back at him has “never left [him].”  Significantly, Und di welt hot 
geshvign's final paragraph does not end there.  It includes the statement that Wiesel began 
                                                
4 One reviewer of Turkov's volume, as Seidman points out, found this series valuable because it included 
“useful historical material” regarding Yiddish theatre and other cultural phenomena destroyed by the 
Holocaust.  Since he attempts to describe the degree to which Transylvanian Jews were ignorant of the 
coming destruction, Wiesel's account is no exception in its value to interested historians of Jewish life 
before World War II.  See Seidman, p. 5. 
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the outline for his memoir while still recovering in Buchenwald, which contradicts 
Wiesel's later claim that he only began to write his story after “ten years of silence.”  But 
perhaps more importantly, Und di welt includes overtly stated political hopes for the 
testimonies of survivors:  
 
I see that the world is forgetting. Germany is now a sovereign state, the 
German army has been reborn.  The bestial sadist of Buchenwald, Ilsa 
Koch, is happily raising her children. War criminals stroll the streets of 
Hamburg and Munich. The past has been erased. Forgotten.5  
 
As an act of rebellion against this forgetting, Wiesel “thought it would be a good idea to 
publish a book based on the notes [he] wrote in Buchenwald.” According to this account, 
what ultimately motivates Wiesel to recover from the abuse he suffered in Auschwitz was 
the rage that awakened his “will to live.”6 Und di welt hot geshvign depicts Wiesel gazing 
into since a mirror for the first time since entering the ghettos before breaking it with his 
fist. “The Yiddish survivor,” writes Seidman, “shatters that image” of the corpse “as soon 
as he sees it, destroying the deathly existence the Nazis willed on him.  The Yiddish 
survivor is filled with rage and the desire to live, to take revenge, to write.”7 Seidman 
concludes that “There are two survivors, then, a Yiddish and a French—or perhaps we 
                                                
5 This is Seidman's translation of the original Yiddish text.  
6 Translation Seidman.  See “Jewish Rage,” 7-8.  
7 Seidman, “Jewish Rage,” 8.  
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should say one survivor who speaks to a Jewish audience and one whose first reader is a 
French Catholic.”8 Seidman suggests that while Wiesel finally gained the audience he 
wanted with Night, he may have done so only by “suppressing the very existence of this 
desire” and by allowing “the survivor who pointed the accusatory finger...[to be] 
supplanted by the survivor haunted by metaphysics and silence.”9   
 One might—and many do-- glean from the pages of La Nuit that talking or 
writing about Auschwitz is impossible, and the only way to truly respect the suffering of 
it's innocent victims is to allow their experiences to remain ineffable. Yet Wiesel, to 
whom this point of view has often been attributed, has been anything but silent, and urges 
any survivors of undeserved suffering and violence to speak up as well.  In fact, dialogue 
that happens in spite of everything is at the very heart of Wiesel's ethic, even if we cannot 
find this message as emphatically expressed in La Nuit as he has certainly expressed it 
elsewhere. It is easy to mis-categorize Wiesel as a thinker, and to overlook the defining 
features of his work when Night is considered the determinate, crowning jewel of his 
efforts. After all, Wiesel's approach to theology, mysticism and ethics have only just 
begun to develop in the pages of Night.  If we are interested in looking beyond Wiesel's 
descriptions of the Holocaust as an event and search for how we might meaningfully 
proceed in light of the Holocaust, Night is not the best source for that information. 
Wiesel's value as a post-modern and contemporary Jewish thinker is better understood if 
we lavish even half as much attention on texts like The Trial of God, Souls on Fire, and 
                                                
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid.  
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Somewhere a Master, as we have lavished on Night. Wiesel's essays and lectures, which 
also tend to receive less attention than his fiction, should also serve as an important part 
of any complete assessment of his thought. Seidman's observations about the significant 
differences between Night and Und di welt hot geshvign are meaningful because they 
remind us of the importance of audience, the difficulty of testimony and the difficulty of 
translating experience linguistically and politically.   
 Seidman's critics argue that claiming that La Nuit is in many ways fundamentally 
different from the testimony Wiesel wrote for fellow Jews is to accuse Wiesel's La Nuit, 
and even Wiesel himself, of inauthenticity.  Wiesel himself—and quite unfairly--even 
made this accusation of Seidman's research.10 Authenticity is hardly the crux of 
Seidman's argument. Rather, she is making larger claims about the culture specificity of 
genre, identity politics, and language.  She is quite careful to remind us that the content of 
the translated text was only lightly—albeit meaningfully--edited and that Wiesel's 
account of his external experience remains much the same. According to Seidman, it is 
Wiesel's account of his internal experience that changes in subtle ways, and these 
changes in part result in a text that is positioned within a literary genre whose readers 
were comprised of entirely different demographic. She claims that “...from the historical 
and political specificities of the Yiddish documentary testimony, Wiesel and his French 
                                                
10   Seidman's work was also taken up by Holocaust deniers, who felt they had discovered a supporter of 
their cause in Seidman. Neither of these unforeseen responses were what Seidman intended. It is ironic 
that Holocaust deniers would fail to see that Seidman's attempts to deeply explore the complications of 
survivor accounts expressed support for the rage of survivors as legitimate and, as yet, still largely 
unheard.   
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publishing house fashioned something closer to mythopoetic narrative.”11 Seidman is 
suggesting that in order to gain the non-Jewish audience to whom Wiesel wanted to tell 
his story, he had to reframe that story by means of a different genre altogether, a genre 
whose audience was much more likely to find Wiesel's unabashed rage as it is expressed 
in Und di welt threatening.  So while there is no reason to assume that Wiesel's testimony 
as it is expressed in Und di welt or La Nuit is anything but factually authentic, the 
problems unrelated to factual authenticity to which Seidman draws attention make either 
text a problematic primary source for any investigation of Wiesel's ethics or his theology.  
 Second, Night  (in all of its manifestations) is a testimony. It is not a novel or a 
midrash or a political essay, genres which are frequently used to explore ethical 
problems.  And while one could certainly derive certain theological or ethical points of 
view from someone's testimony, the fact remains that testimony, as Seidman reminds us, 
is not a genre that is immune to the problem of audience. And Seidman is not alone in 
emphasizing this.  This is by now a well-known point.  The problem of telling the story 
of Auschwitz is complicated even further when survivors want to convey their 
experiences to anyone Jewish or non-Jewish who has never even been held against their 
will.  This is a problem that survivors once faced with great frequency, but we tend to 
forget that fact in the twenty-first century, especially since the “Holocaust experience” is 
now a phenomenon people in the West have heard much about. Survivors who attempted 
to tell their stories faced additional ethical dilemmas beyond those of language and 
representation. Who should speak for the dead victims of the Nazis? And should the 
                                                
11 Seidman, “Jewish Rage,” 6.  
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survivors, who are also victims of the Nazis, be presented as merely victims? Should the 
compromising situations into which victims were forced be brought to light, as Primo 
Levi, Liana Millu and others did, or does such an act constitute a betrayal? Who is meant 
to judge what is said and not said? Would survivors reading the testimonies of others feel 
that these accounts should reflect their own experiences? Would non-survivors and non-
Jews be interested in reading these texts, and if so, why? 
 Wiesel's Night did not discover a sizable audience nor did it successfully “cross 
over” to a non-Jewish audience until the mid-1960s.  It is not clear whether Wiesel 
consciously chose to de-emphasize the rage experienced by Jewish survivors in favor of 
reaching a wider Christian (and otherwise non-Jewish) audience, but as Marc Ellis points 
out, Night has “earned a significant place in the post-Holocaust Christian world.” Ellis 
speculates that “...If Christianity had rejected the Holocaust as a claim on Christian 
conscience the Holocaust dead might have vanished from the memory of Western 
civilization.”12 Ellis also points out that in most forms of tragic literature, “there are 
places of redemption, but not in the Holocaust. Could the Holocaust,” he asks, “invest 
itself in literary hope?”13 Accordingly, Wiesel and others may have been—consciously or 
unconsciously-- expected by Christian audiences to “leave room for them to repent and 
affirm their own heritage.  The difficult relationship between Jews and Christians had just 
culminated in the Holocaust...[but] writing on the Holocaust not only “precipitated a new, 
more positive encounter for Jews and Christians.  It also served as a means for Christian 
                                                
12 Marc H, Ellis, Encounter in the Jewish Future With Wiesel, Buber, Heschel, Arendt and Levinas. 
Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2011, 27.  
13 Ellis, “Jewish Future,” 26.  
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renewal in the post-Holocaust era and secured Jewish life in America to an 
unprecedented degree.”14  
 I disagree with Ellis' contention that Wiesel heavily weighed the concerns of 
“Christian” readers, even if La Nuit was edited with the goal of dampening down his 
rage. I think that Wiesel gave—and continues to give---far more thought to the survivors 
of the Holocaust and their children and grandchildren than to Christians and other non-
Jews living in the wake of the Holocaust.  In fact, as we shall discuss at length in part two 
of this chapter, this is a shortcoming of Wiesel's ethics.  Wiesel never discusses how we 
might prevent the creation of perpetrators or how perpetrators may be rehabilitated. The 
innocent victims and the bystanders of the atrocities committed against the innocent are 
Wiesel only concerns.  His success at “crossing over” to non-Jewish audiences can 
instead be attributed to his ability to show the value of Jewish thought, culture and 
practice to the broader Western world by pointing to the value of particular identity in 
general. Nonetheless, Ellis' broader point remains valid: Night has come to be understood 
as allowing it's non-Jewish readers to atone for the sin of anti-Semitism and to move 
forward into a new future, even if the author of the text does not intend to do so.15The 
same could not be said for Und di welt hot geshvign.  That text was written for Jews, and 
possibly even for Jewish survivors in particular, and expresses rage and contempt for the 
“German murderers” without compunction. And unlike Primo Levi and Liana Millu, 
                                                
14 Ellis, “Jewish Future,” 27.  
15 Such painstaking concern regarding the thoughts and feelings of a Christian (or Gentile) audience can 
more easily be attributed to Ellis' former teacher, Richard Rubenstein, whose work we will analyze in 
Chapter 4 of this study.  
  
163 
Wiesel kept silent on the morally questionable acts of fellow Jews he may have 
witnessed. Wiesel is on the side of the survivors, no matter what; Ellis' depiction of him 
as carefully contemplating how he might provide opportunities for “redemption” for non-
Jews for the sins of the Holocaust is simply inaccurate. 
 To sum up, the role of Night in bringing the Holocaust to the fore of the literary, 
political and ethical imagination of the West is indispensable. The “job” of a testimony is 
complex and fraught with concerns and the authors of Holocaust testimonies are 
traumatized individuals whose concerns are multiple: perceived authenticity, reception, 
demographics of their audience or audiences, and remaining “loyal” to fellow victims to 
list only a few. But is not wise to found the lion's share of our understanding of Wiesel's 
thought on Night alone.  
 
The Din Torah: Wiesel's Post-Holocaust Ethic   
 
 Wiesel’s work combines depictions of the absurd16 with traditional Jewish 
                                                
16 The term “absurd” has been defined in a number of ways in philosophical discourse.  This project uses 
the term  “absurd” in the Kierkegaardian sense: life is absurd because does not appear to have obvious, 
coherent meaning even though mankind desperately seeks it. This is quite different than life is absurd 
because it has no meaning at all and the universe is completely indifferent to human existence, as Sartre 
would later claim.  Also, the Camusian description of the absurd as having been “born out of this 
confrontation between the human need [for meaning] and the unreasonable silence of the world” (The 
Myth of Sisyphus) can be found in much of Wiesel's work as well.  Wiesel would also agree with Camus 
that the absurd “makes fate a human matter, which must be settled among men.” (Ibid).  Understood in 
this more nuanced way, the idea that life is absurd places emphasis on the temporal world and man's 
responsibility for it rather than on the transcendent and its role in creation.  In other words, absurdism 
neither confirms nor denies inherent, transcendent meaning.  Instead, it focuses on the world of 
experience and on man's ability to make this world as just as possible.  
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imagery and narrative forms.  Contrary to readings of Wiesel's work which 
overemphasize and misunderstand the role of silence in his work and thought, the 
absurdity of the world and the intrinsic meaninglessness it arguably indicates point 
neither to man's unbreachable separateness from man and creation, nor to a fundamental 
inability to communicate.  Rather, because life is absurd, man must by means of his free 
will choose to develop not only shared meaning but shared ethics as a defense against the 
murderous abyss created by fanatical ideologies and the undeserved suffering they create. 
Hope is possible only when “the silence of the world,” as Albert Camus once said, and as 
Wiesel would later say, “the silence of God” are met with mankind's sincere interrogation 
and protest, and action even when no concrete solutions to man's suffering are 
forthcoming.  Put another way, humankind's silence in the face of tyranny and 
underserved suffering is not inevitable.  If Wiesel's work can be said to constitute a single 
project it is to rescue ethics from the ideological malaise and loss of innocence that define 
life after Auschwitz, but not by denying that the world is absurd.  Rather, he insists that 
the world has always been absurd.  For Wiesel, the centuries-long history of Jewish 
persecution in Europe and of the persecution of other minority groups around the world is 
proof of the fact that human experience is not monolithic and that the problem of useless 
human suffering is not new.  
 While Wiesel could not be considered an absurdist by trade for many reasons, he 
incorporates salient aspects of absurdism's approach to ethical obligation and the power 
of meaning in human communities. Not unlike Camus, Wiesel insists that the silence of 
the world must be met with protest, if for no other reason than the ethical climate of 
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human society is in our control and is therefore our responsibility. Of course Wiesel's 
inclusion of God in the absurdist landscape is not unique, and other thinkers like him who 
are representative of existentialism also feel that belief in God and religious practice are 
not antithetical to philosophical absurdism, particularly as defined by Kierkegaard and 
Camus. What makes Wiesel’s thought unique is that he grounds ethics in suffering.  
 For Wiesel, it is not only the storyteller who is expected to engage in and 
advocate for ethical activity. Wiesel would agree with Jean-Paul Sartre's claims that a 
reader must engage with any story ethically by bringing “the gift of his whole 
person...[including] his scale of values.”17 Only then can the listener judge whether what 
she hears is ethical or unethical.  Then she must decide if her future actions will be 
altered in light of the new understanding gained through her engagement with the story. 
Stories are often, in the words of Daniel Taylor, “flares sent into the night sky.”18 Taylor 
states that “a reader's willingness to empathize with characters in a narrative or the 
speaker in a poem is itself a moral act...as is the writer's willingness to portray at least 
some of the characters sympathetically...It is parallel to attending to the story of a friend.” 
The implicit hope of the “oppressed writer,” according to Taylor, is that true empathy and 
understanding can be created between people if only “the story [is told] well enough.”19 
Wiesel, who Taylor considers an “oppressed writer,” has expressed that he feels he has a 
story to tell that he tells and retells, only to feel he hasn't gotten it “right” yet. It is not the 
                                                
17Jean-Paul Sartre, What is Literature? And Other Essays, trans. Bernard Frechtman (New York: 
Philosophical Library, 1949), 36.    
18 Daniel Taylor, “The Ethical Implications of Storytelling: Giving Ear to the Literature of the 
Oppressed,” Mars Hill Review, 3 no 3 (1995): 58-70.  
19 Ibid.  
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“facts” of his experiences that he hopes to get “right.” This is especially true because 
most of his texts are fiction. What Wiesel struggles with is the delivery of the moral 
imperative his stories are intended to deliver. 
 Taylor argues that the relationship between literature and ethics is the strongest in 
“the literature of oppressed,” which he defines as “literature that arises out of and is a 
conscious response to dehumanization and the denial of individual value.” According to 
Taylor, “this literature covers a great variety of writings and writers and historical 
contexts” but in spite of these variances contain “recurring emphases and 
strategies...[which] link these otherwise divergent works, each with profound ethical 
implications.” Taylor identifies these three emphases as:  
 
1. The concept of “telling ones story, both one's own and the community's”; Taylor 
rightly frames this shared strategy as itself an act of hope, especially since this claim 
relies on the notion that it is an “ethical responsibility to listen to these stories, and to 
listen without prejudgment.” Telling one's story is complicated by the frequent 
expectation that these stories be told in “the public language,” or what Adrienne Rich 
called “the language of the oppressor”20 which may not even contain references to the 
concepts and experiences the storyteller is attempting to describe.21 The experiences 
of the oppressed are not a part of mainstream discourse—and I would argue that these 
                                                
20 Adrienne Rich, “The Burning of Paper Instead of Children,” The Fact of a Doorframe (WW Norton, 
1985).  
21  Wiesel once said, “ I believe that the subjects I try to deal with, at least in some of my books, are 
beyond language, so I have to find a new language.  The story defies imagination, so I have to invent a 
new kind of imagination.” Franciosi, Shaffer and Wiesel, “An Interview With Elie Wiesel,” 290.  
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experiences are not a part of philosophical discourse, either--but telling one's story 
can change language itself since the storyteller may be required to develop new 
terminology or adapt existing terminology, thereby changing cultural and ethical 
expectations of human behavior.  Storytellers like Wiesel might also face the problem 
of translation from one's mother tongue into other languages from other cultures. For 
Wiesel, telling one's story of survival involves rejecting the pressure to be silent by 
insisting that only talking, telling, and listening can heal the sufferer and the sick or 
broken society that has unfairly forced him to suffer. The telling of one's story can 
therefore heal society and its victims. 
 
2. An unembarrassed appeal to moral criteria; In Taylor's words, “Simply put, this 
literature is not cowed by fashionable contemporary relativism.  It frequently invokes 
standards of right and wrong which would be an embarrassment for...many academics 
and shapers of contemporary culture, except for the irony that these claims are 
coming from people whom these same academics support on political and social 
grounds in their calls for justice.” Like Mendelssohn-Maoz, Taylor claims that the 
tendency to guard against mixing morals and literature often makes academics 
nervous.  But Taylor adds that the “literature of the oppressed” creates even greater 
anxiety than a philosophical novel written by a member of the majority group might, 
in part because in the West “moral order they appeal to has often been the Judeo-
Christian one, broadly conceived” in which these oppressed minorities are, in spite of 
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their “seeming powerlessness” are often seen as “representatives of moral order.”22  
They are, in biblical terms, prophet-like in that they are often outsiders who suffer, 
and who suffer even more because they are driven to deliver a prophetic imperative 
which most of society is likely to ignore. His or her delivery of the message of man's 
responsibility for his fellow man might even bring about more suffering for the 
prophet. And yet in the Western tradition, the prophetic imperative must be 
delivered—and will be ignored at the mainstream majority's peril. As we will discuss 
in greater depth momentarily, Wiesel's works rely heavily on the role of the suffering 
victim as a kind of prophet who delivers messages we might not want to hear. And 
finally, 
 
3. The emphasis on community.  This sense of community “gives writers a feeling of 
mission not often found among other contemporary writers.”  These writers 
frequently feel they are helping to perpetuate the survival of their entire people—or at 
least the communities they grew up in—by means of their writing.  Especially in 
writing of Und di welt hot geshvign, the first version of Wiesel's Holocaust memoir, 
Wiesel sought to preserve the history and memory of not only his little town but also 
his people as he remembered them before the catastrophe. Yet Wiesel's drive to 
preserve his people runs throughout his work. The world of Shamgorod in The Trial 
of God may be fictionalized, but the preservation of Jewish history, culture and 
tradition as it took shape in Eastern Europe—a world now long gone—was another 
                                                
22 Ibid.  
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important goal of the play.  
 
 Although Taylor's interest lies more in arguing that the marriage of ethics and 
literature does not create a substandard literature, Taylor's project also focuses on the 
usefulness of literature as a tool for ethicists. Taylor's work also helps us to place Wiesel 
within a tradition of oppressed writers and storytellers in the West who have used 
literature in much the same way he has. The “literature of the oppressed,” because it is 
concerned with the dissemination of ethics, is a vital part of the existing tradition of  
“philosophical literature” to which novels like Camus' The Plague, Rebecca Newberger 
Goldstein's 36 Arguments for the Existence of God, and Aldous Huxley's Brave New 
World also belong.  The “literature of the oppressed,” to continue to use Taylor's term, is 
both continuous with the broader tradition of philosophical literature at the same time that 
it disrupts it by interrogating traditional philosophical assumptions and forms by insisting 
that the genre of philosophical ethics does not—but should--typically include minority 
voices and experiences.  
 Wiesel uses opposing forces of stasis and disruption in order to portray the painful 
absurdity of senseless human suffering and the ongoing ethical crisis it creates as 
continuous in human history.  The Trial of God in particular consciously employs 
conventional ways of conveying meaning while simultaneously preventing the reader 
from denying the potentially inherent meaninglessness of man's position. The argument 
that the absurd is fundamental to human experience but nonetheless worth fighting 
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against requires history because proving repetition of political and philosophical patterns 
which create and justify human suffering requires hindsight. In The Trial of God, history 
is used to contextualize the absurdity of the present. The greatest challenge of such a 
world-view, especially for someone like Wiesel who defines the Holocaust as a 
historically unique event in history lies in allowing the present time its unparalleled place 
in the trajectory of history without denying the eternal nature of the human struggle 
against the absurd. 
 Conversations among Jewish thinkers regarding the Holocaust have, in 
accordance with Jewish tradition, automatically been framed by larger questions 
regarding disruption and continuity in both history and covenant.  But World War II and 
the Holocaust can be seen as the single most devastating event in modern general 
European history as well. European romantic nationalism, especially as it developed in 
Germany, bred a modern fascism that threatened to become the new ethical center of a 
damaged Europe.23 These realities shaped the philosophical and political landscape to a 
great extent for Jews and non-Jews alike. Wiesel began his studies in secular philosophy 
                                                
23  For a relatively recent exploration of Nazi ‘ethics,’ see The Nazi Conscious by Claudia Koonz 
(Cambridge, MA, 2003), referred to in Chapter 1 of this dissertation. She makes the persuasive 
argument that Nazis did indeed possess an “ethic,” that is, a plan for rightness of action supported by a 
carefully developed moral framework. Koonz argues that the race ethic was central to Nazi thought, 
making any action in defense of the preservation of his “race” and “nation” a moral act that superseded 
all other acts in worth and value. See also the compelling work of David Redles on this subject: Hitler’s 
Millennial Reich: Apocalyptic Belief and the Search for Salvation (New York, 2005).  Redles’ work is 
powerfully convincing and explores the messianic and millennial aspects of Nazism that many scholars 
have left unexplored. The slaughter that took place during the resulting war far surpassed even the worst 
of expectations set by the horrific precedent of the Great War: By 1945, an estimated 55 million lives 
were lost world wide as a result of death camps, POW camps, ghettos, concentration camps and battles 
in two theaters. Please see http://necrometrics.com/20c5m.htm for an efficient break down of lives lost 
to battles fought in both theaters along side estimates of numbers of lives lost the Holocaust.  This site 
also includes a helpful bibliography of recent texts that include statistics regarding total number of lives 
lost during World War II. 
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at the Sorbonne in 1948, the year after Camus finished writing The Plague, where he says 
he “devoured books on philosophy and psychology…” and went to hear “Sartre and 
Buber...lecture on religious existentialism.”24 Wiesel was immersed in the very tradition 
Camus was helping to create.  The most popular philosophical approaches of the time, 
phenomenology and existentialism, were not felt to be in direct opposition with modern 
Jewish identity and practice—at least, not by everyone.  In the meantime, Wiesel also 
continued his Jewish studies, and earned extra money by teaching young boys Talmud.25 
 Camus, whom Wiesel acknowledges as having deeply influenced him as a writer 
and a thinker, also uses shared human experiences of oppression and violence from both 
contemporary times and recorded history to create an ethic which can be shared among 
diverse groups of people. Camus uses French national history specifically and European 
history in general to explore the ethical implications of France's prolonged cooperation 
with Nazis and the power of fascism in twentieth century Europe. The Plague offers an 
ethic that relies on leftwing, post-colonialist26—and even, in its own way, religious and 
theological—sensibilities to provide some kind of organizing principle around which 
atheists and the religious might unite. For Camus, the bubonic plague (rather than a 
raging pogrom) becomes a metaphor for the sweeping de-humanization of fascism and 
                                                
24  Wiesel, Elie, All Rivers Run Into the Sea (New York: Schocken Books, 1995),154-155. 
25  Wiesel, All Rivers, 155.  
26  A great deal of secondary literature has been written regarding Camus’s political beliefs and activities.  
Some critics do not see Camus as at all post-colonialist, and cite his reluctance to support the Algerian 
revolution as proof of his colonialist mentality.  Others disagree.  To explore this aspect of Camus’s 
personal life further, please see Emily Apter, “Out of Character: Camus’s French Algerian Subjects,” 
MLN 112, no. 4, French Issue (Sept., 1997): 499-516, and David Carroll, “Camus’s Algeria: Birthrights, 
Colonial Injustice, and the Fiction of a French-Algerian People,” MLN 112, no. 4, French Issue (Sept., 
1997): 517-549. 
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genocide that took over much of the world that is a unique manifestation—a genetic 
mutation, if you will—of the ever-present possibility of the re-emergence of other 
plague-like diseases of social collapse, despair, and abject brutality that permeate human 
history.  Since France’s own relationship with the plague is intimate and longstanding, 
Camus is not unique in his use of plague history and plague metaphors to illustrate 
political and philosophical points of view. 27 The visibility of the plague in French culture 
and the terminology often utilized to describe its horrendous symptoms (including the 
feverish madness renown for de-humanizing its victims even more than its buboes did) 
created a language that could also be used to discuss Europe’s social, political, and 
ethical concerns.28 For Camus as well the plague becomes a symbol of the absurd and of 
undeserved human suffering against which human beings must actively band together if 
they want to make life meaningful—and therefore worth living. The act of doing rather 
than the act of searching, Camus argues, is the source of happiness, and happiness that 
comes from engaging with others is the source of real meaning.29  
 Wiesel's work shares this belief in the inevitability of undeserved suffering, man's 
inescapable responsibility for his fellow man, the invaluable role of communal identity 
and meaning, and the power of friendship. Both The Trial of God and The Plague create 
new ethics from the ruins of the old because they write about periods of ethical collapse. 
The liminality of such events is devastating, but are also ripe with possibility, especially 
                                                
27 In 1630, French writer Raymond Besard calls the Black Plague “the prototype of all inhumanity.” 
Besard, Raymond, Discours de la Peste (Dole, 1630).  Found in Paul Delsalle, La Franche-Comté au 
temps des archiducs Albert et Isabelle: 1598-1633, Collection Didactiques (Besançon, France: Presses 
Universitaires Franc-Comtoises, 2008), 156.  
28  Ibid.  
29  See Camus’s A Happy Death, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Knopf, 1972). 
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since the “liminal” can be defined as a threshold between here and elsewhere, a bridge 
representing a blurring of the possible and the actual. The Trial of God is based on a real 
din torah with God that took place in Auschwitz. Wiesel writes that he was a witness to 
the trial, and describes having watched silently for several nights as three Jewish scholars 
put God on trial.  At the conclusion of the trial, God was found guilty of crimes against 
creation and humankind.30 In several of Wiesel's earlier texts, trials also figure 
prominently, often to underline the centrality of man's role as guardian of God's Law—a 
law code which in Judaism deals with both religious and civil law--especially when God 
appears absent or is Himself in violation of that Law.  As discussed in Chapter 1 of this 
dissertation, according to many strains of post-Holocaust Jewish thought, God promised 
so many years ago that the children of Abraham could count on His protection but did not 
keep His promise when the Nazis waged their war against European Jewry.  In the most 
literal sense, He broke the very covenant upon which all of Judaism is built.  Even more 
disruptive is the gaping wound the death camps left in the fabric of the human universe.  
What has become of the crown of God’s creation?  If humans are such beasts, then what 
is God?  Where is God? In such a context, liminality also makes us aware of the 
nightmare of our own human potential for base cruelty and our abject helplessness and 
utter dependence on the unreliable good will of man.   
 Wiesel, who feels he struggles to “get it right,” finally wrote about the din torah 
in Auschwitz in The Trial of God in 1979, a play that operates as a kind of Purimschpiel 
                                                
30 Robert McAfee Brown, introduction to The Trial of God, by Elie Wiesel, trans. Marion Wiesel, (New 
York: Schocken Books, 1995), vii.  
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within a Purimschpiel.  But why is Purim the best time for such a tale? Purim is the 
Jewish holiday most characterized by the ambiguity, openness, and the indeterminacy of 
true liminality. On that day, boundaries fall away and are then re-drawn.  So along with 
blurring the lines between good and bad, self and other, Purim also allows for the 
negation of traditional categories. While the Sefer ha-Mo’adim cautions us that, “Fever is 
no sickness and Purim is no holiday,” we cannot help but be reminded that the dangerous, 
boundary-less space of the liminal cannot hold forever. This temporary dissolution of 
everyday identity brings about a disorientation that, theoretically, makes anything 
possible. So what better day to put the Holy One on trial? If we are brave enough, out of 
the sloppy realization that boundaries and limits are social creations comes the real 
possibility of new ethics, new dialogues, and new selves. The deepest pit of despair can 
also, incredibly, offer the opportunity for speech, for new acceptance, even for new ethics 
constructed out of the ashes of the old.   
 It is precisely these things Wiesel attempts to illustrate with his Purimschpiel. 
Wiesel’s trial has no unrealistic designs on ending human suffering. At best, perhaps, it 
aims to impact human response to undeserved suffering.  God is not even expected to 
show up and bluster about as He did when Job accused Him so long ago. The Trial of 
God explores the horror of the Holocaust specifically by exploring both the broader 
history of the senseless suffering created by anti-Semitic violence.31 In so doing, Wiesel 
                                                
31  Wiesel’s use of history submerges readers and audience members in an ongoing conversation about 
what David W. Weiss calls the “earlier holocausts” in Jewish history (murder of Jews in the Rhineland 
in the eleventh century, for example). Both Wiesel and Weiss see these events as crucial parts of a long 
trajectory that eventually led to the unparalleled brutality of the twentieth century Holocaust. Like 
Weiss, Wiesel sees the suffering of the Israelites in Egypt, the murder of innocent Jews in European 
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insists that there have always been bystanders and massacres of innocents in human 
history, even if the Holocaust is a “mutation”32 and therefore unlike what has come 
before it. In other words, although God is the defendant in Wiesel’s trial, The Trial of 
God is really about man, the creature made in God’s complicated and troublesome image.  
Wiesel's seventeenth century characters may gnash their teeth over the absence of God 
but they place the responsibility for the prevention of human suffering squarely onto the 
shoulders of man. The trial is not concluded at the end of the play because the reader is to 
have no illusions that the real-world conditions that warranted the trial have 
disappeared—or ever will, for that matter.33 Elsewhere, Wiesel stated that “...society has 
not changed [since the Holocaust]...but one person? That's enough...”34 And so the trial’s 
value lies not in its conclusion but in the fact of its having happened at all. The dialogue 
of the trial, shaped and guided by ethics, must, in the end, be enough to help humanity 
survive the next Holocaust.35  
  But how can any ethics that cannot promise to stave off future resurgence of utter 
                                                                                                                                            
pogroms, the persecution of Jews in Yemen, and the Holocaust as part of the same ongoing narrative. 
By situating his play in history, Wiesel situates his Jewish voice in the ongoing human dialogue about 
theodicy and suffering. Wiesel easily makes the not uncommon claim that the Jewish quarrel with God 
has enjoyed a long life.  His character Berish is only one of the many participants in that quarrel. 
32  Brown, Robert, McAfee, Elie Wiesel: Messenger to All Humanity, (Notre Dame: Notre Dame 
University Press, 1989), 24. 
33 See Robert McAfee Brown, Messenger to All Humanity, 163 for Wiesel’s assertions about the 
impossibility of “easy denial” and “easy belief” for people who live consciously.  Wiesel often claims, 
as he does here, that the best questions don’t have answers. Here Wiesel positions himself as post-
modern—more interested in eternal questions than in eternal answers. 
34 Franciosi, Shaffer and Wiesel, “An Interview With Elie Wiesel,” 293.  
35  While Wiesel specifically draws on halakhic regulations for court proceedings, Maria the gentile’s 
loyalty to Berish and his daughter shape a significant part of the landscape of the play. That she is 
considered a moral character whom herself was wronged in love by a Jewish man suggests that Wiesel 
hopes for a universal human ethic grounded firmly in the best Judaism has to offer and to which 
Judaism—as well as other traditions—could continue to contribute.   This universal ethics has 
everything to do with the governing of diverse communities who agree to abstain from abusing one 
another in exchange for the right to practice their particular religions and philosophies unmolested.  
  
176 
destruction—and Wiesel's ethics certainly does not--be worthwhile? In Wiesel's own 
words, “I do not like to offer false hope. Why do it?” What matters, he would claim, is 
the way in which he ends his tales. Wiesel states that “...there's still a question mark.  
[My stories] end...on a question mark.”36 An absurdist ethics does not necessarily reject 
universal truths but it does reject transcendent absolutes that claim to provide 
unquestionable assertions regarding beyond those confirmed by shared experience. After 
all, Wiesel continues to champion much of the ethics prized by traditional Judaism.  
Ultimately, though, he relies on humankind's experience of its shared condition as the 
only thing we can really be certain about, the only thing we can do something about, 
rather than on an omnipotent God who is expected to intervene in history to prevent 
undeserved suffering, or on a monolithic state whose judicial aim is always true. Wiesel 
does not claim that God is not omnipotent, nor just, nor benevolent, although his work 
continuously problematizes these traditional notions of God. Instead, he shifts the focus 
of the conversation from theology and the essence of God—something he would claim 
we cannot state with certainty—to human practice, the nature of God's Law and our 
responsibility to uphold it in the temporal world.  
 So while Wiesel's ethics are derived in part from Judaism, a technically non-
absurdist tradition, he simultaneously forsakes reliance on something outside of or above 
individual human agency to provide the foundation for the ethics he promotes, a point of 
supported by some streams of traditional Judaism as well.  Herein lies the usefulness of 
an ethics based primarily on shared experience that nonetheless makes use of traditional 
                                                
36 Franciosi, Shaffer and Wiesel, “An Interview With Elie Wiesel,” 299.  
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narratives and forms: it can be used to urge mankind toward assuaging suffering without 
requiring him to believe in God or to rely on God or his fellow man to act first. This 
ethics, rather than traditional notions of monolithic truths, provides meaning because it is 
derived from shared experience. In The Trial of God, characters and narratives integral to 
the Western biblical tradition bridge the gap between traditional ethical foundations and 
the notion that the world is absurd—a perspective we have come to associate with the 
post-Holocaust landscape. Wiesel successfully uses Job and the age-old discussions 
surrounding his plight as the foot of his ethical compass.  Few texts written in the 
Western world that treat the theme of undeserved human suffering fail to discuss and 
somehow utilize the story of Job.37 Wiesel's use of Job is particularly interesting because 
The Book of Job is arguably one of Western literature’s earliest forays into the absurd.  
Wiesel here and elsewhere uses Job’s story to openly refute the Deuteronomistic 
approach to suffering in favor of an alternative anti-theodic38 approach that urges 
                                                
37  Although the plays, poems, self-help books, theory texts, theological treatises, tractates and midrashim 
which deal with the Job story, or at least refer to Job’s predicament as an indicator of the universality of 
human suffering are too numerous to list or even fully discuss here, it is worthwhile to list at least a few.  
The interest in Job crosses religious, ethnical, race and class lines: Archibald MacLeish, J.B. (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1958); William Blake, The Book of Job, Illustrated by William Blake (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1935); Stephen Mitchell, The Book of Job (New York, Harper Perennial, 
1979); Gerhard Frost, The Color of the Night: Reflections on Suffering and the Book of Job 
(Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing Press, 1998); Robert Eisen, The Book of Job in Medieval Jewish 
Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); Gustavo Gutierrez, On Job: God-Talk and the 
Suffering of the Innocent (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1987); Harold Kushner, When Bad Things 
Happen to Good People (New York: Anchor Publishing, 1981); Doctrine and Covenants (121:1-3, 9-
10); Genesis Rabbah, LXVII; Baba Batra, 15a-16b; Pesachim, 112a; Megillah, 28a; Qur’an, 4:163.  
For a well known discussion of Holocaust survivors as modern day Job, see Eliezer Berkovits, Faith 
After the Holocaust (New York: Schocken Books,1973), 4-5; see ibid., 5 and 68-69 for the necessity of 
the faith of “Job’s brother” (i.e. the Jewish non-survivor) in light of the suffering of the “Job of the Gas 
Chambers.” This short bibliography does not even begin to do justice to the thousands of pages of 
discourse dealing with Job and the way in which his suffering—and his respectful but questioning spirit 
continues to resonate with human beings.  
38 See Zachary Braiterman's (God) After Auschwitz: Tradition and Change in Post-Holocaust Jewish 
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mankind to take responsibility preventing and easing his fellow man’s suffering.   
 Job's story begins as a treatise on the importance of correct and upright behavior, 
with Job as the perfect example. Job is a “good” man and is subsequently rewarded. Job 
believes that being “good” works. The reader is plunged into the abyss of the absurd 
when God and Satan39 enter the story.  After chatting with Satan like a gossip in the 
marketplace, the Almighty is goaded into doubting Job's faith and love for him, and 
readily hands Job over to Satan for purposes of experimentation.  God’s ego allows Him 
to be a bystander to the suffering He gave Satan the permission to inflict.  The Almighty 
appears shallow, insecure, vain, weak and starved for love. Job’s behavior continues to 
outshine God’s when, in the course of one day, all of Job’s children and their flocks are 
ruthlessly slaughtered as part of God’s bet with Satan. Job does not “cast reproach on 
God.” Instead, he throws himself on the ground and worships.40 But God doesn’t seem to 
live up Job’s praise of Him. When God and Satan meet again, God merely sputters and 
fumes,41 and is convinced to allow Satan to continue to test Job, insisting only that Job’s 
life must be spared. Soon Job is covered in “severe inflammation” while his wife urges 
him to “curse God and die.”42 Job angrily replies that they should accept both “good” and 
                                                                                                                                            
Thought (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998) for an analysis of his conception of the “anti-
theodic” in traditional Jewish texts.  
39 In Hebrew, the term “ha-Satan” means “the adversary.”  The image of Satan as a kind of demon or devil 
in direct warfare with God is not native to the Jewish tradition, but developed out Christianity as it 
evolved in Europe.  In the story of Job, Satan operates not as a devil or a supernatural being with his 
own kingdom, but as a foil or adversary to man, God's favored creature.  The Satan who makes an 
appearance in Wiesel's play is depiction is likewise an adversary of man and not a demon or devil.  
40 “Naked came I out of my mother’s womb, and naked shall I return there; the Lord has given and 
the Lord has taken away; blessed be the name of the Lord,” Job, 1:20.  
41 Job, 2:3. 
42 Job 2:9. The words of Job’s wife are problematic in translation (and even in the original Hebrew). 
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“evil” from God.43 This is the first time we are reminded that Job sees a depth to God’s 
character that his friends and family—and perhaps even his own religious tradition—can 
sometimes miss.  
 When Job’s friends, known as “the comforters” come to sit shiva with him, the 
story takes an intriguing turn. Job is so transformed by his suffering that even his three 
closest friends “did not recognize him.”44 Job’s suffering had transformed him into 
someone—or something—so completely different from the man they knew that they are 
silenced. The enormity of Job’s losses and the apparent pointlessness of his suffering 
render the entire experience ineffable. No one says a word for seven days and nights. The 
story then takes an intriguing turn. The enormity of Job’s losses and the apparent 
pointlessness of his suffering render the entire experience ineffable: no one says a word 
for seven days and nights.  The story's use of silence in the immediate aftermath of 
tragedy followed by urgent demands for dialogue also makes Job's tale useful for 
Wiesel's purposes, especially since Job's silence is not permanent.  In fact what follows 
his silence is a deluge of discourse.  Job shakes his fists and weeps and roars his doubts 
and questions and disappointment at anyone in proximity.  It hardly seems to matter 
whether those nearby listen. What matters is that Job is talking and that someone might 
eventually talk back.  
 Job never learns of God’s cheap bet with Satan, but the reader cannot forget it; it 
                                                                                                                                            
The Hebrew word she uses does not mean “curse.” She uses the word for “bless”— ברך. At any 
rate, Job responds to her as though she has spoken against God in some way, and the passage in 
traditionally interpreted as translated above. 
43 Job, 2:10.  
44 Job 3:1.  
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is too absurd, too morally outrageous, even for God. What can it mean that God sought to 
spare Job’s life, while destroying everything that gave Job’s life meaning? Any 
traditional explanation based on notions of God’s omnipotence and complete goodness is 
absolutely absurd. For example, when Eliphaz the Temanite insists that if Job is 
suffering, he must have sinned, Job cannot accept it,45 and states angrily, “I will not speak 
with restraint...I will complain in the bitterness of my soul.”46 Job reminds God that He 
has broken His end of the bargain. Like Wiesel, Job threatens that if God cannot forgive 
Job his small iniquities—iniquities yet to be made clear, even—Job will forsake his end 
of the bargain, too. Job then begins a makeshift trial devoted solely to debate. For how 
long, Job wants to know, will it be allowed for God to break the very rules He has 
insisted men follow for His sake? Is it an act of love to allow God to break His own rules, 
or is it self-deception and weakness?  “See now,” says Job to God in 13:17,  “I have 
prepared a case; I know that I will win it.” 
 We enter The Trial of God, Wiesel’s “anti-theodic” Job story, after Berish—
Wiesel's Job-- and his daughter Hannah have become the sole Jewish survivors of 
Shamgorod.  We are not firsthand witnesses to their undeserved pain, humiliation and 
loss, and unlike his biblical predecessor, Berish’s fortunes have not been restored.  There 
are other marked differences between Wiesel’s more modern Job and the ancient Job as 
well. Berish and his severely traumatized daughter are the sole survivors of a pogrom that 
destroyed their entire community, not just their family; Berish’s “comforters” do not 
                                                
45 Job 4:7-11. 
46 Job 7:11. 
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appear until the one year anniversary of the pogrom, and, notably these comforters are 
fellow survivors of their own undeserved, unspeakable traumas, not Deuteronomistic 
mouthpieces;47 lastly, God never shows up, even to threaten and storm about. But Satan, 
the only character who is willing to play God’s defense attorney, does make a lengthy 
appearance.  Satan, known as Sam48 in Wiesel's story, takes up the role of the 
Deutoronomist by claiming that, because he is alive and well, Berish is a recipient of 
God’s grace rather than a victim of His indifference and ineptitude. These key differences 
between the narrative of The Trial of God and the narrative of the Book of Job illustrate 
how Wiesel develops an ethics of engagement out of the wreckage of meaningless 
collective suffering in a way that is both theologically orthodox and innovative. 
 The Trial of God differs in these key ways from its proof text because it 
emphasizes human, rather than divine grace.  Job is given some recompense (such as it 
is) by God, but receives no real support or kindness from humankind. In fact Job is 
gracious on God's behalf even when it is arguably undeserved. Berish has been living as a 
lone survivor of a minority community; his life is absent of real dialogue with peers who 
                                                
47 Wiesel's ethic tends to emphasize the experience of victims and how their experiences can be shared for 
the sake of individual and communal healing. Wiesel notes that in his earliest years as a writer, his 
motivation was to get survivors to speak out, not only for the sake of their own spiritual and mental 
health, but for the sake of society as a whole.  He felt very strongly that if they told their stories, people 
would surely listen and try to prevent further atrocities.  See Rittner, Between Memory and Hope, 12. 
Over the years, he became less certain that people were indeed listening and would in turn try to prevent 
future suffering, however.  See part two of his memoirs, And the Sea is Never Full.   
48 Wiesel chose the name Sam as a reference to the figure of Samael, who appears in various Jewish texts 
and pieces of folklore over the centuries. Most but not all of these sources consider Samael to be the 
major name of Satan. The name first appears in the Ethiopian Book of Enoch 6. The name stems from 
the root of the word ימס meaning “blind.” Samael serves as a tempter, the Angel of Death, the leader of 
all the demons, and the creature responsible for bringing death and poison to the world.  Note that in 
Wiesel's tale, the words of the “tempter” figure are the Deuteronomistic messages which aim to 
convince the innocent that they are guilty.  
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share his experiences. Though he is never granted a new wife and children as an apology 
from God, the Purimschpielers provide human grace and much needed engagement with 
the survivors of the pogroms. The main action of the play is not the din torah, but the rest 
of the dialogue around which all the other secondary action occurs. The longer the 
Purimschpielers manage to continue drinking at the Inn, the more Berish and his Gentile 
worker Maria share about the grisly history of their lives in Shamgorod. The more Berish 
divulges, the more each fellow survivor—including Maria, who survives a different 
undeserved humiliation--admits to feelings of shame, grief, despair and extreme isolation. 
After a series of moody silences when “everyone remembers his own experiences”49we 
finally hear something about Berish’s life before the fateful pogrom: 
 
…Before, it was different—I was different. The sap of the earth enriched 
my own; the blood of the world flowed in my veins. I loved my steady, 
faithful customers…I was happy and I liked seeing happiness around 
me…I loved to give. Why not?...And God in all this? You want to hear the 
truth? It happened that He would touch me, on the shoulder, as if to 
remind me: See Berish—I exist! I, too, exist! Then I would give Him 
something just to make Him happy…And so, both of us satisfied, we 
would go on with our separate, daily routines…I hardly thought of Him; 
now I do—and I hate myself for it!50 
                                                
49 Wiesel, The Trial of God, 44.  
50 Wiesel, The Trial of God, 45.  
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The men continue to dig deeply into one another's memories, mimicking the structure of 
the Book of Job while simultaneously reinventing it, making it into the tale of a suffering 
people who feel abandoned even by God. When Berish asks Mendel why he does not fear 
God, who in Berish’s opinion has so clearly positioned Himself on “the side of the 
enemy,” Mendel insists that it is “Man” who “steals and kills,”51 not God. Mendel’s 
emphasis on human rather than divine cruelty serves as a turning point in the play: the 
action moves out of a past marked by the shamed silence of victimhood and into the 
present of the active cacophony of engagement in spite of continued suffering.  
 From here, the Book of Job and The Trial of God differ radically. When God 
finally shows himself to Job, He offers no apology, and provides no real answers to Job 
heartfelt questions. Instead, He provides a lengthy list of His many skills as Master of the 
Universe. He employs the same argument in His own defense that the comforters had 
offered up before: divine justice is not comprehensible to humans; humans are mere 
creatures while God is the source of all life and being. Job suffered because he needed 
discipline (and not, as the reader well knows, because God needed to prove something to 
Satan). When God finally thunders, “Shall one who should be disciplined complain 
against Shaddai? He who arraigns God must respond!”52 Job is left to answer for his own 
actions because, after all, God is God and Job is Job. Job’s words are as follows: 
  
Indeed, I spoke without understanding Of things beyond me, which I did 
                                                
51 Wiesel, The Trial of God, 54.  
52 Job, 40:2.  
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not know…Therefore I recant and relent, Being but dust and ashes.53 
 
God does restore his wealth and position, and provides him with children equal in 
number to those he had already lost. God also punishes the comforters because they did 
not speak “the truth” about Him,54 even though it’s unclear how the comforters’ defense 
of God is significantly different from the excuses God made on His own behalf. God 
never mentions the bet with Satan and never takes responsibility for Job’s plight, and the 
reader is left with the horrible weight of that knowledge. God allows Job to believe that 
he needed and deserved the “discipline.” God's actions are unjust, at least in the human 
sense of the word. 
 God never even shows up in Shamgorod. The Purimschpielers insist that God 
have an attorney to represent Him, but one by one, the men refuse. Wiesel’s constructed 
trial takes yet another crucial turn when Berish is asked if he is speaking as Berish the 
prosecutor or Berish the innkeeper and Berish responds, “Berish is Berish…I am I.  Isn’t 
that enough for you?”55Berish has responded almost exactly as God did when Moses 
asked Him for His name, “I am that I am.” Allusions to a kind of similarity or sympathy 
between Berish and God don’t end there.  When Maria describes Berish’s response to 
watching the brutal rape of his daughter during the first pogrom, Berish sounds uncannily 
like the suffering God to whom Wiesel has referred more directly in other writings. This 
God is a loving father bound by His own creation as His children torture one another 
                                                
53 Job, 42, 3-6.  
54 Job, 42:8.  
55 Wiesel, Trial of God, 88.  
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before His eyes.56 The text suggests that just as Berish was helpless to save Hannah, God 
might have also been helpless to save His people. This comparison serves as a reminder 
of the notion that man was made in God’s image, but Wiesel takes this fairly common 
reminder that we are made in God's image even further.  He asserts that God shares our 
suffering as much as we share many of His perfections and faults. Moreover, we share at 
least some—if not most—of the responsibility for the protection of Creation.  
 But again the play, even the trial—Job's trial, Berish's trial or the din torah in 
Auschwitz Wiesel has described numerous times-- is not really about God, or at least not 
only about God. It is about humanity. Wiesel's Mendel tells us, “The verdict will be 
announced by someone else, at a later stage. For the trial will continue—without 
us.”57The important thing about the trial is not the verdict, but the continuity of the trial 
itself, the willingness to interrogate both our Creator and ourselves, and the commitment 
to remaining in dialogue.  Engagement—and verbal engagement in particular—is the 
ethical act par excellence.  This imagery also suggests that we are as mysterious to God 
as He is to us, precisely because we share many of His perfections and, likewise, many of 
His faults, and that moreover God needs us. Wiesel uses the tragedy of the European 
pogroms in tandem with the story of Job to address timeless ethical and theological issues 
made more even more immediate by the catastrophe of the Holocaust: When things fall 
apart, is it God’s fault or ours? Does catastrophe always indicate God has failed us, or 
does it mean we have failed the whole of Creation?  The trial represents our willingness 
                                                
56 Wiesel, The Trial of God, 106-107. 
57 Wiesel, The Trial of God, 158. 
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to interrogate both our Creator and ourselves. According to this model, the goal of 
dialogue is not agreement but connection.  
 The Trial of God is primarily concerned with the survival of the victims, and 
Wiesel's ethics certainly begins with and is founded on the experience of victims. In fact, 
his ethical system would almost cease to exist in a society without victims of serious 
persecution.  For reasons we will explore in a moment, this is in part due to Wiesel's 
understanding of Judaism and Jewish sources.  For Wiesel, the ethical imperative is 
called for because of the experiences of innocent victims, and it is an ethical act to tell 
one's story of victimization for several reasons. First, those victims who did not survive 
will live on in memory if the witnesses to their demise tell the world what happened, not 
once but many times. Demanding dignity for the dead victims of atrocity keeps the 
remembrance of the atrocity in temporal terms. Real lives were lost, real people suffered 
unfairly, and real children never lived to see adulthood.  
 Next, the survivor himself is charged with telling the truth of their suffering 
because as witnesses to and victims of atrocities, they should work toward the prevention 
of further undeserved suffering. Commitment to this task provides meaning for the 
sufferer and for her listeners. According to Wiesel, anyone who hears the story of a 
victim is also in turn charged with this duty, the completion of which is a moral act.  And 
finally, the victim must speak because his or her experience is a reminder of humanity's 
role as a steward of a troubled creation. The victim’s questions are humanity's questions, 
and his suffering, however unique to his particular experience, is nonetheless 
representative of humanity's suffering and confusion. Talking about one's suffering eases 
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the suffering of others, connects us with others and, subsequently, provides meaning.  
Wiesel asserts that an ethic of engagement capable of operating across religious, racial, 
and ethnic lines is not only possible but also necessary. Engagement with other humans is 
the only thing that can guarantee meaning and the only thing that might stem the 
ubiquitous primal tide of violence in human culture.  As Wiesel stated in 1987, 
“...violence is simply another form of language. When the ordinary language has no more 
role to play, then people resort to violence.  As long as we can talk we don't hit each 
other.”58 
 
God in Wiesel's Ethic 
 
 We might well ask, to quote Mendel from The Trial of God: “And God in all 
this?” Wiesel's God is omnipresent even when we cannot find Him.  For Wiesel it is 
possible, and in fact sane, to affirm the existence of God while maintaining our right to 
openly express our rage and disapproval when we feel God ignores, allows or even 
creates meaningless human suffering. Wiesel pushes believers to relieve God of the entire 
burden of human’s suffering by remembering their own part of the covenant: God’s 
moral law is still the law even when God does not—or perhaps cannot—uphold it.  
Instead of wrestling exclusively with the question, “Why did God let the Holocaust 
happen?” Wiesel attempts to deal with the more temporal and ethical question regarding 
what we should do now that the Holocaust happened and God seemed to be nowhere. 
                                                
58 Franciosi, Shaffer and Wiesel, “An Interview With Elie Wiesel,” 292.  
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Remaining morally responsible for self and other is humanity’s most important job, 
especially when God Himself appears neither concerned nor engaged.  If we wait for God 
to act first, says Wiesel, we might very well remain reprehensibly paralyzed just when 
our fellow man—and God—needs us most. According to Wiesel, commitment to the 
ethical and moral imperatives of ancient contracts should bind humans to one another as 
much as they bind us to God, if not more.59 Wiesel has no illusions that the world will be 
peaceful, but he does seem to hope that wars and other atrocities could be less horrific if 
we adopt an ethic that operates in spite of the constant uncertainty caused by absurdity 
and in spite of what we know about the volatile nature of humanity. Wiesel’s The Trial of 
God pleads for meaning-making, ethics-building, and moral responsibility despite God.60  
 For many, especially those unfamiliar with Jewish theology, Wiesel's assertions, 
particularly because they borrow heavily from twentieth century absurdism, might seem 
antinomian. But this simultaneous utilization of post-modern philosophy and traditional 
Jewish learning is not unusual in modern and contemporary Jewish thought. It is in fact a 
defining trait of the genre. While traditional Judaism can be interpreted as subscribing to 
the idea that all life’s structure and meaning are derived strictly from a divine Torah, as 
                                                
59 This concept is central to the thought of Hermann Cohen, whose most well known work, Religion of 
Reason Out of the Sources of Judaism, focuses entirely on the role of correlation between God and man 
and man and man in the ethical constructs of Judaism.  Cohen very much believed that Judaism's 
mission was to spread ethical monotheism throughout the non-Jewish world.  He does this even as he 
neutralizes the intolerance that often typifies monotheistic theology and practice.  For more on Cohen's 
work, see chapter 1 of this study and the accompanying footnotes.  
60 Please see Peter J. Haas’s Morality After Auschwitz: The Radical Challenge of the Nazi Ethic 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988) for an excellent analysis of The Trial of God as a demand for the 
end of bystanderism.  I agree with Haas when he asserts that in The Trial of God, Wiesel unequivocally 
claims that “to abdicate our own moral response and so to accept the atrocities committed on earth is to 
align ourselves with evil.  Only when people recognize their moral duty and do it no matter what, even 
despite God, is there hope for universal redemption,” 227.  
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Josephine Knopp points out, this perception may be “accurate” in the most basic sense, 
but is ultimately far too simplistic because it ignores those texts that support “the well 
established Jewish tradition of challenging God and all His ways.”61 Knopp is correct in 
her assertion that a long precedent of questioning God not only exists but also constitutes 
a significant piece of Jewish theology.  It is important to note here though that in general 
this questioning is limited to ethical matters and did not, historically speaking, extend to 
halakhah. Recall Wiesel's memory of the din torah in Auschwitz. The men felt free to 
question God, and even to find Him guilty of crimes against humanity, but they did not 
feel free—and did not want to be free—to forgo the halakhic requirement of the ma'ariv.  
Generally, fulfillment of halakhah can be understood as required under all circumstances.  
In other words, whether one meets happiness or sorrow, he is obliged to praise and bless 
God (Berakhot, 48b).62 According to Wiesel, questions about meaning and ethics which 
can be separate from questions regarding religious observance, exist alongside questions 
about theodicy found in the traditional texts like the Book of Job, Ecclesiastes, and 
                                                
61 Josephine Knopp, “Wiesel and the Absurd,” Contemporary Literature 15, no. 2 (Spring, 1974), 212.  
62 The matter of Jewish religious observance during and after the Holocaust has been a topic of great 
interest among scholars of the period, and is a topic that will be discussed in greater depth in Chapter 4 
of this study. Some scholars estimate that as many as 3 million of the 6 million Jews murdered in the 
Holocaust were observant of halakhah.  What is certain is that after the passage of the Nuremberg Laws 
in 1935, just as in other periods of persecution in Jewish history, the numbers of she'elot written to 
rabbis considered competent in matters related to halakhah proliferated. There are many accounts of 
practitioners seeking immediate teshuvot from rabbis while in the camps.  One of the most important 
collections of Holocaust responsa is entitled Teshuvot Mi-Maamakim (Responsa From the Depths), a 
three volume set collected by Rabbi Ephraim Oshry.  These volumes were published by the author in 
1949, 1963 and 1969. For more on this see Irving J. Rosenbaum's Holocaust and Halakhah (New York: 
KTAV Press, 1976). On a more theoretical level, the distinction between ethics and law in Jewish 
tradition in practice shifts somewhat over the centuries; during the modern and contemporary periods, 
the conversation often focuses around whether Jewish ethics can be separated from the practice of the 
law and from religious observance in general or whether all ethical concerns and obligations can be met 
through the keeping of the law itself.  Textual support can be found for both perspectives in biblical and 
rabbinical texts.  
  
190 
numerous discussions in early and late rabbinic literature.  
 These texts specifically can be seen as “anti-theodic”—a term created by Zachary 
Braiterman used to define texts that refuse to religiously “justify, explain or accept the 
relationship between God and evil.” Anti-theodic texts may not even be antinomian, 
although they often disrupt “the dominance of theodicy in religious thought.”63They also 
disturb traditional conceptions of collective punishment and divine retribution that 
Wiesel’s work argues against. To this end, anti-theodic readings of canonical texts, along 
with the tales of 17th century Hasidic masters like Reb Levi Yitzak, as well as the 
philosophical methods and texts he began to study as a very young man, form the 
backbone of a theology that Wiesel uses to explore alternatives to abandoning belief in 
God in the face of absurdity. The same collection of primary texts that inspired Wiesel 
allowed thinkers like Martin Buber to continue to believe in a God who “allowed [the 
Holocaust] to happen” while asking nonetheless to know how “one…can still speak to 
Him.”64  
 Among the many who concern themselves with God and ethics after Auschwitz, 
Wiesel’s is unique because he speaks as a survivor and a writer and not only as a 
theologian or philosopher. Therefore he “brings to task entirely different intellectual tools 
from those of other thinkers.”65 Wiesel builds on an extant tradition of an imperfect 
creation and a constrained God in order to address the building tension between Israel as 
God’s chosen people and the brutality that human beings face as inhabitants of that 
                                                
63  Braiterman, (God) After Auschwitz, 20. 
64  Martin Buber, On Judaism, ed. Glatzer, Nahum (New York: Schocken Press, 1967), 224-25. 
65  P. Haas, Morality After Auschwitz, 227. 
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imperfect creation. Wiesel’s re-telling attempts to address this tension without finally 
believing these two realities cannot reasonably co-exist. When Wiesel creates a trial that 
features not one by many Job-like characters as prosecutors, witnesses, and jury members 
with an absentee God as the absent defendant, Wiesel is insisting we learn something 
from Job's personal ethics, who railed against God but never disengaged from Him or 
from his fellow human beings; but when Wiesel places the trial in seventeenth century 
Poland, he re-tells Job's story in hopes that we will see that human suffering has 
multiplied exponentially, making it our responsibility to redouble human efforts to 
remain engaged with ourselves and with God. In modern times, there is not one Job, but 
many. 
 The Trial of God picks up where Job leaves off in the Jewish conversation about 
theodicy because it addresses in a way that canonical texts do not the magnitude of the 
collective injustice inflicted on victims of the Holocaust. But while the Book of Job 
addresses theodicy in a way few sacred texts have, even Job does not really offer 
instructions for Jews who survived the murder of millions of fellow Jews while God—
and nearly the whole of His creation—appeared to be standing by, if not directly aiding 
and abetting the slaughter.66 While Wiesel specifically draws on halakhic prescriptions 
for court proceedings, Maria the Gentile’s loyalty to Berish and his daughter shape a 
significant part of the landscape of the play. That she is considered a moral character 
whom herself was wronged in love by a Jewish man suggests that Wiesel hopes for a 
                                                
66  See Brown, Messenger to All Humanity, 163 for Wiesel’s assertions about the impossibility of “easy 
denial” and “easy belief” for people who live consciously. Wiesel often claims, as he does here, that the 
best questions don’t have answers. Here Wiesel positions himself as post-modern insofar as he is more 
interested in eternal questions than in eternal answers. 
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universally applicable human ethic grounded firmly in the best Judaism has to offer and 
to which Judaism—as well as other traditions—could continue to contribute. The primary 
goal of Wiesel's ethics is to connect diverse communities who agree to abstain from 
abusing one another in exchange for the right to practice their particular religions and 
philosophies unmolested.  But is there real structure to Wiesel's ethic, and if so, is it 
really as universal? 
 
Beyond Fiction: A Deeper Analysis 
  
 Literature has historically been considered a legitimate and useful means to 
explore new solutions to moral problems.  Philosophical fiction has enjoyed a resurgence 
of interest since the end of World War II. But rarely—if ever—has a body of fiction 
served as the sole source of an ethics in its entirety.  Albert Camus' fiction, for example, 
while certainly absurdist, is not the sole progenitor of absurdism. Camus himself wrote 
essays and journalistic pieces meant to illustrate the absurdist point of view, and Sartre 
and others did likewise; and while absurdism does not constitute a mainstream approach 
to ethics, it nonetheless informs many modern ethical norms and systems in the West.  
Yet its precepts and applications were not articulated in well-written fiction alone.    
 Wiesel's assertions about the role of literature in the dissemination of moral 
imperatives and the inescapable responsibility of the writer to uphold moral standards are 
well known. But he has also been a prolific public speaker since the 1960s, and with the 
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exception of the class lectures he gave as a professor at Boston University, nearly all his 
other lectures, addresses, interviews and speeches are, at least in part, in-depth 
explications of his ethics, and usually include suggestions for the ways in which the most 
important components of his system should be interpreted and applied.  This makes these 
lectures and speeches an excellent, often more straightforward, source of information 
about Wiesel as an ethicist, and helps us to address questions regarding the universality 
and the real-world applicability of his project. 
 In a 1975 lecture on the role of morality in literature, for example, Wiesel stated 
unequivocally that literature “should become an aspiration to and for morality.”67And 
again in a lecture entitled “The Trial of Man”: 
 
Literature today, more than ever before, is and must be an act of 
conscience. Whether the writer knows is or not, whether he wants it or not, 
his work acquires an ethical or an unethical dimension.  Words are 
endowed with meaning and therefore with power.  They may kill or 
prevent killing.  They may push mankind into despair or save it...68 
 
Wiesel has expressed this sentiment elsewhere. But it is important to note that in this 
lecture, Wiesel does not define literature in this sense—that is, literature as a vehicle for 
ethics-- as exclusively fiction, the genre for which he is most known.  After asserting that 
                                                
67 Wiesel, “Where is Hope?” Against Silence, vol. 1, 135.   
68 Wiesel, “The Trial of Man,” Against Silence, vol. 1, 178.  
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literature and morality go hand in hand, Wiesel goes on to discuss at length the 
documents left behind by the Sonderkommandos of the Nazi death camps as an example 
of this relationship:69  
   
The documents of the sonderkommandos are simple, sober, and 
heartbreaking. Why did they write them? They wanted not to be forgotten. 
They were convinced that if we remembered, our people would be saved 
and the whole world as well.  Therefore I say: He who does not engage in 
remembering actively becomes an accomplice of the enemy.  We must 
remember.  If we remember we will make others remember as well.70 
 
These documents were not novels, poems or sonatas.  They were records of personal 
experience, and hardly fictional or fictionalized; and yet Wiesel refers to them in as an 
example of powerful literature intended to impact social morality.  I would argue that 
Wiesel believes that not only fiction but words and texts in general constitute acts which 
should tied to one's “conscience.”  This makes the application of Wiesel's ethics easier in 
                                                
69 Sonderkommandos were camp victims who were chosen to feed the crematoria at the camps with the 
often thousands of bodies of those who died or were murdered there.  These unfortunate people often 
placed the bodies of their own families and neighbors into the ovens to be burned to ashes.  In exchange 
for this work, they were given two or three additional months to live. The documents Wiesel mentions 
were written by a few of these sonderkommandos and contain many of their private thoughts and 
feelings. Wiesel references these documents repeatedly in the decade following their discovery.  We 
must therefore assume the fact of their existence and their content were very meaningful to him and 
formed some integral aspect of his thought.  For more of Wiesel's references to these documents, please 
see Against Silence, vol. 1, Irving Abrahamson's 1985 three volume set of Wiesel's lectures, addresses, 
and speeches.   
70 Wiesel, Against Silence, vol. 1, 137.  
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some sense. The word itself, spoken or written is imbued with the same responsibility. 
This has perhaps been one of the most successful aspects of Wiesel's moral teachings 
thus far because they can be delivered anywhere and anytime there are people present to 
deliver and receive them.  
 Wiesel's claims about text and language are tied to his claims about memory.  
Much attention has been paid to the concept of memory as memorial in Wiesel's work.  
To be sure, memory as memorial for those who were murdered by the Nazis—people 
Wiesel, not unproblematically, considers martyrs—is central for Wiesel.  Yet as 
evidenced by Wiesel's response to the sonderkommando documents, memory serves 
another central function in his work. Humanity's ability to remember stories—regardless 
of how they are conveyed to them--and our desire to recount them is precisely what 
makes it possible to construct ethics at all. For Wiesel, stories of suffering are the most 
reliable ground for ethics. Recounting the memories of our own suffering and the 
suffering of others prompts moral action.  People suffer and then testify. When we listen 
to their testimony of suffering, Wiesel hopes we remember it.  When we remember it, the 
memory may prompt us to intervene when we see someone suffering.  This is because 
without the precursory act of remembering, especially in Wiesel's system, there can be no 
ethics;71the imperative to care for one's fellow human being is shaped by remembering 
the stories of his or her sufferings.  What makes the sonderkommando documents so 
                                                
71 See John Silber's “Memory, History and Ethics” in Obliged by Memory: Literature, Religion, Ethics, A 
Collection of Essays in Honor of Elie Wiesel's Seventieth Birthday, edited by Steven T. Katz and Alan 
Rosen (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2006), 53- 64.  Silber briefly explores the relationship 
between memory and ethics by pointing to the relationship between history, memory and intention. 
Silber's essay also touches on what he sees as the difference between memory and history.   
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compelling for Wiesel is that the experiences of the sonderkommandos survives even 
though sonderkommandos themselves do not.  Their suffering was not in vain if it can be 
used to prompt moral action.  
 This brings us to the role of dialogue in Wiesel's ethics. Remembering victims' 
testimonies of suffering is the first step toward envisioning, demanding, and creating a 
moral society, but it is not enough to simply remember.  For Wiesel, dialogue is the most 
powerful of all ethical tools and constitutes another well-known application of his ethics, 
particularly in classroom settings. This notion, like that of the “suffering servant” who is 
God's unwilling messenger to mankind, is also found in traditional Jewish sources, and 
provides the underpinning for the entirety of Wiesel's ethics and his Judaism.  The Jewish 
thinkers who have most influenced Wiesel's relationship to the ethical value of dialogue 
are the Baal Shem Tov, the Kotzker Rebbe, and perhaps most of all, Rebbe Levi Yitzak 
of Berditchev, all Hasidic masters from the 18th century: 
   
Hasidic masters were no less eloquent than [the sages of the Talmud]. The 
first ones, including the Baal Shem Tov, protested from within, but they 
protested.  Rebbe Levi Yitzak of Berditchev would stop the prayer in the 
middle of Yom Kippur and he would say, “If You do not stop persecuting 
Your people, I will stop praying.”  And we remember his famous outcry at 
Rosh Hashanah, when he said in Yiddish—he always spoke Yiddish to 
God, because, you see, God always writes in Hebrew but speaks Yiddish-- 
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“Ribono Shel Olam, what do You want from Your people? Why is it 
always we? And how long will it continue? You prefer Ivan, the gentile 
Ivan? Zol Ivan blozen shofar. Then let Ivan blow the shofar.  In our prayer 
during the High Holy Days, we say “You are right and we are ashamed.  
Rebbe Levi Yitzak translated and interpreted it differently: “You are right, 
O Master of the Universe, because we are ashamed to tell You that you are 
not right.” There are countless examples and sayings of sages and teachers 
and simple Jews who could take it no longer and in their pain and anguish 
spoke up for their people and through their people for humanity when the 
human value of eternity was threatened by the Eternal.72  
 
Like Wiesel's character Berish, Rebbe Levi Yitzak rages and shakes his fist at the sky but 
remains engaged with God.  A significant difference between Levi Yitzak and Berish, 
though, is that the former is known for following the Law scrupulously, even as he 
frothed and fumed at God for His shocking lack of morals. In The Trial of God, Berish 
does not directly state that he no longer keeps halakah, but he makes it clear that he is no 
longer interested in pleasing God, which is at least part of the purpose of halakah.73 Levi 
Yitzak's behavior, as previously stated, is well within the bounds of what Jewish tradition 
would consider an acceptable response to unjust suffering.  And although Wiesel's body 
of work, including his many lectures and speeches, indicates that he keeps the Law 
                                                
72 Wiesel, “The Trial of Man,” Against Silence, 176-177.  
73 See excerpted quote from The Trial of God in this chapter.  
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himself, he does not invite us to reject or shun Berish because he may have chosen a 
different path.  In fact, Berish's rage and deep need to talk and to shout and to fight brings 
together a motley crew of survivors (two of whom are not themselves Jewish) to share 
and perhaps ease their suffering.  Berish's rage may make us uncomfortable, but Wiesel 
wants us to respect him for it and find righteousness in it.   
 In The Trial of God, dialogue has practical value; it allows Berish to communicate 
his experiences. Berish's point of view is derived from his experience, and experience 
shapes ideology and practice. As Wiesel stated in 1967: 
 
All doubts, all angers are permitted, provided they remain within the 
Jewish conscience.  Elisha ben Abuyah remains part of our spiritual 
heritage because it was the Jew in him who turned against God, saying to 
Him: I no longer understand Your justice, I no longer accept it...One can 
say everything, explore everything, provided one remains bound, at the 
root, with those who speak and act differently from us but who, like us, 
evoke Ahavat Yisrael. Thus what you transmit will not from the realm of 
knowledge but from the realm of experience...To transmit experience is 
the very essence of Judaism...74 
 
Wiesel validates his reliance on the transmission of experience as an impetus for ethical 
                                                
74 Wiesel, “On Being a Jew,” Against Silence vol. 1, 247.  
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action by claiming that such transmission constitutes the “very essence of Judaism.” And 
in some ways, what Wiesel claims rings true.  The Jewish liturgical year is full of 
holidays in which Jews celebrate by re-enacting events in Jewish history that were 
initially experienced by an ancient Jewish collective.  These re-enactments are meant to 
inform contemporary Jewish identity and practice.  One takes on the historical collective 
memory as one's own memory, and “remembers” experiences one did not actually have 
as their own.  In a very real sense, Jewish theology relies on the successful transmission 
of collective experiences that generations of Jews will continue to experience as authentic 
to their own lives. But this understanding of the value of transmitting experience is one-
dimensional and speaks more to its role in identity development rather than to its role in 
the foundation of ethics. And although Wiesel clearly emphasizes that suffering is the 
foundation of his ethics, it is less clear how this actually works in the transmission of 
ethical imperatives.  
  The act of remembering spoken and written testimonies of suffering is central to 
Wiesel's ethical system, but the sufferer him or herself is the foot of the compass. Perhaps 
this always the case when we responsibly concern ourselves with the problem of 
suffering.  After all, abstract thoughts of suffering and actual concern for the sufferer are 
two different things. In the words of Joseph Anthony Amato, “...victims represent what 
we owe and also are who we owe.”75 In the broadest sense, the prophets—who suffer in 
order to convey God's message—are the ultimate sufferers in Wiesel's system. They are 
                                                
75 Joseph A. Amato, Victims and Values: A History and a Theory of Suffering, ed. David Monge (New 
York: Praeger Publishers, 1990), 1.  
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God's messengers to humanity and yet both God and man make them suffer for playing 
the role of the prophet, a role most prophets did not ask to play.  A Hebrew Bible 
prophet's suffering is itself representative of the disconnect between collective human 
behavior and God's teachings for humanity, and for Wiesel, survivors of the Holocaust 
are also symbols of that disconnect and, like the reluctant prophets, “teachers” of 
morality: 
 
We [as teachers] could...have asked for the impossible, for we had lived 
the impossible. We could have imposed our will, our vision, on mankind. 
We could have asked for the ultimate redemption.  We had an authority 
unmatched in history, the authority of cumulative suffering and the 
authority of remaining human...We had the power, the moral strength, to 
speak up and demand and compel mankind to change, to give up 
intolerance and hate, bigotry and fanaticism.  We had the right to say “We 
are your teachers.” ...and we had the...metaphysical power to say that we 
shall teach all of mankind how to survive without linking survival to 
betrayal.76 
 
Sufferers possess a “moral authority,” a “metaphysical power” that links them to the 
                                                
76 Wiesel, “Then and Now: The Experiences of a Teacher,” Against Silence, vol. 1, 147-148. Emphasis 
mine.  
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“redemptive process.”  Wiesel refers specifically to child survivors of the Holocaust as 
messianic in that their experiences—and their survival—point simultaneously to the 
profound immorality of God's creation and to humanity's inherent ability to save it if only 
we would act.  Within this duality lies the key to Wiesel's reliance on the moral value of 
suffering.  Sufferers who survive and do not themselves become killers should, according 
to Wiesel, be our most important teachers. 
 Wiesel goes on to say that: 
 
Many survivors today will tell you they are tired...After the liberation all 
illusions were hopes. We were convinced that on the ruins of Europe a 
new world would be built, a new society would be formed.  There would 
be no more wars, no more hatred, no more bloodshed. We thought people 
would remember our experience, our testimony, and how we managed to 
suppress our violent impulses to kill or to hate.77 
 
According to Wiesel, the hopes that survivors of the Holocaust once had that their 
survival would make a difference in the way the Western world re-formed after the 
catastrophe were dashed by the world's inability to commit to even the first step of what 
he believes is required in the development of an ethical society: remembering the 
experience of their suffering.  And for Wiesel, “...only the memory of what the world has 
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done to us [victims of the Holocaust] may save the world from catastrophe.”78 Great 
emphasis is placed on the value of the suffering of victims and on their prophetic ability 
to remind humanity what it owes its victims.  But is this view of suffering enough to 
constitute a workable ethical system?  Wiesel clearly believes that humanity is drawn to 
stories of suffering because in some way we are all sympathetic.  Wiesel never explores 
why we are sympathetic or how listening to the sufferings of others activates our sense of 
shared humanity with others.  The shared experience of human suffering in general is not 
emphasized here; it is the suffering of Holocaust survivors specifically upon which 
Wiesel's ethic balances.   
II. Analysis 
  
 World War II, the war to which, as Viktor Frankl wrote, “we are indebted..for 
enriching our knowledge of the “psychopathology of the masses” also “gave us the war 
of nerves and it gave us the concentration camp.” It was Frankl's desire that people other 
than himself might “distill the contents” of the first section of his bestseller, Man's 
Search for Meaning into “dry theories...[which] might become a contribution to the 
psychology of prison life.”79Frankl's interest in psychology began early in his life, like 
Levinas and Wiesel and others who survived the Holocaust, his methodology and 
theoretical approach were shaped by his experiences during the war. And yet his 
“existential psychology” resonated far more broadly than he ever imagined.  In his 1992 
                                                
78 Wiesel, “Trial of Man,” Against Silence, 176. 
79 Viktor Frankl, Man's Search For Meaning, trans. Ilse Lasche (Boston: Beacon Press, 2006),  
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203 
preface to Man's Search, he states with dismay: 
 
...I do not at all see in bestseller status of my book an achievement and 
accomplishment on my part but rather an expression of the misery of our 
time: if hundreds of thousands of people reach out for a book whose very 
title promises to deal with the question of a meaning to life, it must be a 
question that burns under their fingernails.80 
 
Frankl's Man in Search of Meaning contains his personal account of his time in the 
concentration camp system of the Third Reich as well as abbreviated case studies of 
clients he worked with after the war.  Throughout, Frankl claims that man needs 
meaning, not only to survive traumatic circumstances like those experienced by the 
victims of the Reich, but to ease the burden of other kinds of suffering as well.  He also 
claims that if a sufferer can suffer with dignity, and even feel proud of the way in which 
she conducts herself in spite of her suffering, then this in itself can give meaning and, if 
not happiness—which Frankl feels is less important to humans that meaning—then pride 
in ones own inner strength and value. Frankl attributes his own survival of Auschwitz to 
his ability to focus on reasons to survive, or at least suffer honorably.  With regard to 
ethics, Frankl is less forthcoming, although he makes the following statement in the 
preface of the 1992 edition of Man's Search for Meaning: 
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On the average, only those prisoners could keep alive who, after years of 
trekking from camp to camp, lost all scruples in their fight for existence; 
they were prepared to use every mean, honest and otherwise, even brute 
force, theft, and betrayal of friends, in order to save themselves. We who 
have come back, by the aid of many lucky chances or miracles--whatever 
one may choose to call them—we know: the best of us did not return.81 
 
Lawrence Langer, whose Versions of Survival explores the ways in which survivor 
narratives—and all forms of telling in the narrative mode—modify what is being told. He 
spends a significant amount of time on Frankl's work, which he asserts clings to old, pre-
Holocaust categories of meaning so that the experiences of the Reich's victims can “fit 
into the old world order (as well as the old word order)...” In Frankl's determination to 
“establish such a continuity,” Langer writes, “Frankl narrows the event to the familiar 
challenge of finding meaning in suffering.”82 For Langer, Frankl's account lacks the 
“ambiguity and contradiction” of many other survivor accounts “because he needs to 
eliminate ambiguity and contradiction to support his version of survival...his language 
blunts the menacing blade of atrocity and simplifies the threat of extermination into a 
conventional encounter between the heroic free spirit and human morality.” Frankl's 
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of New York, 1982), 17-18.  
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“rhetoric” transforms victims into “noble creatures” who have “defeated genocide.”83  
 Langer's treatment of Wiesel's work is more gracious.  Like most analyses of 
Wiesel's work, it is almost reverent, in fact.  Like Frankl, Wiesel's writing imparts dignity 
to those who died. As discussed above, for Wiesel the dead are martyrs whose deaths 
take on a metaphysical importance to which survivors must remain loyal.  Langer cannot 
see the victims of the Reich as martyrs because, by definition, martyrs choose to die for 
something. What Langer objects to is any attempt to assign meaning to the event or to 
posit the illusion of control on the part of the victims of the Holocaust.  Any attempts to 
do this indicate an inability or unwillingness to see the event as a “rent in the in the 
apparent seamless web of history and man's spiritual destiny.”84 Any other view of the 
Holocaust, he argues, is a denial of the profound uniqueness of the event.  According to 
Langer, human dignity could in no way flourish in the shadows of the crematoria.  The 
survivor might justifiably “masquerade a dignified image of the humiliated self”85 in 
order to go on living, to give meaning to their own survival when none can be found. But 
it would only be a masquerade, Langer insists.  
 Langer's refrain is familiar: The Holocaust, as an event imposed upon millions of 
victims who had no choice but to be victims, defies meaning. The “Concentrationary 
Universe” disrupts all of our social, spiritual and physical expectations, and as such may 
not be an event that can be described or understood in the usual ways.  Langer's 
assessment is hardly unique (although it was groundbreaking when first published). And 
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yet it is compelling.  Many survivors have attempted to give meaning to their survival, or 
have dedicated their life's work to shedding light on its atrocities, giving voice to the dead 
victims, or, as in the case of Levinas and Wiesel, to preventing the advent of another 
genocidal era with the tools they have at their disposal. As Langer points out, students 
and readers should proceed with caution, since the realities of survival are complex.  
When faced with meaningless, pitiless persecution, the likes of which have arguably 
never been seen or described before, it is only natural that survivors struggle to regain 
meaning and purpose, and recall their experiences to outsiders in a way that spares the 
dead yet another humiliation, or spares the listener the horrifying truth of the survivor's 
despair.   
 Yet there is something doxastic about Langer's treatment of survivor narratives.   
Note Langer's response to the following passage from Wiesel's Legends of Our Time: 
 
At the risk of offending, it must be emphasized that the victims suffered 
more, and more profoundly, from the indifference of the onlookers than 
from the brutality of the executioner. The cruelty of the enemy would have 
been incapable of breaking the prisoner; it was the silence of those he 
believed to be his friends—cruelty more cowardly, more subtle—which 
broke his heart.86 
 
                                                
86 Wiesel, Legends of Our Time, trans. Marion Wiesel (New York: Random House, 2011), 223-224.  
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To this Langer responds: 
 
Such a comment seems to fall under Wiesel's own charge...that to “find 
one answer or another, nothing is easier; language can fix anything.”  For 
who among us, after Auschwitz, fears a broken heart more than a 
mutilated body? What victim of physical torture suffered more from the 
indifference of his torturers than from the pain inflicted by their cunning 
devices?  Retrospectively the survivor may suffer more form the 
indifference of the world (which he came to understand fully after his 
return) than from his remembered pain; but who will ever be convinced 
that the immediate threat of physical extermination and cremation was not 
the greatest source of terror to the potential victim?87  
 
Langer goes on: 
 
The Nazis were so determined to exterminate the Jews that one wonders 
whether any protest, short of direct invasion and liberation, could have 
inhibited the machinery of death once the victims were at the mercy of the 
executioners. The illusion that moral opposition might move such 
executioners, like the illusion that one could keep one's moral nature intact 
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in the death camps, dies hard, because the cynicism implicit in the 
alternative is so contrary to the coherence of the humanistic vision.88  
 
Langer continues by attributing Wiesel's claims to “the ambiguity of his own position, 
which seeks some basis for cause and effect in his fate.” Wiesel's work is indeed marked 
with ambiguities, and the need for meaning—punctuated by the insistence that there can 
be no meaning in Auschwitz—is a familiar and mournful tune in Wiesel's work.  But 
Langer's analysis is not without problems.  Langer responds to Wiesel's text as though it 
were a discussion about fear and terror; it isn't.  The excerpted passage from Legends of 
Our Own Time is about suffering.89    
 In various contexts, Wiesel refers to the shock, despair and suffering he and 
others experienced when they realized upon release that, contrary to what they had 
believed, much of the Western world knew something about their plight and yet failed to 
intervene. He is explicit about the fact that many camp victims found solace in the belief 
that no one really knew what they suffered in the camps, and that their friends and 
neighbors were eagerly awaiting their return. This belief was false, but they believed it, 
                                                
88 Langer, Versions of Survival, 142.  
89 In her important book Spirit and Trauma: A Theology of Remaining (Louisville, Westminster John Knox 
Press, 2010), 15, Shelly Rambo defines trauma as the “suffering that does not go away.” Rambo goes 
on to aptly state that, “In the aftermath of violence, persons and communities are challenged to orient 
themselves in the aftermath of events that shatter familiar frameworks of meaning and trust. In turn, 
people surrounding them struggle to witness the effects of suffering that often cannot be brought into 
speech and symptoms that persist long after an event is over.  Witnessing the suffering that remains 
involves encountering the ways in which death pervades life…Looking through the lens of trauma, the 
pressing questions for theology are: Can theology witness to this suffering that does not go away, to the 
storm that is “always here”? If so, how?” Here Rambo refers to theology in broad terms, although her 
book is an exploration of Christian theology specifically.  Rambo’s insights here can also be applied to 
the problem of Western ethics: Can Western ethics witness to trauma as a storm that is “always here”?   
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and believing it enabled them to bear what they experienced. It enabled them to believe 
that the entirety of Western civilization was not corrupt and that only Germany and her 
closest allies were aberrations.  With all due respect, Langer cannot claim that the 
suffering caused by the realization that governments who were quite capable of bombing 
the train tracks to the camps on behalf of European Jewry and did not do so was not 
finally greater than the horrific physical suffering Wiesel and others suffered at the hands 
of the Nazis. And does it matter if Wiesel could make this claim only in retrospect? 
Survivor narratives will not all fit into a philosophically nihilist perspective on the events 
of 1933-1945, just as they will not all relate historically accurate information with regard 
to certain kinds of details. Langer rightly asserts that: 
 
To accept any single [survivor's] voice is authoritative is to betray the 
complexity of the event and to risk diminishing the full horror of the doom 
of its victims—and the world that destroyed them.90 
 
Likewise, his claims about the unreliable nature of memory and the human tendency to 
protect itself against truths that are too painful to face are critical issues that the student of 
genocide must take into account at every step.  But again: Is it impossible to believe that 
survivors who watched their loved ones murdered and experienced unimaginable 
dehumanization would have suffered more still after realizing that most of the Western 
                                                
90 Langer, Versions of Survival, 8.  
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world—and not just the Reich and its allies—did not feel compelled to intervene on 
European Jewry's behalf?  What might it have been like to re-enter the world which 
created—or at least did not interfere with the creation of—death camps and yet, at least 
not in the 20 years or so following the end of the war, never spoke of them? 
  In a very real sense, survivors left the unprecedented hell of the Reich's camp 
system and re-entered communities whose members had either actively tried to kill them, 
stood by while they were stripped of family and possessions and freedom, or at the very 
least had no interest in knowing what they had been through.  Suffering did not end for 
the survivor after liberation.  It merely changed register. That they had enough to eat, and 
were no longer beaten and tortured meant respite, certainly.  But according to what many 
survivors report, they re-entered society to find that people did not really want to hear 
about what they'd been through.  This was the “after” to which they returned, with which 
they had to “make do.” And in a sense, their suffering and annihilation did and does have 
meaning, or at least pointed toward a larger reality: It meant that Europe was morally 
bankrupt in the deepest sense and that as a result fascism had taken over the continent; 
and it meant that the Germans had built a network of camps, brothels and other systems 
of death and dehumanization which murdered and tortured millions of innocent victims at 
lightening speed while the world looked on. For people like Wiesel, who grew up in 
communities that were remote from Central and Western Europe and managed to survive 
until the end of the war, the depth of Europe's moral insolvency might not have been 
clear until after liberation.  As Wiesel points out in his Nobel Prize acceptance speech: 
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...there are no plausible answers to what [victims of the Holocaust] 
endured.  There are no theological answers, there are no psychological 
answers, there are no literary answers, there are no philosophical answers, 
there are no religious answers.  The only conceivable answer is a moral 
answer.  This means there must be a moral element in what we do.91   
   
Again, the “meaning” of the Holocaust may not be metaphysical or theological, but its 
occurrence proves a moral bankruptcy for which moral action is likely to be the best 
response.  Wiesel indicates that for him, morality, rather than religion or philosophy or 
culture is universal. Put another way, morality is the universal, while religion, philosophy 
and culture are not.  
 Wiesel's work attempts to understand how European anti-Semitism culminated in 
the Holocaust, but his greatest preoccupation is how the experiences of victims, when 
shared with those who will listen, might shift the course of Western culture away from 
possibility of another Auschwitz.  In many ways, the emotional or philosophical  
“objectivity” of his memories (or the ways in which he relates those memories) is less 
relevant to that task than Langer's work suggests.  As much as Wiesel tries to make the 
suffering of the 6 million meaningful by depicting them as martyrs, and as much as these 
attempts are problematic, his greater goal, and perhaps his greatest contribution to the 
Western conversation regarding ethics, is his insistence that the universality of human 
                                                
91 Elie Wiesel, “The Nobel Lecture: Hope, Despair, and Memory,” in The Nobel Peace Prize 1986 (New 
York: Summit Books and Boston University, 1986), 21.  
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suffering can provide the foundation for ethics. Wiesel's distrust in the non-victim's 
ability to grasp the depth of the world's ethical bankruptcy without aid is palpable.   
 Langer's argument regarding “versions of survival” arguably overemphasizes the 
accuracy of nihilistic response to the Holocaust; Wiesel overemphasizes the role of 
Holocaust survivors specifically and victims more generally in the activation of moral 
response to suffering. Ultimately both thinkers rely too heavily on uniqueness and the 
Holocaust as a support for their claims and, as a result, the long-term universal 
applicability of their theories are somewhat problematized. Much has been said about the 
ineffability of the Holocaust experience, and yet survivors do use language and images 
and music to tell their stories.  Survivors and soldiers who fought in the European theatre 
and encountered the camps and historians who study the Holocaust do find ways to 
describe it; and perhaps we may never describe the Holocaust—or any world-changing 
event—with complete accuracy.  One could argue that even describing mundane 
incidents in ways we could all agree on is impossible. Nonetheless, as Wiesel himself has 
argued, the Holocaust is now a part of the fabric of history. To continue to insist that it 
cannot really be spoken of, or that there is a single way to understand or categorize it is 
equivalent to sacrilizing it in a way that even Wiesel would reject. We must talk about it. 
We must find the words.  Otherwise, it can teach us nothing.92  
                                                
92 We have discussed the claim that, in many ways, we lack a vocabulary for describing both the 
Holocaust and the ethical and theological questions it raises.  Yet discussion regarding the Holocaust 
and its repercussions abound. Survivor accounts differ from one another, but they also tend to have a 
great deal in common. It is reasonable to state that the sense of ineffability coupled with the necessity of 
bearing witness associated with the Holocaust is a paradox of some magnitude.  But is discussing the 
Holocaust with any accuracy an entirely insurmountable task? Outcries against cosmic injustice are not 
new to humanity, although they may have become all the more urgent for some communities since the 
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Literature and Ethics 
 
 Wiesel is often referred to as the “the great voice of the Holocaust,”93 “a 
prophet...and moral authority for humanity,”94 and a “messenger to all humanity,”95 but 
he is not widely considered a philosophical ethicist. As Levinas has “blurred” the lines of 
distinction between philosophy and theology, so has Wiesel obscured the boundaries 
between literature, theology and philosophical ethics. The relationship between general 
philosophical ethics, literature and theology has long been enmeshed, despite post-
Enlightenment efforts to separate them into discrete disciplines. Wiesel has openly 
proclaimed that he not only intends to use what he writes to disseminate moral messages, 
but that literature's one purpose is “to correct injustices.”96  Certainly, literary fiction is 
read by audiences much larger and more diverse than those who read the ethical treatises 
of trained philosophers.   
                                                                                                                                            
Holocaust. Descriptions of the experiences of those who suffered in the Holocaust as well as 
explications of the long-term implications of such brutality do exist; the West remains in large part 
baffled by the fact of the Holocaust's existence. In other words, it is not impossible to begin the process 
of telling the tale, at least as one that defies belief. We might not get the details exactly “right,” but we 
can communicate something that is powerful, urgent and horrifying. That the Holocaust was all of those 
things indicates that survivors have done some kind of justice in their re-telling of events. To continue 
to describe the Holocaust as truly ineffable, or as a “tear” in the fabric of human history may be more 
paralyzing that it is mobilizing. If we cannot pinpoint with complete accuracy the events that led up to 
it, do we not at this point know that anti-Semitism, for example, played a major role in the popularity of 
the Reich, and that fighting anti-Semitism and other forms of racism is one among many means of 
preventing genocide?   
93 Morris M. Faierstein, “Abraham Joshua Heschel and the Holocaust,” Modern Judaism 19, no 3 
(October, 1999), 258.  
94 Michael Berg, “Is Elie Wiesel Truly a Moral Authority for Humanity?” Saint Louis Activist Hub, 
Thursday, November 26, 2009 http://stlactivisthub.blogspot.com/2009/11/is-elie-wiesel-truly-moral-
authority.html, accessed June 8, 2012.  
95 Robert McAfee Brown, Elie Wiesel: Messenger To All Humanity (Notre Dame, 1983).  
96 Robert Franciosi, Brian Shaffer and Elie Wiesel, “An Interview With Elie Wiesel,” Contemporary 
Literature, vol. 28, no. 3 (Autumn, 1987), p. 289.  
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 Wiesel's theory of moral activation is compellingly poetic, particularly within the 
context of the Holocaust.  But broadly conceived, Wiesel's ethics do not include an 
understanding of humanity as innately moral per se. Unlike Levinas, Wiesel depicts a 
humanity that is passive, so passive in fact that individuals lack ethical momentum unless 
a victim of tragedy has activated their conscience. Wiesel almost never mentions those 
who did rescue Jews and other victims from the Nazis, despite the fact that many 
thousands were saved by everyday heroes who risked their own lives to save the lives of 
people who were often strangers to them.  In Wiesel's thought, there is little focus on the 
period “before” a tragedy occurs. There is only the catastrophe of “after” populated with 
victims, bystanders and perpetrators.  While this may describe Wiesel's experiences after 
liberation, it does not accurately portray humanity in day-to-day life. People do receive 
moral instruction and as a result of this instruction often do the “right” thing, even if 
governments do not always do the right things.  Of course this may be because, as 
Levinas claims, human consciousness and conscience are both shaped by smaller-scale 
suffering that makes ethical behavior possible. According to this view, all people do 
suffer, even if they are not the victims of genocide, rape, physical or sexual abuse or hate 
crimes. Wiesel's ethics doesn't ever deal with the ability of smaller-scale, day to day 
suffering to activate our empathy and sense of responsibility for others. Wiesel describes 
suffering as “redemptive,” but who is being redeemed? Did the victims of Auschwitz or 
the rice paddies of Cambodia need redeeming?  Or does the suffering of the innocent 
have the power to redeem the non-victim or the perpetrator?  And if so, how?  Because 
Wiesel does not offer an answer to these questions, it seems likely that for him, 
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redemption's power is metaphysical in some way, and therefore, in spite of Wiesel's 
efforts, not entirely temporal in nature.   
 An ethics grounded in suffering takes into account human affectivity more than 
many ethical systems grounded in metaphysics for several reasons.  First and foremost, 
suffering is often observed as an affective response, as shown by Levinas' 
phenomenological accounts of the spectrum of human suffering.  Just as important to an 
ethics grounded in suffering is the emotional response of the “I” to the suffering of the 
other. If I cannot feel empathy when others suffer, or cannot at least identify suffering in 
others, I cannot respond ethically to it.  Consider also the role of personal narrative in 
Wiesel's ethics.  Wiesel's own personal narrative of survival has been a powerful ethical 
tool not just because of its content but also because of the effective manner in which he 
delivers it. As discussed above, as an author of “literature of the oppressed,” Wiesel 
delivers ethical imperatives to mainstream Western society via fiction, and as a member 
of a minority group, his messages have a prophetic dimension with which Western 
audiences are familiar and identify as authoritative.  Wiesel's texts and speeches are not 
philosophical treatises but they can and do play a vital role in moral education and 
development for many Westerners.  Anthony Cunningham writes: 
 
...novels [can] provide a rich picture of the interior life of the mind, something 
akin to access to the innermost reaches of someone's character, even if the 
character is a fictional one. In this arena, emotions are critical to the portrait and 
the appreciation.  Ultimately, character is more than just a matter of what you 
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choose and what you do.  Thoughts, desires, inclinations, attitudes, and emotions 
are important to the assessment of the character, a rich picture with all these 
elements is precisely what more traditional philosophical case studies generally 
leave out.  
 
Applied ethics textbooks, Cunningham argues, don't tend to contain the elements most 
likely to engage our emotional or cognitive empathy. Case studies are written in such a 
way that one person can easily be substituted for another, “provided the substitute has the 
same illness or beef.” But: 
   
...in real life, people with the same afflictions and concerns might be quite 
different and may see and respond to their circumstances differently.  To do 
justice to particular people and their circumstances, we must paint the kinds of 
subtle, detailed pictures that one can bring to life in all their complexity, the kinds 
of pictures literature can paint. 
 
Wiesel uses literature to provide insight into the emotional and physical experiences of 
victims, but he also provides non-Jewish readers who may know nothing about Judaism 
with information about Judaism as it is understood and experienced by practitioners, 
something many non-Jews may have no other opportunity to experience. The non-Jewish 
reader not only learns about Judaism, but is given the opportunity to see past the 
particularities of belief, culture and practice into those aspects of human emotional life 
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and experience shared by most human beings: love of one's parents, friends or children; 
nostalgia for childhood or things long past; and the suffering caused by hunger, physical 
and emotional pain, or the abject humiliation of being subjugated against one's will. 
Moreover: 
 
The right kind of novel—one with detailed character portraits of particular 
people embroiled in complex, meaningful situations--can help us refine 
our moral vision by giving us a studied opportunity to practice seeing and 
appreciating diverse ethical loves.97 
 
Literature's ability to appeal to our emotions constitutes its moral power.  Cunningham 
rightly insists that literature could not—and should not—replace traditional philosophical 
literature which “appeal[s] directly to reason to convince a reader...[since] emotional 
appeals are seen as manipulative attempts to persuade by non-rational means.”  Literature 
illustrates the way in which eliciting emotions in the reader can assist us in ethical 
judgment. And right feeling can lead us to right judgment, good character, and right 
living.98  
 Much has been written on Wiesel's role in programs like Facing History and 
Ourselves and other genocide education curriculums. While his assertions about the 
nature of Jewish election and the role of particularity are, for reasons already discussed, 
                                                
97 Cunningham, The Heart of What Matters, 84-85.  
98 Cunningham, The Heart of What Matters, 86.  
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problematic with regard to the development of a universal ethics, we need not make use 
of his entire system to utilize those aspects which have effectively addressed the problem 
of ethics after Auschwitz. Yet beyond exposing ourselves to the experiences of others and 
responding empathetically to stories of suffering—and then retelling those stories to 
others—what can we do to live moral lives once we have sorted out that preventing 
undeserved suffering before it begins and intervening on behalf of those who already 
suffer unjustly is our most important moral imperative?  
 
Wiesel's Judaism 
 
 As Michael Berenbaum notes, “...the uniqueness of Wiesel's authority and the 
charisma of his person, an understanding of his theological thought within the context of 
contemporary Judaism is...imperative if not all the more difficult.”99 Very few studies 
even attempt to realistically discuss the drawbacks and benefits of the ways in which 
Wiesel's ethics—as well as his approach to Holocaust education—have been applied. 
With regard to Wiesel project in general, few studies exist which don't seem to finally 
dissolve into tribute. This is probably because scholars of contemporary thought often 
label survivors' theological responses to the Holocaust as more authentic and therefore 
more legitimate. It is not without good reason that they do this, of course.  The 
theological responses of survivors are not monolithic by any means, but many reported 
experiencing continued, even strengthened faith while living in the camps and after even 
                                                
99 Michael Berenbaum, Vision of the Void (Middeltown, CT: Wesleyen University Press, 1979),154.  
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liberation.  And often the first impulse for those responding theologically to the 
Holocaust is to honor the experience of the victims in any way possible.100   
 For some, it is important to see Wiesel as theologically radical. Berenbaum claims 
that while Emil Fackenheim “preserves the midrashic framework in his reference to 
God's presence at Auschwitz...Wiesel shatters it in his depiction of the revelatory nature 
of the Auschwitz experience.” Berenbaum states that this is in part because Wiesel 
expresses: 
 
...a sense of despair concerning the human condition, the ontological 
foundation of the universe, and the possibility of redemption. Wiesel's 
overwhelming despair has not led to either impotence or the death of 
Judaism. For Wiesel despair is the prerequisite for the Jews' adoption of a 
revolutionary relationship with both man and God.101  
 
Berenbaum goes on to claim that, unlike Rubenstein, who “breaks with the mythic 
pattern and the symbolic forms of Judaism,” Wiesel continues to adhere to the structure 
of traditional Judaism even though he radically alters its content.”102 Berenbaum is 
mistaken in his understanding of Wiesel's revolutionary theological language. As 
discussed in Chapter 3 of this study, Wiesel's Judaism—in form and in content—is 
Orthodox, even if he chooses to emphasize aspects of Judaism that are less normative.  
                                                
100 See the work of Emil Fackenheim and Eliezer Berkovits.  
101 Berenbaum, Vision of the Void, 157.  
102 Berenbaum, Vision of the Void, 160.  
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As pointed out by Zachary Braiterman and discussed at length above, an anti-theodic 
tradition exists in Judaism from which Wiesel draws with great frequency.  Wiesel’s 
affinity for Hasiduth offers a wellspring of interpretations of biblical and rabbinic themes 
that may be outside the purview of mainstream orthodoxy but by no means constitute a 
radical break with the traditional content of Judaism.  Even Wiesel's understanding of 
God as suffering with His children comes from rabbinic and hasidic depictions which 
Wiesel embellishes to suit the theological needs of the post-Holocaust era as Wiesel 
understands it. Wiesel may be a “revolutionary” but the same could be said for the many 
traditional Jewish texts and figures that demand worldly and divine justice for those who 
suffer unjustly.  
 Berenbaum's claim that Wiesel “shatters” the midrashic tradition is not really 
accurate.  Wiesel has in fact engaged in the midrashic tradition by adding to it, as do 
many others.103 Therefore, he has, if anything, expressed a desire to broaden it. Wiesel 
wants Judaism to include the Holocaust (along with Sinai, liberation from Egypt, and the 
Churban) among things included in the imperative “to remember things you did not 
know, did not live.” Wiesel wants the Holocaust to enter liturgy, to enter the canon of 
post-Biblical Jewish tradition. For example, Wiesel's claim that “Auschwitz is as 
important as Sinai”104 is quoted ad infinitum, and yet it is not always understood as a 
proclamation that the Holocaust has become, whether we like it or not, a part of Judaism's 
historical continuum, and therefore part of Jewish collective memory. As such, the 
                                                
103 Please see Wiesel’s Messengers of God: Biblical Portraits and Legends (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1985) for the best-known example of Wiesel’s midrashim. He has also written a number of 
books on hasiduth, several of which have already been referred to in this dissertation.  
104 Ellen Fine, The Legacy of Night (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1982), 30.  
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Holocaust creates neither the beginning of a new Judaism, nor the end of an old Judaism.  
According to this way of thinking, the Holocaust is unique in Jewish history specifically 
and human history in general, and therefore as impossible to extract from Jewish history 
as Sinai, or the Exodus, the loss of the first and second Temples, or the creation of the 
modern Israeli state in 1948. Wiesel's theology is not a “Holocaust theology” but a 
Jewish theology that incorporates the Holocaust as a watershed moment in Jewish 
history. It seems impossible to understand the Holocaust as anything less than such a 
moment, even if there are no substantial changes to Jewish theology as a result.  
 There are even those who are unconvinced that Wiesel's Judaism, because of its 
orthodoxy, is an authentic response to either the Holocaust or Israeli political struggles in 
the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.  Some reject Wiesel's unwillingness to give up 
traditional theology or speak out more forcefully against Israeli policy in the occupied 
territories.105 So while many Jews may consider Wiesel's orthodoxy a strength, it does not 
guarantee that his Judaism can necessarily garner broad appeal among Jews and non-
Jews. And while Wiesel's earlier work is associated with progressive, left-wing, post-
World War II Paris, his positions on Jerusalem with regard to the ongoing Israeli-
Palestinian conflict and the second Iraq war106 have placed him on the right wing end of 
                                                
105 This topic is beyond the scope of this study, but there is a growing body of work that questions Wiesel's 
effectiveness as political spokesperson for persecuted minorities in light of his muted response to the 
plight of Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza.  See Mark Chmiel’s Elie Wiesel and the Politics 
of Moral Leadership (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001) for one of the better examples of 
this point of view.  
106 See Wiesel's controversial Jerusalem “ad” first published in The International Herald Tribune, The 
Washington Post and The Wall Street Journal can be seen here: 
http://www.politico.com/static/PPM41_elie_wiesel_ad.html. (Accessed July 8, 2013).  See his article on 
the second Iraq War,first published in Parade Magazine, here: 
http://www.orthodoxytoday.org/articles4/WeiselIraq.php.  
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the political spectrum in the minds of many.  Setting aside the question of whether or not 
either of these associations are accurate, it must be said that Wiesel's political activism 
has made him a high-profile figure whose political opinions are of great interest. 
Can the Particular be Universal?  
 
 We recall that for Wiesel, the Jew is meant to embrace an experience that is both 
separate from that of the mainstream and yet has universal implications for humanity.  In 
his own words, “...the Jewish and human conditions become one.  It is a matter of 
concentric circles, one within the other, not one against the other or replacing the 
other.”107 Furthermore, Wiesel asserts that the Jewish experience is unique, but “only to 
the extent that it attains universality, and it is only as Jews that we can best make our 
contributions to society. Let the Jew be a better Jew and the Christian be a better 
Christian.”108 Now we must try to discern what this means in practical terms. This brings 
us to one of the most important questions we should ask ourselves about an ethics that 
aspires to universality: Does it, in fact, possess universal accessibility, appeal, and 
applicability? This question takes on complicated dimensions with respect to Wiesel's 
ethics and theology for a number of reasons.  First of all, Wiesel's Judaism heavily 
emphasizes this notion of the particular within the universal, a theme found in the work 
of many modern and contemporary Jewish thinkers. But what does this mean, exactly?  
 The notion that Judaism is both particular and universal, while often perplexing to 
                                                
107 Wiesel, “A Sacred Realm,” Against Silence, 188.  
108 Wiesel, “On Being a Jew,” Against Silence, 247.  
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people who know nothing about Judaism, is not exclusive to obscure philosophical 
treatises.  In fact, the idea goes hand in hand with the concept of Jewish mission in the 
most mainstream Jewish sources. Consider this from jewishhistory.org: 
 
Judaism is uniquely universal and particular—and establishes this pattern 
in the Book of Genesis...Judaism differs from all religions in that it is 
simultaneously universal and particular.  Christianity and Islam, the other 
monotheistic religions, do not have any national base. They are ostensibly 
for everybody.  In fact, in their pursuit of converts they have attempted to 
convert the whole world to their respective faiths.  Judaism on the other 
hand, is particular in the sense that it deals with a particular people who 
have a particular set of rules that does not apply to other people and who 
are based in particular land.  Yet, it has very dominant universalistic 
aspects along with its particularistic ones.  This combination is not found 
in any other faith....Rabbi Shlomo Carlebach used to reach out to Jewish 
youth on college campuses and...when someone would come up to him 
and say, “I'm a human being,” then Rabbi Carlebach knew that he was a 
Jew.  This is typical of the contemporary Jew accessing his universalistic 
instinct while eschewing his Jewish identity and his people's dreams... 
there are people who are very particular about their Judaism...[and] do not 
look outside their own society or even their own neighborhood... 
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they...have only taken part of the message of Judaism.109 
 
Or this from the sermon of Rabbi David M. Glickman of the North Dallas synagogue 
Shearith Israel: 
 
[As Jews} we need to worry about the universal and the particular.  We 
need to be concerned about our own well being, our own people's survival, 
and we need to save the world. We cannot have one without the other, or 
the other without the one...We are not a religious community if we allow 
the universal to eclipse the particular, nor if we are only concerned with 
the particular at the expense of the universal...I have not seen Judaism 
successfully passed on past one generation when the sole expression of 
Judaism is “to be a mensch”...and there is not serious commitment on the 
part of a family toward particularistic Jewish rituals and practice.  [But]...I 
think we have missed the point of what the Torah is here for if we simply 
stay inside our home koshering our homes....checking our tzitzit and 
mezuzot and never leaving the front door to see what might be 
outside...The purpose of the Torah and the mitzvoth are to teach us how to 
                                                
109 Berel Wein, “The End of the Beginning,” Jewish History.org. Accessed August 8, 2013. 
http://www.jewishhistory.org/the-end-of-the-beginning/   
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engage with the world, not simply to keep us occupied at home.110 
 
And as expressed on the website of Manhattan's Congregation Da'at Elohim: 
 
Although TUJ holds its prayer services in the Park Avenue Christian 
Church (where we suitably convert the altar to a bimah), we are a totally 
Reform Jewish congregation.  We respect the religious beliefs of our host 
congregation, but we faithfully follow the tradition and the beliefs of our 
ancestors.111 
  
The first two excerpts express an approach to particularity and universality that is typical 
of the American Conservative Jewish movement. The excerpt from Rabbi Glickman's 
sermon, for example, makes it very clear that keeping the Law is not a negotiable part of 
Jewish practice for him, and that maintaining a distinct identity is also, for him, central to 
an authentically Jewish life. The latter comes from a website for a Reform congregation 
whose understanding of Judaism is not focused on keeping halakah in conjunction with 
taking part in the solution of universal human problems. For example, they define their 
community in the following way: 
                                                
110 David M. Glickman, “The Particular and the Universal in Judaism,” Congregation Shearith Israel. 
Accessed August 8, 2013. http://shearith.org/about/rel_leaders/glickman/detail.asp?itemid=1865  
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Our community is inclusive and welcomes Jews, non-Jews and Jews by 
choice; intermarried and intramarried, couples and singles; and all who 
wish to worship with us in seeking peace, justice, righteousness...112 
 
What these three excerpts share, in spite of the significant differences between them, is 
the centrality of tikkun olam to the theologies they express. Reform Temple Da'at Elohim 
invites their Jewish, non-Jewish, gay, straight, single and married congregants to share 
the community's “concern for “repairing the world” (tikkun olam) but make no mention 
of the importance of keeping kosher, for example.113 Rabbi Glickman urges his 
community to “save the world,” and although he never specifically employs the phrase 
tikkun olam,there can be no doubt that when he urges them to “create links between your 
social action in the community and the Jewish spiritual life that is your birthright,” this is 
the concept to which he refers.  “Seek out those who are different than you, and show 
them love.  This is the call to create a just society,” exhorts Rabbi Glickman. All this 
must be done in conjunction with keeping the Law in your home and in your daily life. 
Finally, jewishhistory.org claims that “In today's Jewish world...there are people who are 
very interested in what they call tikkun olam...This is a universalistic concept”114 which, 
similarly to Rabbi Glickman, the author feels should be embraced but not at the expense 
                                                
112 Ibid.  
113 Ibid.  
114 http://www.jewishhistory.org/the-end-of-the-beginning/  
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of forsaking the Law. And while these groups might disagree about what parts of the 
world need mending and how we might best mend them, they would certainly agree on 
the centrality of Jewish mission to Jewish thought, practice and identity.115 And in the 
modern context especially, the Jewish “mission” is to “heal the world.”116  
 Wiesel would not disagree with this.  In fact, the universality of Wiesel's ethic 
arises first and foremost out of the theological concept of Jewish mission.  Consider this 
from a symposium in 1967:  
 
Our mission involves other peoples.  Jews do no live alone.  As a result of 
what the world has done to us, it may find a way to save itself.  By now it 
must admit that we do have in our possession a key to survival.  We have 
not survived centuries of atrocities for nothing.  In a world of absurdity, 
we must invent reason...and because there is murder in this world—and 
we are the first ones to know it—and we know how hopeless our battle 
may appear, we have to fight murder and absurdity and give meaning to 
                                                
115 Tikkun Olam becomes an especially important ethical imperative in Judaism after the popularization of 
the thought of Isaac Luria, the 16th century Kabbalist whose understanding of Creation included a 
dramatic “breaking of the vessels” of Creation when God expanded too quickly during the process in 
order to behold Himself. As a result, the sparks of God's divinity were scattered throughout Creation. 
Humanity's job is to gather those sparks together so that the world can be what God first intended it to 
be.  Luria’s ideas are complex and a careful explication of his thought is beyond the scope of this 
project. But one of the more useful aspects of Luria's theory is that it sees Creation as an ongoing 
process in which humanity is urged to participate.  This constitutes one of the more creative and fruitful 
streams of Jewish thought that is often understood as anti-theodic.  
116 While references to Jewish mission to be “a light unto the nations” go back stories of Abraham and the 
original covenant, ideas about what it means to be a “light unto the nations” change over time. There 
have been times when the salvation of the nations was strictly theological.  At other times, that salvation 
has been considered ethical. Generally speaking, however, Jewish mission is usually connected to some 
understanding of messianic future.  
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the battle...117 
 
Here Wiesel is drawing a direct parallel between God's mission for Abraham to be a 
“light among nations” and what he feels is the Holocaust survivor's mission specifically, 
and the modern Jew's mission in general: to teach lessons in physical and moral survival 
in the face of murder and absurdity. In very broad terms, the Jews are all survivors given 
their long history of persecution, according to Wiesel.  And what he perceives as the 
Jews' ability as a people to retain its humanity in the face of brutality and despair is 
potentially a great lesson to mankind, a lesson their history makes them qualified to 
teach.  He has drawn this connection between Abraham and the modern victims of the 
Holocaust directly, in fact: 
 
In the very beginning the Jewish people hoped to save the world by being 
what it was supposed to be. Abraham wanted to build a moral society.  He 
was alone, the Bible says so.  The Bible says he was Abraham ha-Ivri, and 
the Talmud explains why he was called “ha-Ivri.” Ivri comes from the 
word “side.”  He was on the side, and the entire world was on the other 
side...to build a moral society within the context of what seemed to be all 
too often an immoral universe.  What kind of immoral society did the 
Germans and their accomplices create?...in that immoral society a kind of 
                                                
117  Wiesel, “On Jewish Values in the Post-Holocaust Future,” Against Silence, 207.  
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antinomian process occurred...what had been evil became good...in which 
culture lost all ethical dimensions and therefore turned against man and 
against humanity...Jewish tradition has taught us that it is possible to build 
on ruins...118 
   
 Wiesel's assertions here are both old and new.  Jewish thinkers who have been 
interested in engaging with greater society without sidelining their Judaism have 
consistently argued that the moral component of Judaism should serve as a model for 
mainstream ethical norms, but this argument is only compelling if one already feels that 
the mainstream is ethically lacking.  In this case, Wiesel's claims are apropos in light of 
the late nineteenth and twentieth century collapse of European morality and civilization, 
because one could hardly argue that, at least in Europe, the “normal” ethical imperatives 
to which those societies had seemingly once subscribed were enduring in any sense.  But 
for Wiesel, the Holocaust becomes not only a unique event in history, but also a unique 
event in the moral and theological history of the West.  Holocaust survivors, and by 
extension, Jews who live after the Holocaust, are charged with the mission to save the 
world for the sins it has committed against the Jewish people.  So, as much as Wiesel 
asserts that one need not concern oneself with God in order to adopt a universal ethics, 
morality, theology and metaphysics are inextricably intertwined in Wiesel's thought. In 
Wiesel’s estimation, the Jews, after having suffered at the hands of the rest of humanity, 
                                                
118 Wiesel, “The Dream of a Moral Society,” Against Silence, 218-219.  
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are destined to save it nonetheless, in part because, unlike other peoples, they have 
managed to remain human, i.e., moral, in the face of degrading attempts to de-humanize 
them.  It is this ability to remain particular and moral in the face of homogenization and 
amorality that makes the Jew unique (and for Wiesel, this uniqueness is at least in part 
metaphysical).119 These assertions are, in some ways, not unlike those of Hermann Cohen 
from a century ago:  
 
We want to consider Judaism's share in the origins and further 
development of Christian culture...to refute the prejudice that the Jew must 
flee the general culture in order to be able to remain an independent, self-
sufficient Jew.  The Jew retains a good, perhaps the best, part of own 
world, in its deepest intellectual essence, so far as he offers himself, spirit 
and soul, to the general culture.120  
 
Although suffering is not referred to explicitly in this excerpt, the concept was central to 
Cohen's work too, and for some of the same reasons it is central for Wiesel. As Alan 
Mittelman points out, suffering maintains this position in Cohen's system only insofar as 
we must obey the moral imperative to alleviate it.  And yet because Cohen also 
developed a system of ethics that relies on a careful marriage of philosophy, theology and 
                                                
119 See the early quote regarding the role of the Holocaust survivor in the salvation of the West in this 
chapter of this dissertation.  
120 Alan Mittelman, ““The Jew in Christian Culture” by Hermann Cohen: An Introduction and 
Translation,” Modern Judaism 23, no. 1 (2003), 62.  
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history, it is difficult to reduce the role suffering plays in Cohen's thought.  The suffering 
of Isaiah's “suffering servant” in the Hebrew Bible, for example, is not merely 
theoretical.  And for Cohen, the suffering of Jews in general European history as well, is 
not theoretical. So while the lesson Cohen most wants to teach in his system is that we 
are all beholden to one another and therefore commanded—first by God and then by 
reason, God's gift to humanity--to ease one another's suffering, this is but the final 
outcome of adherence to his system of ethics.  
 First and foremost, the Jew has been charged with a mission not unlike that of the 
prophets: to manifest in his or her mind, body and spirit the damages wrought by 
undeserved human suffering, the by-product of an immoral society. Like Wiesel, Cohen 
makes it quite clear that the most important indicator of a society's overall moral health 
and fortitude is its treatment of those individuals and groups it considers “outside” its 
own norms. The suffering Jew in Cohen's work becomes a symbol of the lessons that 
victims, survivors and moral messengers are to teach the broader, largely non-Jewish 
world.  The ultimate moral and philosophical discovery in Cohen's system is the 
correlation between God and humanity and between man and man, a lesson that Cohen 
believed Judaism was uniquely positioned to teach. To be fair, Cohen ultimately claims 
in his later work that the lessons of Judaism need not necessarily be transmitted by Jews. 
Jewish sources possess all that is needed to impart ethical monotheism and responsibility 
for one's fellow man to all of humanity.  In many ways, this enables Cohen's system to 
reject notions that Judaism's uniqueness relies on the idea of a metaphysical uniqueness 
of the Jewish people while embracing claims that the culture and traditions of Judaism 
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are unique but teachable.  Retention of the lessons of Jewish culture and ethical practice 
does not require Jewish identity.  
 We cannot say entirely the same for Wiesel's sense of Judaism, at least not as he 
has articulated it so far. Nor is it clear that the kind of suffering upon which he feels a 
new ethic can be built could be anything but the collective, undeserved suffering of Jews 
in the Western world.  Recall Wiesel's urgent claims that “...only the memory of what the 
world has done to us [victims of the Holocaust] may save the world from catastrophe.” 
What underlies this philosophical and historical claim is the theological claim of the 
uniqueness of Jewish people and the nature of their mission in the world God created. On 
one hand, Wiesel is making claims about the nature of Holocaust as an historical event.  
What happened to the victims of the Reich and their many collaborators was so abysmal, 
so beyond imagining, that, according to Wiesel, if their suffering cannot force humanity 
to see that Western society has lost its moral compass, then nothing will.   
 This argument is not unique to Wiesel, although he makes it more forcefully and 
with different emphases than some.121 But even if we agree that, in the mid-twentieth 
century, the West proved that it was no longer—or perhaps had never been—a moral 
society, what can Judaism offer us in that regard if it can only really be practiced by 
Jews, or do its job in the world as a system if the Jews are engaging in the practice of a 
                                                
121 Emil Fackenheim is among the best-known philosophers to make this claim.  Eliezer Berkovits and of 
course all three thinkers discussed in this dissertation are the other better-known proponents of the idea 
that the Holocaust is unique in human history, not just in Jewish history.  The question remains 
contested. For discussion on this topic, please see Alan S. Rosenberg's edited volume Is the Holocaust 
Unique? Perspectives on Comparative Genocide (Boulder: Westview Press, 2008). This volume 
includes essays that attempt to compare the Atlantic Slave trade, the Stalinist terror, the Armenian 
genocide, recent atrocities in Rwanda, and the Pol Pot regime to the Holocaust.  
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particular orthodox form of Judaism? And if so, what would that morality look like?  
Would it include special imperatives for non-Jews, like the Noahide commandments, and 
another set of imperatives for Jews, such as the 613 commandments of the Torah? If 
Wiesel adheres to the strict interpretation of Jewish mission toward which he often 
gestures, then separate groups might indeed require separate directives. This idea is not 
unacceptable necessarily, but this is not exactly universalism as it is typically understood.  
Nor would it be appealing to both the religious and non-religious, the Jewish and non-
Jewish alike. In fact, the theology from which this kind of moral framework is derived is 
so specific to religions of the West that it is challenging to imagine even describing 
“Jewish mission” to people who are completely unfamiliar with Western theology 
without considerable difficulty.  
 While it is clear that Wiesel feels it is all of humanity's job to intervene on behalf 
of any human who is suffering unjustly, his ethics fails to consistently address 
incongruities that arise from aiming at universality while being derived in large part from 
theological claim that a specific people to which he belongs (to which most humans do 
not belong) is meant to save the entire world. Part of the problem is that Wiesel 
unequivocally claims that the Holocaust is all part of the traditional theological and 
historical narrative of Judaism and therefore pushes Jews and Judaism closer to 
fulfillment of messianic mission; but he also claims that the Holocaust represents a 
fundamental aberration from which Judaism and the world at large cannot emerge 
unchanged.  Things have changed and things remain the same.  The Holocaust is both a 
radical break from history and a fulfillment of it.   
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 It is important to pause here and say a bit more about the problems Wiesel's ethics 
clearly possess when we attempt to apply it as universal, something Wiesel very much 
strives for and believes is possible. But in order for such an ethics to become universal, it 
must be clear how suffering specifically works to engage human beings with one another; 
moreover the suffering and redemption of non-survivors, bystanders and victims must 
also be addressed.  The world is made up of more than Holocaust survivors and those 
who work to prevent another Holocaust.  Finally, what motivates a non-Jew or an atheist 
to intervene on behalf of those who suffer if the victims are not members of his or her 
ethnic, national or ideological group? As Anthony Cunningham points out: 
 
…the content of morality and the motivation to be moral [are often most effective 
with they work in tandem]...If faced with someone for whom moral concerns have 
no motivational force, someone with no sympathy or any interest in 
survival...such demands would have no real relevance. 
 
In other words, moral rules, laws and ideals should matter to us or we won't follow 
them.122 
 But before we reject the possibility that Wiesel's Orthodox Judaism specifically—
and particular identity generally—could offer universally applicable concepts and values, 
let us consider Wiesel's insistence that, because the only plausible “answers” to the 
                                                
122 Cunningham, The Heart of What Matters, 15-16.  
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Holocaust are moral, the best response to the Holocaust is also moral.  Wiesel describes 
morality as something that encompasses but is not exclusive to any one religion, 
philosophy, theology or culture.  According to this point of view, that which is truly 
moral is likely to be universal. We can extrapolate that this understanding of morality has 
a vested interest in the existence of multiple theologies, multiple philosophies, multiple 
religions and multiple cultures. Consider the following excerpts from Carol Ritter's 1988 
interview of Wiesel.  When asked what it means to be a Jew today: 
 
...the mission of the Jew was not to make the whole world Jewish but to 
humanize it, to make it warmer, more hospitable...That is true for 
every...Jew as well as for all the Jewish people but again, I would say that 
this also must be true for others in their own way.  My mission and your 
mission are the same: to humanize the world. 
 
When asked what his spiritual ambitions were: 
 
...since I come from [a religious] background, everything must be 
translated in spiritual terms...We are here to search for truth from God, 
about human beings, about life.  And that truth should never diminish 
anyone; quite the opposite; it should elevate everyone; it should bring 
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people together, it should not separate them. There is a point where peace 
and justice are synonymous, when all lofty ideals and ideas converge.  To 
reach that point is a spiritual ambition.   
 
And when asked what we have learned since 1945: 
 
Everything should be related to [the Holocaust], but nothing should be 
compared to it.  It must maintain its uniqueness, otherwise, who knows 
what will happen? The danger is always cheap comparisons, easy 
analogies...I don't wish to be in a position in which it seems that I am 
begrudging another's suffering.  On the contrary, I respect another person's 
suffering more when I respect the individuality, the genuineness of his or 
her suffering.  I think every group and every person has the right to be 
remembered, but why play with comparisons and analogies, why mix 
sufferings together?123 
 
To return to the question posed at the beginning of this section, Wiesel asserts that 
morality requires that the “Jew be a good Jew” and the “Christian be a better Christian.” 
Wiesel shares Levinas' belief that cultural and ideological heterogeneity is a precondition 
                                                
123 Carol Ritter and Elie Wiesel, “An Interview With Elie Wiesel,” Between Memory and Hope (New 
York: New York University Press: 1990), 31-33.  
  
237 
of a truly ethical society, and part of what makes this possible is that all traditions contain 
ethical imperatives to respect heterogeneity, even conversion-oriented religions like 
Christianity and Islam. When ethics are grounded in the universal experience of 
suffering, each individual's experience of that suffering is nonetheless contingent on the 
time and place in which that individual lives and on his or her role in society and any 
number of other factors. Extensive comparisons can lead to cultural homogenization, to 
inappropriate analogies, and, perhaps worst of all, lead to a failure to respect valuable 
theological, philosophical, religious and cultural differences between the specific culture 
groups that make up the world. We are at our most ethical when the differences between 
us (however odious they may be to us) do not prevent us from intervening on behalf of an 
innocent victim.  For Wiesel, the degree to which we allow peaceful existence for the 
other, even if we don't like him much is a test—perhaps the test--of our humanity.  For 
Levinas and Wiesel, no ethics will be truly universal—and no society will be truly 
ethical—without first and foremost respecting the innate pluralism of humanity as an 
unchanging universal truth.  Particularity is universal. Herein lies the moral value of the 
particular to any universal ethics.  Perhaps more to the point, both Wiesel and Levinas 
contend that when ethics are based on experience rather than on detailed ideology, 
pluralism can thrive.   
 But what about Cunningham's assertion that an ethics must provide us with 
motivation to adhere to its laws and adopt its ideals? Ethics grounded in religion, politics 
or specific cultural norms often have a built-in motivation.  For example, if the Torah 
states that God commands us to intervene on behalf of those who suffer unjustly, the 
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motivation to obey an ethical imperative that is also commandment is “built-in” for the 
religious Jew (even if this fact is not the sole motivation for ethical action).  If you are an 
atheist, your motivation to fulfill the imperative will be different, and there are many 
reasons why intervening on behalf of innocent victims is ethical. Recall that Cunningham 
poses the question of how ethics can motivate an individual who does not feel especially 
empathetic toward others. What would motivate such a person to intervene on behalf of 
those who suffer if he is not a religious practitioner and is not especially invested in the 
cultural norms and values of his community? What if you don't care whether or not 
people you don't like or know personally are suffering? Wiesel doesn't broach this issue 
in any significant way. And while it may make sense to argue, as Levinas does, that we 
all have the potential to be ethical, we know from experience that not all human beings 
internalize moral codes, and therefore cannot be relied upon to behave ethically in the 
absence of authority. Because people are not all alike, any ethical system requires a 
multiple motivations, especially in the absence of a unifying set of beliefs and practices. 
If pluralistic society is not itself a shared value—and we can assume that it will not be, 
even in societies that are successfully pluralistic-- something else must serve as a 
motivator.  Neither Levinas nor Wiesel directly addresses this concern.  
 Besides failing to account for how an ethics grounded in suffering can provide the 
motivation to be ethical whether we are victims, rescuers, bystanders or perpetrators, 
Wiesel's ethics focuses very little on anything beyond the prevention of collective 
suffering.  But for those of us living in more stable times and places than fascist Europe, 
ethical dilemmas of an entirely different sort must be dealt with as well.  If I discover that 
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my best friend is dating a woman who is married to a colleague of mine, what should I 
do? It is likely that someone will suffer whatever choice I make.  If my small child takes 
something from a store without realizing that this is wrong, how should I handle it? My 
child will suffer embarrassment if I force him to return it, but in this case such suffering 
would be instructive and cause no lasting harm to the child. If I need to complete 
personal business on company time and this is against the regulations of my company, 
what do I do? Wiesel's ethics emerge from the most horrific era in modern Western 
history, and is informed by profound trauma. While this does not mean that Wiesel's 
thought is useless in more stable times, it serves us well to recall exactly what kind of 
damage Wiesel experienced and is in turn attempting to repair and prevent. The urgency 
of his imperatives and his laser sharp focus on victims may seem excessive to us if we 
subject his ethics to moral problems of a different nature. But this should not prevent us 
from valuing the insight he offers. Having lived through not only the torture of Nazi 
persecution but also the steady collapse of European civil society endows Levinas and 
Wiesel with insights that could be of considerable assistance to the development of an 
ethics. But what about Rubenstein? What can he, as an American Jew born and raised in 
the United States offer us?
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 Chapter 4 
“There is Nothing Final About the Death of God”: Richard Rubenstein's  
Post-Holocaust Ethics 
 
There are many reasons why [the] insistence upon the ethnic and non-
privileged character of Judaism must be welcomed. If Jewish existence is 
not self-validating, there is real danger that what we take to be theological 
justifications for our existence may turn out to be extensions of thoroughly 
unhealthy and irrational non-Jewish myths about Jews and Judaism.  For 
two thousand years the assertion that Jewish existence is specially related 
to the Divine has been a commonplace of both Jewish and Christian 
theology. The difference between depended upon whether one accepted 
the belief of Jewish theologians that this relationship continued to be one 
of special love and concern on God's part for Israel, or whether one 
accepted the Christian version of the same myth, namely, that the Church 
had become the true Israel and that the Jews, for the crime of rejecting 
Christ, had become the rejected of God...the only proof the Church could 
offer was the historical facts of Jewish degradation and disaster.  Too 
often the human psyche has attempted to make reality conform to its 
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myths.1 
In part one of this chapter presents an exegesis of texts selected from Rubenstein's corpus 
to support the following claims about his project: 
 
1. Rubenstein grounds ethics in suffering. 
2. Rubenstein offers an ethics that attempts to account for how society can prevent the 
creation of perpetrators. 
3. Rubenstein develops his ethics from the sources of Judaism, but ultimately demands 
radical changes in Jewish belief and practice.  
 
Part two is a critical analysis of the texts and ideas presented in part one of the chapter.  
Final conclusions regarding Rubenstein's project are provided in Chapter 5.  
 
I. Exegesis 
 
 Richard Rubenstein's radical theological prescriptions for Jews and Judaism after 
the Holocaust have perhaps come to appear less treacherous over time.  As the first 
Jewish theologian to respond publicly in an innovative way to the theological problems 
posed by Auschwitz, he paved the way for thinkers like Irving Greenberg whose ideas 
                                                
1 Richard L. Rubenstein, After Auschwitz (Indianapolis: The Bobs Merrill Company, 1966), 85.  
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were embraced by far more Jewish intellectuals and practitioners than Rubenstein's, in 
spite of his reformist claims about the long-term effects of the Holocaust on the 
Abrahamic covenant. This is not to say that Greenberg didn't send shock waves by stating 
that God broke the covenant when He allowed the Nazis to wage a successful war against 
the Jews of Europe. Many believed Greenberg was antinomian when he claimed that, 
after Auschwitz, following the Law was no longer compulsory for world Jewry. But 
unlike Rubenstein, Greenberg worked as a pulpit rabbi and as a professor at Yeshiva 
University during the years he made these radical statements.  He also founded and 
chaired the department of Jewish Studies at City College of the City University of New 
York.  In other words, his teachings were not wholly rejected, even if some felt he could 
not legitimately belong to the modern Orthodox community.2  
 Rubenstein, on the other hand, experienced significant professional difficulties 
after the publication of After Auschwitz in 1966. After having served as pulpit rabbi for at 
least two communities, he came to believe that the controversial nature of his ideas 
caused a “bureacratic excommuncation.”3 In spite of the fact that Rubenstein had earned 
advanced degrees from Jewish Theological Seminary and Harvard University, 
Rubenstein worked as an adjunct from 1969 until 1971 when he was finally hired by 
Florida State University's religion department. Rubenstein never entered the Jewish 
establishment, even as a tenured professor. And it is the single, explosive claim that 
                                                
2 See Arnold Jacob Wolf's “The Revisionism of Irving Greenberg” in Sh'ma, 13, no. 254 (May 13 1983) 
for criticism of Greenberg's assertions about the nature of the covenant after Auschwitz.  Compare this 
criticism to claims made about Rubenstein, who was called “Hitler's accomplice.”  See Zach 
Braiterman’s essay ““Hitler's Accomplice?: The Tragic Theology of Richard Rubenstein,” Modern 
Judaism,17 no. 1 (1997): 75-89.  
3 See Z. Braiterman’s (God) After Auschwitz, 8-9.  
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Judaism must abandon the notion of Jewish mission or potentially suffer further 
manifestations of genocidal rage from embittered Christians that has shaped Jewish 
intellectual response to Rubenstein as a thinker and to his entire corpus. 
 To understand the enormity of Rubenstein's demands, consider that, for Wiesel, 
even today, 43 years after the conference in question, Jewish mission remains central to 
his understanding of Judaism at the same time that it informs his ethics—an ethics which 
relinquishes expectations of God's direct involvement in human history and yet cannot 
conceive of a temporal reality without the imperative to heal the world and to direct 
mankind toward God's intended path for it.  As Eliezer Schweid rightly states:  
 
The idea of the chosen people established the self-consciousness of the 
Jewish people from its inception in the Babylonian exile to its second 
return to Zion.  It seems that the Jewish people cannot recognize itself in 
any other image, but after the Shoah, the idea of a people created to fulfill 
a universal mission for humanity became for the majority of Jews a 
meaningless pretense.4 
 
It is precisely this reality—the reality that, for many Jews, most especially the younger 
                                                
4 Eliezer Schweid, “Is There a Religious Meaning to the Idea of a Chosen People after the Shoah?” The 
Impact of the Holocaust in Jewish Theology, Steven T. Katz, ed. (New York: New York University 
Press, 2005), 5.  It must be said that Schweid published this essay in 2005.  And although he has 
published earlier essays on this and other post-Holocaust theological concerns, his path, too, was made 
easier by Rubenstein's largely unwelcome 1966 bombshell.  
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generations, the concept of Jewish mission was an embarrassment5---that pushed 
Rubenstein to “assume to burden of facing the problem” of re-integrating or ultimately 
abandoning what had for centuries been a theological linchpin of Judaism and a 
foundation of more secular constructions of Jewish communal identity as well.   
 As Schweid points out, not even the Enlightenment and its representation of Jews 
and Jewishness as the “main challenger of a traumatic conflict in the self-understanding 
of Western nations and societies” could force Jews to relinquish this most cherished 
aspect of Jewish identity.  Chosenness was ultimately re-adopted through 
“reinterpretation of its traditional meaning” in various ways.  For Reform Judaism, 
assimilation became the vehicle by means of which Jews could “teach humanity the 
values of humanism, and the right way to implement them into reality.”6 This 
understanding of Jewish chosenness permeates the work of Jewish philosophers from the 
eighteenth to the early twentieth centuries, as well.7 The secular Zionists would also take 
up the concept of Jewish chosenness, partly because the “idea of normalizing an exiled 
people is indeed abnormal.”  Zionism adopted what Schweid terms “a self-sacrificial 
                                                
5 Ibid. Schweid asserts that, although the idea of Jewish mission in its traditional formation remains intact 
for many actively religious Jews, Orthodox and non-Orthodox alike, “the question of whether [one's] 
Jewishness endows him or her with a sense of universal mission will be answered with great 
embarrassment.”  
6 Schweid, “Chosen People,” 6.  
7 Hermann Cohen felt that the Jewish mission in Europe (and in Germany in particular) was to spread 
ethical monotheism to non-Jews.  Broadly speaking, Cohen felt that Judaism could teach a great sense 
of responsibility on the part of man for his neighbor. He also felt that Judaism could “help” Christians 
embrace a relationship with God that would not require Christ as an intermediary.  Cohen felt that 
Jewish values, culture and “chosenness” could be taught, learned and embraced by anyone who wished 
to do so.  Modern Jewish philosophy—and even post-modern and contemporary Jewish philosophy—
relies heavily on the idea that Judaism's mission is to impart its unique ethics to the world, thereby 
improving the state of God's creation. This goal would make little sense without the understanding that 
there is a “Jewish mission” which Jews “choose” to fulfill.  
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idealism” that Zionists hoped would catapult “the Zionist movement” toward making 
“the Jewish people like all the other nations, through a heroic universal understanding 
that at one and the same time would normalize the Jewish people and would make it “a 
light unto all the nations.”8 The Jewish nation would show the world that it was possible 
to transform from what was seen as the “sickest,” weakest and most politically 
disorganized of all nations into the most morally upright, democratic, organized and 
militarily strong of all nations.  “This may explain the fact,” Schweid writes, “that on the 
brink of the Second World War almost all movements within the Jewish people adopted 
the idea of chosenness, each in its own interpretation.”9 To be very clear, tikkun olam, 
Schweid correctly states that the Jewish mission for each and every of these groups was 
“to mend the world.” Whether one meant to mend the world with God or without Him, 
from within Israel or from outside Israel was far less relevant than the fulfillment of the 
command to mend the world, all of it—not just Jewish individuals and Jewish 
communities.    
 How then, according to Schweid, does the notion of Jewish mission, so ubiquitous 
in Jewish thought of nearly every stripe and caliber become an “embarrassment” to the 
younger generations of Jews? Schweid argues that the concept becomes camouflaged by 
way of its fulfillment. In the aftermath of the Holocaust, Emil Fackenheim, for example, 
who continued to believe in the idea of a particular Jewish mission to disseminate 
Judaism's universal moral messages to the world also believed that the Holocaust was 
                                                
8 Schweid, “Chosen People,” 7.  
9 Ibid. 
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only possible because “it could only be thought about and then executed only against the 
Jewish people, because of its specific condition in exile and its specific moral-theological 
mission.”10 What is most “broken” about the world, then, according to this view, is that 
humanity was—and may well remain—able to slaughter a people precisely because its 
traditions represented, at least in the West, the pinnacle of moral teachings and because it 
was also a people in exile whose position was particularly precarious. Fackenheim 
argued, as did many others, that the best way to “mend the world” was to “normalize” the 
conditions of world Jewry.  If the Jewish people entered the family of nations and became 
strong enough to protect itself against any threat, thereby becoming “normal,” then not 
only would the Jews ultimately survive, but the world itself would be “on the mend,” so 
to speak.  The Jewish people, once they became a “real nation,” provided it kept a higher 
moral standard than other nations, could continue to embrace the notion of Jewish 
mission because it could continue to be a moral guidepost for the Western world.   
 It must be reiterated that these ideas can found in Zionist literature well before 
Fackenheim expressed them in 1982. Early secular Zionists like Moses Hess, who wrote 
his Rome and Jerusalem: The Last National Question in 1862 believed very strongly that 
if Jewish emancipation proved incommensurate with Jewish nationalism, then 
emancipation must be sacrificed for the greater good of Jewish state. Yet Jewish mission 
remained central even for Hess, who argued vehemently that only the “redemption of the 
soil” could cure the Jewish people of its spiritual and political illness while insisting that 
only the Jewish people could teach the rest of the West how to build and maintain a truly 
                                                
10 Schweid, “Chosen People,” 8. 
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moral nation. There is nothing remotely theological in Hess' claims, yet front and center 
remains what Fackenheim would restate after the Holocaust: that the Jews were charged 
with a special mission which involved saving themselves through “normalization” while 
saving the world with the strength of its moral ascendency. Schweid argues it is the very 
success of this mission to “normalize” the Jewish people through self-reliance, political 
strength and individual and community wellbeing—put into place, one could argue, since 
the Emancipation of European Jewry--that has led to a perceived sense of embarrassment 
about the idea of Jewish mission among younger generations of Jews. In a very real 
sense, the attempts of the mission to save the world by saving the Jews (by means of a 
Jewish state) create the end of the understanding of Jewish mission as continuous in 
time.11 
 Despite these very real changes in the place of Jewish mission the lives of young 
contemporary Jews, when Rubenstein published After Auschwitz in 1966, Jewish mission 
remained, as Schweid states, the one idea which continued to unify otherwise disparate 
Jewish groups in spite of the catastrophe.  The Holocaust was often seen as proof of the 
lasting importance of Jewish moral mission, especially for thinkers like Wiesel. Again, 
per Schweid: 
 
                                                
11 Luria's understanding of the task of “mending the world” was metaphysical as well as temporal ones. 
Humanity mends the world by engaging in temporal acts of charity like feeding the hungry, clothing the 
naked, and housing the homeless.  Humanity also mends the world by simultaneously engaging in 
metaphysical acts of healing, like seeing divinity in even the meanest and most cruel people and places 
in the material world.  This “gathers” the sparks and contributes to the completion of creation.  
Creation, though, is never “complete,” just as, one might say, the messiah never comes.  The task of 
mending the world is not finite, but infinite.  
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In the Shoah [all the movements of the Jewish people] came even closer to 
each other.  The common experience convinced them that Hitler declared 
his war specifically and mainly against the Jewish people because it 
symbolized for him the universal humanism that he rejected.  The chosen 
people incarnated all that Hitler hated in the name of German racist 
superiority.  The Shoah was, then, in the eyes of victimized Jews, the 
struggle between Jewish moral chosenness and German racist monstrosity.  
Thus the final victory was also considered to be the success of the Jewish 
people to withstand its trial, to resist absolute wickedness, as the 
representative of true humanity created in the image of God.12 
 
To repeat, it is Jewish mission, a concept which Schweid rightly states is one of the only 
unifying concepts related to Jewish identity left to the world's remaining Jews —a 
concept Wiesel actively utilizes as a spiritual life-raft in the immediate wake of the 
Holocaust and a guidepost for his universal ethics---which Rubenstein most vehemently 
insists is a “myth” of “privilege” that after the Holocaust is “unhealthy” and 
“irrational.”13 I start the discussion of Rubenstein's ethics with the question of Jewish 
mission because it is one of the ways in which he differs most radically from Wiesel, 
whose ethics rely on the very tenet Rubenstein unequivocally throws away. Yet for 
Rubenstein, the concept of Jewish election is not only illogical but also immoral.  
                                                
12 Schweid, “Chosen People,” 7.  
13 Rubenstein, After Auschwitz, 85.  
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According to Rubenstein, to believe in the God of the Jews after Auschwitz is to either 
believe that the 6 million were guilty as charged or to believe that God is not, after all, 
omnipotent or active in human history.   
 
The Debate: Rubenstein’s Judaism 
 
 I turn now to the debate between Wiesel and Rubenstein regarding the problem of 
Jewish mission after the Holocaust—well-known among students of post-Holocaust 
thought--at the first annual International Scholars' Conference on the German Church 
Struggle and the Holocaust, held at Wayne State University in 1970.  As speakers 
scheduled at different times to address conference attendees, Rubenstein and Wiesel 
engaged in an unplanned dialogue regarding Rubenstein's proclamation that Auschwitz 
proved “God is dead.”14 Roth and Berenbaum are right when they call this exchange 
“part of the lore of Holocaust scholarship.”15  
 “Lore” has it that on Wednesday evening of the conference when Wiesel was 
scheduled to speak on “The Literature of the Holocaust,” he chose not to speak on the 
predetermined topic but to address, at least in part, the lecture given earlier in the day by 
Rubenstein in which he attempted to advance his claims regarding the death of God and 
the subsequent need for the abandonment of the age-old concept of Jewish mission.  I 
                                                
14 There are many accounts of this exchange, but I site here the text that reproduces the “debate” itself.  
John K. Roth and Michael Berenbaum, “Richard Rubenstein and Elie Wiesel: An Exchange,” 
Holocaust: Religious and Philosophical Implications (St. Paul: Paragon House, 1989), 346. 
15 Roth and Berenbaum, “Exchange,” 347.  
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will examine the “exchange” between them here because the analysis is quite fruitful; by 
comparing Rubenstein and Wiesel to one another, particularly within the context of a 
conference such as the International Scholar's Conference, we understand their work in 
general and their ethics specifically in greater depth.  
 The content of the debate can be summarized as follows: Rubenstein discussed 
the problems of faith in the “God of History” after Auschwitz, much of which he already 
described in After Auschwitz.  Rubenstein related his first and second visits to Europe in 
1960 and 1969 respectively. When he encountered German families while vacationing in 
the Netherlands, he found himself plunged into a slowly deepening crisis of faith, in part 
because his young son began asking him questions about Auschwitz and the US 
government's failure to intervene on behalf of Europe's persecuted Jewry. His children 
knew that his wife, herself a Dutch Jew, had barely escaped the Netherlands during the 
war.  His youngest son, Jeremy, accompanied him on his second journey, and Rubenstein 
recounts that while touring the plaza of the Cologne Cathedral, Jeremy suddenly 
shrieked, “Daddy, get me out of here. I don't want to be anywhere near these people.”  
Rubenstein states that he “understood his reaction.  It was a shudder of utter horror when 
he realized the enormity of what the people around him had done...” Rubenstein goes on 
to say that “there is more to the problem” than trying to comprehend the enormity of the 
crime of the Holocaust.  Rubenstein then describes, very succinctly, the breadth and 
depth of the problems posed by Auschwitz, problems that, until Rubenstein published 
After Auschwitz, had not even been voiced, let alone discussed with any alacrity.  
 The first question Rubenstein poses is: How should Jewish parents instruct their 
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children to engage with and think about Christians? It is this question which leads 
Rubenstein to recount the experience he had with Probst Dr. Heinrich Grüber, the only 
German to testify against Adolf Eichmann at the 1961 trial in Jerusalem (about which 
Hannah Arendt's controversial Eichmann in Jerusalem was written). Grüber, who spent 
time in a concentration camp for helping “non-Aryans” escape persecution, asserted that 
Germany was being “punished” by God for making refugees out of much of Europe's 
population, and “commenced with his biblical interpretation of recent history...[and] 
could not stop until he asserted it had been God's will to send Adolf Hitler to exterminate 
Europe's Jews.” This proclamation, Rubenstein says, does not prove that Grüber is an 
anti-Semite.  Rather, it proves that “the logic of Covenant Theology” is impossibly and 
irrevocably flawed for Christian and Jew alike: 
 
The only morally defensible motive for a superior to inflict pain on an 
inferior would be punitive chastisement which has its purpose altering the 
victim's mode of behavior.  If one takes Covenant Theology seriously, as 
did Dean Grüber, Auschwitz must be God's way of punishing the Jewish 
people in order that they might better see the light, the light of Christ if 
one is a Christian, the light of Torah if one is a traditional Jew...If the God 
of the Covenant exists, at Auschwitz my people stood under the most 
fearsome curse that God has ever inflicted. If the God of history does not 
exist, then the Cosmos is ultimately absurd in origin and meaningless in 
purpose...I have elected to accept what Camus...called the courage of the 
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absurd, the courage to live in a meaningless, purposeless Cosmos rather 
than believe in a God who inflicts Auschwitz on his people. 16 
 
As for Jewish identity and Jewish mission, Rubenstein states: 
  
As human beings we are divided by historical and geographical accident 
into the tribes of mankind, to no ultimate reason or purpose.  We are 
simply there for but a moment only to disappear into the midnight silence 
of Eternal Chaos.   
 
Identity is random; Jewishness is random and as a result cannot be imbued with the kind 
of meaning that the concept “chosenness” imbues. And unlike all the Jews in Europe's 
past who could at least “elect...for martyrdom” when faced with persecution, the Nazis 
deprived their victims of any such opportunity: 
 
In the camps it made no difference whether you were Dr. Edith Stein, who 
had become a Carmelite nun, or a Hasidic rabbi. All Jews were 
slaughtered without distinction.  Even baptism provided no escape.  It 
must be sadly noted that the pathetic attempts of the Jewish community to 
see the six million as martyrs is a tragic albeit understandable 
                                                
16 Roth and Berenbaum, “Exchange,” 352-353.  
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misperception.   
 
Rubenstein goes on to say that his use of “language indifferent to the moral dimension” 
when discussing the nature of Auschwitz as an event in human history is “deliberate;” he 
has “attempted to use language as did the Nazis when they spoke of exterminating 
people.”17 Rubenstein makes this point in order to clarify that for him, morality is neither 
inherent nor reliable, especially in times of political and social upheaval.  Here 
Rubenstein is extending Arendt's theory that the idea of inherent “human rights” is no 
longer credible in a post-totalitarian world18 to similar theological claims that God 
“endows man with a certain irreducible measure of dignity.” For Rubenstein, the 
Germans proved that concepts on inalienable rights are of “no consequence when such 
talk might really matter...[because it would] neither deter future emulators of the Nazis 
nor comfort realistically their victims.”19  
 It is this perspective—that “rights” in the Enlightenment sense of the term or even 
in the theological sense of the term are not innate—which leads Rubenstein to his support 
of the Israeli state. For Rubenstein, “the possession of power is indispensable for human 
dignity” because mankind is, by nature, clannish and violent.  There could be no future 
protection of the world's remaining Jews without a Jewish state powerful enough to 
defend its citizens—and, presumably, world Jewry—from any and all threats. “I do not 
                                                
17 Roth and Berenbaum, “Exchange,” 357.  
18 See Arendt's Origins of Totalitarianism.  Arendt experienced the realities of statelessness in Nazi 
Europe, and her ideas about human rights as contingent on the power of one's political community 
reflect those experiences.  
19 Roth and Berenbaum, “Exchange,” 358.  
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see,” said Rubenstein, “how one can escape the sorrowful conclusion that he alone has 
rights and dignity who has the power to enforce those rights or belongs to a group that 
possesses such power.”20 Rubenstein states that he feels freed by his new understanding 
of humans as creatures marked by the “psychological reality of the Fall.”  He claims that, 
as such, he is “neither disappointed nor resentful when people behave in a way that is 
both predictable and consistent with their nature.  In times of stress,” he avers, “it is 
unrealistic to expect much virtue or magnanimity from the generality of men, no matter 
how praiseworthy such behavior may be when it surfaces unexpectedly.”21  
 Finally, Rubenstein offers his “own confession of faith,” and describes himself as 
a pagan, which he defines as “find[ing] once again one's roots as a child of Earth and to 
see one's own existence as wholly and totally an earthly existence.”  He goes on to state: 
 
[Being pagan]...means to find once again to understand that for mankind 
the true divinities are the gods of the earth, not the high gods of the sky; 
the gods of space and place, not the gods of time; the gods of home and 
hearth, not the gods of wandering, though wanderers we must be.  Though 
every single establishment Jewish theologian rejects this position, the 
Jewish people have given their assent—with their feet.  They have gone 
home.  The best part of that people has ceased to be wanderers.  They have 
                                                
20 Roth and Berenbaum, “Exchange,” 359.   
21 Roth and Berenbaum, “Exchange,” 359-360.  
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once again found a place of their own on this earth.  That is paganism.22 
 
He compares this confession of paganism to the burying of his Lithuanian Yiddish 
speaking grandmother with a small bag of dirt from mandate-era Palestine, and closes by 
musing that she “was as thoroughgoing a pagan” as he is.  
 It is not difficult to anticipate Wiesel's response to Rubenstein's hand grenade of 
an address. Wiesel began by immediately obscuring not only his audience's access to the 
experience of the survivor, but also his own access to “the Event” as a survivor, a move 
familiar to readers of Wiesel's work.  In this context, however, it is easier to see why 
Wiesel often chooses to obfuscate his own experience for the sake of his larger message.  
“I don't know,” he began, “what happened to Moishe the-beadle23. I don't even know 
what happened to Him, the One he addressed.  I don't even know whether I am here.”  
Wiesel goes on to explain that the person he feels himself to be today feels, at times, 
disconnected from the child who went straight from the Yeshiva to Auschwitz who 
wonders “whether there was a Holocaust at all.”24 Wiesel's emphasis on this 
disconnection could be justified in a number of ways; one could say, for example, that it 
is a way of highlighting the profound trauma of the experience i.e., Auschwitz was so 
disconnected from normal human life and experience that to try and connect with the 
survivor experience even as the survivor who experienced it is impossible. Yet Wiesel 
                                                
22 Roth and Berenbaum, “Exchange,” 360. 
23 Moishe the beadle, as he explains somewhat briefly in this address and at greater length elsewhere, is 
one of Wiesel's madmen who is a kind of modern day prophet whose presence and message are rejected 
and yet herald an unwanted and unforeseen catastrophe which is about to befall the Jewish people.   
24 Roth and Berenbaum, “An Exchange,” 363.  
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means to do more than that, because in the next breath he describes what he believes 
other survivors believed about the world outside the camps during those fateful years: 
 
...all the Jews who were trapped there had no idea that outside world knew 
what was happening.  I listened today to Dick Rubenstein.  Of course I 
share his anger and his despair...it is fortunate that Jews in the camps did 
not know what was happening in the world.  Had the Jews known that 
Roosevelt and Churchill and De Gaulle and the Pope and everybody knew, 
and no one cared, I think they would have...chosen not to survive.25  
 
Wiesel goes on to make at least one of the reasons for his downplaying the details of 
survivor experience clear.  He claims that he “never speaks of God now”: 
 
I rather speak of men who believed in God or men who denied God. How 
strange that the philosophy of denying God came not from the 
survivors...my dispute, my bewilderment, my astonishment is with men.  I 
didn't understand how men could be so “barbarian” as you called it, Dick. 
I still don't understand it.  
 
Wiesel wanted to focus on human response to the suffering of other humans, not on God 
                                                
25 Roth and Berenbaum, “An Exchange,” 363.  
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or on the experience of suffering itself, because it is our response to our fellow human's 
suffering which can be, in some way, measured and, perhaps in the future, shaped by 
education and experience.  In other words, both Rubenstein and Wiesel place the focus on 
humanity with regard to the problem of ethics. But while Rubenstein proclaims God is 
dead (and Rubenstein would rather believe Him dead rather than unable to or 
uninterested in meeting his expectations of the God of History) Wiesel proves himself to 
have far fewer expectations of God's “behavior” and far greater expectations of humanity.  
Rubenstein does place some faith in human collectives, or at least in the brute strength of 
a collective when it is motivated to protect its members from harm.  But this hardly 
seems to be an expression of hope for humankind's moral future.  Wiesel moved on to 
discuss, if indirectly, Jewish identity: 
  
Let me reassure you, Dick, a Jew is incapable of hate.  In the Bible, 
whenever hate is mentioned, it always refers to self-hate.  The only hate 
that a Jew is capable of—unfortunately--is self-hate.  But then he does it 
well.  We cannot hate our neighbors; we cannot even hate our enemies.  
Look at Israel; Israelis do not hate Arabs...Strange as it may sound, there 
was no hate involved in the relationship between Jew and German...we 
didn't hate them because we are incapable of hate, especially as they 
represented the Malach Hamavet, the Angel of Death.  How can you hate 
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death?26  
 
Wiesel's apparent certainty that Jews are metaphysically incapable of hate is, even 43 
years after he spoke these words, shocking for a number of reasons.  First, he attributes 
innate qualities to Jews that are arguably politically convenient stereotypes of the 'un-
angry' Holocaust survivor--discussed earlier in this study and described so well by Naomi 
Seidman.  If Jewish victims of the Shoah can be said to be free of hate and the desire for 
revenge, then they will not only appear less threatening to members of perpetrator 
societies; they can also be used as moral examples. But this depiction of the survivor as 
free of hate, even free of anger, is patently inaccurate, as proven by Wiesel's own early 
work.  It is also philosophically problematic given that Nazism attributed innate social 
and personality characteristics to biological “identities. ” Such claims are risky even 
when the characteristics deemed innate are positive in nature.  Second, by claiming that 
Jews cannot hate or seek revenge for undeserved persecution, even hyperbolically, is to 
deprive Jews of their humanity.  But beyond the potential political benefits of this 
position, why does Wiesel say this, here and elsewhere?  
 Wiesel tells the story from the Babylonian Talmud about Rabbi Ishmael, a 
tannaitic sage and martyr from the Roman period.  According to the story, as Rabbi 
Ishmael is led to his death, he hears God's voice telling him that if he sheds even one tear 
while being murdered, He will “return the universe to its primary chaos.” Rabbi Ishmael 
                                                
26 Roth and Berenbaun, “An Exchange,” 364.  
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did not cry, and Wiesel ends his discussion by telling us why he believes Rabbi Ishmael 
did not cry:  1.) He was a martyr and did not cry so the world would be saved; 2.) he 
obeyed; and finally, and most importantly, 3.) he wanted to teach that:  
  
The world deserves to be destroyed. But to be a Jew is to have all the 
reasons in the world to destroy the world and not to destroy! To be a Jew 
is to have all the reasons on the world to hate the Germans and not to hate 
them! To be a Jew...is to have all the reasons in the world not to have faith 
in language, in singing, in prayers, and in God, but to go on telling the 
tale, to go on carrying on the dialogue, and to have my own silent prayers 
and quarrels with God.27  
 
Wiesel's sweeping statements about what it means to be “a Jew” are first and foremost 
definitions and endorsements of a specific interpretation of Jewish mission. Wiesel's 
muddling of descriptions of the Holocaust experience as well as his explicit avoidance of 
stating much that is truly definitive about the nature of God as he understands it are, 
among other things, tools which enable him to focus on the notion of Jewish mission 
specifically and on human ethical engagement more broadly.  If Jewish mission remains 
intact, the way forward after the Shoah—at least for world Jewry--remains or becomes 
clear: Jews should remember the suffering of their dead martyrs and try to save the 
                                                
27 Roth and Berenbaum, “An Exchange,” 368-369.  Emphasis original.  
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Jews—and the world that would subject them to it—from another Holocaust.  If Jewish 
mission remains intact, then the suffering of the victims is not entirely in vain because 
what they experienced will enable them to “mend the world.”  The distinctions between 
Wiesel's understanding of Jewish mission and the pre-war and interwar understanding of 
Jewish mission as briefly outlined by Schweid are nuanced but ultimately more similar 
than dissimilar.  
 This is exactly what Rubenstein is rejecting.  The Jews died by the millions in 
Europe and God did not intervene; God no longer “chooses” them, and for Rubenstein, to 
continue to believe He did was ludicrous. If we apply the same logic to the matter of God 
in Rubenstein's argument, God is dead because God as Rubenstein understood Him 
would have intervened and God did not intervene.  Therefore, He must be dead.  Victims 
of the Shoah were innocent and their deaths did nothing to alter the true nature of the 
world of mankind as a chaotic, cruel, empty place wherein the only things human beings 
have in common are the suffering they inflict on one another and the desire to protect 
themselves from it.  To sum up the whole of Rubenstein's argument as presented at the 
International Scholars' Conference, leaving aside for the moment any objections to his 
conclusions: 
 
1. If you believe victims of Nazi persecution were innocent, the only way to take the 
covenantal theology of Judaism seriously is by rejecting the idea of Jewish mission 
and the continued existence of a God of History completely. 
2. The way Dean Grüber and those who think like him define, understand and identify 
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Jewish chosenness accurately: The Jews and only the Jews are God's favorite and 
most beloved people and possess a special relationship with God that, for the non-
Jew, is impossible to attain, even if he or she converts. It would therefore be 
foolhardy and dangerous for any Jew to subscribe to the idea of Jewish mission in any 
of its permutation as meaningful (presumably even if his or her understanding of 
chosenness is different than Grüber's) if he or she wants to avoid further anti-Semitic 
violence.  
3. Jewish victims of the Holocaust, although innocent, are not martyrs because they 
could not choose death over conversion or flight, as did their persecuted ancestors.  
To believe victims of the Holocaust were martyrs is to misunderstand martyrdom and 
the nature of the Reich's policies.  
4. The whole continuum of Jewish history can be understood as culminating in the 
Holocaust.  In fact we must understand Jewish history in this way if we understand 
the Holocaust accurately. 
5. Morality is not inherent nor is it transcendent/transcendental.   
6. Humanity does not possess an innate tendency toward morality. 
7. Following Arendt, human beings do not possess inherent “rights.”  Human rights are 
an extension of the state, and then only insofar as that state can defend itself against 
all aggressors. 
8. Paganism can be understood as a more or less unified set of beliefs that are in direct 
opposition with the central tenets of traditional Judaism; whereas paganism represents 
rootedness and connection with land, bodies, materiality and presence in the temporal 
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world. Judaism represents landlessness, abstraction, ideas, and disconnection from 
modern society.  
9. Jewish support of Israel and the popularity of making aliyah is a rejection of the 
tenets of traditional Judaism. 
10. The presence of useless human suffering on the scale of that inflicted by the Third 
Reich proves that life has no inherent meaning or purpose, and if there are 
metaphysical truths, we have failed to grasp them as a species. 
 
 
 The above are the basic concepts most scholars discuss regarding Rubenstein's 
project. Although After Auschwitz does not contain a separate section on ethics, the 
problem of ethics after World War II is as central to the text as Rubenstein's prescriptions 
for Jewish theology and remains as yet untapped by most students and critics of post-
Holocaust thought.  Rubenstein's theological ideas often differ significantly from 
Wiesel's—particularly with regard to expectations of God's involvement in the matters of 
humanity, as discussed above—but both feel that at bottom “man is a problem to 
himself” since “human evil has done far more harm throughout the ages than natural 
catastrophe.”28 We must remember here that for Rubenstein, the matter of God's 
existence is directly connected to human ethics. For example, when discussing Rabbi 
Jack J. Cohen's important Reconstructionist contribution, The Case for Religious 
Supernaturalism, Rubenstein insists that, contra Cohen who felt that study of the physical 
                                                
28 Rubenstein, After Auschwitz, 86.  
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sciences proved modern people could not insist on the existence of a personal God, “the 
moral and psychological objections are more telling than the objections arising from the 
physical sciences.”29 What makes belief in a personal God immoral for Rubenstein is not 
the belief itself but rather what he understood be the resulting lack of moral agency:  
 
[My ancestors] attempted to solve [the problem of the existence of 
undeserved suffering] by projecting an existence of another world wherein 
this world's cruelty would be rectified. We cannot accept this solution and 
we would do well to recognize the disguised yet nonetheless strong 
criticism of God's government of this world implied in their fantasy of 
another world in which He would ultimately do a better job.30  
 
As we might expect from Rubenstein, his conception of traditional Judaism's treatment of 
theodicy is, at least as he delineates it in After Auschswitz, both limited and static, and 
seems to ignore that one need not reduce theodicy to a single, outmoded understanding of 
the idea in order to reject the need for theodicy completely.  Moreover one need not reject 
traditional Judaism in order to reject theodicy. Rubenstein does not even mention the 
many thinkers who, by 1966, also rejected theodicy precisely because of the moral 
implications of embracing it. Rubenstein goes on to laud Paul Tillich for believing that 
“[the God of theism] is dead and deserved to die,” for “praising...Nietzsche” and for 
                                                
29 Rubenstein, After Auschwitz, 87.  
30 Rubenstein, After Auschwitz, 87.  
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contending that a personal God “is the enemy of human freedom.”31In short, “human 
moral autonomy is incompatible with the traditional conception of a personal God.”32 
Rubenstein conflates the idea of a personal God with acceptance of traditional 
Deuteronomistic theodicy.  In addition, Rubenstein claims: 
       
1. The “Christian religion, alone among the religions of the world, begins with a 
murder—the murder of God”;33   
2. that the “murder of God is an immensely potent symbol of man's primal desire to do 
away with his impediments to instinctual gratification”;34 
3. that the “perversity of the human heart finds its ultimate expression in the myth of the 
murder of God”;35  
4. and finally that “The death camp,” only possible in a world devoid of God,36  
“became the place where the morally impossible became the commonplace and even 
the trivial for the Nazis.”37  
 
Rubenstein shrinks from the notion of deicide present in Christianity and yet embraces 
what he sees as the “moral autonomy” he feels must result from such an action.  The 
implication is that humans will be more ethical if they are not modeling their ethics after 
                                                
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid.  
33 Rubenstein, After Auschwitz, 9. 
34 Rubenstein, After Auschwitz, 12 Emphasis original.  
35 Rubenstein, After Auschwitz, 13.  
36 Rubenstein follows Arendt here.  
37 Rubenstein, After Auschwitz, 13.  
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God's.  Killing God—or proclaiming Him dead—makes us, so Rubenstein, morally 
responsible for one another and ourselves.  And yet one possible logical end of a world 
without the moral boundaries Western society embraced before 1933 is the Nazi death 
camps. Rubenstein's lack of theological nuance and his unwillingness to portray Jewish 
theology as far more than traditional Christian understandings of it weakens his argument 
rather than strengthens it; God is a punishing God, and therefore makes “sinners” suffer 
in ways that do not fit the “sin.” His understanding of many of the doctrines of Judaism 
read like misunderstandings of Jewish religious thought and practice from an almost anti-
Jewish Christian perspective.  In other words, his “traditional Jewish theology” is quite 
like Dean Grüber's anti-Jewish Christianity.  It is likely that the reasons for this are 
complicated, and perhaps related to Rubenstein's personal need to work though the crisis 
of the Holocaust by theological means; and while one cannot in fairness claim 
Rubenstein is anti-Jewish or anti-Semitic (indeed he is in crisis because he is grieving the 
murder of 6 million Jews and wants to prevent another Shoah), the theology he suggests 
often adopts the very approach and tone of rhetoric he wants to fight. Even Rubenstein's 
assertions that Jews should support Israel because Israel can protect world Jewry with its 
military might come dangerously close to twentieth century fascist claims that “might 
makes right.”  Just as he lauds the moral responsibility brought on by the death of God 
and yet claims that the  “aim of creating a world in which God is dead (or, more 
precisely, in which the Judaeo-Christian God is negated) was at the heart of the Nazi 
program,” he also responds to fascism's claims that the strongest will and should prevail 
by sadly proclaiming that they were right to think so. This aspect of Rubenstein's work 
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remains troubling.  
 
What is Suffering?  
 
 Setting aside for a moment that Rubenstein errs here in much the same way he 
errs with regard to the doctrine of chosenness and the problem of the covenant,38 there is 
much to be gleaned from Rubenstein's system with regard to the problem of suffering and 
the contingent problem of ethics.  Rubenstein objects to God because he objects to the 
reality of the world as a place of great undeserved suffering, suffering which even the 
radical evil of Auschwitz has not stymied. Rubenstein's understanding of the world as a 
place full of undeserved suffering has caused him to reject God—or even the premise that 
God exists—on ethical grounds.  For Rubenstein, humanity's only true common 
denominator is the ubiquity of suffering; Rubenstein's understanding of the world is 
nihilistic insofar as he believes we live in “an unfeeling and silent cosmos.”39 He does not 
view human morality or even the tendency toward morality as innate. Like Wiesel, 
Rubenstein feels a call to respond to that suffering not for God or on account of God, but 
for and on account of humanity, in spite of the “perversity” of the human heart.  “The real 
objections against a personal or theistic God,” writes Rubenstein, “come from the 
irreconcilability of the claim of God's perfection with the hideous human evil tolerated by 
                                                
38 The issue of chosenness as it appears in Rubenstein's work is discussed at length in the section of 
Chapter 5.  
39 Rubenstein, After Auschwitz, 225.   
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such a God.”40 Like Dostoevsky, Rubenstein firmly believes God is implicated in man's 
cruelty to man if He has the power to control it.  It follows that the most important ethical 
imperative in Rubenstein's ethical system is the necessity of human intervention on 
behalf of those who suffer unjustly.   
 And while he discusses the possibility that a Jew living after the Holocaust might 
choose to reject Jewish identity for the sake of their children's survival,41 he states: 
 
Had I rejected myself as a Jew, I would have had to enthrone the opinions 
of others as ultimately decisive for my inner life.  I could not grant the 
world that tyranny over me.  I am prepared to do many things that society 
requires of me, granted their consistency with the canons of human 
decency, but I am not prepared to bestow upon others the right to 
determine how I shall think of myself or my community. By accepting 
myself as a Jew, I have liberated myself from the most futile and 
degrading of servilities, that of forever attempting to appease the irrational 
mythology that the Christian world has constructed of the Jew.42 
 
                                                
40 Rubenstein, After Auschswitz, 86.   
41 Rubenstein writes that “Judaism is simply no longer worth the price of martyrdom for far more young 
Jews than most of us can possibly imagine...martyrdom has gone out of fashion among Jews and it has 
been replaced by the possibility of massive defection.”  Whether or not Rubenstein's claims have turned 
out to be true is another matter.  But this establishes his understanding of the nature of Jewish identity 
after the Shoah.  
42 Rubenstein, After Auschwitz, 224. Rubenstein's understanding of Jewish identification here is 
undoubtedly shaped in large part by his experiences as a Jew in interwar and post World War II 
America.   
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Perhaps this seems surprising, given Rubenstein's embrace of many aspects of Protestant 
Death of God theology, and his rejection of Jewish chosenness and by extension the 
value of particularity in general.  Yet Rubenstein's desire to remain a Jew for reasons of 
personal authenticity is not unlike Moses Mendelssohn's continued practice of Judaism 
for reasons of filial piety, or Leo Strauss’ claims that is impossible not to remain a Jew.  
A kind of honor is found in remaining who one is, in spite of what the wider world would 
like one to be. Moreover, when Rubenstein cites his behavioral boundaries as defined by 
the “cannons of human decency,” we can be sure that much of what his personal canon of 
decency contains has its origins in Jewish culture, thought and practice.   
 While Rubenstein's Judaism may not, as far as I can tell, feel authentic to many 
people who identify as Jewish—and he may do away with or completely ignore those 
texts, practices and ideas upon which most Jewish thinkers rely when constructing an 
ethic from Judaism-- he nonetheless, like Levinas and Wiesel, believes that Jewish 
sources and traditions provide necessary alternatives to Western ethics derived almost 
exclusively from philosophy. Unlike Wiesel and Levinas, who both draw heavily on the 
prophetic books and traditions, Rubenstein identifies the “archaic elements [of Judaism]” 
associated with cultic or Temple Judaism as “the most meaningful” part of the tradition. 
He views humankind as “[in]capable of much improvement through homiletic 
exhortation” associated with the prophetic tradition because man “needs the drama and 
the consolation of religion as much to share his inevitable failings as to be encouraged for 
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further striving.”43 Rubenstein views humankind as prone to hate “the very disciplines 
and limitations he recognizes as absolutely necessary for his own preservation”; since 
God is understood in Rubenstein's system as a kind of metaphysical super ego, man's 
hatred of limitations translates into a “hatred of God” and the perceived necessity of 
submission to Him and the limitations His power imposes upon us.44 For Rubenstein it is 
Judaism's traditions of sacrifice and atonement that have the most to offer contemporary 
society and therefore make it unique among the Western faiths.  In this, as in many things 
theological, Rubenstein goes against the grain. 
 He is correct when he points to the “aura of embarrassment” which “hangs over 
the treatment of sacrifice in contemporary Jewish liturgy.”  Nonetheless, Rubenstein 
insists that there are “important reasons why the symbolic assertion of the primacy of 
sacrifice ought to be retained as a central element in Jewish religious life.”45 Rubenstein 
cites several possible reasons for contemporary Judaism's reluctance to retain, let alone 
augment, its liturgical or practical applications of the concept of atonement through 
sacrifice.  The first is the Protestant influence over nineteenth century enlightenment-
inspired Judaism, which is indeed partly responsible for Judaism's ambivalent 
relationship to its priestly tradition, and thinkers like Hermann Cohen and Leo Baeck are 
two of the philosophical figures most representative of the school of thought which 
considered the prophetic tradition far superior to the priestly tradition with regard to 
ethics and spirituality.  The prophetic tradition was considered the culmination of 
                                                
43 Rubenstein, After Auschwitz, 92.  
44 Ibid.  
45 Rubenstein, After Auschwitz, 93.  
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mankind's development toward “ever more significant religious and moral attainments.”46  
 The Scriptural readings in the synagogue for the Conservative and Orthodox 
traditions on the morning of Yom Kippur are a verbal re-enactment of this sacrificial rite 
of atonement during which the Priest would cast lots between two animal victims. One 
would become the offering within the Sanctuary while the other would act as the 
scapegoat for the sins of the entirety of Israel. This second animal was the vehicle for 
collective vicarious atonement, a concept which Rubenstein suggests “few Jews can feel 
altogether comfortable with” given that the Jewish people “itself has been the vicarious 
victim” of and for guilty parties.  This historical reality, Rubenstein pointedly states, has 
“lent a very real measure of repugnance to the scapegoat theme.”47 And indeed, 
sacrificial worship is a “thinly disguised surrogate for an original human sacrifice.” 
Sacrificial worship is murder, and replacing an innocent human with another innocent 
animal does not make the ritualization of the murder of innocents less execrable.  The 
“prophetic moralist,” to use Rubenstein's term, remains in a state of dissatisfaction with 
the “moral state of the community,” the “priest” or the practitioner of ritual sacrifice 
insists that it is “very doubtful that that much can be done to change human nature; his 
effort is directed primarily at making the best of a not entirely perfect creation.”48 For 
Rubenstein, herein lies the greatest strength of the priestly tradition: 
  
At the heart of the sacrificial system lies the unspoken conviction that 
                                                
46 Rubenstein, After Auschwitz, 94-95.  
47 Rubenstein, After Auschwitz, 95.  
48 Rubenstein, After Auschwitz, 106.  
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human beings are more likely to repeat their failings and their 
characteristic modes of behavior from one generation to the next than they 
are to improve upon them.49 
 
And although Rubenstein asserts that sacrificial worship does not actually cleanse the 
community of guilt or evil, it can provide what he calls “controlled magic.”  Such 
“controlled magic” does not and would not result in “greater rationality” but might 
prevent “outbursts of devastatingly uncontrolled irrationality.”50 According to 
Rubenstein, the death of 6 million Jews during the Holocaust is “a colossal ritual murder 
carried out on the vastest possible scale” which took place because of humanity's 
unmet—and unavoidable--need for vicarious atonement. Ritual murder—rather than 
actual murder--that takes place in a religious context is “the magic attempt to avoid guilt 
and danger by the death of another” could prevent the large-scale social and moral 
catastrophes associated with the modern period.  The “scapegoat offering of the ancient 
pagans,” because the pagans (unlike the post-Enlightenment West, perhaps) recognized 
human nature for what it was and “never let it get out of hand.”51  
 Herein lies one of the most important points of Rubenstein's argument for a return 
to some aspects of priestly Judaism. “The veneer of civilization, rationality, and morality 
in any society [is thin]” Rubenstein writes, and “in times of great communal stress, such 
as war, depression, or national frustration,” people are not who they are in better times.  
                                                
49 Rubenstein, After Auschwitz, 106. Emphasis original.  
50 Rubenstein, After Auschwitz, 106. Emphasis original.  
51 Rubenstein, After Auschwitz, 107.  
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The way to avoid mass murder at such times is not to “exhort them to a goodness which 
the stress of events precluded,” but to “satisfy...their magic hunger for a victim, and a 
scapegoat...[thereby]...limit[ing] the destructiveness of these periods of stress.”52 The 
suffering of potential perpetrators must be addressed if we do not want them to victimize 
innocent people; like Levinas, Rubenstein agrees that unmediated suffering creates both 
victims and victimizers.  We cannot prevent the latter without preventing the former.  
 Recall Wiesel's treatment of “liminal” times in human history in The Trial of God 
specifically indicates a similar belief in the danger of those times when, in the words of 
Chinua Achebe, “things fall apart.” Wiesel draws similar conclusions about the fragility 
of social norms and constructs and also suggests that humanity's thirst for violence is 
unquenchable (although in Wiesel's work the most frequent victims of such violence in 
the past, present and future are Jews and Rubenstein paints in much broader, more 
intentionally inclusive strokes).  And yet for Wiesel, who believes unequivocally that “we 
are less likely to hit one another if we are talking,” it is dialogue rather than ritual that 
disrupts potential mass murder.  To be sure, modern understandings of the prophetic 
tradition (upon which Wiesel heavily relies) would certainly place the prophet in the 
middle of a burning city because it is then, when humanity is indeed at its weakest, that it 
is most in need of “prophetic exhortation.” These exhortations consistently remind us of 
our duty to our fellow human beings, and of the broader value of collective responsibility 
for even the least ethical among us.  
  Yet it is within the collective experience of ritual sacrifice—whether it is actual or 
                                                
52 Rubenstein, After Auschwitz, 107.  
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liturgical—and not within the language of prophetic imperative that Rubenstein finds the 
most potential for teaching the value of collective responsibility. Rubenstein argues that 
collective ritual sacrifice prevents an individual member of the community from feeling 
alone in his or her guilt; conversely, it prevents the community from avoiding 
responsibility for the repercussions of the guilty individual's actions, since for 
Rubenstein, “there is no such thing as a world of isolated rugged individuals in the 
sacrificial tradition.”53 Recognizing that everyone is guilty of something and is likely to 
be guilty again in the future prevents the kind of cultural alienation and despair described 
by Fritz Stern and others who attempt to map Europe's path from the Enlightenment to 
widespread fascism.  According to this understanding of guilt, we must have a place to 
express our rage and shame and disappointment for consistently falling short of our own 
necessary standards.  If we do not have safe, socially condoned places to do that, then we 
will make the world our public stage for bloody atonement rituals.  “World War II was 
not,” Rubenstein warns, 
 
...a fortuitous accident but a deep revelation of the night side of human 
existence.  The more we know about what took place, the greater does the 
stigma of guilt seem to be and the more far reaching does its extension 
become.  [Modern] men do not have more insight [than did ancient man]. 
We are caught between the realization of the gratuity of the magic and the 
inability of mankind to rise above magic. Ultimately the choice may be 
                                                
53 Rubenstein, After Auschwitz, 103.  
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only between the compelling magic symbols of death, such as the 
swastika, and the compelling magic symbols of life, such as were 
represented in the religious tradition...if the symbol makers and magicians 
of life refuse their task because of its ultimate...fictitiousness, they will by 
no means be joined by the symbol makers of death, who stand ready to 
give modern man what he thirsts for most, an integrated psyche in which 
his personal goals, both conscious and unconscious, are at one with the 
goals of the larger community.  That such a community might well be a 
community of human lemmings, led by a demonic Pied Piper to its 
collective death, will hardly stop the power and the fascination of the 
masters of irrationality.  In the Götterdammerung ending of Hitler's Third 
Reich, we have seen one instance of the power of such symbols.54 
  
Rubenstein asserts that the “rabbinic compromise” between the priestly and prophetic 
traditions represents the “very best response to this dilemma. Judaism never did away 
with sacrifice entirely until modern times, but Judaism progressively limited the 
gratuitous harm which the system could do.”55 Rubenstein also urges his readers—and 
presumably most of these readers were, at least immediately following the book's initial 
publication, Jewish--not to do away completely with those aspects of traditional liturgy 
which honor what he considers man's irrational need for magic.  
                                                
54 Rubenstein, After Auschwitz, 110.  
55 Rubenstein, After Auschwitz, 111.  
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 And yet if one could argue that that one of Judaism's strengths is its unwillingness 
to forsake liturgy of sacrifice, one could also argue that Christianity, too, has faithfully 
retained both the prophetic and priestly traditions (at least with regard to vicarious 
sacrifice).  Christianity has embraced the ritualistic value of sacrifice so much that a 
human sacrifice (and its many theological implications) is at the core of the tradition.  
And yet Christian anti-Judaism is the primary source of the modern anti-Semitism that 
culminated in the Holocaust.  Clearly a repeated liturgical re-enactment of the sacrifice of 
one innocent Jew was not enough to stave off the death of 6 million innocent Jews. If 
Christianity, a religion focused on the universal redemptive value of vicarious sacrifice, 
did not benefit from the cathartic value of the sacrificial tradition, then what religion or 
culture would?  
 What never fails to resonate about Rubenstein's work, though, is the urgency of its 
exhortation: We must all reflect deeply on our culture, reflect deeply on the darkest parts 
of ourselves, and gaze with clear eyes into our most cryptic, destructive urges, because 
only then can we thwart them. Rubenstein may laud the value of atonement through ritual 
sacrifice, but he beseeches his reader like a modern day Jeremiah.  In this sense, 
Rubenstein is not unlike Wiesel or Levinas, who champion the prophetic tradition for 
reasons that extend beyond its tendency to threaten listeners to heed the call or risk 
eminent doom. But this is not the only thing Rubenstein's system shares with those of 
Wiesel and Levinas. Like his cohorts, he rejects the possibility of an ethics grounded in 
metaphysics or theology.  Likewise his worldview is existentialist and abandons all 
attempts to derive inherent meaning either from the experience of undeserved suffering or 
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from human existence itself; meaning is not given but made, and ethics must be an 
important part of what gives meaning to our lives. Despite the fact that Rubenstein finds 
answers in the priestly tradition rather than the prophetic tradition, he nonetheless 
believes that the gifts of Judaism have not been sufficiently embraced.  He too would say 
that Judaism, in spite of its emphasis on nationhood and election in all its iterations, is 
nonetheless interested in universal care for “the other,” if for no other reason that “the 
other,” if left too isolated for too long, may rise up against the collective in order to 
destroy it. This is the one, invaluable tenet missing from the work of Levinas and Wiesel.  
Levinas attempts to account for the existence of victimizers by providing a 
phenomenology of their response to suffering.  Wiesel not only fails to provide reasons 
for the existence of perpetrators, but explicitly states that perpetrators are not his 
problem.  Perhaps there is much to be salvaged from Rubenstein's system after all. 
 Like Wiesel, Rubenstein is wary of ideologies which over-value assimilation and 
homogeneity of thought and practice and ultimately undervalue “the facilities of each 
man's specific human situation” and thus “ignore...the actualities of present day Jewish 
fate and destiny.”56 The preservation of particularity is itself an ethical matter; 
metaphysical violence of enforced ideological homogeneity leads to physical violence.  
Yet despite the fact that Rubenstein's goal is to offer new ethical imperatives derived 
from Judaism that will impede the next genocide, his work almost never refers to or 
makes use of the experience of the victims of the Holocaust.  In After Auschwitz, his 
efforts are almost exclusively focused on understanding and addressing perpetrators' 
                                                
56 Rubenstein, After Auschwitz, 118.  
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motivations for creating and perpetuating genocidal systems.  Rubenstein identifies man's 
impulse to reject social limitations on his behavior as the primary source of genocidal 
activity and therefore spends a great deal of energy on considering how we might change 
extant religious and political systems to both account for and take responsibility for the 
effective management of these impulses.  We recall that it is, at least part, Rubenstein's 
concern for how non-Jews feel about being “un-chosen” people which motivates him to 
reject the doctrine of election.  In Rubenstein's estimation, the perpetrators of violence are 
themselves suffering from something and, in turn, take their misery out on the most 
vulnerable among us. That Rubenstein makes this conjecture in 1961 at the risk of losing 
his credibility among his peers offers proof of how strongly he believed that ethics can 
and should be grounded in humanity's shared experience of suffering—the suffering of 
all humanity, not just the suffering of victims. Rubenstein vehemently insists that we 
cannot prevent profound loss of life at the hands of disenfranchised “madmen” by 
shaking our prophet fingers at them. Instead we must prevent their disenfranchisement by 
considering their suffering, too.  In Rubenstein's system, victim and perpetrator are 
seated, however reluctantly, at the same table, dealing with the same bleak estimations 
about the nature of man and existence.  
 In many ways, Rubenstein's project leaves us in much the same place as Wiesel's; 
while there is no question that ethics must be of greater concern not only for philosophy 
but for Western culture, it remains to be seen how an ethics grounded in suffering can be 
utilized in situations which have nothing to do with suffering.  The landscape of 
Rubenstein's system is apocalyptic.  Gas chambers and murdered gods and 
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disenfranchised murderers litter the skyline.  His system is set apart, though, by his 
interest in adopting communal religious ritual from within Jewish liturgy as a preventive 
measure against violence, and his claim that the perpetrators, too are members of the 
human family whose actions must be understood, managed, and prevented if we are to 
prevent another Holocaust.   We cannot simply assert that the perpetrators are someone 
else's problem.  
II. Analysis 
 
 Rubenstein is the only thinker examined in this study who is not a survivor of the 
Holocaust, and as Wiesel and others have pointed out, there are often marked theological 
and philosophical differences between survivors and non-survivors.  Rubenstein presents 
himself as a Jewish member of a trendy Protestant group—the Death of God 
theologians—at the same time that he rejects Christianity as murderous and theologically 
juvenile.  Rubenstein's argument is articulate and passionate and surely speaks to both his 
love for Judaism as he understands it and to the depth of his grief about the fact that the 
world is a place where Auschwitz was allowed to happen.  His outrage and indignation 
are compelling, and his radicalism, although it lacks nuance, is alluring. But if one delves 
into Rubenstein's thought more deeply, significant flaws in logic emerge (along with no 
small measure of reactionary gestures) present themselves and must be addressed.  If 
Wiesel's ethics rely on an understanding of Jewish mission that could be alienating to 
non-Jews, Jews who are not survivors or who share no connections with survivors, or 
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Jews who simply do not share Wiesel's theology, Rubenstein offers an understanding of 
Judaism which lacks history and subtlety, and strips it of tenets that most believers  (and 
even most secular Jews who strongly identify with Jewish values) identify with 
Jewishness.  Rubenstein asks brave questions which must be asked, and for this, much is 
owed to him.  But if his questions are successful, as Steven T. Katz aptly points out, his 
answers are not.57 For a closer look at Rubenstein's thought with regard to the problem of 
ethics after Aushwitz, as well as the role Judaism and Jewish thought can play in 
addressing that problem, I turn to After Auschwitz, which remains the place where 
Rubenstein's foundational ideas are best articulated.  
 Let us address the most pressing issues listed above in turn. First, Rubenstein is 
absolutely correct that the Abrahamic covenant must be taken seriously.  Yet again he 
engages in no discussion of the many ways in which the covenant has been perceived, 
honored and interrogated in Jewish history and theology.  Recall the Hasidic rebbes who 
influenced Wiesel's theology, for example. When the covenant is understood as a mutual 
agreement between two parties who may default in their responsibilities, the conversation 
deepens and takes on a more realistic tone.  In periods of persecution, the Hasidic rebbes 
felt completely justified in telling God that if He did not do better by His people, then His 
people would no longer worship Him. These are not the beliefs of someone who trembles 
before God as an ultimate Lord whose ways must always be approved of by His people. 
                                                
57 On page 17 of “The Issue of Confirmation and Disconfirmation,” Steven T. Katz argues succinctly that 
Rubenstein's thought relies on the “negative significance of “evil” without any attempt to balance it 
against the “good” we encounter in history...[and moreover Rubenstein's] intense focus on Auschwitz 
reflects an already decided theological choice based on certain normative presuppositions and a 
compelling desire to justify certain conclusions.”   
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Rubenstein is aware of Mordecai Kaplan's equally “serious” approach to the covenant, 
which involved understanding the covenant as a product of the common history of Jewish 
civilization.  Rubenstein was a great admirer of Kaplan and a follower of his ideas, 
particularly with regard to the problem of chosenness, which I address in a moment. Yet 
he does not appear to acknowledge that Jewish theology is, ought to be and has been—
flexible with regard to certain concepts and that this fact has enabled Jews and Judaism to 
withstand the trials and tribulations experienced by believers over the centuries.  
Avoiding discussion of these alternative understandings of covenant (again, of which 
Rubenstein is surely aware) even if it is only to state that he does not agree with them, 
does nothing for Rubenstein's argument.   To be fair, there were not as many 
contemporary voices posing post-Holocaust alternatives as there would be after 
Rubenstein rocked the theological boat. Innovative re-iterations of covenant, such as the 
one discussed above offered by Irving Greenberg, the “Neo-Hasidic” understanding of 
covenant offered by Arthur Green, and even the modern hasidic theology of the Chabad 
movement were still yet to come.58 
 Second, and perhaps most importantly for our purposes here, Rubenstein's 
understanding of chosenness deeply problematic.  Rubenstein is inarguably correct when 
he insists that Jewish theology must be self-affirming. Whether Rubenstein means that 
Jews must not seek justification for their existence from non-Jews, or whether he is 
insisting that Jews cannot expect God to affirm their understanding of chosenness is 
                                                
58 Greenberg wrote his groundbreaking piece on the voluntary nature of the covenant in 1981.  Green does 
not begin publishing until the late 1980's and early 1990's, and both benefited from Rubenstein's having 
paved the way, and perhaps learned from his mistakes, so to speak.  
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unclear.  But in either case, Rubenstein would be correct, and would not likely be met 
with much argument regarding these claims.  But Rubebenstein's rejects Jewish mission 
and chosenness as theologically central to Judaism because “it may be impossible for 
Christians to remain Christians without regarding Jews in mythic, magic and theological 
categories.”59 Rubenstein insists: 
   
Can we really blame the Christian community for viewing us through the 
prism of a mythology of history when we were the first to assert the 
history ourselves?  As long as we continue to hold ourselves open to the 
doctrine of the election of Israel, we will leave ourselves open to the 
theology expressed by Dean Grüber, that because Jews are God's Chosen 
People, God wanted Hitler to punish them.60 
 
Yet if Judaism relinquishes Jewish mission as central to its theological and moral self-
understanding for the reasons Rubenstein offers, they would be doing so precisely 
because of an over-dependence on Christian/non-Jewish acceptance and comprehension 
of Jewish mission.  And although Rubenstein is correct that many Christian theologians 
have balked at relinquishing the idea of chosenness, his insistence that Judaism should let 
go of chosenness for the sake of fighting anti-Semitism would mean seeking the 
“outside” justification Rubenstein wants Judaism to reject. What Christians like Grüber 
                                                
59 Rubenstein, After Auschwitz, 56.  
60 Rubenstein, After Auschwitz, 58.  
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believe regarding Jewish chosenness is the concern of Christianity; in fact, Christians, 
Muslims, and the members of all other groups whose theology relies in some sense on 
their understanding of Judaism are the ones who need to address the moral problems 
inherent in justifying anti-Semitism and anti-Semitic violence on a single understanding 
of chosenness which many Jews consider outdated and static.  The greatest moral and 
political problem presented by the Holocaust is that anti-Semitism was acceptable enough 
that many felt the persecution of Jews was justified.  This is not to say that all anti-
Semites of the time supported the presence of six death camps, but there is much 
evidence that many aspects of the Nuremberg laws, for example, were not considered 
entirely repugnant. This amounts to a justification of violence that is no way the fault of 
the victims of that violence. Rubenstein comes dangerously close himself to justifying 
violence against the Jews by connecting that violence to the resentment caused by 
concept of Jewish mission.  It cannot be denied that although Rubenstein wants to 
“demythologize” the Jews, he also fervently hopes that relinquishing Jewish mission will, 
above all else, create warmer feelings for Jews on the part of Christians and perhaps work 
to prevent continued violence against the Jews.  And yet a change in Jewish theology 
could not possibly have stemmed the tide of fascist anti-Semitism or the theologically 
driven violence of the Crusades. Anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism are both grounded in 
false beliefs, understandings and perceptions of Jews and Judaism fueled by economic 
and political interests far more than they were fueled by well-articulated theological 
objections based on genuine understandings of Judaism.  
 In his address to the 1970 convention discussed in Chapter 4, Rubenstein fails to 
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mention the most well-known of Jewish theologians to have tackled the problem posed 
by Jewish mission and chosenness in the modern world: Mordecai Kaplan, whose 
rejection of chosenness is accompanied by a close analysis of the many benefits Judaism 
and its adherents derived from notions of chosenness over the centuries.  Kaplan's 
rejection is in itself more nuanced than Rubenstein's; we recall that Rubenstein is a great 
admirer of Kaplan when we see that Kaplan also associated chosenness with more 
primitive forms of worship, self-understanding, and nation building.  Rubenstein does 
mention Kaplan in After Auschwitz, but he doesn't he make any attempts to replace the 
concept of chosenness with another, more acceptable tenet.61 Rubenstein writes the 
following about Kaplan and Reconstruction: 
   
There is a way out [of being viewed through a prism of a mythology of 
history] and Reconstruction has pointed to it.  Religious uniqueness does 
not necessarily place us at the center of the divine drama of perdition, 
redemption and salvation for mankind.  All we need for a sane religious 
life is to recognize that we are, when given normal opportunities, neither 
more nor less than other men, sharing the pain, the joy, and the fated 
                                                
61 For more on Kaplan's nuanced, informed, and articulate argument against the preservation of 
chosenness, see his Judaism as a Civilization: Toward a Reconstruction of American-Jewish Life (New 
York: MacMillian Company, 1934).  See especially 253-263 for Chapter XIX entitled “Cultural 
Nationalism as a Call of the Spirit.” While there is no doubt that Rubenstein is a Zionist in the modern 
sense of the term and Kaplan himself was not, Kaplan's work remains a force with which those who 
discuss the problem of chosenness in the modern world must reckon.  
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destiny which Earth alone has meted out to all her children.62   
 
Rubenstein indirectly calls past and contemporary Jewish belief and practice “insane” 
when he states that Jewish religious life would be “sane” if it accepted “the fated destiny 
which Earth alone has meted out to all her children.”  In other words, continued belief in 
chosenness, mission, and a living God of history is insane, and those beliefs have led 
directly to past persecutions of world Jewry. Perhaps this is simply another way in which 
Rubenstein asserts that nothing relating to Judaism, Jewishness or Jewish life can or 
should be the same after Auschwitz.  But if Rubenstein is serious about protecting Jews 
from violence—and I very much believe he is—his argument would be better served by 
providing a more accurate sense of what Jewish mission means and could mean to Jews. 
Rubenstein could have approached the issue by introducing or reviewing the many 
interpretations of Jewish “chosenness” which do not rely on manifestations of God's 
“special love and concern” at all. And he ignores the fact that in the modern period, most 
Jews do not assume that Jewish suffering caused by persecution from majority groups is 
punishment for failing to fulfill the commandments, although hundreds of years ago, this 
was not the case.  In contrast to Rubenstein's analysis, for Jews themselves the concept of 
chosenness is not monolithic or homogenous but shifts and changes in emphasis, nuance 
and complexity over time, even as non-Jewish understandings of Jewish election tend to 
remain static.   
                                                
62 Rubenstein, After Auschwitz, 58.  
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 As S. Leyla Gürkan writes: 
 
In one way, the Jewish idea of being chosen refers to a general problem of 
all monotheistic religions in respect of their claims to exclusive truth; in 
this, Judaism is not alone.  However, unlike the Christian notion of 
chosenness and the Islamic claim to truth, both of which are individualist 
and faith-centered, the Jewish doctrine of chosenness is based on the 
physical and collective existence of one people, the Jews.  Indeed, what is 
unique about the Jewish idea of chosenness is related to the fact that it 
provides Judaism with the elements of religion and nationality at once. 
This is why the Jewish religion is bound up with the existence and the 
experience of the Jewish people as a physical, collective entity. So 
Judaism does not only shape but is shaped by its followers, more so than 
any other religion is.63 
 
Gürkan points out that, contrary to Rubenstein's claims that ideas of Jewish mission and 
chosenness are not self-referential, Judaism's sense of these concepts tend to be 
“independent of the outside world.”64 It is the lack of interest in non-Jewish opinions of 
Jewish theology that has often been interpreted as disdain for Gentiles and identified by 
Christians and Jews alike as offensive. Of course intellectual and political changes in the 
                                                
63 S. Leyla Gürkin, The Jews as a Chosen People: Tradition and Transformation (New York: Routledge, 
2009), 1.  
64 Ibid., p. 3.  
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wider world impact Jewish culture, theology and practice profoundly, and concepts of 
Jewish mission are no exception. Early rabbinic understandings of chosenness focus on 
holiness and separateness, yet as Jon Levinson argues one way to understand biblical and 
rabbinic understandings of chosenness is that: 
 
  Chosennness...need not [in this period] entail implacable enmity on 
  anyone's part; nor are the unchosen the enemies of God or the  
  Jewish people. The Other has dignity while remaining the Other.   
  He is not required, in the biblical view, to be brought low, to convert, 
  least of all, die.65 
 
During the medieval period Jewish understandings of chosenness changed to reflect the 
altered condition of the Jews themselves.  After the second exile, Jews living in Europe, 
for example, came to understand themselves in much the same way that the Christians 
did with regard to chosenness: the Jews were being punished for their sins by being 
forced to live in exile.  Yet the Jews also understood themselves as having been singled 
out for redemption, a redemption which their suffering indicated was close at hand.  
During this period, intellectual approaches to chosenness varied with respect to the issue 
of agency.  Judah Halevi felt that Jews were inherently different from others; so 
                                                
65 Jon D. Levinson, “Chosenness and its Enemies,” Commentary, December 2008. Accessed on August 8, 
2013. http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/chosenness-and-its-enemies/. This is radically 
different than later Christian understandings of the chosenness as they had adopted it for Christains, 
“The New Israel.”  In the medieval and early modern periods, the murder of those Jews and other non-
Christians who chose not to convert to Christianity was considered justifiable.  
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according to Halevi, God imbued Adam with a “divine essence” which was passed on 
through Seth's line to the entirety of the Jewish people.  This interpretation does indeed 
define chosenness as a genetically encoded privilege, the understanding of chosenness to 
which Rubenstein refers.  According to this view, a person who is born a non-Jew cannot 
acquire the essence of the Torah, which God revealed at Sinai, no matter how much he or 
she might try to live in accordance with its commandments.66   
 Maimonides had a different view, however. Contrary to earlier understandings 
that God's choices were random, Maimonides felt that Abraham was chosen by God to be 
the father of His people based on the virtue of his actions.67 According to the Mishneh 
Torah, anyone “who sets oneself apart to stand before, to serve, to worship, and to know 
God...is consecrated to the Holy of Holies, and his portion and inheritance shall be in 
God forever.”68 Maimonides' understanding leaves open the possibility that non-Jews 
may be “chosen” and Jews un-chosen, depending on their actions—or at least that 
chosenness is not about unalterable superiority. Then, too, chosenness is often understood 
not only as a quality but as a duty; the duty of the Jews, because they were “chosen” or 
“have chosen” (depending on whether one embraces a Halevi’s approach or Maimonides’ 
approach to election) is to fulfill the mission charged to them to be “a light among the 
nations.” With the notion of choice comes responsibility.  
                                                
66 See Judah Halevi's The Kusari: An Argument for the Faith of Israel, trans. Hartwig Hirschfeld (New 
York: Schocken Books, 1964).  
67 It must be said here that the kinds of stories upon which the argument regarding Abraham's virtue are 
not usually biblical.  For example the story about Abraham smashing the idols in his father's shop 
cannot be found in the Bible, and yet it shapes both the Jewish and Muslim understandings of Abraham 
a the virtuous and brave founder of monotheism.  This fact supports the claim that understandings of 
chosenness both change over time and are by no means monolithic or static.  
68 Hilkhot Shemita v'Yohel, 13:13.  
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 While Gürkan's study tends to work in broad, historical strokes, her sense of the 
way in which Jewish understandings of chosenness have changed from the rabbinic era to 
after the Holocaust is apt.  Generally speaking, in the rabbinic and classical periods, 
chosenness was most often understood in terms of holiness or separateness (election and 
covenant).  In the modern period, chosenness was more often understood as related to 
notions of mission (a unique Jewish vocation).  After the Holocaust, ideas of chosenness 
were directly connected to the concrete drive to survive (and live a uniquely Jewish 
existence which may or may not be religious or Zionistic in any sense).69 Traces of earlier 
understandings of chosenness can be found in contemporary Jewish thought and practice, 
of course.  But the notion that the Jews should be a separate, holy people, for example, 
whose chosenness indicates superiority, would more likely be embraced by the ultra-
orthodox and the Hasidim, which make up only a small—albeit highly visible--part of the 
world Jewish population.   
 This theme of holiness is replaced by the theme of mission only in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries with the advent of the Enlightenment and subsequent Jewish 
emancipation in Europe, and the understanding of “mission” is shaped in large part by 
Haskalah (Jewish Enlightenment, supported and perpetuated by thinkers from Moses 
Mendelssohn, S. I. Abramovich and Isaac Baer Levinson to name only a few) and the 
changing political, social and economic conditions in which Jews found themselves as a 
result.  This movement redefined Judaism as a universal religion based on a mission to 
help the world, rather than an exclusive one based on separateness and inherited 
                                                
69 Gürkan, Chosen People, 4. 
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nationhood.70 As Gürkan points out: 
 
[By the nineteenth century]...Jews...were defined as a religious community 
striving for a universal goal.  They were not only a chosen people but a 
choosing people working toward universal redemption. Chosenness was 
thus considered to refer to something beyond mere status.  It was a 
responsibility as well, a universal/spiritual role which would establish 
redemption on earth on the basis of justice and equality. In this way, the 
rabbinic notion of fundamental difference between Jews and non-Jews, 
each having totally different attributes and opposite roles to play in this 
world (i.e., the people of God and the enemies of God) was fiercely 
challenged by the enlightened Jews.71  
  
Modern notions of Jewish mission embraced the belief that the Jews were endowed with 
a special mission to aid in the redemption of the world, and here redemption was defined 
in a number of ways.  Some Jews felt that the redemption was spiritual, so that Jews were 
meant to aid the world in the embrace of monotheistic values and the ethical framework 
associated with those values, regardless of their religious affiliation.  Some Jews felt that 
the redemption would manifest itself politically through social reforms in labor, social 
                                                
70 Ibid.  
71 Ibid. 
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services, the treatment of prisoners and other social justice oriented concerns.72  Jewish 
mission understood in this way is meant to spur Jews to work toward justice on earth for 
all people; the duty is inescapable and can be fulfilled in a number of ways.  Having been 
“chosen” is secondary to the importance of the mission itself.  
 For some, the Holocaust changes the understanding of chosenness yet again. New 
conceptions of chosenness are, as Gürkan points out, concomitant with belief in the 
uniqueness of the Holocaust as an historical event and with diversifying opinions 
regarding the nature of the covenant.  American Reformed Jewish definitions of 
chosenness “...unlike traditional ones, generated confirming, yet non-apologetic, faith-
related, but mainly experience-based, interpretations of chosenness with the intent of 
making proud of themselves, proud of their difference and their otherness.”  Gürkan 
speculates that this mostly indicates a desire on the part of the Reform establishment, to 
“make Jewish distinctiveness inescapable, even desirable, for Jews, rather than making it 
acceptable and reasonable for non-Jews.”73 What pervades Gürkan's study is the sense 
that since the Holocaust Judaism has 'resorted' to a shallow, exclusivist understanding of 
chosenness in response to Jewish suffering that ironically borrows heavily from Christian 
typologies of suffering.  She also suggests that post-Holocaust theologians might borrow 
from the sages' responses to the loss of the first and second Temples in order to come to a 
“deeper” understanding of chosenness after the Holocaust. 
 Gürkan is not alone in her disappointment with regard to post-Holocaust Judaism.  
                                                
72 Refer back to our earlier discussion in Chapter 3 of modern and contemporary treatments of tikkun 
olam. 
73 Gürkan, Chosen People, 143.   
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Certainly there have been more than a few Jewish theologians and rabbis who have 
intimated any number of problems regarding chosenness and mission.  Some suggest that 
chosenness be rejected altogether, or that it recover its sense of universal mission, or that 
it embrace an earlier sense of chosenness that is at least more faith based. But when you 
consider that many survivors of the Shoah are still alive, and that many—Jew and non-
Jew alike—feel that the Holocaust remains a unique event in human history, the 
reluctance to make Jewish mission anything greater than Jewish survival is 
understandable.  When 6 million people who define themselves in the same way you do 
are slaughtered in unforeseen ways while most of the world looks on—or even assists in 
the murders—it is hard to think beyond the survival of those who are left.  And why 
should this be a problem for non-Jews—or even fellow Jews? If the remainder of world 
Jewry were not in some way concerned with its survival, it would be shocking.  
 What is, for our purposes, ironic, is that Rubenstein ends up replacing what 
Gürkan would call a biblical understanding of chosenness with similar “post-Holocaust” 
forms of chosenness popular among non-Orthodox American Jews—but he doesn't call it 
that.  This indicates that even as Rubenstein works to reject the doctrine of chosenness, 
he remains deeply ambivalent about doing so. We recall that Levinas and Wiesel are also 
ambivalent about the nature of chosenness. Rubenstein relinquishes previous notions of 
Jewish mission and chosenness but replaces them with an emphasis on Jewish survival by 
means of a physical nation that will create and live out a uniquely Jewish existence.  This 
is likely what he means when he urges Jews to focus on “self-validation.” To the extent 
that for him, Jewish mission (even though he doesn't call it that) should constitute a 
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national turning inward on the part of world Jewry, Rubenstein is of his time.  The call to 
support Israel becomes increasingly urgent in Rubenstein's later work, in part because 
Rubenstein lost faith in the Enlightenment, traditional Judaism, modern Christianity, and 
ethics as they have been traditionally understood. His call for Jewish support of Israel as 
a necessary protection for the remainder of world Jewry was in many ways another 
example of a transformed understanding of chosenness and mission.  This emphasis on 
the Jewish people rather than on theology is also reminiscent of Kaplan. 
 Rubenstein's failure to connect his ideas to those of other thinkers like Kaplan or 
even the early Hasidic rebbes whose theological questions were similar to his own, or to 
connect his own beliefs about the centrality of the Israeli state to pre-existing ideas about 
Jewish mission suggests that he was, at least during the years After Auschwitz was written 
and most intensely discussed, out of touch with current understandings of Jewish thought 
and history. At the very least, his theological suggestions did not resonate with his fellow 
Jews.  The problems with After Auschwitz's answers to very important questions—at least 
in relation to its authenticity for Jewish self-perceptions, practice, and thought--are not 
isolated to Rubenstein's treatment of the existence of God, or to his ideas about 
chosenness, Jewish mission and covenant. Rubenstein's treatment of Jewish theology 
after the Shoah is also limited by his rigid view of Jewish history.  Steven Katz writes: 
 
...emerging out of, as well as essential to, the “Death of God” view 
putatively grounded in the Holocaust experience is...the way one views 
Jewish history, its continuities and discontinuities, its “causal 
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connectedness” and interdependencies....[Rubenstein] sees Jewish history 
too narrowly, i.e., focused solely in and through the Holocaust. He takes 
the decisive view of history to be the death camps.  But this is a distorted 
image of Jewish experience, for there is a pre-Holocaust and post-
Holocaust Jewish reality that must be considered in dealing with the 
questions raised by the Nazi epoch...One cannot make the events of 1933-
1945 intelligible in isolation.  To think, moreover, that one can excise this 
block of time from the flow of Jewish history and then, by concentrating 
on it, extract the “meaning” of all Jewish existence is more than uncertain, 
no matter how momentous or demonic this time may have been.74 
   
At issue are Rubenstein's conclusions as well as his method of analysis.  Despite his 
knowledge of Jewish history and thought, the Holocaust is of such intense focus that it 
becomes the defining event for Judaism, Jewish identity and Jewish thought.  To be clear, 
claiming that the Holocaust is a unique event in human history in general and in Jewish 
history in particular, as many other thinkers have argued, is not equivalent to making it 
the central, defining climax of Jewish existence in all its facets, as Rubenstein seems to 
have done.75 Add to this Rubenstein's claims that love of and connection to land is 
                                                
74 Katz, “The Issue of Confirmation and Disconfirmation,” 15.  
75 With regard to Israel, Rubenstein accepts that the creation of the modern state is a consequence of the 
events of World War II, and the Holocaust specifically, but he is steadfast in his assertion that the 
connection between Israel and the Shoah is not theological; Israel, according to Rubenstein, should in 
no way be understood as “the reward after the punishment” of Auschwitz. While this point of view is 
perhaps admirable, one can surely reject theodicy while maintaining a sense of authentic Judaism and 
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inherently pagan and therefore not a traditional part of Judaism and Jewish identity, and 
what emerges is a theology that lacks depth, flexibility and authenticity for anyone whose 
ideas are not identical—or at least very similar--to Rubenstein's.  
 Finally, despite Rubenstein's declaration that God is dead, he claims it is religion 
that connects Jews specifically to one another.  He writes that Jewish atheism (defined as 
Jewish life which does not include religion, rather than a Jewish life without belief in 
God) “fail[s] to see that it is precisely the ultimate hopelessness and gratuity of our 
human situation which calls forth our strongest need for religious community.  If all we 
have is one another, then assuredly we need one another more than ever.”76  
 Religion, then, is not dead, even if God is; it is the glue that holds together 
communities, provides the most comprehensive systems of meaningful symbols and 
rituals, and connects communities who are otherwise disconnected from one another. 
Unlike Wiesel, whose ethics rely on the stories of survivors to help activate ethical action 
on the part of bystanders (sometimes as slowly as one survivor and one bystander at a 
time), Rubenstein's system ethics emphasizes collective action. Unlike Wiesel, 
Rubenstein never mentions the survivors of trauma at all, in fact.  He doesn't appear to 
have any faith in the effectiveness of moral education per se, either, and his theoretical 
approach is solidly Freudian: Man is a mess of impulses and drives which society must 
harness and sublimate in order to create civilization.  His own brand of post-Holocaust 
theology and a postmodern understanding of Freudian psychoanalysis blend to create an 
                                                                                                                                            
Jewish existence.  
76 Rubenstein, After Auschwtiz, 119.  
  
295 
understanding of the nature of man that is far bleaker than either Wiesel's or Levinas', and 
rather than attempting to encourage further development of humanity's better angels as 
Wiesel and Levinas do, Rubenstein promotes accepting that our dreams for a morally 
evolved humanity are just that: dreams.  When we accept that we are a violent, bigoted 
species that never learns from its mistakes, we can focus on adopting measures to 
minimize the damage we cause to one another and to the rest of the planet. 
 Perhaps the most unfortunate aspect of Rubenstein's system is its tendency toward 
relativism.  Unlike Levinas and Wiesel, who attempt to provide firm ground for ethics in 
suffering as a temporal experience, Rubenstein ultimately ends up rejecting even the 
possibility of ethical impulse because of the ubiquity of human suffering in the world.  In 
a very real sense, Rubenstein develops more of a Weltanschauung than an ethics.  
According to Rubenstein, the world is brutal and full of suffering and man's essential 
nature is cruel rather than innately or even potentially moral. One could argue, therefore, 
the only systems which can impart human “rights” are states whose laws are enforced by 
military bodies.  The stateless are not therefore guaranteed protection from persecution 
and therefore murdering them is not a “crime” per se. Didier Pollefeyt writes: 
 
When the moral quality of an act is justified only from within and by the 
ethical framework of the (ruling) group, and when the validity of this 
ethical structure depends only on formal criteria, then there can be no 
moral story against evil deeds...except for the story of another ethical 
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system with the same formal characteristics, defended with the same 
ethical passion. Ethics becomes a question of the strongest, the most 
beautiful, the most intelligent, the most influential, the most privileged, the 
most numerous, etc...For Rubenstein, the only response of the Jews to the 
[H]olocaust would be the establishment of their own community...the 
story of the [H]olocaust risks becoming an ethical legitimation of new 
forms of injustice, [and] an ethic can easily become an ideology.77 
 
And yet Rubenstein challenges us to, as Jon M. Young suggests, “face the horrible 
political deeds of this century without sentimentality” by moving away from ethical 
theory and theology altogether.  Young goes on to state that although individuals “profess 
religious belief, modern civilization has [indeed] become godless.” The starting point for 
“ethical theory and theology must be a recognition of the cultural conditions of modern 
existence.”78 Rubenstein begins his project at the very same place Levinas and Wiesel 
begins theirs; all three thinkers are searching for 1.) an understanding of modern society 
in light of the Holocaust; 2.) the presence of ethicality in humanity; 3.) what universal 
experiences unify human existence and profound a ground for ethics; 4.) and finally, 
what kind of moral education will best utilize humanity's ethical impulses. Rubenstein 
                                                
77 Didier Pollefeyt, “The Morality of Auschwitz? A Critical Confrontation with Peter J. Haas's Ethical 
Interpretation of the Holocaust,” Good and Evil After Auschwitz: Ethical Implications for Today 
(Hoboken, NJ: KTAV, 2000), 126. For Rubenstein's claims that no crimes were committed in 
Auschwitz, see his book  The Cunning of History, p. 67.  
78 Jon M. Young, “Ethics, Theology and Surplus Populations,” What Kind of God? Essays in Honor of 
Richard L. Rubenstein (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of Amerca, 1995), 246-247.  
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remains unconvinced that humanity is innately moral, and is likewise unconvinced that 
there is any single educational method or tool that will “train” humanity to respond 
ethically to suffering.  But Rubenstein's best offering to the project of grounding an ethics 
in suffering can be summed up in this passage from The Age of Triage, written in 1983: 
 
We can no longer rest content with a humanity divided into working and 
the workless, the saved and the damned, the Occident and the Orient.  Our 
fates are too deeply intertwined...Conversion has all too often been devoid 
of the inclusive social component our times demand. In truth, we must be 
born again as men and women blessed with the capacity to care for each 
other here and now.79
                                                
79 Rubenstein, The Age of Triage: Fear and Hope in an Overcrowded World (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1983), 240.  
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Chapter 5 
Toward an Ethics Grounded in Suffering 
 
 According to Levinas, Wiesel and Rubenstein, an ethics that prioritizes the 
alleviation and prevention of suffering does not exist in general philosophy and culture.  
In response to the problem of ethics after Auschwitz, they make ethics “first philosophy” 
by rejecting traditional metaphysics and grounding ethics in the experience of suffering.  
Suffering becomes not only the first priority of ethics, but an experience that 
simultaneously necessitates and activates ethical response. According to this view, human 
beings are not blank slates whose values are informed exclusively by culture and moral 
instruction alone.  Nor is human consciousness awakened or even primarily constituted 
by reason, as believed by Kant, Cohen and others who subscribe to and promote 
deontological ethics.  Rather, consciousness is characterized by affectivity and sensibility 
as interconnected faculties meant to work in concert with one another to create ethical 
response. If what makes ethics possible can be located in the consciousness of humankind 
rather than in metaphysics or culture, then traditional ethical systems which have shaped 
our understanding of ethics are indeed significantly problematized. A re-orientation of 
philosophy toward the investigation of human affectivity and its role in ethical response 
is in order.  
 Levinas, Wiesel and Rubenstein all derive their ethics from Jewish sources for 
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many reasons, at least two of which have meaningful implications if we want to derive a 
universal ethics that allows for and encourages cultural, political and theological 
particularity.  Because they perceive ethics as Judaism's first priority, all three thinkers 
insist that Judaism has much to offer Western thought and culture.  For Levinas and 
Wiesel, this is most evident in the prophetic texts of the Bible and rabbinic literature.  For 
Rubenstein, Judaism is at it most ethical in the priestly texts from which the atonement 
liturgy is derived.   All of these texts treat the alleviation and prevention of human 
suffering as a universal obligation of the highest order; in addition, Judaism sees 
prophetic suffering as an experience that connects human beings with one another and 
with God. Suffering is the most powerful common denominator in all of creation.  
Second, for Levinas, Wiesel and Rubenstein, Judaism's valorization of particular identity 
has significant moral value. This understanding of particularity as a moral model is a 
critical part of Jewish thought from the eighteenth century to the present. For example, if 
my community subscribes to beliefs and practices which are not subscribed to by the 
majority and I nonetheless contribute to and value the well-being of both my own 
community and the larger, general community as well, then I am well positioned to serve 
as a moral example.  The observant Jew who can remain faithful to her particular 
community while participating ethically in general society is in itself proof that ethics do 
not necessarily require shared ideology or practice.  I can intervene on behalf of another 
because I identify with his suffering and feel compelled to alleviate it.  Or I can intervene 
on his behalf because I reject persecuting violence for my own sake; if persecution is 
inflicted on my neighbor now it may be inflicted on me next.  
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 On a broader level, any individual who upholds the norms of general culture 
represents the experience of every individual who, in spite of his particular values, 
interests and proclivities can intervene on behalf of other, equally particular members of 
greater society who suffer unjustly without violating any ethical codes or values 
particular to him.  If ethics can be grounded in shared experience, and if humans can be 
understood as being in relation to one another even on an affective, pre-reflexive level, 
then new understandings of universality are possible because what connects us to one 
another in a global sense does not require shared values, culture, language or belief.  
Instead we are profoundly and inextricably connected by our ability to activate 
emotional—and potentially ethical--responses in one another. What makes pluralistic 
societies possible is that we don't need to share detailed ideologies and directives with 
our neighbors in order to value their right to exist without persecution.  These two aspects 
of Levinas, Wiesel and Rubenstein's projects are among the very best of what they offer 
to the Western conversation regarding ethics, and both are derived from Judaism.   
 For Levinas, affectivity precedes our ability to reflect cognitively on our 
experiences. Therefore we respond emotionally—and with emotional intelligence--to the 
presence of the other person before we even know what responding is. According to 
Levinas, this response is so deeply engrained that it takes place even against our wills and 
is what makes ethical behavior possible. This strongly suggests that ethical response is far 
more intuitive and far more primal than philosophy and psychology has often claimed.1 
                                                
1 Although psychologists like Freud and Piaget believed that infants are amoral and therefore require 
socialization before they can develop the compassion, guilt or shame required to develop “higher 
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Rationality, prized by idealism and deontology, creates (and then, according to Levinas 
and other critics of deontology, is not able to step outside of) systems that ultimately 
become totalizing frameworks which distort our emotional response to our fellow 
humans. This means that reason alone cannot be trusted to either create or dictate ethical 
action.2 According to Levinas, making ethics “first philosophy” means not only making 
ethical relation the first priority of philosophy; it also entails making our emotional 
responses to one another as well as our profound desire to connect with one another focal 
points of philosophical inquiry as well.  For Levinas, our very first response to the other 
is a kind of suffering; we “suffer” when we encounter the demands of the other—
demands which are dictated by her mere existence. Because she exists, I am not the 
center of the world, and I cannot neatly categorize the world and all other beings as mere 
extensions of myself or objects which do not challenge my views. This awareness 
constitutes a suffering because it both makes me “strange” to myself (i.e., I become 
aware that I am both object and subject) and “nails me to the present.” It makes me aware 
of an ultimate truth which I cannot escape, even if I think I can. In response to this 
suffering, I either accept ethical obligation to the other, or I attempt to ideologically or 
physically obliterate the other because she disrupts me. In short, I either accept my ethical 
                                                                                                                                            
principles,” a study by the Infant Cognition Center at Yale University has found evidence that 
humans possess a “rudimentary moral sense from the very start of life.”  See 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/09/magazine/09babies-t.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1& (accessed July 
23, 2013). See also Robert N. Emde, Zeynep Birigen, Robert B. Clyman and David Oppenheim's “The 
moral self of infancy: Affective Core and procedural knowledge, Developmental Review 11, no. 3, 
(September 1991): 251-270.  
2 Kant does accept that “sentimentality” can help us to feel compassion and compassion is at times useful 
when we need to make ethical choices.  But Kant is wary of human “passions” and therefore insists that 
what is truly ethical can always be discovered by reason alone.  For him, reason makes use human and 
it enables us to make ethical choices, and human emotions are meant to be tamed, not heeded.  
  
302 
impulse or I reject it. Ethical impetus is not outside of me or imposed upon me but comes 
from within me and animates my actions whether I like it or not.  
 For Wiesel, ethics is grounded in suffering as well, but Wiesel does not focus on 
the development of human consciousness. Rather, the suffering of others activates our 
compassion for the innocent such that we may be compelled to act on their behalf. This 
ethics relies heavily on victims who are willing to advocate on behalf of other victims 
and share their stories of suffering with potential bystanders.  Like Levinas, Wiesel sees 
humans as essentially moral creatures who can be lead astray by logic and power. How 
else, Wiesel argues, can one explain the presence of an Eichmann or a Mengele? Wiesel's 
vision, although moral, is not utopian.  For him, the world will never be without 
persecution and suffering, and therefore he does not aim to proactively prevent suffering 
as much as he attempts to shape human response to suffering into something profoundly 
more ethical than was the majority response to the suffering of mid-twentieth century 
European Jewry. Wiesel suggests that there will probably be another Auschwitz or 
Rwanda or Cambodia, and that the best we can do is intervene as quickly as possible at 
the first rumblings of undeserved persecutions. But concern for others is born out of and 
nurtured by dialogue, which is the center of Wiesel’s ethics.  And we do more than talk 
when we engage in dialogue; we also listen to others talk, process the content of their 
words, and formulate responses to those who are speaking.  
 This activity of engaging in dialogue forces us to acknowledge the sentience of 
the other with whom we engage. Wiesel and Levinas both see the act of engaging with 
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the other as a powerful means of stepping outside of our own experiences and concerns 
and therefore possess great potential to create ethical response. I cannot really respond to 
the suffering of others--especially those outside my own community--unless I deem 
others worthy of engaging in dialogue with me.  It follows that victims are not pitiful 
objects but subjects whose insights into the human nature, persecution and suffering 
should be used to shape ethics. Because stories of victimization are found in every culture 
from every time and place, they help to prove, beyond a doubt, that undeserved suffering 
is universal, and that some portion of that suffering is within our power to prevent. 
General philosophy has had very little—if any—interest in the voices of minorities and 
victims, and is lacking because of it. We must begin to conceive of universality 
differently.   
 Rubenstein's understanding of the nature of man is radically different from that of 
Levinas and Wiesel, who continue to see humanity as potentially moral in spite of its 
brutality. According to Rubenstein, the  fact that moral codes are successfully 
internalized by a relatively small minority of human beings does not powerfully suggest 
that humanity is fundamentally moral.  Instead, it suggests that the opposite is true. And 
yet the unabated suffering of the world, much of which is caused by human brutality, 
should, according to Rubenstein, prompt us to do our best mitigate it. He also insists that 
any attempts to assign meaning to suffering or even to life in general should be met with 
suspicion. Rubenstein's ethics are more pragmatic than those of Levinas or Wiesel insofar 
as he has no expectation that the ethical imperative to intervene on behalf of those who 
suffer will be heeded by most of us for altruistic reasons.  According to Rubenstein, 
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preventing the rise of totalitarian regimes that perpetuate violence and demand cultural 
and ideological homogeneity is practical: If such regimes are not allowed to come to 
power anywhere, then they cannot come into power in my neighborhood, either.  For 
Rubenstein, humanity's potential for moral turpitude will ultimately be our downfall on a 
practical level; moral behavior helps us protect us from harm and fosters civilizations that 
flourish economically and culturally.  This aspect of Rubenstein's ethics provides 
compelling motives for intervening when others suffer.  It is bad for humanity when 
fanaticism and totalitarianism prevails. When I intervene on behalf of my neighbor, it 
matters very little whether I do so because I actually empathize with my neighbor or 
because I fear his persecution will become my persecution if he is rescued and protected. 
All that matters is that I choose to intervene rather than watch my neighbors suffer 
unfairly.  
 Of the three thinkers examined in this study, none reject metaphysics entirely. 
Instead, they offer alternatives to traditional metaphysics.  Providing an agreed-upon 
definition of metaphysics is extremely difficult if for no other reason than because what is 
meant by the term changes significantly over time and from thinker to thinker.  An in 
depth exploration of this history is outside the purview of this dissertation, but a working 
definition of metaphysics for our purposes is necessary.  Generally speaking, metaphysics 
refers to an aspect of reality that cannot be reduced to typical forms of representation and 
yet informs, defines or somehow unifies observable reality and human perceptions and 
experiences of it.  Metaphysics is often constituted of things a thinker considers a priori. 
Rubenstein, for example, views not just the Holocaust but human nature and all existence 
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though the lens of philosophical nihilism.  For Rubenstein, it is a metaphysical truth that 
life is inherently meaningless and he must a priori reject any evidence to the contrary.3 
Rubenstein claims that God the Father is dead, and yet he cannot relinquish the notion of 
an meta-omnipresence that escapes human comprehension; perhaps this is what he is 
settling for when he acknowledges the inherent difficulties for the Jew who claims that 
God is really “dead.” For Rubenstein, “God,” insofar as He can be said to exist, is more 
like a weather pattern that is indifferent to creation and yet awes us with a kind of amoral 
majesty.      
 Wiesel cannot resist the notion of identity as metaphysically informed; Jewish 
people generally and Holocaust survivors specifically are in special categories which 
enable them to serve as moral messengers to the rest of humanity. As “chosen people,” 
Jews are vehicles for the salvation of humanity, and because of their suffering, Holocaust 
survivors are specially positioned to fulfill this duty.  For Wiesel, Jews and Jewish history 
serve as testimony of the fact that humanity can remain moral in the face of unimaginable 
persecution. Wiesel embraces the idea of multiple metaphysically particular ways of 
being, however.  He might say also that an explication of what constitutes each category 
of “being” should be left to those who occupy that category. These separate, particular 
categories of being do not disconnect people from one another, since the experiences we 
share as a species ultimately unify us and make universal ethics possible. If we see 
                                                
3 Rubenstein might argue with this point, and yet I think it is accurate. Rubenstein's entire project 
depends on his understanding of human existence as inherently meaningless.  None of Rubenstein's 
precepts really violate this philosophical perspective, since it is the assumption upon which all his other 
assertions rest.  
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particularity as universal, humanity's experiences of suffering, loss, love, hope and other 
fundamental emotions are the things upon which ethics can reliably be built.  Also, for 
Wiesel, God is mysterious and suffers with humanity, so much so that He cannot always 
intervene on its behalf, and yet maintains with it what can only be called a metaphysical 
connection. Humanity suffers and God suffers with it.4  Again, suffering is the common 
denominator of all creation.   
 Levinas has directly argued what Wiesel's work points toward the reality that 
“being” is not monolithic but multiple. When he claimed that Judaism was a different 
category of being altogether, this is precisely what he meant. Being—the way we see the 
world, the way we feel in the world, and our place in society—is not singular.  Ways of 
being are both metaphysical and at the same time shaped by experience. Again, 
particularity of being is universal; the experience to which a Jew in Nazi Europe was 
inescapably tied was significantly different from the experience of the Nazi officer living 
in the same time and place. That two people would have such radically different 
experiences of being and yet live in the same time and place supports the notion of 
multiple categories of being. In Levinasian terms, if we force a univocal understanding of 
“Being” rather than accepting multiples ways of being—or when we feel we must make 
all other kinds of being submit to a single kind of being as superior--we commit an 
                                                
4    This is also Abraham Joshua Heschel’s understanding of the nature of God. Although an in depth 
examination of this idea is beyond the scope of this study, this view has roots in traditional Jewish 
theology. For example, Ezekiel’s vision of God leaving Jerusalem in His chariot so that He can live in 
exile with His people is sometimes used as an example of the ways in which Judaism can support such a 
view of God.  According to Judaism, humans are made in the image of God, which can be understood to 
mean that God and humans share many characteristics. From a practical point of view, if God suffers 
along with us, it is harder to blame Him for failing to intervene.  From a spiritual point of view, it is 
perhaps meaningful that at least with are suffering with God.  
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ideological violence that can be used to justify the physical obliteration of the other.5 
Like Wiesel's God, Levinas' God is also metaphysical; the alterity of the Holy One Most 
High prefigures and informs the alterity of the human other to whom I am bound in 
ethical obligation.  
 Finally, recall also that in Totality and Infinity Levinas repeatedly refers to the 
face-to-face relationship as metaphysical. Levinas means that this relation cannot be 
reduced phenomenologically in the same way one might reduce other objects of 
philosophical analysis.  The face-to-face relation resists representation and yet is a faculty 
of human consciousness. This connection to which we are beholden in spite of ourselves 
creates both the suffering and the desire for connection that makes ethics possible.  This 
relation is not visible in the same way that a table and chair are visible, but unifies and 
dictates to our consciousness and our experiences nonetheless.  Levinas himself subjects 
affectivity to philosophical analysis as a means of getting at the face-to-face relation, and 
when he calls for a re-orientation of philosophy, he is first and foremost asking that 
philosophy take greater interest in human emotion and its power to both unite and divide 
us. Levinas also accounts for possible violent response to the face-to-face relation, 
thereby accounting for the development of perpetrators and victimizers; this places 
victimizers within the human family and makes them our responsibility whether we like 
                                                
5 A 1991 documentary made for French television entitled Pensur Aujourd'hui: Emmanuel Levinas 
contains excellent discussion between Levinas and his interviewer, Catherine Chalier.  In the second 
section of the documentary, “The Right to Be,” Levinas discusses his understanding of Being as 
predatory.  This is juxtaposed against “being,” or the experience of the particular or other in the face of 
Being. Levinas also suggests that when humanity “encroaches on Being” or tries to take more power 
over creation than is its due, then it tends toward evil. What tempers this “encroachment on Being” are 
the commandments revealed at Sinai. This documentary was directed by Nat Lilienstein.   
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it or not.  
 Despite the innovative nature of their projects, however, none of the thinkers 
examined in this dissertation creates an ethics that could operate successfully on its own. 
Of the three, Levinas' theory is the most convincing because he argues that human ethics 
are an extension of human consciousness which evolves in advance of our ability to 
reason.  As an innate quality of the human animal, the ethical impulse is arguably among 
the most important and most neglected human faculties, and Levinas' work can be used to 
support further studies of the morality of babies and children and the possibility of innate 
ethical impulses in humans in general. If an innate source for human ethics can be 
illuminated in ways that are useful for the humanities and sciences alike, then the future 
of moral education designed to more successfully prevent mass murders, genocide, hate 
crimes, rape and abuse and prevent hunger, joblessness and disease could be bright. What 
Levinas' project provides in the way of theoretical substance and brevity it lacks in 
normative statements and directives.  Levinas hoped that others would use his theoretical 
framework and its inherent prioritization of the problem of suffering to develop a fuller 
ethics. This is both liberating and daunting for those drawn to his theory of ethics.   
 Wiesel's project is less concerned with providing proof of the possibility of ethics 
and focuses instead on how suffering as a common denominator of human experience 
makes it possible for victims to use their experiences to prevent further victimization. 
Stories of loss and suffering create empathetic responses in listeners and emphasize what 
connects us rather than what drives us apart. Yet Wiesel has much more to offer Western 
ethics than stories of suffering. Wiesel's work has already been successfully applied to 
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the development of genocide education curricula in primary, secondary and higher 
education. Coupled with Levinas' theoretical understanding of the source of ethical 
response, Wiesel's approach to moral education could be applied more broadly.6 Yet 
Wiesel's ethics focus almost exclusively on rescuing and healing victims and activating 
bystander response to undeserved suffering; it largely ignores the questions of whether—
and how--victimizers and perpetrators can be rehabilitated and how the creation of 
victimizers can be prevented as part of an overall ethical imperative. It is here, however, 
where Rubenstein's ethics shines.  
  Like Levinas, Rubenstein makes a rigorous attempt to understand how 
victimizers are created. Rubenstein agrees that perpetrators commit violence as a 
response to their own suffering.  Rubenstein goes further when he asserts that victimizers 
are themselves victims of society.  He makes it clear that their re-entry into society is 
unavoidable, and his insistent inclusion of potential predators and victimizers in the 
human family is what drives him to explore the possibility of reviving Judaic cultic 
atonement ritual.  If we can allow those who might someday violent crimes to atone 
communally with the rest of us, and if the community is forced to acknowledge that guilt 
is universal, then perhaps it is possible to prevent the creation of so many innocent 
victims.  Rubenstein's solutions to the problem of perpetrators leaves much to be desired 
for a number of reasons. First of all, as Rubenstein himself points out, it is unlikely that 
                                                
6 See Facing History and Ourselves' web site: http://www.facing.org (accessed July 21, 2013). This 
organization uses Night and other parts of Wiesel's corpus as a central part of its educational program. 
FHAO believes that “education is the key to combating bigotry and nurturing democracy.” They 
provide extensive resources and training for professional communities, educators and interested 
individual designed to promote civic engagement.  
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Judaism will return to cultic practice. Second, as we discussed in Chapter 4, many of the 
European perpetrators of the Nazi period were Christian, at least culturally; Christianity 
is born out of  the sacrifice of an innocent Jew, and this has never slaked the European 
thirst for Jewish blood. Yet his observations of the victimizers as sufferers and his 
insistent claims that the victimizers are profoundly human and therefore also our 
responsibility is invaluable to the development of any ethics. We can acknowledge the 
value of Rubenstein's insight and apply ourselves to taking this problem seriously without 
accepting his proposed solutions.  Additional development of this aspect of an ethics 
grounded in suffering must include realistic and practical approaches to dealing with 
potential predators and victimizers.  
 Levinas, Wiesel and Rubestein, particularly when their projects are examined 
together, offer compelling approaches to making ethics and suffering the central concerns 
of philosophy, but their projects also share some significant flaws. Judaism as Levinas, 
Wiesel and Rubenstein understand it takes on what they feel philosophy leaves out: 
suffering and its role in the creation of ethics and the demand the ethics remain 
humanity's first and most important concern.  In addition, Judaism offers a tradition of 
maintaining particular identity in the face of the totalizing nature of secular Western 
culture.  It offers some proof that we can remain particular while engaging ethically with 
the larger collective. All three thinkers would also agree that it is better for all of us if we 
are not all the same, since the presence of minorities insures ethical relations. All three 
argued convincingly on behalf of Judaism's potential value to Western philosophy, but 
none of them consistently dealt with the concept of Jewish election in a way that could 
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appeal to Jews of different denominations and non-Jews of all kinds.  Even if we consider 
that the term “election” could be used to describe only one among many kinds of being, 
the election of the Jews as all three understand it is inextricably connected to Jewish 
rather than universal ethical imperatives. Rubenstein tries to reject election completely, 
but in the end adopts a kind of Zionism that is a post-Holocaust iteration of chosenness.7 
Wiesel, albeit inconsistently, makes Holocaust survivors specifically the moral 
messengers for humanity, and arguably leaves less ethical authority or autonomy to other 
individuals.  Finally, Levinas succeeds in making chosenness temporal, but can't seem to 
decide if election is synonymous with being trapped in Jewishness in a anti-Semitic 
world, or if the election of the Jews is simply a metaphor for the election of humanity.  
Finally, if a universal ethics grounded in suffering were to retain the understandings of 
election described by Levinas, Wiesel and Rubenstein, it quite simply could not be called 
a universal ethics, unless they have developed a means to do so which is certainly 
possible. 
 In any case, none of the three thinkers examined here deal with the issue of 
chosenness in ways that will appeal to Jews and non-Jew alike.  But Levinas' attempts to 
transform the idea of election into a universal state shared by humanity would be 
meaningful if consistently applied. Further development of a universal ethics created out 
of Jewish sources would need to address this point while remaining committed to 
demands that in order accurately depict and engage with Western thought and culture, 
                                                
7   See Chapter 4 of this dissertation for a discussion of the ways in which understandings of Jewish 
election continue to change through time.  
  
312 
Western philosophy must reflect minority experience and apply itself to the problems 
faced by members of persecuted groups.  Ultimately, “love thy neighbor as thyself” has 
long been an imperative in Western ethics. What must changed is not the content of the 
command, but the definition of “neighbor.”  My neighbors are not only the members of 
my religious community, my state or my country, but all of humanity. This re-definition 
of “neighbor” is critical for any universal ethics, and is offered by Levinas, Wiesel and 
Rubenstein in spite of the problems involved in deriving a universal ethics from their 
understandings of Judaism. If we understand an ethics grounded in suffering this way, 
then it has the potential to transcend those aspects of its foundation which are not truly 
universal.  
 The ethics examined in this dissertation also fail to address moral concerns that 
have nothing to do with suffering. How can Levinas, Wiesel and Rubenstein help me if I 
catch my office mate stealing office supplies, discover that my daughter's grade school 
teacher has a mental illness, or if I find out that the superintendent of my apartment 
building is an illegal alien? How should such questions be approached, according to 
Levinas, Wiesel and Rubenstein with regard to problems that have little or nothing to do 
with suffering? It is in some respects liberating—and perhaps more realistic—to embrace 
an ethics that contains few directives, and yet these day-to-day questions are not 
unimportant.  Our responses to these kinds of problems are precisely what tend to inform 
our responses to catastrophe, in fact.  If ethics are grounded in suffering, it makes sense 
that we should always ask ourselves if the choices we make (or don't make) will cause 
undeserved suffering. There may be times when answering even that question will be 
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difficult.  For example, if suffering will be the result of any of the possible choices I 
make, then I must decide whose suffering I most want to avoid causing.  It is also the 
case that if an ethics prioritizes the mitigation and prevention of suffering, then the 
general well being of the other is a priority as well. Perhaps an ethics grounded in 
suffering need not contain entirely new directives from the normative ethics of the past; 
one of the greatest differences between traditional ethics and the ethics of Levinas, 
Wiesel and Rubenstein lies in what all three thinkers emphasize above all other factors: 
the well-being and safety of the other.  
 One of the most significant shortcomings of the ethics developed by Levinas, 
Wiesel and Rubenstein is that none of them mention our responsibility to alleviate non-
human suffering, although certainly all three would agree that humanity must make the 
alleviation of animal suffering a priority. What about the suffering of the thousands of 
animals whose entire habitat is disappearing, or the suffering of beef cattle as they watch 
one another slaughtered one by one, or the suffering of a mother sheep whose lambs are 
repeatedly sold for meat before they have even stopped suckling? What about the low 
conviction rate for animal abusers, or the fact that torturing and murdering a pet is not a 
felony in all 50 states? What about bullfighting, cockfighting and dogfighting? What 
about pesticide use and its devastating effects on the lives of bees and other innocent 
creatures who sustain the ecosystems of the entire planet? The list of violations 
committed by humans against their fellow creatures and the planet we share with them 
goes on and on.  An ethics which fails to address these mounting concerns that millions 
of people consider highly relevant can never be of universal value. There has been 
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significant scholarship on whether or not animals can be said to suffer, what kind of 
responsibility humans have toward animals who suffer, and to what lengths humans 
should go to preserve the planet from further pollution and damage due to overpopulation 
and over-harvesting of natural resources.  And yet the ethics of Levinas, Wiesel and 
Rubenstein can accommodate imperatives to alleviate non-human suffering as well, 
despite the fact that all three thinkers are almost exclusively preoccupied with human 
suffering.  
 Recall that as much as Levinas engages in wordplay regarding a “contentless” 
revelation, the revelation of the other to the I does indeed possess content: the face of the 
other is what contains the call “thou shalt not kill.” Moreover, Levinas claims that it is the 
eyes specifically which contain that message.8 For Levinas, the eyes make consciousness 
visible to me, and contain the demand that I allow the other to live unmolested. It is not 
just the human face, then, which places me in ethical relation against my will, but the 
eyes of the other.  Levinas' insistence that the eyes of the other is the ultimate source of 
ethical demand suggests that the sentience of the other, rather than the visage itself which 
engages me and affects me. This means the other could be an ape, a dog, or a human 
child.   
 This has exciting implications for the creation of an ethics which draws on 
                                                
8 See Levinas, Difficult Freedom, 23 for just one example: “Possession denies the independence of being, 
without destroying that being—it denies and maintains.  The face, for its part, is inviolable; those eyes, 
which are absolutely without protection, the most naked part of the human body, nonetheless offer 
absolute resistance to which the temptation to murder is inscribed.” Levinas refers to the human being 
here, but what he states about the power of eyes to convey “absolute resistance” could also be said of 
non-human eyes.  This should be investigated more deeply.  
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traditional sources and yet broadens the definition of “neighbor” even further to include 
non-human others.  It would be of significant philosophical and scientific value to 
embark upon a affective phenomenology of animal suffering; though we could not 
speculate on the cognitive experience of non-human suffering, a phenomenology of 
suffering as the catalyst for the human ethical obligation to prevent and intervene on non-
human suffering would be fruitful.  Extending human ethical obligation to all of creation 
might not be appealing to those who don't feel compassion for non-human sufferers or 
lack a sense of connection to the natural world. But it is nonetheless reasonable to 
prioritize the ethical treatment of animals, since research shows that humans who abuse 
animals are much more likely to abuse people, too.9 By the same token, human beings 
will suffer from more hunger and disease if the planet is not better protected from 
pollutants, invasive and sloppy extraction of resources and other human abuses of the 
environment. It must be said that extending ethical obligation to non-humans and the 
natural world in general will make many ethical questions more complicated.  I may 
object to “chicken factories” which consign beakless chickens to a life spent on a 
conveyor belt.  But these chicken factories also supply inexpensive protein and feed 
                                                
9 Studies show that most serial killers engage in animal torture as children and then progress to the torture 
and murder of human beings.  This strongly suggests that those who cannot empathize with our fellow 
creatures cannot empathize with their “own kind” either.  See Joseph G. Saunder, “Enacting and 
Enforcing Felony Animal Cruelty Laws to Prevent Violence Against Humans.” 6 Animal L. 1  (2001); 
BR Johnson and JV Becker, “Natural Born Killers?: the development of the sexually sadistic serial 
killer,” Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, 25:3:335-348 (1997); Randall 
Lockwood, “Animal Cruelty and Violence Against Humans: Making the Connection,” 8 Animal L. 81 
(1999); and Jeremy Wright and Christopher Hensley, “From Animal Cruelty to Serial Murder: 
Applying the Graduation Hypothesis,” International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative 
Criminology. Vol 47, no. 1, pp. 71-88.  Every serial killer does not have a history of animal abuse.  The 
connection is not always there.  For example, Hitler was a known animal lover and vegetarian.  But 
researchers have established that the likelihood that an animal abuser will abuse humans as well is 
considerable.   
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millions of hungry people who might not be able to afford free-range chicken meat. 
When the definition of “neighbor” is extended significantly, there is more at stake, rather 
than less.  And yet if we choose to believe that humanity's dominance of the planet 
suggests we are “elected” as stewards of creation, then these kinds of complicated ethical 
choices must be faced.  
  Levinas, Wiesel and Rubenstein demand a re-orientation of philosophy toward 
ethics, prioritize the alleviation of suffering and broaden the definition of “neighbor” to 
include all of humanity.  Their ethics are not of lesser value because they do not contain 
the kind of normative statements that are typical of traditional ethical systems. In fact, the 
most useful aspects of each project augment one another and together form a solid 
theoretical framework that can be used to create a more complete ethics grounded in 
suffering that contains more normative statements and directives. And Levinas, Wiesel 
and Rubenstein remind us that religion continues to be of value to human thought and 
culture even if we do not believe in God; religion has consistently concerned itself with 
issues like the problem of suffering, relatedness, and responsibility for the other. It is 
often argued that without God, religion has no authority. And yet part of what makes 
religion attractive to thinkers like Levinas, Wiesel and Rubenstein is that religious 
thought traditionally concerns itself with matters such as the value human emotion, the 
importance of ritual, and perhaps most importantly, the problem of suffering, all of which 
modern philosophy tends to avoid. Contemporary Jewish thought is ideally positioned to 
re-orient philosophy toward more practical, engaged demands for human responsibility 
for creation.  If philosophy were to commit to taking up these problems with real 
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seriousness, then a long overdue interest in minority experience would surely follow.  
Finally, Judaism's focus on the regenerative value of dialogue between parties who are at 
odds with one another—a tool meaningfully applied to the alleviation and prevention of 
suffering in the projects analyzed in this dissertation---can be of real value to a 
philosophy interested in accurately reflecting the universality of particularity.  If 
philosophy cannot reposition itself toward valuing particular experience and dialogue 
over monolithic universalism and monologue, then it cannot really apply itself to the task 
of prioritizing the alleviation of suffering, either.  
  
  
318 
Bibliography 
 
Abrahamson, Irving, ed. Against Silence: The Voice and Vision of Elie Wiesel, 3 
Volumes. New York: Schocken Books, 1988.  
 
Amato, Joseph, A. Victims and Values: A History and a Theory of Suffering. Edited by 
David Monge. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990.  
 
Anti-Defamation League, “A Report on the Evil of Banality: The Arendt Book,” Facts 15 
no 1 (July-August, 1963): 263-270.  
 
Apter, Emily.“Out of Character: Camus’s French Algerian Subjects.” MLN, 112 no. 4, 
French Issue (Sept., 1997): 499-516.  
 
Arendt, Hannah. ““A Daughter of Our People”: A Response to Gershom Scholem.” The 
Portable Hannah Arendt. New York: Penguin Books, 2000: 391-396.  
 
Arendt, Hannah. “An Exchange of Letters,” Encounter 22 no. 1 (January 1964):53-55.  
 
Arendt, Hannah.  Eichmann in Jerusalem. New York: Penguin Books, 1965.  
 
Arendt, Hannah. The Portable Hannah Arendt. Edited by Peter Baehr.  New York: 
Penguin Books, 2000.  
 
Bauer, Yehuda.  Rethinking the Holocaust. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002. 
 
Bemporad, Jack, John T. Pawlikowski, and Joseph Sievers, eds. Good and Evil After 
Auschwitz: Ethical Implications for Today. Hoboken, NJ: KTAV Publishing House, 
2000.  
 
Benda, Julien. The Treason of the Intellectuals. Translated by Richard Aldington. 
Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1981.  
 
Berenbaum, Michael. The Vision of the Void: Theological Reflections on the Works of 
Elie Wiesel. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1979.  
 
Berg, Michael. “Is Elie Wiesel Truly a Moral Authority for Humanity?” Saint Louis 
Activist Hub, Thursday, November 26, 2009 
http://stlactivisthub.blogspot.com/2009/11/is-elie-wiesel-truly-moral-authority.html, 
accessed June 8, 2012.  
 
Berger, Alan, L. Children of Job: American Second-Generation Witnesses to the 
Holocaust. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997.  
  
319 
 
Bergo, Bettina. “Emmanuel Levinas,” The Standard Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Summer 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).  
 
Bergo, Bettina. “Ontology, Transcendence and Immanence in Emmanuel Levinas' 
Philosophy.” Research in Phenomenology 35 no. 1 (2005): 141-180.  
 
Bergo, Bettina.  “What is Levinas Doing? Phenomenology and the Rhetoric of an Ethical 
Un-Conscious.” Philosophy and Rhetoric 8 no 2 (2004): 122-144.  
 
Berkovits, Eliezer.  Faith After the Holocaust. New York: Schocken Books, 1973.  
 
Bertens, Hans, and Joseph Natoli, eds. Postmodernism: The Key Figures. Malden, MA: 
Blackwell Publishers, 2002.  
 
Bettelheim, Bruno. “Eichmann; the System; the Victims,” review of Hannah Arendt's 
Eichmann in Jerusalem. The New Republic 40 no. 24, (June 15, 1963):23-33.  
 
Bienenstock, Myriam. “Levinas: The French Connection.” Lecture at the Elie Wiesel 
Center for Judaic Studies at Boston University, Boston, MA, April 10, 2013. Podcast 
available here: http://worldofideas.wbur.org 
 
Bienenstock, Myriam. “Levinas: The German Connection.” Lecture at the Elie Wiesel 
Center for Judaic Studies at Boston University, Boston, MA, April 17, 2013. Podcast 
available here:  http://worldofideas.wbur.org 
 
Bienenstock, Myriam. “Levinas: The JewishConnection.” Lecture at the Elie Wiesel 
Center for Judaic Studies at Boston University, Boston, MA, April 24, 2013. Podcast 
available here: http://worldofideas.wbur.org 
 
Blake William. The Book of Job, Illustrated by William Blake. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1935.  
 
Bollnow, Otto, Friedrich. “Gespräche in Davos,” Errinerung an Martin Heidegger. 
Edited by Günter Neske. Pfullingen: Neske, 1977. 
 
Braiterman, Zachary. (God) After Auschwitz: Tradition and Change in Post-Holocaust 
Jewish Thought. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998.  
 
Braiterman, Zachary. “Hitler's Accomplice?: The Tragic Theology of Richard 
Rubenstein,” Modern Judaism,17 no. 1 (1997): 75-89.  
 
Brecht, Arnold. “Walter Rathenau and the German People,” The Journal of Politics 10, 
  
320 
no. 1 (1948): 20-48  
 
Brown, Robert, McAfee, Elie Wiesel: Messenger to All Humanity. Notre Dame: Notre 
Dame University Press, 1989.  
 
Buber, Martin. At The Turning. New York: Schocken Books, 1952.  
 
Buber, Martin, On Judaism. Edited by Nahum Glatzer. New York: Schocken Books, 
1967.  
 
Camus, Albert. A Happy Death. Translated by Richard Howard.  New York: Knopf, 
1972.  
 
Caputo, John, D., and Gianni Vattimo, After the Death of God. Edited by Jeffrey W. 
Robbins. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.  
 
Caputo, John D., and Michael J. Scanlon, eds., God, the Gift, and Postmodernism. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999. 
 
Caputo, John, D. ed. The Religious. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2002. 
 
Carroll, David. “Camus’s Algeria: Birthrights, Colonial Injustice, and the Fiction of a 
French-Algerian People” MLN, 112 no. 4, French Issue (Sept., 1997): 517-549. 
 
Cassirer, Ernst. Symbol, Myth and Culture:Essays and Lectures of Ernst Cassirer, 1935-
1945. Edited by Donald Phillip Verene. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981.  
 
Cassirer, Ernst.  The Myth of the State. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961.  
 
Chmiel, Mark.  Elie Wiesel and the Politics of Moral Leadership. Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 2001.   
 
 
Cohen, Hermann.  Ethics of Maimonides. Translated by Almut Sh. Bruckstein. Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 2003.  
 
Cohen, Richard, A. “Emmanuel Levinas: Philosopher and Jew,” Revista Portuguesa de 
Filosofia, T. 62, Fasc. 2/4 Entre Razão e Revelação: A'Lógica' da Dimensão Semíta na 
Filosofia/Between Reason and Revelation : The 'Logic' of the Semitic Dimension of 
Philosophy (April -Dec., 2006): 481-490.  
 
Coughlin, Charles.  A Series of Lectures on Social Justice. Chicago: The Radio League of 
the Little Flower, 1935.  
  
321 
 
Craig, Megan. Levinas and James: Toward a Pragmatic Phenomenology. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2010.  
 
Crick, Bernard. “Hannah Arendt and the Burden of Our Times,” The Political Quarterly 
30 (1997): 77-84. 
 
Critchley, Simon.  Ethics-Politics-Subjectivity: Essays on Derrida, Levinas and 
Contemporary French Thought. London: Verso, 1999.  
 
Critchley, Simon. The Ethics of Deconstruction. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University 
Press, 1992.  
 
Critchley, Simon and Robert Bernasconi, eds. The Cambridge Companion to Levinas. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.  
 
Critchley, Simon, Jacques Derria, Ernesto Laclau, and Richard Rorty. Deconstruction 
and Pragmatism. Edited by Chantal Mouffe. London: Routledge Press, 1996.  
 
Cunnigham, Anthony. The Heart of What Matters: The Role for Literature in Moral 
Philosophy. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001.  
 
Dawidowicz, Lucy. The War Against the Jews: 1933-1945. Claremont, FL: Paw Prints 
Publishing, 2008.  
 
Delsalle, Paul. La Franche-Comté au temps des archiducs Albert et Isabelle: 1598-1633, 
Collection Didactiques. Besançon, France: Presses Universitaires Franc-Comtoises, 
2008.  
 
Dilthey, Wilhelm. “Metahistorie statt Geschichte” Dilthey Jahrbuch (Band XI), pp. 203–
237. 
 
Dominick III, Raymond, H.  The Environmental Movement in Germany: Prophets and 
Pioneers, 1871-1971. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992.  
 
Eisen, Robert. The Book of Job in Medieval Jewish Philosophy. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2004.  
 
Ellis, Marc, H.  Encountering the Jewish Future With Wiesel, Buber, Heschel, Arendt and 
Levinas. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2011. 
 
Emde, Robert, N., Zeynep Birigen, Robert B. Clyman and David Oppenheim's “The 
moral self of infancy: Affective Core and procedural knowledge.” Developmental Review 
  
322 
11, no. 3 (September 1991): 251-270.  
 
Eskin, Michael. “On Literature and Ethics,” Poetics Today 25 (4), no. 573 (2004): 573- 
594.  
 
Ezra, Michael. “The Eichmann Polemics: Hannah Arendt and Her Critics,” Democratiya 
9 (Summer 2007): 141-165. 
 
Facing History and Ourselves. Accessed August 8, 2013.  
http://www.facing.org 
 
Fackenheim, Emil, L.  To Mend the World: Foundations of Post-Holocaust Jewish 
Thought. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994.  
 
Faierstein, Morris, M. “Abraham Joshua Heschel and the Holocaust.” Modern Judaism 
19 no. 3 (October, 1999): 255-275.  
 
Farías, Victor. Heidegger and Nazism.  Translated by Paul Burrell and Gabriel R. Ricci. 
Philadelphia:Temple University Press, 1989.  
 
Faye, Emmanuel.  Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy. Translated by 
Michael B. Smith. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009. 
 
Fein, Gene. “Twisted Justice: Father Coughlin and the Christian Front.” The Forum on 
Public Policy, Spring 2009 Edition. 
http://forumonpublicpolicy.com/spring09papers/socjusspr09.html 
 
Fine, Ellen. Legacy of Night: The Literary Universe of Elie Wiesel. New York:SUNY 
Press, 1982.  
 
Fox, Marvin, “Law and Ethics in Modern Jewish Philosophy: The Case of Moses 
Mendelssohn,” Proceedings for the American Academy for Jewish Research, 43 (1976):  
1-13.  
 
Franciosi, Robert and Brian Shaffer and Elie Wiesel, “An Interview With Elie Wiesel,” 
Contemporary Literature 28, no. 3 (Autumn, 1987).  
 
Franciosi, Robert, ed. Elie Wiesel: Conversations. Jackson: University Press of 
Mississippi, 2002.  
 
Frankl, Viktor. Man's Search For Meaning. Translated by Ilse Lasche. Boston: Beacon 
Press, 2006.  
 
  
323 
Franks, Paul, W., “Jewish Philosophy After Kant: The Legacy of Salomon Maimon.” 
Modern Jewish Philosophy  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (2007): 53-79.  
 
Friedlander, Saul.  Nazi Germany and the Jews, 1939-1945: The Years of Extermination. 
London: Harper Perennial, 2008.  
 
Frost, Gerhard. The Color of the Night: Reflections on Suffering and the Book of Job. 
Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1998.  
 
Gadamer, Hans. Hermeneutik im Rückblick Gesammelte Werke Vol. 10.  Tübingen: 
J.C.B. Mohr. Grosse, Jürgen, 1997-1998.  
 
Gibbs, Robert. Correlations in Rosenzweig and Levinas. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1992.  
 
Glickman, David, M. “The Particular and the Universal in Judaism,” Congregation 
Shearith Israel. Accessed August 8, 2013.  
http://shearith.org/about/rel_leaders/glickman/detail.asp?itemid=1865 
 
Goldie, Peter. The Mess Inside: Narrative, Emotion, and the Mind. Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2012.  
 
Gordon, Peter, E., Modern Jewish Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007).   
 
Gordon, Peter, E.  Continental Divide: Heidegger, Cassirer, Davos. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2010.  
 
Gordon, Peter, E. “Myth and Modernity: Cassirer's Critique of Heidegger,” New German 
Critique, no. 94 (2005): 127-168.  
 
Gordon, Peter, E.  Rosenzweig and Heidegger: Between Judaism and German 
Philosophy. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005.  
 
Green, Nancy, L. “The Dreyfus Affair and Ruling Class Cohesion.” Science and Society, 
43 no. 1 (1979): 29-50.  
 
Greenberg, Irving.  “Cloud of Fire, Pillar of Smoke: Judaism, Christianity and Modernity 
After the Holocaust.” In  Auschwitz: The Beginning of a New Era? Reflections on the 
Holocaust, Papers Given at the International Symposium on the Holocaust, Held at the 
Cathedral of St. John the Divine, New York City, edited by Eva Fleisher, 7-55. 
Philadelphia: KTAV Publishing, 1977.  
 
  
324 
Greenberg, Irving. The Jewish Way: Living the Holidays. New York: Touchstone, 1993.  
 
Gubar, Susan. Poetry After Auschwitz: Remembering What One Never Knew. 
Bloomnigton: Indiana University Press, 2003.  
 
Gürkin, Leyla, S. The Jews as a Chosen People: Tradition and Transformation. New 
York: Routledge Press, 2009.  
 
Gutierrez, Gustavo. On Job: God-Talk and the Suffering of the Innocent. Maryknoll, 
N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1987.  
 
Haas, Peter, J. Morality After Auschwitz: The Radical Challenge of the Nazi Ethic.  
Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988.  
 
Halevi, Judah. The Kusari: An Argument for the Faith of Israel. Translated by Hartwig 
Hirschfeld . New York: Schocken Books, 1964.  
 
Hammerschlag, Sarah, “ 'A splinter in the Flesh,': Levinas and the Resignification of 
Jewish Suffering, 1928-1947,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 no. 3 
(2012): 389-419.  
 
Hand, Seán, ed. Emmanuel Levinas. London: Routledge Press, 2009.  
 
Hand, Seán. The Levinas Reader. Cambridge, Basil Blackwell, 1989.    
 
Harpham, Geoffrey, Galt.  Language Alone: The Critical Fetish of Modernity. New York: 
Routledge, 2002. 
 
Hart, Alan.  Arafat: A Political Biography. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989.  
 
Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Translated by John Macquerrie and Edward 
Robinson. New York: Harper Perennial, 1962.  
 
Herrigel, Hermann. “Denken dieser Zeit: Fakultäten und Nationen treffen sich in Davos,” 
FZ, April 22, 1929, Abendblatt:Hochschulblatt, 4.   
 
Hess, Moses. The Revival of Israel: Rome and Jerusalem, the Last Nationalist Question. 
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1943.  
 
Hilberg, Raul. The Destruction of the European Jews. Teaneck NJ: Holmes and Meier, 
1985.  
 
Husserl, Edmund.  Logical Investigations. Edited by J.N. Findlay.  The International 
  
325 
Library of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method, 1970.  
 
Husserl, Edmund. The Paris Lectures. Edited by Peter Koestenbaum. Bassendean: The 
Hague, 1967.  
 
Irigaray, Luce.  An Ethics of Sexual Difference. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984. 
 
Irwin, Theodor. “Inside the 'Christian Front,'” Forum and Century 103, no. 3 (1940): 
102-108.  
 
Janicaud, Dominique, Jean-François Courtine, Jean-Louis Chrétien, Michel Henry, Jean-
Luc Marion and Paul Ricoeur. Phenomenology and the“Theological Turn”: The French 
Debate.  New York: Fordham University Press, 2000.  
 
Johnson, BR and JV Becker. “Natural Born Killers? : the development of the sexually 
sadistic serial killer,” Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, 25,  
no. 3 (1997): 335-348. 
 
Kant, Immanuel.  The Metaphysics of Morals.  Translated and edited by Mary Gregor.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.  
 
Kaplan, Mordecai. Judaism as a Civilization: Toward a Reconstruction of American-
Jewish Life. New York: MacMillian Company, 1934. 
 
Katz, Jacob.  From Prejudice to Destruction:Anti-Semitism, 1700-1933. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1982.  
 
Katz, Steven T.  Introduction to “Part III: European and American Responses During and 
Following the War,” Wrestling with God: Jewish Theological Responses During and 
After the Holocaust. Edited by Steven T. Katz, Shlomo Biderman and Gershon 
Greenberg. New York, 2007. PAGE  
 
Katz, Steven T. and J. Francis Gladstone, Post-Holocaust Dialogues: Critical Studies in 
Modern Jewish Thought. New York: New York University Press, 1985. 
 
Katz, Steven, T. and Alan Rosen, eds. Obliged by Memory: Literature, Religion, Ethics, 
A Collection of Essays in Honor of Elie Wiesel's Seventieth Birthday. Syracuse: Syracuse 
University Press, 2006. 
 
Katz, Steven, T.  The Holocaust in Historical Context: The Holocaust and Mass Death 
Before the Modern Age, Volume 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.  
 
Katz, Steven T. The Holocaust in Historical Context: The Holocaust and Mass Death 
  
326 
Before the Modern Age, Volume 3. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.  
 
Katz, Steven T. ed. The Impact of the Holocaust on Jewish Theology. New York: New 
York University Press, 2005. 
 
Katz, Steven T.  “The Issue of Confirmation and Disconfirmation in Jewish Thought 
After the Shoah,” The Impact of the Holocaust on Jewish Theology. 13-60. New York, 
NYU Press, 2007.  
 
Katz, Steven T., Shlomo Biderman, and Gershon Greenberg, eds. Wrestling With God: 
Jewish Theological Responses During and After the Holocaust. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007.  
 
Knopp, Josephine. “Wiesel and the Absurd.” Contemporary Literature, 15 no. 2 (Spring, 
1974): 212- 220.  
 
Kocka, Jürgen, “German History Before Hitler: The Debate About the German 
Sonderweg.” Journal of Contemporary History 23, no. 1 (January, 1988): 3-16.  
 
 
Koonz, Claudia. The Nazi Conscience. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003. 
 
Krois, John, Micahel, “Cassirer's Unpublished Critique of Heidegger.” Philosophy and Rhetoric 16, no. 3 (1983): 147-159.  
 
Kushner, Harold. When Bad Things Happen to Good People. New York, Anchor 
Publishing, 1981.  
 
Lagarde, Paul De,  Deutsche Schriften. Ulan Press, 2012.  
 
Langer, Lawrence, L. Versions of Survival: The Holocaust and the Human Spirit.  
Albany: State University of New York, 1982.  
 
LaFollette, Hugh, ed., Ethics in Practice: An Anthology. Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Publishers, 1997.  
 
Lang, Berel. “Evil, Suffering and the Holocaust,” The Cambridge Companion to Modern 
Jewish Philosophy. Edited by Michael L. Morgan and Peter Eli Gordon.  Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press,  2007.  
 
Leaman, Oliver. Evil and Suffering in Jewish Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995.  
 
Levinas, Emmanuel. Beyond the Verse: Talmudic Readings and Lectures. Translated by 
  
327 
Gary D. Mole. London: Continuum, 1994. 
 
Levinas, Emmanuel. Carnets de Captivité: oeuvres 1. Paris: Bernard Grasset/IMEC, 
2009. 
 
Levinas, Emmanuel. “Demanding Judaism.” Beyond the Verse: Talmudic Readings and 
Lectures, Gary D. Mole, trans. PAGES. London: Continuum, 2007.  
 
Levinas, Emmanuel. En découvrant l'existence avec Husserl et Heidegger. Reprinted 
with new essays.  Paris: Librarie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1982.  
 
Levinas, Emmanuel. Ethics and Infinity:Conversations with Philippe Nemo. Translated 
by Richard A. Cohen.  Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1985.  
 
Levinas, Emmanuel.  In the Time of the Nations. Translated by Michael B. Smith. 
London: Continuum, 1994.  
 
Levinas, Emmanuel. “On Jewish Philosophy.” In the Time of the Nations. Translated by 
Michael B. Smith, PAGE. London: Continuum, 2007.  
 
Levinas, Emmanuel. “Revelation in the Jewish Tradition.” Beyond the Verse. Translated 
by Gary D. Mole. London: Continuum, 2007. PAGES   
 
Levinas, Emmanuel. The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology. Translated by 
Andreé Orianne. Evanston, IL: Northwest University Press, 1973. 
 
Levinas, Emmanuel.  Otherwise Than Being, or Beyond Essence. Translated by Alphonso 
Lingis. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1998. 
 
Levinas, Emmanuel. “Reflections of the Philosophy of Hitlerism,” Translated by Seán 
Hand. Critical Inquiry 17, no 1 (1990): 62-71.  
 
Levinas, Emmanuel.  Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority. Translated by 
Alphonso Lingis. Pittsburgh: Duquesne Press, 1969.  
 
Levinas, Emmanuel and Catherine Chalier. Pensur Aujourd'hui: Emmanuel Levinas. 
Film. Directed by Nat Lilienstein. 1991. Paris: Arte, le Productions d l'espoir, Une 2 plus. 
Television documentary.  
 
Levinson, Jon, D. “Chosenness and its Enemies.” Commentary December 2008. 
Accessed on August 8, 2013.  
http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/chosenness-and-its-enemies/ 
 
  
328 
Levy, Herbert. “About Us,” Congregation Da'at Elohim. Accessed on August 8, 2013. 
http://www.tuj.org/about-us/ 
 
Lockwood, Randall. “Animal Cruelty and Violence Against Humans: Making the 
Connection,” 8 Animal L. 81 (1999).  
 
Lowith, Karl. “M. Heidegger and F. Rosenzweig or Temporality and Eternity.” 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 3, no. 1 (Sept., 1942): 53-77.  
 
Lundgren, Svante. Particularism and Universalism in Modern Jewish Thought. 
Binghamton: Global Publications, State University of New York, 2001.  
 
MacLeish, Archibald.  J.B. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958.  
 
Maier, Charles, S. The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust and German National 
Identity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998. 
 
Maimonides, Moses. The Guide of the Perplexed. Translated by Shlomo Pines. Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1974.  
 
Mendelsohn-Moaz, Adia. “Ethics and Literature: An Introduction,” Philosophia 35 
(2007): 111-116.  
 
Mitchell, Stephen. The Book of Job. New York: Harper Perennial, 1979.  
 
Mittelman, Alan. ““The Jew in Christian Culture” by Hermann Cohen: An Introduction 
and Translation,” Modern Judaism 23 no 1 (2003): 51-73.  
 
Moore, R. I. The Formation of a Persecuting Society: Power and Deviance in Western 
Europe, 950-1250. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 1987. 
 
Morgan, Michael, L. and Peter Eli Gordon, eds. The Cambridge Companion to Modern 
Jewish Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
 
Musmanno, Michael, A. “Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Critique,” Chicago Jewish Forum 
21 no. 4 (Summer, 1963): 282-285.  
 
Mussolini, Benito. “Relativismo e Fascismo,” Opera omni 17. Edited by Edoardo Susmel 
and Duilio Susmel. Firenze: La Fenice, 1951-1964. 
 
Mussolini, Benito and Giovanni Gentile, Fascism Doctrine and Institutions (Rome: 
Ardita Publishers, 1935), 7-42. Accessed from 
http://www.upf.edu/materials/fhuma/nacionalismes/nacio/docs/muss-doctrine.pdf.  
  
329 
 
Newman, Michael. 2000. “Sensibility, Trauma and the Trace: Levinas from 
Phenomenology to the Immemorial.” In The Face of the Other and the Trace of God: 
Essays on the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, edited by Jeffery Bloechl, 90-129. New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2000. 90-129. 
 
Novak, David. “Jewish Theology,” Modern Judaism, 10, no. 1 (1990): 311-323.  
 
Orton, William. “Understanding the Nazis,” The North American Review, 239, no 3 
(1935): 226-233.   
 
Ott, Hugo.  Martin Heidegger. Translated by Alan Blunden. Seattle: Basic Books, 1993.  
 
Peck, Abraham, J. ed. Jews and Christians After the Holocaust. Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1982. 
 
Perpich,Diane. The Ethics of Emmanuel Levinas. Edited by Mieke Bal and Hent de Vries. 
Standford: Stanford University Press, 2008. 
 
Petropoulos Jonathan and John R. Roth, eds., Gray Zones: Ambiguity and Compromise in 
the Holocaust and it's Aftermath. New York: Berghahn Books, 2005.  
 
Pietikainen, Petteri, “The Volk and its Unconscious: Jung, Hauer and the ‘German 
Revolution.’”  Journal of Contemporary History. 35, no. 4 (2000): 523-539.  
 
Poirié, François. Emmanuel Lévinas: Qui êtesvous? Lyon: La Manufacture, 1987.   
 
Rabinovich, Anson. “Eichmann in New York: The New York Intellectuals and the 
Hannah Arendt Controversy,” October 108 no.1 (2004): 97-111.   
 
Rathenau,Walther.  Kritik der dreifachen Revolution. Buenos Aires: Fischer Press, 1919.  
 
Rathenau, Walther. The New Society. London: Williams and Norgate, 1921.  
 
Redles, David. Hitler's Millennial Reich: Apocalyptic Belief and the Search for Salvation. 
New York: New York University Press, 2005.  
 
Rich, Adrienne. “The Burning of Paper Instead of Children.” The Fact of a Doorframe 
New York: WW Norton, 1985. 
  
Rittner, Carol, R.S.M., ed. Elie Wiesel: Between Memory and Hope. New York: New 
York University Press, 1990.  
 
  
330 
Rorty, Richard.  An Ethics for Today: Finding Common Ground Between Philosophy and 
Religion. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008.  
 
Rorty, Richard. Philosophy and Social Hope. London: Penguin Books, 1999.  
 
Rosenbaum, Alan, S. Is the Holocaust Unique? Perspectives on Comparative Genocide.   
Boulder: Westview Press, 2001.  
 
Rosenbaum, Irving, J.  Holocaust and Halakhah. New York: KTAV Press, 1976.  
 
Roth, John, K. and Michael Berenbaum, eds., Holocaust: Religious and Philosophical 
Implications. St. Paul: Paragon House, 1989. 
 
Rubenstein, Betty, Rogers and Michael Berenbaum, eds. What Kind of God? Essays in 
Honor of Richard L. Rubenstein, Studies in the Shoah, Volume XI. New York: University 
Press of America, 1995.  
 
Rubenstein, Richard.  After Auschwitz: Radical Theology and Contemporary Judaism. 
Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1966. 
 
Rubenstein, Richard. The Age of Triage: Fear and Hope in an Overcrowded World. 
Boston: Beacon Press, 1983.  
 
Rubenstein, Richard. The Cunning of History: The Holocaust and the American Future. 
New York: Peter Smith Publisher, 1979.  
 
Rubenstein, Richard. “The Philosopher and the Jews: The Case of Martin Heidegger,” 
Modern Judaism, 9, no. 2 (1989): 179-196.  
 
Rutkoff, Peter, M. “The Ligue des Patriotes: The Nature of the Radical Right and the 
Dreyfuss Affair,” French Historical Studies, 8 no. 4 (1974), 585-603.  
 
el-Sadat, Anwar.  In Search of Identity: An Autobiography. London: Harpercollins, 1978.  
 
Sartre, Jean-Paul. What is Literature? And Other Essays.  Translated by Bernard 
Frechtman. New York: Philosophical Library, 1949.    
 
Saunder, Joseph, G. “Enacting and Enforcing Felony Animal Cruelty Laws to Prevent 
Violence Against Humans.” 6 Animal L. 1  (2001).  
 
Scholem, Gershom. “Eichmann in Jerusalem,” Encounter 22 no. 1(January 1964):51-52.  
 
Scholem, Gershom. Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism. New York: Schocken Books. 
  
331 
1941. 
 
Schweid, Eliezer. “Is There a Religious Meaning to the Idea of a Chosen People after the 
Shoah?” The Impact of the Holocaust in Jewish Theology. Edited by Steven T. Katz. 
(New York: New York University Press, 2005) PAGE  
 
Seidman, Naomi, “Elie Wiesel and the Scandal of Jewish Rage,” Jewish Social Studies 3 
no. 1 (Autumn, 1996): 1-19.  
 
Sheehan, Thomas. “Heidegger and the Nazis.” New York Review. (June 16, 1988):38-47.  
 
Shklar, Judith, N.  “Hannah Arendt as Pariah,” Partisan Review 50:1 (1983): 64-77.  
 
Simmons, J. Aaron. God and the Other: Ethics and Politics After the Theological Turn. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011.  
 
Slade, Francis. “A Conversation Between Ernst Cassirer and Martin Heidegger,” The 
Existential Tradition: Selected Writings. Edited by Nino Langiulli. New York: 
Doubleday, 1971.  
 
Sorel, Georges.  Reflections on Violence. Translated by T. E. Hulme. New York: Dover 
Books, 1961.  
 
Stern, Fritz. The Politics of Cultural Despair: A Study in the Rise of the Germanic 
Ideology.  Berkley: University of California Press, 1961.  
 
Strauss, Leo. “An Introduction to Heideggerian Existentialism,” The Rebirth of Political 
Rationalism: An Introduction to the Thought of Leo Strauss.  Edited by Thomas L. 
Pangle. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1989.  
 
Strauss, Leo. What is Political Philosophy? And Other Studies. Glencoe, IL: McGraw-
Hill Publishing, 1959.  
 
Taylor, Daniel. “The Ethical Implications of Storytelling: Giving Ear to the Literature of 
the Oppressed.” Mars Hill Review, 3 no 3 (1995):58-70.  
 
Twentieth Century Atlas: Death Tolls. “Second World War (1935-45):66,000,000.” 
necrometrics.org. (Accessed August 9, 2013). 
http://necrometrics.com/20c5m.htm#Second  
 
United States Holocaust Museum. “German American Bund,” Holocaust Encyclopedia. 
Accessed on January 29, 2012.   
http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005684.  
  
332 
 
Visker, Rudi. “The Core of My Opposition to Levinas: A Clarification for Richard 
Rorty.” Ethical Perspectives: The Journal of the European Ethics Network 3, no. 4 
(October, 2000):154-70 
 
Waite, Geoffrey. “On Esotericism: Heidegger and/or Cassirer at Davos,” Political 
Theory, 26, no. 5 (1998): 603-651.  
 
Wechsler, James. “The Coughlin Terror,” The Nation, 2, no. 94  (July 22, 1939): 92-96.  
 
Wein, Berel. “The End of the Beginning.” Jewish History.org. Accessed August 8, 2013.  
http://www.jewishhistory.org/the-end-of-the-beginning/ 
 
Wiesel, Elie.  All Rivers Run Into the Sea. New York: Schocken Books, 1996. 
 
Wiesel, Elie.  And the Sea is Never Full.  New York: Schocken Books, 2000.  
 
Wiesel, Elie. “For Jerusalem.” Politico.org. Accessed August 8, 2013.  
http://www.politico.com/static/PPM41_elie_wiesel_ad.html 
 
 
Wiesel, Elie.  Four Hasidic Masters and Their Struggle Against Melancholy. Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1978.  
 
Wiesel, Elie. Legends of Our Time. Translated by Marion Wiesel. New York: Random 
House, 2011.  
 
Wiesel, Elie.  Souls on Fire: Portraits and Legends of Hasidic Masters. Translated by 
Marion Wiesel. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972.  
 
Wiesel, Elie. Somewhere a Master: Further Hasidic Portraits and Legends. Translated 
by Marion Wiesel.  New York: Summit Books, 1982.  
 
Wiesel, Elie. “The America I Love.” OrthodoxyToday.org. Posted October 14, 2004. 
http://www.orthodoxytoday.org/articles4/WeiselIraq.php 
 
Wiesel, Elie, “The Nobel Lecture: Hope, Despair, and Memory.” The Nobel Peace Prize 
1986. New York: Summit Books and Boston University, 1986.  
 
Wiesel, Elie. The Trial of God. Translated by Marion Wiesel. New York: Schocken 
Books, 1979. 
 
Wiesel, Elie, “Without Conscience,” New England Journal of Medicine 352 no. 15 (April 
  
333 
14, 2005): 1511-1513.  
 
Wolf, Arnold, Jacob. “The Revisionism of Irving Greenberg.” Sh'ma, 13 no 254 (May 13 
1983): 104-106.  
 
Wright, Jeremy and Christopher Hensley, “From Animal Cruelty to Serial Murder: 
Applying the Graduation Hypothesis.” International Journal of Offender Therapy and 
Comparative Criminology 47 no. 1(2003):71-88.  
 
Young, Jon, M. “Ethics, Theology and Surplus Populations,” What Kind of God? Essays 
in Honor of Richard L. Rubenstein. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 
1995. PAGES 
 
Young-Bruehl, Elizabeth. Hannah Arendt:For Love of the World. Yale University Press, 
1982.  
 
Zank, Michael. ““Between Rivers” or Zwischen den Stühlen? The End of Modern Jewish 
Philosophy.” Unpublished essay, Boston University.   
 
Zank, Michael. The Idea of Atonement in the Philosophy of Hermann Cohen. Atlanta, 
Scholars Press, 2000.   
 
Zank, Michael. “Zwischen den Stühlen? On the Taxonomic Anxieties of Modern Jewish 
Philosophy,” European Journal for Jewish Studies, 1 no. 1 (2007): 105-134.  
 
Zimmerman, Michael. Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1990.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 334 
Curriculum Vitae 
 335 
 336 
  
337 
